The Origin Of Thought

Chapter 2

Mature And Popular Philosophy, And Their Opposite Defects

29. The two principles governing an exact, genuine method in philosophical investigation are matched by two, and only two, basic defects in theories concerned with the human spirit. Some theories offend against the first principle by not taking into account sufficient to explain the facts, others, by too easily accepting matters inessential to the explanation of facts provided by observation, offend against the second principle and give rise to superfluous hypotheses.

30. Avoiding these hazards is difficult, and philosophy is near perfection when it succeeds in negotiating them carefully. It will not achieve this, however: 1. without full and complete observation of the facts; 2. without accurately and wisely identifying and isolating specific, characteristic facts; 3. without recognising and weighing the difficulty of explaining the facts on the one hand, and the force of preferred reasons on the other. If philosophical understanding neglects accurate consideration and penetration both of the difficulty and of the force of the reasons given, the arguments will either be invalid or superfluous without our being aware of it.

31. Errors in popular philosophy originate in the absence of one or all of these three conditions, and usually offend against the first of the two principles mentioned above. Popular philosophy(2) is never based on complete observation. It is incapable of classifying observed facts, or of distinguishing characteristic from non-characteristic facts. Having collected many facts, it thinks it has made progress, without realising that the success of observation depends upon the number of characteristic facts, that is, upon those distinguishing a species, and not upon the number of common, repetitive facts. Finally, it does not penetrate the interior nature of the fact, nor feel the force of reasons explaining it. Popular philosophy is marked by all these imperfections and defects.

32. Anyone accustomed to reflection can easily recognise the imperfections of popular thinking through contact with people in general, amongst whom the absence of the three conditions already mentioned gives rise to evident contradiction. For instance, people generally show no surprise at what is in itself amazing. If you ask them a reason for the marvel, they imagine that their natural, easy answer is satisfactory, and they may even be amused at your ignorance. They ask few questions, and solve their difficulties with reasons, or gross suppositions, that leave them without misgivings. But when you cast doubt on their answers, or point to some snag they can comprehend, their first reaction leads them to the opposite extreme. Previously they had solved the difficulty by not seeing it but, as soon as they understand the objection, the reasons you rightly offer for its solution are as hard for them to follow as their previous acceptance of the matter was easy.

I mention this to show that the theories of those who take too little into account coincide with simplistic thinking in so far as both lack sufficient reasons. On the other hand, those take too much into account who, after serious investigation, have encountered difficulties without being able to discover any fundamental explanation for them. This requires time, because the first reasons suggested, although hypothetical and involved, are accepted by our impatient mind which, unable to discover better reasons, will not tolerate its own lack of them.

34. As a consequence, we can outline three periods of philosophy. First, popular philosophy, lacking self-criticism, which if it succeeds in seeing difficulties explains them by confused or shallow hypotheses. In the second period philosophy, having gained experience, is aware of the difficulties inherent in former hypotheses, and comes to despise the old, popular theories. Ingenious and difficult systems are devised, but they offend by excess as much as popular philosophy offended by defect. In both periods, philosophy is defective: in the first, because it is new to difficulties; in the second, because it is new to solving them. But as it progresses, defects are corrected and theories simplified and completed. Philosophy has now entered its third period, that of its perfection.

40. If I have to justify myself, therefore, for positing what I call the form of truth as the sole form of human reason, I can only succeed by showing that there is no other way to avoid the two hazards on which modern theories have foundered. [...] I have to prove that the theory postulating a single form of reason takes account of both dangers, while offering the simplest and most complete explanation of the fact I have before me. This theory will take into account and presuppose less than any other.

However, I do not wish to provide a theory of everything observable in the human spirit. I simply want to explain the origin of ideas. To do this, I shall first have to indicate as briefly and clearly as possible the essential nature of the fact. This will enable the reader to penetrate the problem, and understand why its solution is so difficult.

Notes

(2) What I call 'popular philosophy' is the imperfect philosophy found in the general body of thinkers despite the deep, speculative acumen presented in books handed down for generations. In the last century, marked by a move to forsake our entire tradition, philosophy relapsed into an infantile state. I call this 'popular philosophy' because, like the man in the street, it continues to deal with initial problems which later may have changed their nature and status as a result of deeper and more mature philosophy. [...]