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Chapter 1

Subject In General

771. The general meaning given to the word subject includes beings that have no feeling. In this sense, subject simply means substance, or more generally, `the being in and through which we conceive the existence of accidents'. This meaning is found in the origin of the word itself. Etymologically it means `that which lies beneath' (this is the way people generally conceive it), that which supports something else resting upon it. As I have said, it is a metaphorical sense, taken from what is seen or believed to happen in bodies.

Furthermore, this meaning is not restricted to the order of real things; it is also applied to purely ideal things produced by the spirit. The topic of a discourse is called a subject because we imagine our reasoning ranging over the topic, as it were, and working at it, as a sculptor works at marble with his chisel to sculpt and shape it. This meaning of subject clearly has a twofold metaphorical sense. First of all, the word subject is itself metaphorical, as I have said. Secondly, the matter of the discourse (the thoughts) is compared to real, corporeal matter, even though the words, which indicate the thoughts only externally, do not in any way affect or modify them. In paying attention to thoughts connected with a definite theme, the mind does not change or modify the theme itself.

772. These meanings of subject require us to note carefully that whenever the word is applied to a non-feeling thing, whether real or ideal, it means properly speaking no more than the way we think. Non-feeling things, which feel neither themselves nor what is different from themselves, do not enjoy any sensation; they exist not to themselves but only to the one who feels and conceives them.(347) Hence, even the intrinsic order conceived in them by the mind exists only to the mind, that is, only as thinkable. Such a use of subject, therefore, clearly expresses no more than a relationship or order which the contemplating mind notices between the quality and properties of the thing thought. The basis of this relationship and order is that one of the properties is necessary for thinking the others, and gives them their unity; indeed, this one property in which all the other properties have their origin is the first act of the thing thought. Thus, the name subject, given to this first act which constitutes the individuality of a thing and provides a foundation for its concept, has no value apart from the mind. We believe, therefore, that this species of being should not be called subjects without qualification, but subjects of the mind.

773. The case of beings that feel is quite different. Feeling is an internal principle, not a mere object of the mind contemplating it. There is an immense difference between the mode of being of that which feels and of that which does not feel. The former, granted its existence, needs nothing else; it is something of itself, a form, not simply uninformed matter. The latter constitutes only an existence relative to a feeling, so that it is no more than the matter or term of the feeling.

774. We can therefore justly infer that subject, in its correct meaning, applies solely to beings with feeling. Matter can constitute part of a subject but not the total subject. Its mode of being is to form part of a whole and not to form a whole of itself. As I said, it is conceivable only as a term of feeling, without which its whole concept vanishes.(348)

775. Modern philosophy is principally responsible for the observation in the preceding article. But philosophy as a whole also offers a more precise, correct use of the word subject.
The word subject is taken in conjunction with both the word accident and with the word object. When taken in conjunction with the word accident, it means `the principle which supports the accident', that is, `that in which and through which accidents subsist'. This is the definition of substance (cf. 765).

776. This was the more usual meaning of the word among earlier writers. Hence Boethius' statement that `a simple form cannot be a subject'.(349) If the form is entirely simple, it does not have accidents, and the principle supporting the accidents cannot be distinguished from the accidents supported.

777. But when subject is taken in conjunction with object, it can be defined as `that which is a principle of action, or receives action in itself'. This was the meaning invariably given by grammarians, for whom the subject is expressed in the nominative case; it is also the meaning to which modern philosophy pays greater attention. In this sense, subject can be a simple form without accidents, provided it is a principle that has its own mode of being within itself, without any obligation to obtain this mode from something else. In other words, it is a principle which feels.(350)

778. To summarise what we have said. There are subjects conceived by the mind alone and these too are classed amongst non-feeling beings. There are true subjects, in the proper, absolute sense which is understood solely of feeling beings. To these the word subject is applied to indicate either a principle which supports the accidents, or a principle which has its own absolute mode of being and is not merely relative. According to our use of the word, the second meaning properly speaking constitutes the essential characteristic of a subject. We consider as `subject' any simple form, devoid even of all accidents, in so far as it has its own existence, that is, has life and feeling, in which consists real, absolute existence.

779. We have therefore the following definition of subject: `A sentient being in so far as it contains within itself a supreme, active principle' (cf. 767).
The definition contains the words active principle because the subject, even if it were only a feeling being and felt merely passively relative to the agent arousing feeling, is in itself an activity which supposes an actual existence.

Secondly, according to the definition the subject may or may not have accidents. Even if only a uniform feeling were present, that is, a simple, indivisible feeling free from every kind of modification, the subject would still exist, possessing all that is necessary for its entity as subject.
At the same time, if the feeling of this sense-being received different modifications, the active, feeling principle, provided it remained identical, would be the subject of all the different feelings. Both the proper existence of the being, as a feeling principle, and the modifications experienced by the feeling would be grounded in this principle.

780. Furthermore, we see how the two meanings of `subject' as opposite of object and of accidents unite and have as their common root the property of constituting the reason for the subsistence. The active principle constituting the subject contains its own reason for subsistence,(351) while the modifications or accidents have the reason of their subsistence in the principle. This explains again why the principle is called `subject': in either case the principle is the source of subsistence and merits the name `subject'. `Subject' means having its own changeless mode of existence, that is, it is a real principle of existence within a given nature.

781. Finally, the definition says that the active principle, in order to be called`subject', must be supreme within the nature. If it were subordinate to some other principle, it would depend on that principle and not have within itself the basis of its own existence - it would not be the nail, so to speak, on which the entire feeling hangs.

782. The use we have described of the word subject will be more distinctly understood if we compare it with the definitions of other entities which might be easily confused with it.
We will consider some of the ontological definitions we have already given, and add others necessary at this point.

First, essence is that which is understood in the idea of a thing,(352) (cf. 764).

