Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science
Appendix 8. (602).
This is the famous question of help `without which' (sine quo) and help `with which' (quo). St. Augustine says that the first human being was helped by a kind of grace without which he could not desire good. It was a condition necessary for making his will capable of good. He says that much more was given to human beings redeemed by the Saviour, that is, they receive a kind of grace with which they desire good. This help is a sufficient, full cause for producing good will in us. `Thus the aids must be distinguished. One is a help without which nothing is done; the other a help with which something is done' (L. de corrept. et gratia, c. 12). The first is that given to Adam; the second, to Christians. `The first (grace) is that by which a human being may have justice if he will. The second does more and enables him to will.' (Ibid., c. 11). Note that according to Augustine the grace of the Redeemer is that `which enables a human being to will', but he never says that its effect is such that `a human being must will', that he `necessarily wills'.
There is a great difference between these two ways of speaking. To say that grace is the kind of energy `with which a human being may will' indicates only that it is a sufficient, full cause capable of moving his will; it does not indicate that the will itself is unable to resist the grace, which would be the case if we said `so that a human being must will' or `so that he wills necessarily'. For example, to say that the human will is that with which we move our feet when walking does not mean that moving feet and walking is such an absolutely necessary effect that our feet cannot be stopped by a cause different from our will. It means simply that our will, if it is not impeded, is the sufficient, full cause of moving our feet.
It is in fact a dogma proclaimed by the Church that the grace of Christ is sufficient for saving us, and rendering our will completely good; it is sufficient for us to be rendered capable of willing good. The Church teaches precisely this when she says that the sacraments effect salvation in us ex opere operato. Although the effect of sacramental grace is absolute, full, independent of, and superior to our will because sacramental grace clothes the will itself with holiness and justice, this does not mean that we cannot place an obstacle to the grace of the sacraments. The one does not destroy the other. The power of the sacrament on our spirit, therefore, remains complete although we can still obstruct its effect. This does not mean that I deny extraordinary cases where grace has triumphed, nor that the merit of some saints has been unable to obtain for them confirmation in grace even in the present life.
Finally I think the problem of the gift of perseverance must be distinguished from the problem of assistance in general. Perseverance can be brought about in two ways, not in one only: either through confirmation in grace, or by the foreknowledge with which God sees that a human being will not resist the effect of divine grace which in itself is certain and full.