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Chapter 1

The Formation Of Conscience

115. The problem of the origin of conscience involves:

1. An investigation of the stimuli that lead us to form the judgment called moral conscience before we act;
2. An investigation of the difference between the human spirit devoid of conscience and the human spirit which possesses and uses conscience as a proximate rule of its actions.

116. We have already dealt with the first of the two investigations (cf. 49-71). We noted that one of the first stimuli, perhaps the first to move us to make a definite judgment about our actions, is our perverse will. Because we are inclined to evil, we do not follow the spontaneous movement of nature (for which conscience is not required). We act against nature and place ourselves in opposition to the law by determining our free will through a practical judgment. We judge it good to act against the law. Such a judgment necessarily includes the ethical judgment that our act is contrary to the law: and this judgment is conscience.

117. We have noted that two circumstances accompanied the first example of sin in Genesis: 1. the evil action done by the first human beings was not against natural law but against positive law; and 2. they were moved to perform it by the seductive words of the demon.

These circumstances are very important. In a good nature, subject to a loving providence, no reason could be found obliging human beings to decide to sin against the natural law. It is difficult enough to believe that they could be induced to sin even against the positive law if an external being had not moved them to do so through speech, and persuaded them to think they would obtain some mysterious good by violating the law. The natural law itself directed them to the observance of the positive law, because it is a precept of natural law to obey the one who has the right to command.

The first sin, when analysed, reveals: 1. a positive law; 2. an external temptation; 3. speech, that is, a means of communication by which the human mind was able to conceive the positive law and to receive the temptation through belief in the false good deceptively offered to the imagination by violation of the law. Here are found all the elements that explain how the human race passed from a state without conscience to the state of conscience.

It will not be a waste of time if we consider these two states of the human spirit so as to explain clearly what we are saying and avoid misunderstanding.

118. The will is the principle of moral actions. Thus, in order to indicate the different moral states of the human being and the different kinds of morality he acquires, we must determine and describe the various states of the human will.

119. The will is defined as a principle which acts in accordance with what we know.

120. Its different states cannot be described, therefore. without a prior description of the different states of the mind. In our case, this simply means defining the ways in which the mind conceives the law, the norm of the will.

121. Each of the different ways in which knowledge of the law presents itself to the understanding can be a basis for the will's moral action. More importantly, the different ways can be present simultaneously in the same mind, and so the will can have different foundations for its actions. As we shall see, all the difficulties concerning conscience come from this last fact.

122. Let us see, therefore, amongst the different ways in which the law can be present in the human mind, those to which no conscience corresponds, and those with corresponding consciences. We will then examine how the states with corresponding consciences differ from each other, and thus determine the different states of conscience. This will allow us to investigate the logical rules for solving the difficulties found in those states.

123. At first, the human being lacks all determined ideas, which are acquired only at a later stage. But he perceives beings, and notices among them not only those like himself, endowed with feeling, intelligence and the desire for a pleasant existence, but also those lacking all feeling, or which, having feeling, lack intelligence and will. Here, I am not concerned whether such a person sometimes wrongly attributes intelligence and will (qualities proper to him) to beings that do not have them. Even if mistaken, he still conceives beings like himself, and distinguishes them from those without his own endowments.

124. The spontaneous movement of his own nature (granted that it is not damaged) is to acknowledge these beings in practice for what they are, according to his mental conception of them. This means giving them the same value he gives himself, and results in an equivalent affection. But to acknowledge spontaneously these beings conceived in his mind, in the way he conceives them, requires no other law or norm than the beings themselves as determined by the judgment made at the time of their perception. All that is required, is 1. the perception of the beings (direct knowledge), and 2. the spontaneous movement of the will, which adheres to the entire conceived entity (practical, reflective-willed knowledge).

125. These are the first moral acts of a human being. They precede the formation of moral norms and precepts, but their morality is undeniable because the will acts in conformity with the exigency of beings. They also precede the formation of all moral, abstract norms because the first moral acts require only the mental conception of the beings towards whom they are directed, and the spontaneous movement of the will.

In these first moments when the human being begins to act morally, he has not formed any science of morality, nor could he answer questions on the matter; he could not state any precept or law externally with words or even internally in his mind, because a precept or law, whether spoken or thought, is something abstracted from beings, a general concept. At this stage the human being has only the perception and conception of individual beings without any reflection.

126. Comparing our actions with the law to discover whether they conform to it or not, requires a judgment of conscience. Neither a mental conception of individual beings, by itself, nor the spontaneous movement of the will determining our actions, is sufficient. An abstract, general norm is necessary, to act as mediator for the comparison between actions to be done and conceived beings. The analysis of any comparison clearly demonstrates this need, and I have shown that no comparison could be made if only two real terms were present, for example, two sensations of a similar white colour. To be able to compare these two kinds of whiteness, we need the abstract concept of whiteness in general. In the comparison, we are simply applying the axiom: two things equal to a third are equal to each other.(90)

127. Thus, in our case, each action must be judged either right and good or evil. Or to keep the expression that first comes to mind, we must judge whether the esteem we give to each being is equal or not to the exigency of its mentally conceived being. And we cannot make this judgment unless we have previously abstracted from the being the concept of its exigency, that is, the force of obligation, the rule, precept and law.

