Appendix 11. (743).
The obligation not to reject any so-called probable opinion, that is, an opinion supported by even a small number of moralists, was asserted so forcefully that 'refusing absolution to a pentient who acted according to a probable opinion' was considered 'a mortal sin by its very nature'. This was Fr. Bauny's very rigorous statement in favour of the lax view, and he cites Suarez, Vasquez and Sanchez. But such an absolute decision seems to me very strange on the lips of a probabilist. I have no doubt that many reputable authors would reject it and, in doing so, would approve as probable the opposite opinion affirming that 'the confessor does not sin if he refuses absolution to a penitent who refuses to accept an opinion supported by some contemporary moralists, but considered truly false and harmful by the confessor himself'. But if the second opinion (that the confessor does not sin) is as probable as the first, can Bauny accuse of mortal sin the confessor who follows it? The first opinion is indeed contradictory when affirmed by probabilists, and self-destructive.
I have defined probable opinions according to the mind of the authors I am refuting, that is, 'opinions sustained by a small number of moralists.' But the respect due to recent moralists was taken to extremes when their opinions were made an obligation of conscience according to the statement, supported by not a few authors, 'that a single reputable author is sufficient to make an opinion probable'. Amongst the moralists in favour of this assertion were Fagnani (op. cit.), Gregory of Valencia (I, 2, dis. 2, q. 12, tract. 4, q. 4), Emmanuel Sà (Summ. in 5 Dubium, n. 1), Sanchez (Decal, tom. 1, bk. 1, c. 9, n. 6), Filliuccio (Tom. 2, tract. 21, c. 4, n. 134), and others referred to by Diana (Resol. Moral., part. 4, tract. 4; Miscell., resol. 30). Sanchez writes: 'You may doubt whether the authority of a single reputable author is sufficient to make an opinion probable. I reply, along with Angelo, Silvius, Navarrus, Emmanuel Sà, etc, that it can. The proof may be stated as follows. A probable opinion is one based on a solid foundation. But the authority of a pious, learned person is not a weak, but a truly strong foundation' (Sum., bk. 1, c. 9). Therefore . . . such teaching becomes repugnant when it is taken to the point of reducing all decisions simply to the opinions of theologians which then become an obligation in conscience to confessors under pain of mortal sin. And it is offered as benign teaching. On the other hand, there is some truth in it when its authority is viewed more moderately and accompanied by reason, which God has given to everyone. But we shall speak later about this aspsect of the teaching.