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Chapter 3

The Moral Act

574. The human act is the genus; the intellective act and the volitive act are the species. There is, however, a third species, moral acts, which contains the eminently human acts.

575. For an act to be moral, it is not sufficient for it to be intellective and volitive. The first intellections and volitions of children cannot be called moral because the law is not yet promulgated in these children who are ignorant of the objective order of beings, that is, of the order to which duty is directed (cf. 560-563).

We have seen that volitions or acts of the will are divided into two very different classes which we called `affective' and `evaluative volitions' (cf. 563). A concept formed by the intellect must precede both classes of volition, because, as we said, the will is simply the power by which human beings tend to a known good.

But not every volition need be preceded by many concepts, or by concepts of the same quality. Affective volitions require less intellectual development than evaluative volitions. This is indeed what precisely differentiates them from the latter and makes them the first to be activated in human development.

Affective volitions in the intellective part require only perceptions of animal good. Evaluative volitions require much more. In order to desire something as a result of its evaluation, we need more than perception. The thing must be evaluated by us, that is, judged. This judgment on the thing's value needs a rule which is always an abstract idea. Thus, abstraction must precede the evaluative volition (cf. 541-544).

576. Purely affective volitions cannot be called moral, because they contain no value judgment; the will co-operates in the act solely to gratify and assist animal instinct.

577. Nor are all evaluative volitions moral. To be moral, the evaluative judgment must be regulated not by any rule, but by a moral rule. As we saw, there are three kinds of rules according to which human beings in their first development judge the value of things - three criteria of good, which we form successively. The first rule states: `That which satisfies our animal senses is good.' In this case the rule is `the abstract idea of animal good.' Next, we discover new good manifested to us by a human instinct, and the rule of our judgments becomes the principle: `That which pleases us, whether it be animal or spiritual, is good'. These first two rules are used solely for measuring and evaluating subjective good; the moral rule, lying deep within our soul, has not yet assumed an external, explicit and really effective form. It is activated only when we become aware that there are other intelligent beings in the world besides ourselves whom we must treat with the same regard as we treat ourselves (cf. 546-554).

When we have discovered the existence of other beings like ourselves, we quickly arrive at the mental conception of the first intelligence by the faculty of integration(236) and at what is owed to supreme intelligence, God himself, the source of all intelligences. In this way, we attain full possession `of the abstract idea of objective good'; the idea in our mind has become determinate and been applied. In a word, it is suitable for guiding our judgments, and by means of them our volitions, and finally our actions by means of our volitions. The moral act begins, therefore, when this idea speaks in us for the first time.

If we now go on to call `law' this abstract, specific idea of objective good, this rule of the absolute value of things and actions, we shall have a clear definition of a moral act, namely, `the act of the will in its relationship with the law'.

578. In moral acts, therefore, we can distinguish three elements: the first, appertaining to the intellect, is the perception and conception of any thing towards which duty is exercised; the second, evaluative volition, appertains to the will; the third element, the law or idea of objective good, which is superior to both the intellect and will.(237)

As long as none of these ideas of objective good is formed in us, our acts cannot be moral. But from the moment that only one of the ideas is formed in our spirit, human acts have acquired the characteristic of morality.

Notes

(236) OT, 623, 624.

(237) It is traditional teaching that moral good consists in preferring objective to subjective good, and moral evil in preferring subjective to objective good. It is an essentially Christian teaching. St. Augustine says: `A will turned from unchangeable good' (objective good) `to its own good' (subjective good) `sins' (De Lib. Arbitrio). His follower, St. Prosper, repeats the same sentiment to explain sin: `Changeable nature, which depends on unchangeable essence for its preservation, turned away from the supreme good to be wickedly enthralled by its own good,' which is subjective (De vocat. gent., II, c. 34).