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Chapter 11

The Imputability Of Actions

870. Imputability, as we understand it, pertains to moral actions. To impute an action means to attribute the action to the agent who as its cause produces it.
We have seen that the moral agent is the volitive, personal principle: the will is the cause of actions conforming to or deviating from the law. We must remember, however, that the will operates in two ways: with spontaneous movement or also with free movement. In both cases moral good or evil can be present. In the preceding chapter, we saw that the conditions required for moral good are two only: 1. a moral law known by the will, and 2. a will knowing and adhering to the law - the opposite is moral evil. Only willed activity, therefore, not free activity, is required for the existence of moral good and evil.

This teaching on the essence of moral good and evil accords fully with the dogmas of Christianity which alone made it known by teaching that in the human being moral evil exists prior to the exercise of freedom, and consists in a virtual aversion from the law and from God. Christianity also teaches that in a baby regenerated by baptism, which removes original sin by infusing the Saviour's grace, moral good exists prior to and independently of the exercise of freedom .

871. Granted therefore that moral good and evil is present whenever the will is properly or evilly disposed relative to the law, is it also true that every moral good and evil is imputable to the person in whom it exists? I say `to the person in whom it exists' because the sin transmitted from parent to child in human generation is undoubtedly imputable relative to the will of the first parent who was its free cause. It is also certain that the moral good of a baptised human being must be imputed to the Redeemer's merits. Our question therefore is: `Must the moral good and evil present in a person who is not its free cause be imputed to this person?'

In attempting a reply to this difficult question, we first have to concede that the good or evil we correctly call natural must equally be called personal, because such good or evil truly affects the person, that is, the supreme, objective principle, the will. But saying that this good and evil is personal is quite different from saying that it is truly imputable to the individual person in whom it is present.

At this point, it will be helpful if we recall the definition we gave of imputability. We said that to impute a moral action means attributing it to the cause which produced it. We need to see, therefore, whether the will or person can truly be called the cause of an action which it cannot avoid. To do this, let us consider the elements which give rise to the force which necessarily produces in the will and person the good and evil under discussion. We need only recall what has already been said about the movements and laws according to which the will moves.

For the will to move and incline necessarily to moral good or evil, it must first be stimulated by some good or bad instinct. But stimulation of the instincts, no matter how powerful, is never a complete, necessitating cause of the will. The cause becomes complete when the will cedes and consents to the instinct's invitations. But this consent of the will is spontaneous, not free (which would be contrary to the hypothesis). Hence, consent comes about in virtue of the natural laws of spontaneity, which we discussed earlier. The elements of the force which necessarily inclines the will, therefore, are two: 1. the pressure of instincts; 2. the laws of spontaneity. A consideration of these two elements shows that relative to both, the will and person is passive, not active.

In the case of the first element, it is clear that the will and person is passive, because the instinct stimulating the will is foreign to the will upon which the instinct exercises its influence.

In the case of the second element, the laws of spontaneity proceed from the same nature which constitutes the will, and are therefore unchangeable. Their cause is not the will but the Author of the will and of nature. The will does not have authority over these laws; it can only be governed by them and submit to them obediently. The will, therefore, is still passive, and totally passive relative to these laws which are firmly imposed on it.(402)

The will, although passive relative to the two elements which constitute the full cause of necessary moral good and evil, is not the cause of necessary good and evil. Necessary good or evil cannot be imputed to the will and person, because, as we said, to impute an action is simply to attribute it to the cause from which the action proceeds.(403)

The will and person, therefore, may not be the first cause of necessary moral good and evil (which consequently cannot be imputed to it). Nevertheless good and evil can be called and truly are personal. As we have seen, the will and person can be the subject of both actions and experiences; it can be in a state of passivity and activity. But in order to be the cause of moral good and evil, the will must be active, and in order to be sufficiently active, it must be free (cf. 857). Imputability, therefore, is a consequence of freedom. Bilateral freedom, however, does not constitute person as such, although it does constitute the truly active person by providing person with the noble qualification `cause'.

872. Let us further clarify the concept of a will necessitated to good. For the will to be truly necessitated to good, we must suppose that the movements determining it are greater than the forces the will can use to oppose the movements. Thus, a necessitated will presents the concept of a will weaker than the necessitating forces. This weakness in face of the necessitating forces can be caused by different circumstances, which we have discussed elsewhere.

