Introduction

1. In Principles of Ethics I presented the theory of moral law and obligation.(1) But the theory has to be applied, and we must be very careful not to err in its application. Consequently, we have to know intimately the subject, the human being, to which the theory is applied. Hence the necessity for prefacing applied morality and the science of applying the supreme law (2) with an anthropology which provides us with knowledge of human nature relative to morality. My intention in writing this book is to propose such an anthropology as an aid to moral science.

2. Obviously, it must not be thought that everything can be said about the human being in this study, even in a general sense. `This little world', as the ancient writers called it, is not so quickly dismissed. Indeed, even the little we know about ourselves is sufficient to form not one but many sciences. There are innumerable disciplines which have human beings as their object. Considered from the point of view of bodily health, the human being is the object of medical science; considered as founder and member of civil society, the human being is the object of political sciences. Psychology concerns the human soul and its powers; pedagogy, eudaimonology, ethics and many other studies consider human beings relative to their needs, inclinations, means of progress, their ceaselessly changing acts and states, the fruits of their labour, the laws to which they are subject, and the relationships that bind them to all beings, to all points of the universe, and even to what is infinite. And while anthropology in general is limited to considering the nature of this being that is so fascinated by itself, the present work limits the study still further. In moral anthropology, as we call it, we consider the human being solely from the moral point of view.

3. We note, however, that moral perfection is the unique point to which all human energy and every human faculty is naturally directed. Morality is the summit from which to view the human being; it is the panorama which in some sense embraces all partial views, and subjects them to itself. Everything concerning human beings touches upon morality, which extends to every relationship, watches over everything, and subjects everything to its judgment, by applying to everything an order, measure and character. Because of this extent of moral anthropology I have obviously not exhausted the argument in this book, but I will have done enough if I have succeeded in outlining its borders and indicating simply the principal paths to follow in this vast subject.(3)

4. Another preliminary reflection is called for. When we ask about the moral state of humanity we are dealing with a matter of fact; we are observing human beings and describing them as they are. So too when we ask about the necessary aids by which human beings can render themselves good. This further question of moral anthropology deals with a complex, real question, not with something purely abstract. We cannot omit anything necessary for the complete development of human good, and consequently cannot restrict ourselves solely to what is purely rational and ignore the great historical, moral facts of the human race.

Clearly, therefore, moral anthropology, considered in its entirety, cannot be classified among those sciences which limit themselves to a quality abstracted from a total complex, as pure mathematics does when it reasons about quantity as conceived solely in the mind by virtue of abstraction, although such quantity does not exist in reality. All abstract sciences are commendable in that they prepare us, although remotely, for practical conclusions. But as long as they are treated in isolation they have no effective use; in order to insert these sciences into the order of realities, all the omitted qualities of the case must be included. Thus, a surveyor wishing to apply his theories either to building a bridge, to moving a large mass, or pumping water, must first identify and assemble all the data about the real bodies on which he intends to work. These facts are neglected in general, abstract theory. In my opinion, this explains why abstract sciences are studied by so few: they do not directly arouse the interest and universal study of human beings. In the last analysis, human beings seek what is of real, practical use, and only when they have obtained it do they feel they have complete, effective knowledge.

A public administrator, for example, urgently required to make a piece of land productive or to establish some industry or trade, cannot be satisfied with a general theory of economy. He has to apply the economic rules, and obtain the most detailed information about the local climate, soil, population, customs, prejudices, and level of skills available, that is, he needs practical information. Nature is not aroused to action by abstract ideas; it must be dealt with effectively and its forces acted upon. This cannot be done unless positive knowledge with its applications and modifications is added to the general theories. Thus, sciences like moral anthropology, that have a complex object, and aim at complete, finite knowledge, cannot and must not limit themselves solely to details obtained by pure speculation. They must make use of every opportunity to enrich themselves through reason or history.

