Chapter 6

The Different Kinds Of Freedom Appropriate To The Human Will

586. `Freedom', generally understood, means the opposite of `servitude'. But just as there are different kinds of servitude, there are also different kinds of freedom. Perfect freedom excludes all servitude — as Seneca says: `Freedom consists in serving nothing.'(239) Let us distinguish carefully the various types of freedom.

587. We said that the human will is always free. This must be correctly understood. If the expression means that the will cannot be constrained, it is true without qualification because it is simply a result of my defining `will' as `desire tending to known good'. A will, therefore, that acted as a result of violence used towards it would be a contradiction in terms. We would be saying: `Willing what is not willed'. To will something is to regard that thing as good; to will something is to love it. But what is regarded as good, what is loved, is willed without constraint. On the other hand, to apply violence to the will means so to operate that the will, which by its essence is the tendency to good, tends to evil as evil.

Hence, no external force, no violence whatsoever, acts on the will. External force and will are opposites which never meet in any way. There is no middle term: either the object of the will is considered good and the will loves it without any constraint, or the will considers the object evil, in which case it is no longer the object of the faculty.

588. For this reason, St. Thomas says that even God (who cannot do contradictory things because they are not things) cannot constrain the will. `Violence cannot be done to the will, relative to the will's proper act, because an act of the will is simply an inclination which proceeds from a knowing, internal principle. On the other hand, constraint or violence come from an external principle. Hence, clearly, constraining or violating the will is contrary to the notion of its act.' From this truth, St. Thomas immediately deduces that God can indeed move the will in some other way, but not by doing violence to it. If God moved the will through violence, the will would play no part: `It would not be the will that was moved but something contrary to the will.'(240)

589. Nevertheless, the will, although it cannot be subject to violence, is not always free in the strict and proper sense. It could be moved from necessity without suffering violence.

Hence, theologians distinguish two kinds of liberty which they call: `freedom from violence' (libertas a coactione), and `freedom from necessity' (libertas a necessitate).

590. Although they apply the word `freedom' to both kinds of liberty, they teach that absolutely speaking the word cannot, without qualification, be applied properly to a will which is free from violence but nevertheless under necessity to some extraneous principle.

591. In order to avoid all equivocation, therefore, it will help to distinguish spontaneity from freedom in the faculty of will which, although it can never act except spontaneously, does not always act with complete freedom.

Nor is the distinction between completely free action and spontaneous action of little importance. It has been solemnly approved in the Church by the decisions of Councils and Popes in condemning the teaching of Calvin, Jansen and Baius. This teaching was grounded in the confusion between will and freedom which is an accident of will. To eliminate the confusion and correct the error, `freedom' (in the strict, absolute sense) was reserved specifically for the human ability to act without any determining necessity, that is, without any impulse outside the volitive principle (cf. 584). Baius' proposition `Violence alone is opposed to the natural freedom of the human being'(241) was condemned; its opposite therefore must be true and approved, namely, `Not only violence but every necessitating impulse is opposed to natural freedom.' Consequently, whenever the will acts under necessity, and precisely because it is under necessity, there can be no freedom. We are left only with a non-free will.

The same use of the word `freedom', taken to mean exclusively a state or condition of the will in which no violence is experienced, is confirmed by Baius' other proposition (also condemned by the Church): `Whatever is done by the will, even if under necessity, is done freely.'(242) If this is false, its opposite is true, namely, `That which is done by the will, but done necessarily, is not done freely.' Here, use of the phrase `to act freely' is clearly rejected as an indication of an action which merits in the strict sense, although it is carried out simply with will and spontaneity. The Church's decision also declares that the word `freedom' and the expressions `acting with freedom' and `acting freely' are best used to indicate the function or act of will in which the power of will is not under necessity to anything, but determines and moves itself towards any one of the choices before it.

592. If, therefore, certain writers, including St. Augustine, sometimes use `freedom' or `free will' to mean the will's spontaneous but necessitated action, their meaning must be interpreted according to the context in which these phrases are used, and by comparison with parallel places. Attention must not be fixed on a single phrase, or on any phrase taken out of context, but on the total teaching, on the core of the whole system, and on the understanding to which the author's thought is seen to be finally directed. And because anything that can help the true, correct interpretation of such an outstanding, authoritative and penetrating author as St. Augustine must be of great importance, I beg the reader's patience if here and elsewhere, while dealing with freedom or free will, I try to explain the concepts and expressions of the great Father.

