Appendix 3. (305).
In his De Volunt. et Involuntar. (disp. 4, sect. 3) Suarez asks when lack of attention is willed and when unwilled. He replies that any answer has 'to avoid two extremes' (n. 17). The second extreme - the only one we need to consider here - consists in thinking that 'inattention is unwilled simply because it is not adverted to, that is, in so far as a person does not reflect upon his inattention and consequently does not form any consciousness of it. The other extreme is present when we say that lack of attention is willed only when it is reflected upon formally in some way, and WE EXPRESSLY NOTICE THAT THE MATTER IN HAND, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED SUFFICIENTLY, REQUIRES MORE CAREFUL ATTENTION or we at least doubt whether sufficient thought has been given to it, and consider that we are obliged to pay it more attention.' (n. 21). Suarez agrees that if this teaching were true, many difficulties would be solved easily, and many sins excused. But it is precisely this that makes him very suspicious of the opinion: 'But this makes me very SUSPICIOUS OF SUCH A MORALLY DIFFICULT opinion' (n. 21).
He goes on to note three absurdities which would arise if such lax teaching were accepted. First, no one would sin mortally who did not actually advert that his act was a grave offence against God. 'One EXTREMELY ABSURD consequence is that no one would sin mortally except the person who actually thinks that his act is a serious offence against God. Very few think in this way when they sin. They are preoccupied instead with their own pleasure, revenge or utility, etc.' (n. 14).
Second, all those who are on the whole perfect would never commit venial sins because they would never wish any evil to which they adverted. 'Secondly, it follows in the same way that no one would sin venially without actually pondering the malice and depravity of the venial sin and discovering it in the particular act he performs . . . The result of this can scarcely be believed. Many people in a normal state of perfection would rarely or never sin venially - yet the falsity of this is apparent from what we know on the subject of grace.
The conclusion is obvious: there are many who would never commit an evil act for any reason whatsoever if they ACTUALLY ADVERTED even to its venial malice. But IS THERE EVER ANY ACTUAL ATTENTION IN VENIAL SINS WHICH COME ABOUT ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT?. When actual attention is present, the sin has already been deliberated with at least the IMPERCEPTIBLE DELIBERATION (hence without conscience) SUFFICIENT FOR MORTAL SIN. This applies to actually carrying out the sin, as Cajetan noted above (II-II, q. 88, art. 1) and we shall consider when we come to the section on sins' (n. 15).
Finally, the third absurdity, noted by Suarez (n. 16) as a consequence of the opinion that inadverted lack of attention is never willed, is that in such a case there could be no imputation to fault without some actual reproof on the part of one's conscience. 'Thirdly, it follows that an act is never imputed to fault unless it is done WITH SOME ACTUAL REPROOF ON THE PART OF CONSCIENCE. If there were no reproof, there would be some lack of attention.' This would appear contrary to scripture in the first place. 'This consequence appears contrary to Paul's saying (2 [1] Cor 4): "I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted", words used almost in our context by St. Jerome in his Second Dialogue against Pelagius where he reproves Pelagius for saying that no sin is committed through ignorance. "Often enough," he says, "THERE IS SOME HIDDEN MALICE WHERE WE THINK WE HAVE ACTED WELL. This explains why the Apostle expresses himself cautiously: he may have sinned through ignorance." Certainly this ignorance in Paul could only consist in lack of actual attention . . . We also have the words of sacred scripture WHICH SEVERELY REPROVE THOSE WHO OFFEND WITHOUT ANY REPROOF ON THE PART OF CONSCIENCE BECAUSE THEY ARE SO ACCUSTOMED TO SINNING, and drink in sin like water.' The Fathers agree with this: 'The Fathers can be quoted as witnesses to this when they warn us that even works of virtue are to be done with great discretion "LEST WHAT IS THOUGHT TO BE A CAUSE OF VIRTUE BE IN FACT A GUILTY OFFENCE", as Gregory said (Moral., bk. 1, c. 19, alias 39; and bk. 5, c. 22, alias 23; and bk. 9, c. 16 seu 25 ss.), and Cassian (Collat., 1, c. 20-22).'