It would be strange, or even ridiculous, if someone, intending to produce a certain effect, used method as a pretext for rejecting the means necessary for the effect. Yet many writers fall into this curious error. They claim that the most important things concerning human beings, namely, how to be virtuous and happy, must be deduced a priori by reason. To do this, they use an unreal rationalism which never descends to the level of human needs. They intend to teach us how to become happy and good, but they also claim to speak only according to the natural light of reason, and to prescind entirely from the fact of divine revelation and the consequent positive relationships that the human being has with God. They do not deny revelation itself; they simply think that good philosophical method is offended by mentioning it. Thus, instead of offering suitable nourishment to the hungry human race, they insist upon a solemn disputation about the plate on which the food is served. They deny human beings sustenance simply because the dish is silver rather than the porcelain or other substance they would prefer. Consequently, these teachers of virtue and happiness never go further than halfway. Because an isolated, abstract part of an art is insufficient to obtain the end proposed by the art itself, they never succeed in teaching the human race to obtain what it longs for, or what they promise, namely, a virtuous and happy life.

A similar situation would be that of a person who gives orders to a commander attacking a fort, and instructs him in the art of assault simply by quoting a few general principles about lines of defence, earthworks, mines and so on, making him believe that attention to details through inspection of the real parts of the fortress and its defences is useless. These details, it is claimed, are foreign to the rigorous method followed by science. The commander might say: `Your method is good, but do not claim that it alone will overrun this fortress; it will overrun only the fortress you have created in your mind. I am faced with the enemy; I have to manoeuvre on the terrain you can see and against a real fortified stronghold. To your fine theories you must add very accurate details about the construction of the fortress, and about the people and artillery defending it. In applying your rules to my case, you must pay careful attention to all the circumstances which you are neglecting because you are not in command. You conquer fortresses in the classroom; you fight only with words.'

5. The commander's position is that of every human being relative to happiness and goodness. All human beings have a supreme need to attain real satisfaction, and an absolute duty to be good. It is the real, concrete human being, not some philosophical abstraction, who must be good and happy. We must not, therefore, be surprised to see that the only discipline which attracts, and always has attracted, the attention of the human race, is full knowledge of the means by which human nature obtains its moral end effectively.

The human race differs greatly from the small section of mortals who call themselves learned. People such as these, accustomed to a solitary life of study, deceive themselves when they declare that the only thing they consider important are certain formulas of abstract knowledge and method they think they possess. Meanwhile, because the light, unnourishing fare of abstractions does not satisfy, the human race can look only to religion, especially positive religion, for what is real and complete. For the human race, wisdom today as in the past is only that knowledge which teaches (and shows it can teach) the whole truth and has never been taught apart from religion.

6. The great thinkers of the past agreed with this feeling proper to the human race. They consistently used the word wisdom for the body of teachings which responded most eminently to the highest needs and purposes of humanity. These teachings included traditions and theories, historical facts and rational principles, beliefs and proofs, divine revelations and human reasons. Cicero says: `Philosophy is the science of human and divine things.'(4) Wisdom, of which philosophy is merely the love and study, is defined by Plato as `a perfect union of justice and holiness with prudence, by which humans become like God'.(5) Aristotle states that the philosopher's occupation is `to speculate about everything, because no one will consider what the philosopher does not consider'.(6) Such was the elevated thought, the UNITY and TOTALITY with which the early thinkers considered human cognitions. They thought and wrote for people as people, and were not drawn from the real needs of human nature to chase after curious, unrelated speculations.

7. In a word, the truly wise did not teach for the sake of teaching, nor restrict themselves to the limits of arbitrary method and thus forget the only true, effective purpose of knowledge.

