Chapter 6

DOUBT AND METHODICAL INTELLIGENCE

1477. Descartes founded the philosophical edifice on the basis of the state of doubt with which, according to him, he viewed all his knowledge. This he called `methodical doubt’; it was not intended as true doubt, but as an aid to the method and order in which philosophy had to be undertaken. Although Descartes was not the first to begin systematic learning with this supposed doubt, which had been admitted by the Scholastics,(337) methodical doubt did lead to serious criticism of Descartes, possibly through its abuse by some who misunderstood it.

1478. We must note two things here. First, at the beginning of philosophy, the supposed state of the philosopher is one of methodical ignorance rather than methodical doubt. If philosophy begins by indicating the origin of human knowledge, and develops by gradually deducing it from its first source, the nature of the philosophical treatise presupposes that prior to its origin this knowledge was not. But the absence of knowledge in human beings is called `ignorance’, and in this respect there is a clear difference between the character of Descartes’ philosophy and ours: his philosophy has a demonstrative nature, and intends from the start to search for certainty; our philosophy goes a step further back, and begins not from demonstration, but from observation of the first facts which are the basis of demonstration itself and constitute its possibility.

The first aim of our philosophy, therefore, is knowledge itself, not its certainty. We enquire about the existence and origin of knowledge and, as corollary to this, about the principle of certainty. Nevertheless, the origin and certainty of knowledge are very much alike. Consequently, the states of methodical ignorance and methodical doubt are alike. But first, in order to remove any ambiguity and reasonable cause for criticism on this point, I must show clearly the place held among human beings by such ignorance and doubt; this is the second of the observations which I had in mind.

1479. We have already distinguished popular from philosophical knowledge, and defined the latter as the effect of deeper reflection which by analysing, demonstrating and ordering popular knowledge forms philosophical knowledge (cf. 1264 ss.). Popular knowledge is sufficient, normally speaking, for the ordinary needs of human life, although philosophical knowledge could be very useful even here. But I want to note that popular knowledge, together with its certainty, must always be preserved in us, never cancelled, and never changed into true universal doubt. On the other hand, the first steps in philosophical investigation, when deeper reflection begins, necessarily presuppose the non-existence of all parts of the philosophy that we hope to produce. This makes up the state of methodical ignorance from which I start. It does not consist in the perfect absence of all knowledge, but the absence of philosophical knowledge or, as I said, of deeper reflection. And I think that some passages of Descartes(338) allow us to believe that he restricted his methodical doubt more or less within these limits. However, the idea he formed of it was not sufficiently clear and precise to enable him to communicate it to others with the clarity of the distinction made above.

Notes

(337) In accordance with the custom amongst the Schoolmen of his time, St. Thomas entitled all his treatises `Questions', and began from the objections that could be made against the truth. For example, `It would seem that there is no God' and similar phrases open the questions. St. Thomas worked in this way, as he says, because `those who want to seek the truth without first considering doubts against it, are like people who do not know where they are going'.

(338) In his discourse On Method, Descartes, who first proposes his doubt as the principle of philosophy, goes on to restrict it with several practical maxims. `The first of which,' he says, `would be to obey the laws and customs of my country by upholding constantly the religion in which God gave me the grace to be instructed from my infancy, and by directing myself in all things according to the most moderate and least excessive opinions which in practice would be accepted by the best of the people amongst whom I had to live.' Here we can see that Descartes deferred quite considerably to common sense. Nevertheless, some of his expressions show clearly that he had not noted the importance and the certainty of direct and popular knowledge.