Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science
Appendix 12. (fn. 409).
It must be noted that here St. Thomas is speaking about a formal action, an inclination of the soul, not a material action. He means an inclination of the will because, as he teaches, it is the will that inclines the soul. Such a sin, however, is not imputable as mortal fault, although the will is certainly present. We have noted that according to St. Thomas the soul acts only with the power of the will. But freedom, the deliberating reason, is lacking. The imputability of actions as fault, therefore, depends on freedom, not simply on the will.
Freedom, according to St. Thomas' way of expressing himself, makes perfect what is willed, or fully possesses the nature of what is willed. Hence, the Saint teaches that praise and blame are not united to any willed act whatsoever, but solely to the act which has fully the nature of that which is willed: `Praise and blame (or fault) follow a willed act according to the full nature of what is willed' (S.T., I-II, q. 6, art. 2, ad 3). These words need to be correctly understood; if they are interpreted contrary to the author's mind, they have a false, harmful sense. It will be helpful therefore if I add and explain the words that follow this last quotation.
He continues by establishing the nature of the perfect willingness of an act. For him it exists when the principle of the act is from within and accompanied by perfect knowledge of the end: `Perfect knowledge of the end is present not only when we know what the end is, but when we know also the reason why the thing is an end, and the proportion between the end and the action ordered to the end' (ibid.). Perfect knowledge of the proportion between the end and the action is possible only if the human being knows or compares both the action and omission of the action with its end. He may then see the good of doing or omitting the action in such a practical way that he has time to deliberate and choose. Purely speculative knowledge of the end and means is possessed even by those in heaven and hell, but, as the Saint says, they have no capacity to merit or demerit. Hence, we have to maintain that in order to receive praise or blame, in the strict, correct sense, the human being needs more than knowledge and will in a general sense; a deliberating will (as the Saint calls it) is required. `In this way,' he says, `the human being is master of his acts and can deliberate about them. When the deliberating reason is faced with two opposites, the will can decide for one or the other' (S.T., I-II, q. 6, art. 2, ad 2).