In the following passage St. Augustine uses the expression `free will' in the sense of `the will acting spontaneously', as the context clearly shows: `The congenital, enduringly human free will we are looking for is that by which all wish to be blessed, including those who refuse the means leading to beatitude.'(243) Here we clearly have a definition of the will in general, that is, of that power which, as I frequently assert, tends to good as such, and consequently to happiness. St. Augustine does not say simply `free will' but `congenital, enduring, human free will'; he has made additions which clearly show that there must be another free will. He defines the special characteristics of one free will, and indicates that it must not be confused with the other.

The same can be said when he uses the word `freedom' instead of `spontaneity' which is clearly intended by the contest. Augustine says: `The immutable freedom of will with which the human being has been and is created is that with which we all wish to be blessed, and which we cannot not will.'(244) He adds immediately: `But this freedom is insufficient for us to be blessed, or to live uprightly and so become blessed. The freedom by which we can do good is not immutably congenital in us in the same way as the will by which we wish to be blessed. We all want to be blessed, even those who do not want to do good.'(245) Clearly, then, there are two distinct freedoms, the first of which appears to be synonymous with `will'; only the second, however, can properly be described as `moral will' and `meritorious freedom.'

593. In conclusion I note that the word `free' is taken to mean both `free to do something' and `free from all subjection, not under any necessity, free not to do that thing.' In the first case, `free' means being master of a situation, that is, `having the power and capacity to do something'. This is the opposite of the second case. In fact, it is possible to have the power to do a given thing and at the same time be under necessity in doing it. St. Augustine took this view in the passages quoted above where he called human will `freedom' or `free will', and in doing so indicated our power to tend to happiness. We certainly `have the power to tend to happiness' although, because we are under necessity to tend towards it, `we are not free not to tend to it.' It is proper, therefore, for someone who is free, that is, not subject to the power of another, to do what he finds most pleasing; one who serves, however, is prevented from doing many things he would like and desire to do. Hence freedom is used to describe what is properly a consequence of freedom, that is, human dominion to tend towards and desire the things we like, irrespective of any necessity.

594. Authoritative writers gave other meanings to the word `freedom', considered as a quality of willed action, and made whatever distinctions were needed to ensure their writings would be correctly understood. As we said, freedom was first applied metaphorically to mean a quality of willed action, and thus detached from its proper sense which simply indicates the opposite of servitude. But we could expect it to retain some of its original meanings. These will be rooted in the threefold understanding of servitude, which we must now examine: 1. servitude with a basis in right alone (servitude de jure); 2. actual or de facto servitude alone; 3. servitude with a basis in right combined with enforced actual servitude.

595. Three kinds of freedom correspond to these three kinds of servitude. We can be 1. free by right, but actually bonded; 2. actually free, but not by right; and finally 3. free neither actually nor by right. In this last case, when persons freely remain subject to a master, they can be called `free' because they are subject to servitude without any pressure from force or coercion.

596. All three meanings were applied to the freedom of the human will. First, the will is said to originate as not free but subject to the law. Second, the will that does not wish to serve the law is said to be free from the law in so far as it has thrown off subjection to the law. Third, although the will obeys the law, it is said to remain free in the sense that it obeys of its own accord, without external force, and effectively.

597. The three species can also be considered as three degrees of servitude and of freedom. The first degree depends upon the presence or absence of rightful subjection; the second upon the presence or absence of actual subjection; the third upon the presence of rightful and actual subjection, which may be either enforced or willed.

598. Writers always considered such subjection and freedom in relationship with justice and injustice, and thus distinguished three states of will. In the first state, the will is the servant of justice and therefore free from sin. In the second state, the will is the servant of sin and consequently free from justice. In the third state, the will has the power to serve either justice or sin, but does not necessarily serve one or the other. The first two states could be called states of unilateral freedom, the third the state of bilateral freedom.

599. The three degrees of servitude or freedom we have indicated can each be distinguished in the first two states, that is, those which concern justice and sin. The service of justice can be understood from the point of view of right, or factually (because of an act by a non-necessitated will), or finally according to necessary servitude. Those who are admitted to the beatific vision serve justice by willed necessity, just as the damned in hell are necessarily the servants of sin.