One of these circumstance is the limited development of the understanding. The will is always limited to the good presented to it by understanding and feeling. Thus, if only one good were presented, the will could not compare this good with another. As a result the will would necessarily be determined towards that good through one of the laws of spontaneity which naturally incline it to good. If more than one purely subjective good were presented, the will would be necessitated to the greatest of them, according to another law of spontaneity which directs the will to the greatest good.

Only when an objective good is presented in contrast with a subjective good, does the will master the laws of spontaneity and become free. But even in this state of intellectual development, another circumstance can necessitate it. If the subjective good attracting the will stimulates it so intensely that time for reflection is denied, the will's weakness then arises from this delay in reflection.

A third circumstance which renders the will comparatively weak is force of instinct and the attraction of some good which exceeds the will's strength.
In all these three cases in which the will either does not know the objective good, or is too slow to reflect on it, or is intrinsically weak when confronted with the attractions of subjective good, a defect or limitation in the human person is present.

873. Objective good, as an idea, never necessitates, but absolute good, that is, God, necessarily determines the will when he fully communicates himself, as he does to those in heaven. This necessitated determination of the will does not suppose any defect in the person so necessitated, who in fact is elevated by the communication of divine nature.

874. If we consider the question from all points of view, we can conceive the case in which God makes the actual vision of himself dependent on the will of a being. In this case, God, united continuously with the being, could be either contemplated or not by the being. Although the being which actually contemplates God must love him exceedingly, such a being would first have the power of placing itself in this state of necessity or not . Hence, no contradiction is involved in having a person who was free (or not free if it so pleased him), particularly in the first moment of his existence.

875. In this first moment of existence, the person could freely decide for good, that is, to do the will of God. And in order to do God's will he could decide to grant or not grant to himself a greater or lesser amount of the vision of God present to him. An ability of this kind would, however, be an entirely gratuitous gift of God. In this case, although the person is always determined to good in virtue of the first, absolute determination enduring in him, we could not say that he would be necessitated. In fact, everything he did would depend on an act of his wise, most powerful and completely free will.

876. Moral good or evil not caused by the will, or person, cannot be imputed to it; properly speaking it cannot cause such good or evil unless 1. it is free; 2. the action depends upon it; and 3. it is not only passive, but truly active. The will is passive, not active, if its action depends on an overpowering, superior agent and it is not the first agent on which the existence of the action's proximate cause depends.
All the other elements, therefore, that come to constitute the full, proximate cause of the action must depend on the will if the good or evil is to be imputable to to it.

877. But because this dependence can vary, there are various ways in which moral good and evil can be caused by the will and person, to whom, as a result, moral good and evil can be imputed.
Indeed the lower, active principles, the instincts, sometimes act in complete independence of free will, as in sleep and mental alienation. These cases cannot be imputed to the will because it is not the first constitutive element of their cause. The will and person are passive; these are events happening in us without our involvement. This extraordinary phenomenon was not considered to any great extent by ancient philosophy. It was discovered by Christianity, which called attention to a fact as profound as it is certain.

878. However, although the will plays no positive role in the actions of the instincts, it can sometimes be present like a spectator at a play. In this situation two conditions can obtain: first, the will finds itself so totally weak that all its own activity is exhausted simply by looking dazed at the action before it which it can neither accept nor reject. If this state is not of its own making, the will cannot be said to cause whatever is being carried out in its presence by sudden, overpowering instinct.

879. Second, the will can make a judgment and either reprove or approve the instinctive actions. Finding itself with a certain degree of activity, the will is obliged to disapprove what is base, and to master all that is happening in the human individual. It cannot remain indifferent, without at least some defect.

880. The will can of course approve the instinct and consent to its disordinate act. In this case, even if the will does not contribute with its energy nor incite the instinct positively to act, it becomes guilty of consent by allowing the instinct free rein. But if the will's energies extend no further than disapproving what the instinct does, without being able to oppose the actions of instinct, it is not obliged to anything more, although it is defective.

