Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science

Foreword

The aim of this foreword is to indicate the place of Rosmini's Anthropology in his moral system, to describe schematically the work itself, and to indicate its present importance and usefulness.

Rosmini in his New Essay on the Origin of Ideas(1) had elaborated a theory of knowledge dependent upon the innate light of being as a foundation of his philosophical work. This light, an essential constitutive of human intelligence, is not a subjective ingredient of knowledge, but an objective element of thought characterised by qualities superior to the finite being, to whom it is conceded. It illuminates subjective human feeling, which it makes intellectually perceivable.

On this basis, Rosmini founded his theory of moral science which he developed in four works dealing respectively with the principles of ethics, the philosophical history of the development of systems of morality, the human being as subject of morality, and the application of the principles to the actions of this subject.

In Principles of Ethics(2) Rosmini examines the nature of good, of natural law, intrinsic evil, obligation, and of the will as an essential component of every moral act. In his Storia comparativa e critica dei sistemi morali(3) he shows clearly the sources on which he had drawn in propounding his own teaching. This he evaluates and clarifies in the light of the deficiencies or excesses inherent to moral systems prior to his time. Finally, he draws the ultimate conclusions of moral science in Conscience(4) by showing how the principles of ethics are to be applied reflectively by individuals to their own actions.

Still lacking, however, is any systematic examination of the nature of the subjects of morality, that is, human beings who, possessed of the light of intelligence and quickened by feeling, have to govern reason and instinct with their will according to the dictates of the moral law impressed upon their nature. This gap is filled by Rosmini's Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science: `In Principles of Ethics I presented the theory of moral law and obligation. But the theory has to be applied, and we must be careful not to err in its application . . . we have to know intimately the subject . . . to which the theory is applied. Hence the necessity for . . . an anthropology which provides us with knowledge of human nature relative to morality'( [1] ).

This anthropology is concerned with the whole human being in its essence and in all the activities which have their root in that essence, and solely in that essence (Rosmini is not concerned here with human beings as subjects of any action of God's grace which would raise them to a supernatural level). He simply observes what nature has to offer, and reflects upon that. From the beginning, his observations enable him to define the human being clearly, if not briefly, in a way that foreshadows the complete account of human nature that he intends to give in developing his study.

The human being is `an animal subject endowed with the intuition of indeterminate, ideal being and with the perception of its own corporeal, fundamental feeling, and operating in accordance with animality and intelligence' ( [23] ). On the basis of this definition Rosmini is able to order his work by examining in turn the constitu-tive elements of human nature — the corporeal term, the feeling principle, the fundamental corporeal feeling, instinct, intelligence, ideal being, will, reason — and of person, the high point of human existence. He does this under three main headings: animality, spiritu-ality and the human subject.

In dealing with the animal part of the human being, Rosmini first distinguishes between the passive and active faculties that lie at the basis of feeling and instinct before showing how feeling and instinct act together within animality to provide the animal subject with all that it needs for preservation and generation. Of particular importance here is Rosmini's insistence that the corporeal term cannot be understood without reference to an immaterial principle, the anima (soul), and his conviction that instinct, the reaction of this principle, cannot be discussed in material terms alone. The well-being of the animal will depend on the harmony or discord produced in feeling by the differing capacities of the life instinct and the sensuous instinct. Illness, for example, will be the result of the disharmony produced by the prevalence of the sensuous instinct over the life instinct.

It is important to note that Rosmini's conclusions in this section of his work are not the result of speculation. They depend upon his own and others' observation, and the use of principles necessary to provide an explanation of these observations. He also makes use of scientific discoveries in so far as they provide an additional source of observation. Consequently, his conclusions, especially those concerned with the nature of feeling and of the body, with the activity of instinct and the fundamental causes of animal well-being, are not only valid today but would, if rightly used, throw a good deal of light on matters, such as the nature of digestion and of death, that remain a mystery .

But the human being is not only an animal. Careful examination and observation (a pre-requisite for Rosmini in all his work) reveal the existence of something more in human beings than in mere animals. Intellect and reason on the one hand, and will and freedom on the other, are respectively the active and passive faculties that constitute the human spirit. Intellect as the power that intuits ideal being is a presupposition of reason which applies the idea of being to feelings, and provides human beings with the functions of abstraction and reflection.

The active powers of will and freedom receive very extensive treatment, as we would expect in an anthropology intended as an aid to moral science. The human act, the willed act, the moral act, the act of choice, the free act and the intellective act are all analysed at length with particular attention being paid to freedom.

The liberty possessed by us as developed human beings is exercised when we are placed in the position of having to choose between an objective good (which is good in itself, and known as such intellectually) and a subjective good (that by which the subject is attracted irrespective of the place in the order of being of that subjective good). As a result of the choice we make, we find ourselves exercising morally or immorally the supreme human activity that enhances or degrades us as persons. This activity differs in moral quality from that produced by other individual faculties in the human being each of which if permitted acts unilaterally and of its own accord.

The final section of the work is devoted to a synthetic view of the human subject. Making use of his detailed analysis of the individual elements constituting the human subject, Rosmini is able finally to offer a definition of person in general and of the human person in particular. Every person is `an intellective subject in so far as it contains a supreme active principle', that is, an independent and incommunicable principle. Perhaps the most important words of this definition are `in so far as'. They indicate the essential element of person, the substantial relationship which, as substantial, provides the intelligent subject with that supreme act constituting the subject as independent and incommunicable. `"Person" cannot mean simply either a substance or a relationship. It must mean a substantial relationship, that is, a relationship found in the intrinsic order of being of a substance' ( [833] , ftn. 395). When these constitutive, ontological elements of person are found in the human subject, we have arrived at the concept of human person.

