Chapter 12
Clarification Of The Definition Of Life
262. We are now in a position to clarify our definition of animal
life as `an unceasing production of material and corporeal feeling'.
We have seen that feeling is produced unceasingly by the union of two elements,
that is, of that which feels, the feeling principle, with that which is felt,
the term of feeling. These two elements - that which feels and the felt,
principle and term of feeling - although distinct from one another and in a
relationship of opposites to one another, cannot be really divided and
separated without the destruction of both. If we presuppose a complete lack of
what is felt, we can no longer conceive the continuing existence of a feeling
principle which, if it feels nothing, is nothing. Every feeling principle
ceases because feeling, once one of its two essential elements is removed, has
vanished.
263. We might prefer to imagine that something remained after the elimination of feeling. This `something' could perhaps be conceived mentally as an object, but never as a subject. It would be capable of becoming the term of my thought, but in itself feel nothing and be nothing. In other words, it would be purely imaginary and totally alien to feeling. It would not be found by analysing feeling itself, and hence could only be a substitute for the feeling principle of which we are speaking. The feeling principle never offers itself for reflection except simply as feeling considered in its relationship of feeling activity that constitutes it. What feels, therefore, cannot be posited without what is felt, nor what is felt without that which feels. Both must be created simultaneously by God, and united. Feeling, I mean, must be created, and in feeling the distinct natures denoting that which feels and that which is felt, the `sentient' and the `feelable'.(125)
264. This explains the common saying that life consists in the union of soul
and body, and death in the separation of these two substances. In agreement
with this common persuasion, we have considered life as the unceasing
production of material and corporeal feeling.
This definition of life can be extended more generally by omitting the
adjectives `corporeal' and `material', which we add to `feeling' to
characterise animal life. Life in general is then defined as an unceasing
production of feeling, or even as an unceasing actuation of feeling.
265. In this definition, variety in the term of feeling, that is, variety in what is felt, will be the variable element constituting the different kinds of life.
If something extended is felt, corporeal life is present.
If something extended and material is felt, that is, subject to alterations produced by matter, material life is present.
If a spiritual object is felt, spirit life is present.
266. Both animal (corporeal-material) and spirit life vary in degree and nature according to variations in what is felt. The feeling principle which, as it were, draws its existence from what is felt, remains constant and simple.
267. This helps to clarify the other three definitions of life.
The feeling soul lives only through feeling, without which it would cease to be.
The body is said to be alive only in so far as it possesses the act with which it produces feeling in the soul.
The definition of life which we have given merits further consideration in so far as life is attributed to what is commonly called body. We said that in this case life is `the unceasing production of all those extrasubjective phenomena which precede, accompany and follow in parallel the corporeal and material feeling'.
We have already seen how the subjective and extrasubjective phenomena are revealed in the same space. Thus we are in the habit of judging that when we see and touch the extended being in which we feel also, we see and touch our own body and nothing else, although the extrasubjective phenomena of touch and sight have no similarity whatsoever with the subjective phenomena.
Nevertheless, these two series of phenomena, which proceed from the single principle we call our body, run parallel to, and in harmony with one another, as we have seen. In fact, our body exercises two actions, one on our spirit where it produces the fundamental feeling, the other on our organs producing the sensations of touch, sight and the other senses. As a result, a change in feelings (subjective phenomena) alters the power of our body in its operation on our senses. For example, terror is shown when others see us change colour. On the other hand, when our extrasubjective body changes, our feelings change. For example, sight of a wound is contemporaneous with a feeling of pain in the person wounded.
268. Granted a given complex of extrasubjective phenomena, therefore, we have a subjective feeling. In this case, extrasubjective phenomena are sure signs of life. Medicine, which is ignorant of the origin and formation of feeling, makes use of this very definite law operating between the extrasubjective phenomena and the vital feeling in order to produce and regulate the phenomena which inevitably accompany the feeling of life, and a healthy state of feeling.
Notes
(125) We could ask if `the feeling principle can have its roots in some other entity anterior to feeling'. Such a question, however, would take us beyond the bounds of human experience. It is sufficient for us to know that this principle would no longer remain if what is felt were removed. This truth is made known to us by our meditation on the nature of feeling.