Appendix 12. (787).
The moralists' phrase probable opinions is concerned with theory; the phrase the judgment on the probable lawfulness of an action I am about to do is concerned with conscience. Probable opinions, which are so many different general theories, are found in books and in the minds of moralists; the judgment on the probable lawfulness of an action I am about to do is wholly particular, and is not found in books and in the minds of moralists but formed in an instant by a person about to act. It is therefore a spontaneous judgment on the probable lawfulness of the action which he is considering. Probability in this case falls immediately on the lawfulness of the action under consideration, and is therefore a probability proximate to action. In forming this judgment, use is sometimes made of a probable opinion, that is, a theory applied in judging the lawfulness of an action, but not the action itself. Relative to the action, therefore, we are dealing with a remote probability.
For example, I could have a firm, certain opinion, and nevertheless remain uncertain about the lawfulness of my action if in applying this opinion I doubt whether I am applying it rightly. Probable opinions and what is normally called probable conscience are different things, giving rise to quite different questions. 'Is it lawful for me to follow probable opinions?' is not the same as 'Is it lawful for me to follow a probable conscience?' Considering the two questions as though they were the same is the cause of great confusion and harm, and my whole aim in writing this study on conscience has been to separate them clearly. Anyone wishing to act must first resolve the question 'What must I do if I am in doubt about the lawfulness of my action, or if the lawfulness of my act is only probable?' But the other question 'To what extent and how may I follow probable opinions?' has to be resolved principally by those directing others who act. It concerns the confessor's moral science especially, not the conscience of the person who acts. We have dealt with the former throughout the book, with the latter only here at the end.
Nevertheless, these questions, so different in themselves, gradually develop towards one another. This takes place because theory in every science is always a complex of principles which of their nature form an order with different levels where the more general descend to the less, right down to the final species. The same occurs in moral science. The opinions (if I may speak like this) composing it are distributed of their nature in different orders: first, the most general, then the less general, and finally the most particular and determined of all, that is, so-called cases of conscience. When these cases are solved, they come very close to the judgment of conscience which they help to form, although they are confused with it because:
1. Cases of conscience proposed in morals books usually lack innumerable determinations fosund in practice. The immense diversity of these determinations cannot be adequately catered for in a book.
2. Even if the cases proposed and resolved in books did in fact possess all the determinations and accidental qualities found in practice, the solutions given would still be theoretical and general and, as such, applicable to an infinite number of equal cases.
The real case cannot therefore be resolved by means of the theoretical case until the latter is applied to the former. But this application also presents its own difficulties, and is subject to error if made inexpertly. For example, the theoretical case can be applied rightly to the real case only if the two are perfectly equal. And how easy it is to take two similar cases as though they were equal!
Although the most particular opinions, that is, those regarding the solution of cases presented in all their individual circumstances, do indeed come close to the real solutions found by the conscience of the person who acts, the two questions about probable opinions and probable conscience (to use the common phrase) remain distinct.