128. A study of knowledge shows that an abstract idea is formed only with the help of speech.(91) Consequently, in order to have conscience, we must live in society, and receive from the speech preserved by the society the development necessary for us to form the abstract concept of obligation. We will reach the same conclusion if we recall that conscience is a judgment at the second level of reflection at least (cf. 30, 3l), and that we do not move to this level except by means of speech obtained by our association with other intelligent beings.

129. Furthermore, if we find in society someone to teach or state for us the formula containing the abstract law, our understanding carries out the abstraction much more quickly. And this is what usually takes place, especially if we are in contact with a higher, intelligent being from the beginning of our development, as happened with the first father of the human race, to whom God himself spoke.

In fact, people often say to children: 'You must do this; you must not do that' or 'Don't do that; it is wrong.' In this way they communicate the idea of duty, obligation and law, an idea or mental being, abstracted from perceived beings. Such instructions have an extraordinary way of moving the child's attention (which is concentrated naturally and totally on understanding the words it hears) to determine abstractedly the idea of law, duty and obligation.

130. If we are stimulated to form this abstraction by speech, and by society's use of speech, we must also admit that the abstract idea of law becomes even more distinct and separate from perceived beings if we are victims of temptation, that is, if some evil being proposes and persuades us to do evil, or act contrary to our duty. The reason for this, as I have already explained, is that on the one hand we feel the exigency of the being against whom we are being induced to sin, while on the other we are aware that the suggestion itself is contrary to the exigency. Because of this opposition, the obligation we are tempted to violate presents itself more urgently to our mind and is felt more acutely in our spirit. This is the normal way in which human intelligence perfects its knowledge; it notes differences when faced with comparisons and contraries.(92)

131. Finally, the greatest help we have in fixing our attention on our obligation and on the law abstracted from beings is the imposition of a positive law, which also requires speech.

A precept or positive law is simply the will, expressed in signs, of a being who has the right to command. The expression is itself something abstracted from the beings to which it applies. For example, the concept contained in the formula: 'You shall not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil' differs so much from the concept of the tree itself that a human being would never have obtained it from the perception of the tree. But once the law was stated, two things were present: the perceived tree, object of the law, and the law itself. This indicates an important difference between positive law and rational law. In positive law two things are always distinguished, the object of the law and the law itself; in rational law this is not necessarily so. As we develop, rational law is present in us in two successive states corresponding to the levels of development. In the first state, there is no law differing from mentally conceived beings; they are themselves laws. Their quantity of being shows the amount of action we need towards them and also manifests their exigency, which is felt not in the abstract but in their perception. The second state follows on the first: moved by some stimulus, we abstract this exigency and, separating it from the subsistent beings, express it in some way, giving it a condition similar to that of the positive law. It becomes a mental entity formulated in words, independent of any being and applicable to every being of the same species or genus.

132. Only when law has acquired its own mental existence in human understanding, can it be called 'law'. Because of this, I have made the essence of law consist in a notion of the mind, according to which we must act.(93) This does not exclude the existence of the force of law and obligation prior to the notion in its abstract form. In fact we have seen that this force is the exigency in beings to be spontaneously and rationally acknowledged for what they are as soon as they are perceived. The exigency has no name because it has no mode of being of its own, a state required for anything to be named. However it receives such a mode of being of its own when it is abstracted as a mental being from beings and becomes applicable to them as their measure.

133. This change of the exigency of beings into a true law expressed like positive law is mentioned by St. Paul when he is speaking about the pagans' lack of the positive law of Moses: 'When Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them.'(94) He says the Gentiles have no law. This refers to an early stage of humanity, when positive law, such as the law of the Hebrews, did not exist. Secondly, he says that, although they did not have a law, they did by nature what belongs to the law.(95) This is a second stage of humanity: because intellectual and moral faculties have their own instinctive action, people act naturally and spontaneously according to the exigency of beings. Thirdly, he says the Gentiles are a law to themselves, conscious of doing good and evil, accusing and defending themselves. This is a third stage: humans have noticed within themselves the exigency of beings (through conscience, with its remorse and approval) and have expressed the exigency in words, demonstrated by their mutual accusations and defence.

134. Hence, as soon as human beings acquire in their spirit the abstract, formulated notion called 'law', they are able to use it as rule and norm of their actions, and are forbidden to act against it.

