Appendix 4. (360).
An apparently simple act is very often composite, that is, caused by many simultaneous acts, some good, some evil, which can differ in their morality. This union of good and evil in human actions is always possible in the case of venial sins which, because they do not drive grace away, do not prevent merit. It explains many otherwise inexplicable facts praised in divine scripture such as God's praise of the Hebrew nurses despite their untruthfulness. 'In saving children,' says St. Thomas, 'these nurses acted with a good will. Nevertheless their will was not upright when they lied' (S.T., I-II, q. 114, last art., ad 2). The question of multiple good and bad moral acts existing in a single act is dealt with clearly by Cardinal Gerdil in his De Actib. Hum., c. 4, prop. 3.
St. Bernard also recognises that it is possible, in the same act, to merit and to sin venially as a result of the complexity of the elementary acts constituting the action in its moral essence. After saying that if an act is evil, the intention cannot make it good, he adds: 'I maintain that a right intention alone also deserves praise. Clearly, a good will is not deprived of its worthy reward even in an act that is not good. However, simplicity is not deceived without some evil' (De Praecepto et Dispens., c. 14). In my opinion St. Alphonsus does not use appropriately this passage of St. Bernard, and another of St. Thomas, in attempting to show that a good intention sanctifies an action in itself evil. He writes: 'The holy doctor (Aquinas) is speaking here of good understood simply and absolutely, not relatively and accidentally, that is, of good invincibly apprehended by conscience which is the proximate rule of our action' (De Consc., c. 1, 7). This distinction does not seem to represent Aquinas' mind on the matter. St. Thomas speaks expressly about sin; he says: 'Whatever is done contrary to the law is always evil, and is not excused by the fact that it is done according to conscience' (Quodlib., 8, 13).
Summarised, the different opinions may be expressed as follows:
1. When we act contrary to the law, even if according to conscience, sin is
always present;
2. When we act according to conscience, even against the law, sin is never
present;
3. We must distinguish between a vincible and invincible
conscience: we always act correctly with an invincible conscience but not with
a vincible conscience. The majority follow this third opinion.
But the correct definition of an invincible conscience leads to further differences, or at least obscurity. An invincible conscience:
a) can be directly contrary to the rational law;
b) can never be contrary to the rational law;
c) cannot be contrary to the principles of natural law, but can
be contrary to the remote consequences of the law.
I hold the third opinion, but I must add a distinction I consider important. Relative to the remote consequences of the natural law, an erroneous conscience can be formed:
1. through inculpable ignorance, in which case the dictate to be applied is absent and the conscience is indeed invincibly erroneous;
2. through culpable ignorance, that is, through neglect or hatred of the truth; in this case the dictate is again absent but such a conscience is seldom sincere (which means it is rarely conscience) and is always sinful. Nevertheless, if the dictate is absent and we have repented of our sin of ignorance (at least generally of all our sins, known or not), which we cannot dispel immediately, the vincible conscience becomes invincible for as long as we are not able to dispel the ignorance, and we do not sin by acting in accord with it;
3. through error in deducing or applying the proximate dictate. In this case:
either A, the error is due to ignorance of a fact or circumstance, and can be culpable or inculpable; or it is due to another's authority, which can be followed without fault, and sometimes must be.
or B, the error is formal; in which case moral defect and sin is always present; the conscience is no longer invincible, and it is sinful to follow it.
But this last sin can be venial or mortal. In the first case it is possible for the action, even if done with minor guilt, to be good, granted the good intention of the will. In the second case the action can never be good but can be accompanied by some good, natural disposition.