881. However, the will can be strong enough not only to disapprove the instincts' disordinate movements but to resist them. In this case its power, which had previously extended solely to chosen acts, extends to acts of command. When the will finds within itself forces enabling it to oppose the forces of an instinct which arises independently, a struggle takes place between will and instinct. If the will makes use of all its forces, but still cannot immediately subjugate the instinct, the result must be ascribed to the instinct, not the will.

If the will is seduced by the instinct and acts according to the laws of spontaneity, the theories we have stated above should be applied. We should see whether freedom to resist was still possible for the will, or whether it had to give way, as happens apparently in certain first movements. In this case the will, which does not reflect on the law during the act, can be called a rational, but not a moral power.(404)
On the other hand, if the will is positively active, and provides the impulse for the instinct, it is clearly the cause of all the effects which proceed from this initial impulse and were understood or foreseen by the will.

882. Actions imputable to the will are certainly imputable to person.

883. Consequently, what has been said elsewhere seems true: three relationships can be distinguished between the will and the active principles subordinate to it: a relationship of 1. diversity, when subordinate principles act without any intervention at all from the will; 2. opposition, when a struggle takes place between the subordinate principles and the will; 3. concord, when subordinate principles act in harmony with the will.

In the first two cases a division exists between person and nature, because the actions of the lower principles, unknown or opposed to the will, cannot be called personal. On the other hand, when all the active principles subject to the will are in harmony, a perfect, personal unity is found in the human being, and all actions, including those directly proceeding from the lowest active principle, must rightly be called `personal'.(405)

884. All that we have discussed so far indicates that we must distinguish between good which is simply moral and good which is imputable. But when moral good is imputable to the will and person that causes the good, it is also praiseworthy good; it is our reason for praising this person.

885. Thus, properly speaking, praise can be given only to a will and person, and in this sense is essentially personal. Moreover, in order to be praised, will and person must be the cause of some moral good. Hence, praise is essentially moral.
All praise attributed to things and not to persons is improper. And praise given to persons by any other title than that of their being author and cause of moral good is also improper and unjust.

886. Just as moral good is imputed as praise to the person who is its cause, so moral evil is imputed as reproach to the person who causes it. This constitutes the difference between sin and fault: every moral evil is called sin; when imputed, it is called `fault'.

`Just as the notion of evil is more extensive than that of sin,' St. Thomas says, `so the notion of sin is more extensive than that of fault. For an act is said to be culpable or praiseworthy when imputed to the person performing it. To praise or to blame simply means to impute to someone the goodness or malice of his action. But the act is imputed to the agent when he is able to control it; this happens in every voluntary act(406) because a human being controls his actions through his will - only voluntary (free)(407) acts of good and evil therefore are subject to praise and blame; and in them, evil, sin and fault are the same thing.'(408)

887. Consequently St. Thomas teaches in another place that a sin cannot be imputed as a mortal fault unless in addition to the simple presence of the will, a deliberating will is also present. He says: `Mortal sin consists in aversion from the final end, which is God. This aversion pertains to deliberating reason, whose function is to order things to their end. Sometimes, however, the soul's inclination to something contrary to the final end is not mortal sin because the deliberating reason had no possibility of taking action, as happens in sudden movements.'(409)

888. Willem van Est writes: `Only externally good or evil actions are rewarded or punished by humankind, never good or evil habits hidden in the soul. With God, however, not only internal actions but also habits (which are, AS IT WERE, CONTINUOUS, INTERNAL ACTS) receive their recompense.'(410) We should note that the author is speaking here about habits of the will and moral habits, not about the habits of other powers.
In order that good and evil moral habits may be imputed, therefore, they must be produced by the will and person; nothing can be imputed unless the will or person is the true, first cause of what is imputed.

But the only way the will or person can produce good or evil moral habits is by the acts it posits which leave some permanent quality in the soul inclining the soul to good or evil, and giving it a propensity for one or the other. The imputability of these habits therefore must, properly speaking, be referred to the free acts which have produced them. Hence, the moralists' principle that `the human being neither merits nor demerits by habits.'(411)

889. This kind of habit, which consists solely in some inclination and facility to do good and evil, must be distinguished from another kind, to which, properly speaking, we should apply Willem van Est's opinion that habits somehow have the nature of `continuous, interior acts'. This kind of habit consists in a firm intention deep in the soul to do good or evil. As long as the intention remains, it is truly a continuous act, and the human being is continually its author and cause.
Habits of this kind, therefore, are not only imputable to the will and person through the first acts by which they come into existence, but of themselves. The will, which could at any time reform them, is continuously their cause if it does not do so.