600. St. Paul speaks about unilateral freedom and servitude when he says: `Freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice; — hence, on the other hand, when you were servants of sin you were free from justice.'(246) In these words the Apostle points to the kind of freedom and servitude that is rooted both in right and in act. Relative to freedom and servitude by right, he argues his case on the basis of the titles by which we have been freed from servitude to sin and become servants of the justice of Christ, that is: 1. the title of purchase, and 2. the title of willing dedication. The Apostle had already said about the title of purchase, by which Christ redeemed us from servitude of sin: `Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized in Jesus Christ, were baptized in his death?'(247) About the title of spontaneous dedication he had said: `Do you not know that to whomsoever you make yourselves servants by obeying him, you are servants of him whom you obey, whether of sin unto death or of obedience unto justice? But thanks be to God, you who were servants of sin have sincerely obeyed the form of the teaching into which you have been changed.'(248) The passage shows that he is not speaking about freedom and servitude dependent simply on right, but also about that which actually exists. He exhorts Christians to maintain themselves in this freedom from sin, obtained for them by Christ.

The third degree of servitude (necessary servitude to sin) is also indicated by the Apostle in the same place. Without the grace of Jesus Christ, there was a necessary servitude to sin and it is of this that he is speaking when he says: `Because sin will not rule over you, since you are no longer under the law but under grace'(249) and again: `We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold to sin.'(250)

601. These different meanings of the word `freedom' should be borne in mind if we want to understand certain passages of the Fathers, and especially of St. Augustine. It is easy to see that human beings can never be without one or other of the three kinds and degrees of freedom and servitude. There can be no difficulty, therefore, in the following passage: `A free will is always present in us, but it is not always good. It is either free from justice when it serves sin, in which case it is evil; or it is free from sin when it serves justice, and in this case it is good.'(251)

St. Augustine, the `doctor of grace' indicates this triple freedom in very many places. I shall quote two passages as a key to understanding many others. He asks: `What will be freer than free will when it is unable to sin? For human beings, this state should have been the reward of merit, just as it was for the holy angels. But when the good which was to be merited had been lost through sin, that which was to have been the reward of merit became, in those who had been freed, a gift of grace'(252) (that is, it became the happiness of not being able to serve sin). He continues: `For this reason, we must carefully and diligently note how much "being able not to sin" differs from "not being able to sin" . . . The first human being was able not to sin . . . The first freedom of the will, therefore, was "being able not to sin"' (it was a bilateral freedom from both good and evil); `the last freedom will be much greater, "not being able to sin"' (this is servitude to justice). ` . . . The first was the possibility of perseverance; . . . the last will be the happiness of perseverance.'(253) He also says: `A free will without sin was given to him (the first human being), and he turned it to the service of sin. On the other hand, these (Christians) had a will which served sin, but then was freed by him who said: "If the Son of man frees you, you will be free indeed." Through this grace their freedom is such that although they may have to struggle against the concupiscence of sin as long as they live they no longer serve the sin that brings death.'(254)

These passages clearly show that St. Augustine distinguishes:

1st. The kind of freedom which renders human beings free from the happy service of justice and makes them servants of sin. This is the wretched freedom of the damned, and is partly inherited by the children of Adam from their unfaithful father.

2nd. The freedom which renders human beings free from the miserable service of sin, making them servants of justice. This is the blessed freedom enjoyed by those enlightened in heaven, or confirmed in grace, or infallibly and irresistibly moved to some holy act by a dominant, effective grace.

3rd. Finally, the freedom in which we are free to serve one of two masters, justice or sin, according to which pleases us most. The first human being possessed this freedom in the state of innocence. It is also possessed by those redeemed by Christ. Grace has restored to them the power to conquer evil fully and to do good in the supernatural order also.

602. It is true that it is not easy to follow St. Augustine's mind on the matter of the bilateral freedom possessed by human beings after the sin of Adam. But if we concentrate sufficiently, I think we can confidently summarise his thought as follows.

Adam as innocent, constituted in the state of nature and of grace, was able to sin and not to sin, that is, he possessed bilateral freedom.(255) After turning his freedom to evil by sin, he put himself and his descendants in servitude to sin. From that moment, neither he nor his descendants had the kind of freedom which allowed them to save themselves by doing good fully and perfectly. In this sense the human family had lost free will. But God came to their aid, and through Christ freed them from sin, giving them grace to do perfect, saving good.(256)

In this state the ability to do perfect good comes from God, while the ability to do evil is proper to the human being. Thus, bilateral freedom was restored to us.
But in this new state the will cannot be indifferent; it cannot be neither good nor evil but must be good or evil.(257)

If the will is good, it comes from God; if evil, it comes from us. The disposition or power of the will must be distinguished therefore from the real fact or act of the will. Now bilateral freedom relates to the disposition of the will which, however, in fact is always in some determined state either of goodness and salvation or of sin and loss of salvation.