The supreme, active principle in the human subject is the will, first as intellectually instinctive reaction in the undeveloped being, and then as free reaction in the growing person. The ontological relationship between this supreme activity and the individual powers of human nature is such that nature, when freely activated, is to be subject to the objective power and dominion of the will. When this is not the case, and the will allows itself to be dominated simply by the acts of nature, immorality rules in the human person.

It is clear that for Rosmini `person', as the fount of moral, human action, is the foundation of all right in human relationships because its very own worth is drawn from that which ultimately forms the human, intellective subject. `This moral excellence and superiority by right, which elevates the human person above the whole of nature, must have the same source as all morality and right. This source is the light of reason, the source of right and of moral good and evil' ([848]).

Thus we return to the starting point: the light of reason, the idea of being, superior to human nature yet forming the inmost core of that nature, and now seen to be the spark of divinity shared by the human spirit. It is this light which makes persons ends, not means, and provides the foundation for immensely important conclusions relative to daily existence.

But before we deal with present-day matters touching directly upon the human person as such, it will be necessary to indicate underlying problems which, although greatly neglected today, are treated by Rosmini as essential prerequisites to serious meditation upon the sacred reality of person. Briefly we may say that Rosmini in his Anthropology stimulates thought at several different levels of perennial interest and at points of immediate, vital importance for us today.

First, he offers a thorough examination of the problem of materialism, and concludes that body can neither be understood without soul, nor confused with soul. His conclusion is not, however, rooted in some a priori necessity demanding the distinct existence of body and soul. Rather, he takes his stand on observation and then goes on to deduce reflectively the essential elements required to make the facts of observation intelligible.

The same method, which is constant throughout the work, enables him to deal at length, and very satisfactorily, with the difference between what he calls the subjective and extrasubjective elements in feeling. All feeling springing from the union between one's own body and soul is subjective; feeling dependent upon the perception of bodies other than one's own is extrasubjective. This very important distinction opens the way to further clarifications about the nature of body and soul within the animal sphere.

Second, Rosmini's work on instinct provides ground for dealing with the problem of apparent intelligence in animals. In particular, he examines the nature of the unity of feeling and instinct in the animal. This part of his work, taken in conjunction with the elaboration of the distinction between subjective and extrasubjective within the ambit of feeling, is the most original and helpful in the section of the book on animality. And although Rosmini makes extensive use of the scientific knowledge of his own time, it will easily be seen that such knowledge provides what we may call an atmosphere consonant with his conclusions rather than substantiation of them. In other words, his philosophical results are clarified, not proved by the scientific knowledge available in the first half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, it is evident that the philosophical conclusions themselves are often indications for the path to be taken in the progress of scientific knowledge. If there is indeed an immaterial element effective in the constitution of the animal, it is impossible for medicine to restrict research into the elimination of pain and illness to the chemical composition of the body, just as work on psychological problems would be deficient if it took no account of chemistry and related sciences in tackling these problems.

Third, in the section of the Anthropology on spirituality Rosmini lays the foundations for a sure grasp of the essential difference and comprehensive unity between animal soul and intelligent, willing spirit. In this part of the work, he is not dealing with spirituality in any religious sense, but simply with the spirit, that part of human beings which distinguishes them from what is animal. Here finally, at the apex of human existence, he deals with will and freedom, and their relationship with morality, the aim of the entire work. In the last analysis, only our voluntary acceptance of things as we know them through our direct knowledge enables us to embrace interiorly and freely all that is. Morality is not an imposition upon human subjects, but the willed perfection and completion of the human subject that enables these subjects to acquiesce in the unlimited dignity for which their intellectual nature provides the essential repository.

It should now be possible to comprehend the usefulness of Rosmini's work in today's world. Above all, we find ourselves in need of a suitable basis for the development of our understanding of the nature of human rights.
Are they simply something granted by positive law, or public opinion, or are they innate in individuals? If they are innate, what is their source? Is it the simple existence of the human being, so easily swept away? Or the presence within human beings of something which provides them with inviolable dignity even when they, as babes in the womb, as children, as handicapped mentally or physically, are physically and mentally defenceless? And in the end, are human rights simply a bundle of privileges to be respected in some way according to circumstances, or the growth from a single seed of a single inviolable right which is to be respected in its essence despite occasional, inevitable limitations of parts of its exercise?

The basis for answers to these questions is provided in this Anthropology.

DENIS CLEARY
TERENCE WATSON

Durham,
January, 1992.

Notes

(1) Nuovo Saggio sull'origine delle idee, Rome 1830. The second volume of this work has been translated under the title, The Origin of Thought, Durham 1989 (2nd edition).

(2) Principi della scienza morale, Intra 1867. Translated as Principles of Ethics, Durham 1989 (2nd edition).

(3) Critical edition, Stresa 1991.

(4) Trattato della coscienza morale, Milan 1844. Translated as Conscience, Durham 1989.

Note

Square brackets [ ] indicate an editor's note or addition.
[ . . . ] indicates an omission from the text.
References to this and other works of Rosmini are given by paragraph number unless otherwise stated.
Abbreviations used for Rosmini's quoted works are:
AMS: Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science
PE: Principles of Ethics
OT: The Origin of Thought
CE: Certainty