Chapter 4
The Human Subject
And The Generation Of `Myself'
805. We have come to the human subject and described the generation of
`myself', which expresses the subject. Let us recapitulate.
The human subject feels materially that which is extended and its own activity.
This activity, in which passive and active are mixed, is identified with the
felt, extended element. The human subject also intuits being, and feels its own
cognoscitive activity indivisibly in intuited being.
This, however, is not sufficient. The single, simple human subject unites what is felt with what is understood, and by means of this union sees that what is felt exists in what is understood as being. It sees that the feeling makes an equation with the idea, that the feeling is a realisation of the being intuited in the idea, and that consequently there is in the feeling a being or feeling principle. This union of feeling and idea brought about by the human being produces the perception of the feeling principle, without which the feeling itself would be inexplicable.
806. In a similar way the human subject discovers an intelligent principle, when, instead of applying the being to his own material feeling, he applies it to his own knowledge, that is, either to the intellective perception of the feeling, or to intuited being itself. He now sees the cognition or perception in the idea of being, equates the two terms, and acknowledges that the cognition or perception is simply being itself realised. And precisely because there is cognition, perception, intellection, he concludes there is someone who knows or perceives, that is, an intelligent principle.
807. Moreover, the human subject, in joining and equating the feeling with
the idea (and we can say the same about the cognition and the idea),
acknowledges that they are the same being under two forms, that is, under the
ideal form and real form. In doing this, the subject exercises a new activity.
The activity which unites feeling and idea is neither the activity which feels
what is extended, nor the activity which intuits ideal being. It is a third
activity, unifying and reconciling the first two.
This third activity takes the felt-extended element (product of the feeling
activity) and the intuited being (presented by the intelligent activity),
unites these two terms of the two feeling and intelligent activities, and
composes a single ideal-real being. This is the meaning of `to perceive
intellectively'.
The human subject feels this third activity, and feels it as dominating the
other two. As a result it feels the two as dependent on the third and therefore
possessing a common principle. The subject concludes that the feeling principle
and the intelligent principle are a single, identical activity, which
simultaneously feels and understands.
808. But this higher activity, in which both the intelligent and the feeling principles participate, is not only felt but perceived intellectively by the human subject. The subject can compare this activity with the ideal being it possesses and acknowledge that, like any other entity, the activity is already contained in ideal being, just as drops of water are contained in the sea. At the moment the human being sees the higher activity in ideal being, he changes it into a being, that is, he has acknowledged it as a being. But it is a being only on condition that it has an active, subsistent principle (through the principle of substance). In this activity, therefore, the human being discovers entity or substance, that is, the feeling, intelligent, unifying active principle, which, although totally one and simple, is endowed with a trine act.(363)
809. At this point the human being has found himself without knowing that he has found himself: he does not know that the being or substance he has discovered is himself; he has formed no consciousness of himself and cannot yet say `myself'. But in order to confer this new level of existence on himself and verify not only that he is alive but is beginning to know he is alive, and alive to himself, he needs to take one step only. He needs to re-examine the way in which he discovered the single principle which feels, understands and reasons.
When he contemplated the bonding or reasoning activity in being and saw it in the principle, he performed a new act with which he perceived the reasoning activity. At the moment when the human being sees that the act which perceives the reasoning activity is identical with the reasoning activity, he has perceived himself and can say `myself'. `Myself' expresses the identity between the reasoning principle and the principle which says `myself'. The very pronunciation of the word indicates that the person pronouncing it is aware of the existence of an activity which, through speech, announces itself and is conscious of itself. Anyone who says `myself' must have reflected on his own activity and been conscious that that which reflects is the same principle as the activity on which he is reflecting.
Finally, we have to explain how the human being can recognise that the reflecting, speaking activity is also the perceiving, reasoning activity.
The identity of the principle in the different reflections is indicated by the intimate feeling which the human being has of his own universal activity. All partial activities are potentially found and identified in this activity, where the human being feels that the act by which he perceives and reasons is simply an act or partial application of the first, fundamental activity. This fundamental activity is the source of reflection upon what has been perceived and reasoned, that is, upon perceptions, reasonings and reflections themselves. It is the activity which, by saying `myself', pronounces and posits itself.(364) In this way `myself' is generated.
810. Consequently, we clearly see that
1st. a purely feeling subject exists which neither understands nor feels itself;
2nd. an intellective subject exists even before it understands itself;
3rd. a human, intellective-feeling subject exists prior to consciousness of itself;
4th. when the human subject acquires consciousness of itself by means of the various functions of its faculties, it becomes `myself'.
811. 5th. Finally, from this process of the generation of `myself' we can deduce an important difference between the concept of `myself' and the concept of `subject'. The latter is a supreme, active principle in a given individual, the foundation of the subsistence and activity of an individual. The concept of `myself', however, consists properly speaking in having consciousness of self. Thus, if an active principle, conscious of itself, were present in a given individual, it would already be `myself', even though it were not supreme and the individual's subsistence were to depend on some other subsistent principle in the individual. Only this other principle could fittingly be called a `subject'.
Notes
(363) This entity or substance therefore is only intelligible, not feelable. It is a true noumenon, not a phenomenon. One philosopher, when he saw that a part of the subject was feelable and another part (which is strictly speaking the foundation of the subject) intelligible, made two subjects out of one by distinguishing a phenomenal and a substantial subject. This is obviously an error, and I have shown the absurdity of the consequences of such a distinction. I refer the reader to my Rinnovamento etc., bk. 3, c. 13.
(364) `Myself' does not express simply the subject but also the relationship which the subject has with itself by means of the intimate feeling and the subject's various reflections. The pronouns `you' and `he/she' add another relationship, because they indicate the `myself' of a subject pronounced by a different subject. One subject in conversation with another expresses his relationship with `you'; when the other subject is absent, the relationship is expressed with `he/she'. - In Rinnovamento etc., bk.3, c. 18, I demonstrated that `myself' is not known through itself; it is not the first thing known. Here I have also shown that `myself' is something formed only after the use of intelligence. Therefore, a previous idea is required not only in order that `myself' may be known, but in order that `myself' may exist and be placed in act.