The grace of the Redeemer is so powerful that it moves the will to act; the grace given to Adam provided him only with the ability to move his will of himself. However, although the grace of the Redeemer is sufficient to move effectively the will of anyone not opposed to it, it does not follow that the human being cannot resist it most of the time. It is not the same to say on the one hand that a cause is sufficient to produce an effect, and on the other that this cause cannot be obstructed by another cause while producing the effect for which of itself it is sufficient [App., no. 8].

603. There is yet another meaning given to `freedom.' As we noted, serving justice is justice itself. But this kind of justice cannot aptly be called servitude in the normal sense of the word. Servitude normally indicates an unpleasant condition, or at least the privation of some good such as freedom. On the other hand, serving injustice means serving an unjust master, who has no right to subject us. Because it entails every kind of trouble and unrest, servitude to sin is servitude at its worst.

It is in this sense that St. Augustine maintains God's freedom even in respect of moral relationship, although God cannot be unjust.(258) This explains why the Saint says: `What can be freer than free will, when it no longer serves sin?'(259) For the same reason St. Leo says that `true freedom exists when the flesh is ruled by the judgment of the soul and the spirit is governed by God.'(260) It explains why the saints in heaven are said to be free,(261) and gives meaning to the well-known dictum: `To serve God is to reign.' Scripture speaks in the same way, as we can see simply by referring to the place where Christ says that the truth will set us free.(262)

604. This is a most noble and sublime form of freedom, and can fittingly be called `freedom of intelligence' because the intellectual element of our humanity provides our relationship with the objective world of beings. In so far as we live in this world, we feel the moral necessity, founded in our intellectual nature, of conforming ourselves to the objective, absolute world. The human being, considered simply as intelligence, needs this moral order, and essentially desires it. Because our intellectual will, deeply rooted in and forming the noblest part of our nature, constitutes our nature, it follows that our essential, intellective human will, when contradicted, opposed or in the grip of passions which tend to subjective good, is locked, as it were, in a narrow prison and made a servant of subjective good (that is, of good enclosed in an infinitely narrow sphere compared with the vast sphere of objective being). But simultaneously the will wishes to expand in the universality of objective, moral good which alone constitutes its delight; it wishes to extend in the vast domain from which every narrow limit cuts it off; it wishes to be free in that sphere where it has all that it desires and where nothing is opposed to its sublime aspiration.

In the human being, therefore, we can distinguish two kinds of natural inclinations of will. First, subjective inclinations which incline the will to satisfying the tendencies of its own nature as subject. Second, objective inclinations or the moral necessity felt at a certain level of development of human intelligence. This is an infinitely precious need by which the noblest part of human nature desires to conform with the known truth, the order of beings. It is a need to acknowledge all beings for what they are, and give each its due.

The subjective inclination restricts us to a limited sphere, the objective extends us towards the infinite. The sphere of the subjective inclination is a real prison in which our lot is servitude; the sphere of the objective inclination is the mansion of heaven where we enjoy freedom.

Universal intelligence contains the principal, sovereign part of the human being. Subjective pleasure is the essentially subordinate, less important part. We can say therefore that as human beings we are free when our better, naturally dominant part is free. We are servants when this part has to submit to the less important, naturally subordinate part.

The human will called by nature to prevail is that which follows intelligence. When its desires are implemented, we are free because we are not prevented from doing what we most desire. The triumph of our higher will is then joined with happiness which satisfies all human longings. When nothing more restricts our will and we possess and do all we desire, we have reached true, fullest freedom. It is the freedom proper to those who have attained heaven.

605. Such freedom, perfect in every part, cannot be obtained in this present life. The freedom possible here is always mixed with some kind of servitude. Nevertheless, the free human being is the virtuous human being, whose noblest part is free and is valued for its own sake; in the virtuous person only the lowest part is servant, that is, the part containing the passions or limited, subjective instincts destined for servitude. And for human beings dominion over these is a desirable and glorious good.(263)

If, therefore, submission to justice is a indeed a yoke, it is sweet and light, as Christ tells us.(264)

Notes

(239) `You ask what is freedom? It is to serve nothing, to be necessitated by nothing' (Ep. 47).