783. Second, substance is the act by which the essence of a thing subsists(353) (cf. 764 [5]).
This definition shows how substance is distinguished from accidents. Accidents are not the act by which essence subsists; they are rather the term and effect of such an act.

784. Third, individual is any being in so far as it is unique, indivisible, incommunicable, and distinct from all other beings.(354) (cf. 766).
The Schoolmen, who debated the very important but difficult question: `What is the principle of individuation?' affirmed with Aristotle: `Matter is the principle of individuation.' But this answer has no place in a universal ontology. It is limited, and, like all aristotelian responses, is evidently derived from a partial, limited consideration of corporeal beings, not from a consideration of beings in general.

I have observed that matter which can individuate the feeling whose term it is, cannot individuate anything else. I now add that matter could not even individuate the feeling whose term it is, without having the principle of individuation in itself in some way. The scholastic problem, therefore, is not solved but carried a step further by the reply, because we still have to ask: `How does the individuation of matter come about?' And we answer this difficult, subtle question as follows.

785. We distinguish the order of ideal being from the order of real being. According to us, that which is truly individual is found only in the order of real being; in individuation the principle is the reality itself of being.(355) On the other hand, the universal is found only in the order of ideal being; the principle of universality is the very ideality of a being. This teaching is so consistently true that it brooks no exception. Consequently, any being whose concept excludes all multiplicity — such as the concept of God and the concept of `myself' — cannot be known by means of a pure concept, but has to be really perceived. Without this, we cannot have a positive idea of it. Indeed, the pure concept of God without perception of him does not exist.

786. We must not confuse the individual with the idea of the individual. The individual is something necessarily real. The idea of an individual, as idea, is not an individual; it is a true universal, in the way that all ideas are said to be universal.
Nor must we confuse an imaginary individual, a complex unity formed mentally, with a real individual. An imaginary individual may be called a fictitious or artificial individual, but it is never a natural individual in the true and proper sense.

787. This supports the truth of St. Thomas' opinion that `the individual is placed in a special way in the genus of substances'.(356) Indeed, the individual has its basis in the act by which a being first subsists. This act supports all successive and accidental acts, and has in its very self (as is clear from the definition of substance) subsistence itself.

788. Finally, the observation I made when discussing subject can also be applied to the substantial individuals under discussion: where feeling is lacking, there is only a relative not a proper mode of existence. We distinguish individuals conceived mentally, that is, purely mental individuals, from individuals in an absolute sense — just as we distinguished subjects. The latter are normally included in the definition of a subject, so that we could also define a subject as `a substantial, feeling individual'.(357)

Notes

(347) Cf. PE, 21-42 [App., no. 9].

(348) I would willingly apply the word `supposed' to what I have called `subjects of the mind'. In this way, we would have two different words, one for so-called inanimate subjects, the other for true subjects. But the use of these words is too fixed for their meanings to be altered.

(349) De Trinit. 2.

(350) The struggle between aristotelian philosophy and Christian dogma at a time when no one wished to abandon either Aristotle's philosophy or still less the Catholic faith is a matter for wonder. A compromise had to be struck with aristotelism under which aristotelian philosophy would be allowed to maintain faithfully all its terminology, provided that the meaning of the terms could be changed in certain circumstances. In fact, if aristotelian philosophy had faithfully and constantly held to the meanings it had given to subject and person (person should have meant an intelligent subject), the two words would have had to be banished from theology. As understood by the Aristotelians, they include the concept of accidents and matter, and therefore exclude the divine nature in which there is neither matter nor distinguishable accidents of any kind. Hence, it was necessary to make a distinction by saying that `the word hypostasis (that is, person) considered in its original sense does not apply to God, because accidents cannot be predicated of God, but does apply to him in so far as it expresses something subsistent' (St. Thomas, S.T., I, q. 29, art. 3, ad 3). Christian theology therefore took the words subject, hypostasis and person to mean not `a principle supporting accidents' but, as St. Thomas teaches, `something subsistent', something which has no need of anything else in order to exist. In other words, theology does not take these words in meaningful conjunction with accidents but in meaningful conjunction with object, so that they come to express a subjective existence which is proper, internal and independent. The use, therefore, which modern philosophy makes of the word subject clearly stems from the hidden, beneficial influence exercised over philosophy by the enlightened ideas of Christianity.

(351) When I say that `the subject has in itself the reason of its own subsistence', I am not referring to the ultimate cause but the reason found within the sphere of the nature in question, even if the nature itself depends and subsists through another principle different from itself.

(352) OT, 646.

(353) Ibid., 657-659.

(354) `"Individual" is that which is undivided in itself, but divided from other things' (St. Thomas, S.T., I, q. 24, art. 4, corp.).

(355) This truth did not escape St. Thomas [App., no. 10].

(356) S.T., I, q. 29, art. 1, corp.

(357) Does the soul separated from the body constitute an individual, a subject, a person? A negative answer was given to this debated question because the soul is part, not the whole, of a human individual. The reply is correct if the question concerns the human individual or subject. The human subject is composed not of one but of two parts, soul and body. But if it is accepted that individuality, subjectivity, personality possess their own subsistence, we have to say that even the soul separated from the body is an individual substance (although not a human being); it is both subject and person, and has in itself its own subsistence without drawing it from the body. We must distinguish, therefore, the subsistence proper to the soul from its subsistence relative to the body. Relative to its proper subsistent, it is individual, subject, person; in its subsistence relative to the body, it is neither individual nor subject nor person. Lastly, we must note that if we are dealing with a purely feeling soul, it has a subsistence relative only to the body. The Schoolmen, in fact, began with the feeling soul and from it took their solution to the question under discussion. Cf. St. Thomas, S.T., I, q. 29, art. 1, ad 5.