Chapter 10
The Moral Value Of Actions
865. The moral good or evil of an action constitutes the moral value of
actions. In other words, an action has value in proportion to its moral good,
and lack of value in proportion to its moral evil.
As we have said, moral good consists in the will's adhesion to the law, or in
willing good according to the objective order of beings. Moral evil, on the
other hand, consists in disharmony between the will and the law, or in not
willing good according to the known objective order of beings.
When the will adheres to beings according to their objective order, it shares, as fully as the objective order requires, in the entity to which it adheres, and thus wonderfully ennobles itself.(398) On the other hand, the will that refuses to adhere to the known objective order of beings lacks good, and so deforms itself.
866. We need to note that the beauty and dignity of a good will, and the deformity and ugliness of an evil will, can be called infinite, because being in its order, with which good will ennobles itself, is characterised by infinite good, while opposition to this being is characterised by infinite evil.(399)
867. Such great moral good or evil embellishes or disfigures the volitive, personal principle producing the good or evil, and is different from every other good and evil which may be added to the human being independently of his will. This latter kind of good and evil does not make the human will and person good or evil, although it can help or harm his nature.(400)
868. Finally, when the will makes itself good by following the objective order of beings, it raises itself to eternal things, because the order of beings is eternal. From this height it rules supreme over all temporal things. Enthroned on the object, the will rules over the subject, that is, over itself and its own nature. Adhering to the object in this way, the will now receives a new, divine power and finds in the object itself the means for attaining a more sublime activity. Thus, the personal principle raises itself to a new level, as it were, because it is the supreme activity manifested in willed actions.
869. It is true that there is some kind of good in evil itself, a good worthy of the devil - a kind of wicked enjoyment, I mean, which the intelligent spirit finds in the use of its freedom, despising all obstacles, the nature of things, the law and the Creator.(401) Rebelling in this way against being and objective good, the intelligent spirit can experience a feeling of proud activity, a crazy, credulous confidence in challenging everything, even the infinite, and in setting itself above every power, above God himself. This miserable exercise of its freedom contains a human feeling of power, a monstrous form of greatness; the very experience of this mortal exultation is a kind of good. But it is equally true that this good does not compensate for the infinite evil accompanying it; just as this good experienced in the subject's nature does not render the person good but simply guilty.
Yet the fascination of such a good did not seduce Lucifer alone. Many facts of human history, especially the fury with which limitless freedom of every form and species is sought and pursued, can only be explained by this mad desire to experience the delight of an unbridled exercise of freedom. Such formless freedom of human nature is ultimately the most oppressive enslavement of the human person.
Notes
(398) St. Thomas explains this increase in good, acquired by adherence to the law, by showing precisely that such adherence makes us share more abundantly in being: `The good and evil of actions is the same as the good and evil in things because each thing produces an action according to its being. Things have as much good as they have being, because being and good are interchanged (one is taken for the other) - Hence, an action ceases to be good and is called evil in so far as it lacks the fullness of being proper to it (such as the quantity or place assigned to it by reason)' (S.T., I-II, q. 18, art. 1, corp.).
(399) St. Thomas touches upon the explanation for the supreme value of morally good actions when he says: `The evil which is punishment removes the creature's good. - But the evil which is fault is properly speaking opposed to uncreated good. - It is clear therefore that fault is of its nature more evil than punishment' (S.T., I, q. 48, art. 6, corp.).
(400) This is expressed by St. Thomas in the following terms: `Because good consists simply in act and not in potency, and the last act is the action or use of anything whatsoever we possess, human good is to be found simply in good action or good use of things possessed. But we use everything through our will. Hence a human being is said to be good according to the good will with which he uses what he possesses. - Because fault consists in a disordered act of the will, while punishment consists in the deprivation of any of the things the will uses, fault is by nature more perfectly evil than punishment' (S.T., I, q. 48, art. 6, corp.).
(401) That is, provided the Creator preserves the spirit and allows it to act.