However, while I defend the need for a complete, effective knowledge, and praise the early thinkers for having constantly kept such a need before their eyes, I do not deny the great merit of modern writers who have sought to introduce distinction - the mother of light - into different parts of knowledge. I criticise only the action of those who, not content to distinguish, divide up the different parts of human knowledge, even the most insignificant, and sift them like chaff. I also criticise the action of those who, after dividing knowledge into so many parts, choose the parts which suit their taste, condemning the remainder as useless because unsuited to their palate, and opposing its use. By such intolerable harshness and boldness, they dismember human genius and set themselves up as distributors and judges of its dead remains! Analysis, distinction and light should continue but exclusion be avoided; arbitrary methods should be rejected, for they suppress the more important part of knowledge and retard rather than advance civilisation.

We must work to unite the advantages of both modern and older methods, retaining the methodical distinctions which clarify cognitions so well, without losing the bonds which draw them together into a beautiful, wonderfully ordered whole. We must not neglect the abstract part of knowledge which is the warp, nor the concrete part which is, as it were, the weft and draws a teaching to its final act where alone it is appropriate for helping us and bringing us the real good we need [App., no. 1]. To accomplish all this, I see no better way than that which I have always endeavoured to follow in philosophical matters, namely, to place the pure, abstract part of knowledge first, followed by the concrete, particular part.

8. I intend, therefore, to follow the same procedure in this moral anthropology, which requires me to consider the human being as author and subject of moral actions and of the good and evil resulting from those actions. I have to discuss the present moral conditions of human nature and the variety of human, moral states; I have to speak about the means and impulses by which human nature passes from one state to another. It is clear, therefore, that I must deduce the necessary, relevant points of the argument from both rational and historical sources, and that my work divides naturally into two parts which, although different, cannot be separated, just as the limbs of a human being differ from one another without being separated from the body.

Human, moral states and means result partly from human nature itself and partly from positive relationships with the Creator. The first are known by observation of the internal and external facts of human nature, which to some extent can be carried out with our natural light. The second must necessarily be obtained from what tradition teaches. Hence, in any anthropology there must be a rational part and a positive part in conformity with the two orders to which human beings belong. Nature is one of these orders; and the moral conditions deriving from it form the first part of the book. But because, according to the Christian system, human beings belong also to a supernatural order, of grace, the moral conditions which flow to us from this higher order are the subject of the second part.

9. This book contains only the first of the two parts; the second and principal part will be deferred to a more suitable time. This first part, an aid to natural ethics, is the foundation for the part which will follow (God willing). It deals with the imputation of human actions, a subject which causes much difficulty relative to the theory of human freedom and of the connection between the different parts of the human being, especially the connection between the physical part and the wonderful faculty of free action with which the Creator has endowed us.

10. However, before beginning, I must state the two postulates required not only by our subject but generally by any subject whatsoever, for they contain the conditions that alone make discussion possible.

Notes

(1) The obligating force is the formal part of laws. I have shown that the first law of all obliges in itself and is itself the obligating force. It is therefore the form of all other laws. Cf. Storia comparativa e critica de' sistemi intorno al principio della morale.

(2) I distinguish applied morality from the science of the application. The latter is `the ordered complex of the rules according to which the supreme law (the moral principle) must be applied'. The former (applied morality) is the result of the application, and is a body of particular duties and responsibilities. Thus the science which teaches the way to apply the moral principle is a kind of moral logic. Cf. the Preface to the works on morality [PE].

(3) In spite of this, some may find we have devoted too much time to a particular topic, for instance to the animality of the human being. This is true, but perhaps I can be excused if the reader reflects that the section could have been shortened if a psychology had been written to which I could have referred. As long as the different sciences are not arranged in order, I often have to speak at length about something not strictly belonging to the subject, although I should be able to presuppose such matter, and refer to it. The same can be said about the two postulates with which I begin this Anthropology; they are equally necessary for all philosophical sciences, and ought to be discussed in the part of logic which deals with method. But until the reader can be referred to an already existent logic, we have to use and justify those postulates. We cannot leave the reader to invent or imagine what we are not saying.

(4) De Off., bk. 2, 2 [5].

(5) Cf. Theaetetus.

(6) Metaph., bk. 4, c. 2.