Appendix 8. (626).
St. Alphonsus himself asks: 'Must a subject obey his superior in matters which are doubtfully unlawful?' He replies affirmatively, but qualifies his answer in this way: 'Soto, Tournely, Lessius, Sanchez, the Salmaticensians and in general all theologians limit this: whenever what is commanded is extremely difficult or harmful, namely, if the subject in obeying had to expose himself or another person to danger of serious spiritual or temporal harm' (Th. M. De Cons., n. 31).
St. Alphonsus reasons as follows: 'In doubt, the superior, who holds the power of command, is favoured. The doubt cannot rob him of his power to command.' He repeats this when he speaks of a doubtfully unjust war (Morale Systema, coroll. 1).
However, we have to ask ourselves in the first place if possession of the power to command - on which the argument relies - is the possession under consideration in moral cases. This kind of possession depends upon answering the question: 'Which actually prevails here and now: the law or freedom?'; it does not depend on the superior's actually holding the power to command, or upon any other person's holding it. Two principles, dissimilar in nature but similar in expression, have been confused.
In the second place, the reason why a subject must fight even in a doubtfully just war does not depend upon the ruler's possession of the power to command. In fact, if the ruler thought the war were doubtfully just, he could not put his subjects' lives in danger by waging it. The reason for obedience is that 'the right to judge if a war is just or not is the responsibility of the ruler', not of the subject. The subject has to consider it just on the authority of the ruler (as we saw, this is a principle of moral certainty) who declares it just, unless of course there are clear arguments to the contrary. If a ruler or government were to neglect morality and justice, and were to call on subjects to wage a doubtfully just war, the subjects would not be obliged to support what the governing authority has declared doubtfully just. This is true even though in general there is a definite right to command vested in the ruler or government. In this particular case, the right would not be certain, but altogether non-existent.
How then are we to solve our general question: 'Must the subject obey a
superior who commands something doubtfully lawful?'
We have to distinguish.
If the doubtful unlawfulness springs from positive laws, but in itself the
action is certainly upright, the subject must obey.
If the doubt concerns the intrinsic uprightness of the action commanded, a
further distinction is necessary.
If the person in command judges the action to be lawful (and we have to
presuppose this, if he commands it), and his judgment is such that we have
to abandon all doubt (either because of the right he has to make such a
judgment or in general because he possesses magisterial authority), then we
must obey.
If the judgment of the person in command is not such that we must obey
it (granted, for instance, special circumstances), our first duty is to resolve
the doubt. It will never be lawful for us to act while we are truly in doubt
about the intrinsic lawfulness of an action.