(240) S.T., I-II, q. 6, art. 4, corp.

(241) Baius' 66th proposition, condemned by St. Pius V, Gregory XIII and Urban VIII.

(242) [Proposition 39].

(243) Operis imp. contra Jul., bk. 6, c. 11.

(244) Ibid., c. 12; see also c. 26.

(245) Ibid.

(246) Rom 6: [18, 20].

(247) Rom 6: [3].

(248) Rom 6: [16, 17].

(249) Rom 6: [14].

(250) Rom 7: [14]. The reformers of the 16th century, particularly Beza, misapplied these passages of the Apostle which, according to them, demonstrated that human bilateral freedom had perished with original sin. But this is quite foolish. St. Paul exhorts his Christians not to give themselves to the servitude of sin, especially after baptism. This presupposes possible falls. It is true that without the grace of Christ we can perform no work meriting eternal life, and that, as St. Paul says, we are servants of sin. But this does not mean that we have been deprived of the assistance necessary for salvation; even before the time of Christ God's mercy provided in various ways.

(251) L. de gratia et libero arb., c. 15.

(252) L. de corrept. et gratia., c. 11.

(253) Ibid., c. 12.

(254) Ibid., c. 12.

(255) `If he wished, he could have persevered. That he did not wish to persevere depended on his free will, which then was so free that it could wish both good and evil' (Ibid., c. 11).

(256) `As long as the human being used his free will well, he had no need for grace to raise him since he could not rise. Now in his ruined state, he is free of justice and servant of sin. Nor can he be a servant of justice and free from the dominion of sin unless the Son has freed him' (Op. imp. contra Jul., bk. 1, 82). Note carefully that St. Augustine is continually speaking about perfect moral good, not about moral good in general. He describes that good which renders the human will completely good, pleasing in the eyes of God, and able to save him. Some would like to deduce from this that `the works of unbelievers are sins', but this is ridiculous. St. Augustine's teaching does not deny that we can practise natural virtue, even if deprived of grace. He denies that these virtues can be so perfect that they make the will of the doer justified and acceptable in the eyes of God.

(257) `The will cannot seem to take up any kind of middle stance between good and evil. If we love justice, our will is good. If we love justice more, our will is better; if we love it less, the will is less good. If we do not love justice at all, our will is not good, and we have no hesitation in saying that a will which does not love justice in any way is not only evil, but greatly evil. If the will, therefore, is either good or evil, and no evil comes from God, we must have our good will from God. Otherwise I do not see in what other gift of his we are to rejoice, since we are justified by him. This, I think, is why it is written: "The will is prepared by God." And in the Psalms: "The steps of man are guided by the Lord, and he decides his way." As the Apostle says: "It is God who acts in you, and wills and acts in favour of a good will"' (De peccator. merit. et remis., bk. 2, c. 18).

(258) Op. imper. contra Jul., in many places, and amongst others, bk. 1, c. 81, and bk. 6, c. 10.

(259) L. de corrept. et gratia, c. 11.

(260) Serm. 1 de quadrag.

(261) Op. imp. contra Jul., bk. 4, c. 10.

(262) Jn 8: [32].

(263) `Freedom is threefold', says St. Bernard. `First of all, it is the opposite of natural necessity, and as such free will' (bilateral freedom). `Third, it is the opposite of death and the ills of this life, and as such confers blessedness on human beings' (the freedom possessed by those who have gained heaven). `Second, it is the opposite of sin, and as such makes human beings just and holy' (the freedom of the just on earth) (L. de gratia et libero arb.). St. Augustine is of the same mind: `The freedom possessed by the just to do good perfectly (ad perficiendum bonum) in this life is not as great as that to be found in the life where we will no longer say: "I do what I like".' (Op. imperf. contra Jul., bk. 1, c. 99).

(264) Matt 11: [30]. St. Anselm indicates how obedience to justice can be called freedom in one sense and servitude in another: `This freedom relative to justice is said to be and is freedom relative to the justice found in upright action which is done freely; at the same time, it is also servitude relative to obedience to a precept. Similarly, good servants serve their masters freely and willingly so that servants both good and bad maintain their free will while they serve. Surely we retain our free will whether we serve justice or sin?' [Dialogus de libero arbitrio]. And so Jesus Christ in the gospel sometimes describes the observance of his law as a pleasing servitude or as a light and sweet yoke, and sometimes as freedom: `The truth will set you free.'