135. In fact the formed law becomes our rule of action because it is extremely helpful, is clearly present to our minds and attracts our free, personal attention much more than the felt exigency of beings which, in its non-abstracted state, is one with our perception.

136. However, we must not think that when we possess the law, we no longer feel the exigency of the perceived beings which beforehand we felt directly without the mediation of formulated law. Perceived beings continue to make their exigency felt directly in us,(96) although the exigency is of things that take place in us without their being noticed by ourselves or even by philosophers. First, as we have often said, our spontaneous action is always difficult to observe and analyse because it contains nothing new and extraordinary to engage our powers of attention and reflection. Second, formulated law, which has become the clear, general rule of our activity, is nearly always associated with the exigency of perceived beings, and demands our full attention in such a way that we persuade ourselves that we follow no other principle of action. In reality, however, things are often very different: two principles controlling our actions are at work simultaneously, namely, the exigency of perceived beings, inseparable from beings, and formulated law. When we act in accordance with the exigency of beings we act immediately and spontaneously, and although we operate rationally, our actions are very similar to those produced by feeling — so much so that the effect produced in us by the exigency of beings can be called feeling. When we act in accordance with formulated law, however, we usually pay attention to what we are doing, make a choice, and even deliberate.

137. But even more thought needs to be given to the fact that these two principles not only move us simultaneously to action but draw us in opposite directions. This explains the state of perplexity in which we sometimes find ourselves.

138. All this will be clear from what has been said. When we act according to formulated law, as we do in a developed state, the application of the law must be made to the act we wish to posit, because formulated law is not a part of beings, as we have seen, but something separate and abstract, a mental being on its own. It is impossible for us, therefore, to use it as a norm of our actions if we do not first apply it to beings and to the actions we intend to do, when we judge them in conformity or not with the law. However, we can err in making this application, and often do so without noticing what we have done. We make a false judgment, pronouncing as right an action that is wrong, or viceversa. Our judgment now contradicts the judgment we have called moral sense or feeling produced in the perception of beings. Thus there are two conflicting rules of action in us.

139. And here indeed we see clearly how we cannot act in accord with formulated law if we have not first formed a conscience about our actions. As we have said, formulated law cannot be used as a norm for our actions until it is applied because, by means of this application, our actions are judged right or wrong, in conformity with the law or not. This judgment on actions we intend to do is precisely conscience.

140. Conscience therefore is the proximate rule for human actions, but it is not the only rule. There are two proximate rules: 1. the moral sense or non-formulated law, which guides human beings to moral actions without conscience and needs no application, since it applies itself and 'adheres' to perceived beings; and 2. conscience, which is the application of formulated law to the individual actions each person is about to do.

Notes

(90) Nuovo Saggio sull'origine delle Idee, Intra, 1885, vol. 1, sect. 3, c. 4, art. 20.

(91) OT, 514.

(92) It will be helpful to quote St. Augustine who, after mentioning certain passages of the letter to the Romans that deal with the law as the occasion of sin, adds that if the law produced sin, sin then gave human beings knowledge of themselves and awareness of their own weakness. 'Well then, can it be doubted that the law was given for us to find ourselves? As long as God did not prohibit evil, we were hidden from ourselves; we did not discover how weak we were until we received the prohibiting law. It was then we found ourselves, found ourselves acting evilly. Where could we flee? Wherever we went, our very self followed us. And what use was the knowledge of ourselves as refound, if we were reproached by conscience?' (St. Aug., Serm. 154, de verb. Apost., Rom 7, c. 1, 1).

(93) PE, 1, 2.

(94) Rom 2: 14, 15.

(95) The scientific precision of St. Paul's words needs to be noted. In several places he implicitly refers to the acknowledgement-principle that we accept as the essence of morality. He says that although the Gentiles 'knew God they did not honour him as God'. Here we find direct knowledge of God, which requires as a consequence that God be honoured, that is, acknowledged in practice. He goes on: 'and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds, or animals or reptiles.' Here he indicates the efficacy of a corrupt will to transform one being into another by attributing to it what belongs to the other, despite what is known about the perceived being. Thus, he says: 'They exchanged the truth about God' (direct knowledge, in which the true concept of God is found) 'for a lie', that is, for a fiction of their imagination. That we must act according to the knowledge of being is wonderfully expressed in the words about the Gentiles: 'They did not see fit to acknowledge God' (Rom 1: 21, 23, 25, 28).

(96) For this reason the law inscribed in us is fittingly called both 'natural' and 'rational'. It is natural in so far as the intellectually conceived nature of beings is a law or rule for our actions; it is rational in so far as it is reason which first conceives beings and then abstracts their exigency and formula. Thus the term 'natural law' is appropriate for the law's first appearance, when it is still part of the natures of beings; 'rational law' is much better adapted to describe the law's second appearance, when it has been abstracted and becomes a being of our reason.