Notes

(402) Earlier thinkers distinguished two kinds of operation of the will, calling the first `will as nature', and the second `will as reason'. St. John Damascene names the first [qelhsiV], and the second [boulhsiV] (Bk. 2). Cf. St. Thomas, S.T., III, q. 18, art 3.

(403) It should be carefully noted that the will cannot be called simply a cause of action unless it is a first cause not determined by a preceding cause. It must be the cause of determination and choice between contrary volitions.

(404) Not all passive movements, it must be noted, are merely animal; some are human or rational, like those caused by the knowledge or intellective apprehension of something (for example, an imminent danger or news of a disaster).

(405) Just as the actions of the lower active principles become imputable when the will produces or directs them as first, determinate cause, so these actions, blind and instinctive in themselves, are generally called willed and rational by earlier thinkers when the actions are considered from the point of view of their natural subordination to will and reason. This observation indicates the way we must understand certain expressions used by authors. At first sight, they seem to confuse animal instinct with will and reason and thus posit in brute-animals powers which are proper only to the human being. St. Thomas speaks expressly about the matter, and even defends Aristotle who sometimes gives the name `reason' and `will' to animal feeling and instinct: `We know that feeling or sense-appetite, IN SO FAR AS IT EXISTS TO OBEY REASON, is called rational by participation, as we see in Aristotle, Eth., I (last chapter). And because will is in reason, we can equally say that feeling is WILL BY PARTICIPATION' (S.T., III, q. 18, art. 2). Again he says: `The actions of the feeling soul in some way obey reason, and are therefore rational and human in so far as they obey reason' (S.T., III, q. 19, art. 2).

(406) As the context shows, St. Thomas is speaking about will as free. A human being has no mastery to do or omit an action unless his will is in this state.

(407) St. Thomas habitually calls will or willed acts those alone which he understands as necessarily free. This way of expressing himself can cause confusion to inattentive readers, and in fact has caused serious problems for theologians. The difficulty is noticeable in the first article of the second part of his Summa which acts as a foundation for the whole moral treatise that follows. Sometimes, in this first article, St. Thomas says simply will, but at other times he says (synonymously) deliberate will. Thus, he says: `Only actions under the control of the human being are properly called human. But the human being controls his actions through reason and will.' A little further on, however, he uses the following expressions for the same concept: `Only actions proceeding from a DELIBERATE WILL are properly called human.' We must not think that he makes no clear distinction between will as such and deliberate will; he does so very well indeed, attributing to the latter a different act of its own, that is, choice, whereas the more general act of volition pertains to the former. St. Thomas' mind, however, is clearly indicated because wherever he uses will and deliberate will indifferently, the context determines and explains the meaning to be given to each expression in every case. Elsewhere he expressly says that just as he considers the intellect and will as a single power, so he considers will and freedom as acts of the same power (S.T., III, q. 18, arts. 3 and 4, corp.).

(408) S.T., I [II]-II, q. 21, art. 2, corp.

(409) `Mortal sin, that is, sin imputed as mortal fault, consists in aversion from the final end, which is God. This aversion pertains to deliberating reason, whose function is to order things to their end. Sometimes, however, the soul's inclination to something contrary to the final end is not mortal sin because the deliberating reason had no possibility of taking action, as happens in movements to which the soul is subject' (S.T., I-II, q. 77, art. 8 corp.). [App., no. 12]

(410) In II, distinct. 30, §8.

(411) Hence, St. Thomas justly considers habits more as means of meriting than as merits themselves. He says: `We are said to merit by something in a twofold way. First, by merit itself, in the way we are said to run by running; in this case we merit by our acts. Second, we are said to merit by something as the principle of meriting, just as we are said to run by motive power; in this case we merit by virtues and habits' (S.T., I-II, q. 55, art. 1, ad. 3).