Chapter 5
The Free Act
581. We must now distinguish some very closely related and easily confused
ideas.
The act of choice cannot be confused with free act.
In fact, the first level of choice is truly devoid of freedom because choice is
determined by the prevalence of animal instincts, to which the will
spontaneously accedes.
Relative to the second level of choice, freedom seems present because we choose between real, physical good and opiniative good. The latter is not always indicated by natural human instinct; it is created by us and is a product of our practical force. But can the practical force, which creates what we think is good, truly act as long as we are confined to the sphere of subjective good? And if it can, is it free within this sphere? I doubt this very much. If the practical force acts while we are confined to the sphere of subjective good, I think it would indeed create a chosen good for us, but not freely. Accidental causes would determine the practical force to boost one good rather than another. These causes, which could be very slight and could perhaps pass unobserved, would remove the exercise of free will because spontaneity would immediately accede to them.
582. However, the real and clear location of the power of human freedom is the third level of choice. At this level freedom is called to exercise control over all that is subjective, by conforming it to the objective, absolute order; it is called to make what is unseen and ideal - truth and justice - dominate over all that is visible and real, over the universe and, in the universe, over everything beautiful, great, seductive and captivating.
583. In my opinion, St. Thomas must be understood as speaking about this third level of choice when he posits human freedom in the act of choice, because it is clear that he is speaking about choice relative to morality, that is, a moral choice. But, as I have shown, choice is moral only at its third level.(238)
584. Freedom, therefore, strictly speaking consists in not experiencing necessity. A free act is an act of the will, an act not determined by any necessary cause different from the willing principle.
585. This freedom is the source of the merit (in the strict sense) of human actions. There are, however, other kinds of freedom appropriate to the will, which explains why `freedom', or `free will', is given different meanings. And these meanings must be carefully distinguished if we are to avoid discussing insoluble problems, a trap into which many authors have fallen in their treatment of freedom.
And I think it worthwhile, for the sake of avoiding confusion, to separate meritorious freedom from every other kind of freedom appropriate to the human will.
Notes
(238) According to St. Thomas, and as we ourselves say, freedom is a characteristic not of all, but of certain acts of the will. St. Thomas reduced the principal acts of the will to two: volition and choice. Simple volition is not free; freedom, according to St. Thomas, is rooted in choice: `Choice is proper to free will. Thus we say it is characteristic of free will that we can accept one thing and refuse another. This is choice, and therefore the nature of free will must be considered from the point of view of choice' (S.T., I, q. 83, art. 3, corp). The places in which St. Thomas teaches that freedom has its seat in the act of choice have been published together in Petavius, bk. 3, c. 4, De opificio sex dierum. An examination of all these places does not show that Aquinas intended to affirm that every choice was free, but only that choice is a characteristic of freedom, and that without choice there can be no freedom. Lastly, St. Thomas does not normally speak about choice in general, as we said, but about moral choice.