A little later (n. 23) Suarez considers the case of a person who in sinning adverts to what he does, but not to the species or gravity of the evil he commits. Suarez reproves those who say that such a person always sins venially simply because he does not advert in particular to the gravity of his sin. He says: 'This kind of moral teaching is FALSE AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS. If it were true, practically all sins would be venial, especially in the uneducated . . . Again, who would say that a person harming his neighbour, and actually thinking of doing evil and causing him harm - great harm, in fact - would sin only venially because he did not actually consider the gravity of the harm done?' He confirms this with another observation: 'This can be confirmed in another way. If two people commit a theft with exactly the same advertence, thinking only that the theft is evil but without considering the matter further, and one steals 100 and the other 10, the former sins more gravely although he does not advert formally to the more serious malice in the matter. If this were not the case, it would have to be said that sins done with simple, confused advertence to their malice, were equal and slight, which NO THEOLOGIAN WOULD HOLD.'
Suarez then brings forward (nn. 28-31) an intrinsic reason which shows undoubtedly that people can sin without conscience and without advertence to or reflection on the iniquity of their act. He begins with the principle obliging us to act prudently and with attention when our duties are in question. Such a precept can only be ignored through lack of attention and advertence. Now, let us suppose that this command would not oblige except when we reflect upon it. In this case, we have to go on to ask if this reflection on the command to reflect is obligatory or not. If it is not obligatory, there is no command to reflect on our duties. If it is obligatory, it either requires a further reflection on the obligation to reflect on the duty of reflection, or we have to say that there is an obligation to reflect without further reflection on the obligation. In the former case, we fall into the absurdity of requiring an infinite series of reflections before arriving at the precept of reflection on our duties.
Because an infinite series of reflections can never be exhausted, this is equivalent to rendering this precept impossible. In the second case, our assumption is granted: a command to reflect can be required or not required without further reflection, that is to say, without advertence. 'The obligation (of considering this precept, and acting prudently), or rather of not excusing persons from it, does not require formal, actual reflection and ADVERTENCE ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF ACTING PRUDENTLY. If this were the case, there would be another obligation about the obligation to advert and reflect, which in turn would require MORE ADVERTENCE AND MORE REFLECTION, and so on ENDLESSLY' (n. 31). Nor can it be maintained that in the absence of this advertence and reflection, free will is lacking. 'By the very fact of considering something, we CAN WILL to consider it EVEN IF THERE IS NO OTHER ACT BY WHICH WE CONSIDER OURSELVES CONSIDERING IT. In the same way, we can set our understanding to consider, in itself and distinctly, either the term of such habit or what is contained there in a confused manner. Augustine is very clear about this in De Trinitate, bk. 10, c. 1 and 2) But we shall speak about this more at length in the proper place' (n. 28).
Nevertheless, Suarez agrees (n. 27) that it is difficult to conceive how inadvertence and lack of attention can be 'indirectly willed' not only 'by means of a positive act', but also 'when an act is lacking'. He writes: 'The latter is more difficult to explain, and IN MY OPINION IT IS OFTEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO UNDERSTAND whether inadvertence is willed or not. This, perhaps, is why it is said that "the heart is deceitful above all things" (Jer 17), and "from my hidden sins cleanse me" (Ps 81 [18: 13]).'
But he notes that the difficulty in conceiving such an act of will is not sufficient to exclude it: 'Such a difficulty, however, does not provide sufficient reason for denying this kind of willed inattention.' He confirms this truth on the authority of St. Thomas and other teachers, 'St. Thomas (I-II, q. 6) undoubtedly presupposes this where he teaches . . . that an effect can be willed, although it may not be foreseen (he is speaking about direct, not about possible, indirect foresight) . . . The same truth can be gathered from other authors who say that VIRTUAL DELIBERATION, as Cajetan affirms, or INTERPRETATIVE DELIBERATION, as Durandus affirms, is sufficient for a willed act. Others state that fault is present when the will neglects to apply the intellect sufficiently to learn what is required, as Gabriel says in 2, D. 12, and Cordova accepts with others whom he quotes, q. 17, dub. 1, in fine.'
I hope this extract from Suarez' teaching about inattention and inadvertence will be useful in pointing to a difficult moral question, which today is treated far too lightly. The extract shows: 1. that according to Suarez, St. Thomas, St. Augustine and the other doctors quoted, inadvertence itself is sometimes a sin, although the inadvertence is not adverted to; 2. that hence while knowledge of evil and free will are indeed necessary for a culpable sin, advertence, that is, reflection on one's knowledge and on one's free will, is not - hence neither advertence, nor conscience is involved; 3. that consequently an erroneous, malicious and blameworthy judgment is possible without reflection, attention or conscience on the part of the person who makes the judgment; 4. that this culpable error is not something natural and necessary, but willed and free, at least as a consequence of the bad disposition of will that precedes and determines it.