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Chapter 2 - (Part 1)

Erroneous Conscience

231. The rules for an erroneous conscience are more difficult to determine and must be deduced more carefully. We should note that error in conscience can happen in three ways:

1. we can be mistaken about the law, that is, about the moral formula applied in the judgment of conscience;
2. we can be mistaken in our way of applying the law or formula to our actions;
3. we can be mistaken about some factual circumstance when applying the law.

232. An error therefore can concern either law, or an application of the law, or a fact. An example will illustrate the three kinds of mistake.

At the beginning of Christianity, some Jews believed that the law of circumcision and other ancient ceremonies were still obligatory. Hence they formed an erroneous conscience about the necessity of maintaining the Mosaic law. This erroneous conscience was caused by an error regarding the law.

The Pharisees formed an erroneous conscience about the sanctification of the Sabbath: they forbade certain minute actions as if they were prohibited by the law which obliged the sanctification of the seventh day of the week. Their conscience was erroneous because it came from an error about the application of the Sabbath law to minute actions.
Jacob formed an erroneous conscience when he believed it was lawful for him to sleep with the woman in whose company he found himself on the first night of his marriage; he thought Lia was his wife Rachel. This erroneous conscience was due to an error about fact.

233. These examples, however, are not sufficient to classify the various errors possible in forming the judgment. Each example is only a particular case of the three kinds of erroneous conscience we have distinguished. But we can in fact err in many ways not only about the law, but also about its application and about fact. Discussion about conscience would receive much light if we could carefully enumerate all these ways, but to avoid prolonging the argument, we shall deal with the distinctions as they arise.

RULE

234. 'It is always unlawful to act against an invincibly erroneous conscience.'

Explanation

Whether the error is due to a preceding error about the law or about fact, or due to an error concomitant with the application of the law, is indifferent. If at the time the conscience is formed the error is truly invincible so that the conscience is formed without any hesitation or doubt whatever, it obliges; to act against the dictate of such a conscience is unlawful. This obvious truth is accepted by all. If a person is persuaded without any hesitation - this proviso must be carefully noted - that an action or its omission is a sin, he cannot desire the action or omission without desiring the sin and performing a reprehensible act.

235. This fault, depending entirely on the false persuasion of the subject, belongs to subjective morality.

236. Before we determine how a person with a vincibly erroneous conscience is obliged to act, we must describe what constitutes vincible error and distinguish it from invincible error. Without an accurate concept of vincible error, no obligation can be safely determined.

237. Vincible error is usually defined as 'that which can and must be avoided'. Although this definition is sufficient, an important question has to be solved: When can and must we avoid error?

238. First, the expression, 'an error that can be avoided', certainly has different meanings. If it meant absolute possibility, no error could be avoided because every error is of its nature contingent and not necessary. Moralists therefore are not speaking about this kind of possibility.

239. I have shown in Certainty that there are only two causes of human error: human will and a false datum supposed true.(130)
Is every willed error vincible? Can all willed errors be avoided? If somebody chose to follow an opinion known to be erroneous, it is clear that the error would not only be vincible but also a free aversion from the truth.

240. To speak about 'willed errors', however, means to refer to cases where the will is involved but, because of a hurried and immature judgment, does not know that error is present. Are all such errors invincible and inevitable?
We must distinguish three cases. The will can be moved to an erroneous conclusion by three causes: 1. evil disposition, which induces the will to see as true the erroneous conclusion favourable to its yearning and urges it to a precipitate judgment; 2. natural instinct; 3. the need to act, which obliges the human being to make a practical decision in favour of one side or the other.

241. If the will is ensnared by evil disposition, the culpability of the error conforms with the cause. Thus if the evil disposition as cause of the error was free, the error was free and vincible. If it was not free, the error is a necessary moral evil (cf. 81-110).(131)

242. If the error has its cause in natural instinct, as in the case of thinking the sun revolves around the earth, the error is innocent, provided it is, as we have said, provisional, and rejected as soon as the light of truth presents itself.(132)

243. Finally, if the cause is the need to act, the error is innocent provided the person makes a simple practical assertion of his own choice, without adding absolute certainty, and is ready to change his opinion once the truth is made known.

244. If the error is caused by some false datum supposed true, it can be simply material and entirely innocent, provided it is not produced by any evil disposition of the will, in which case the error would be willed because of its cause.
We must now examine whether material error can occur relative to the law, or to the way the law is applied or to some fact or circumstance serving as the occasion for applying the law.

245. If we consider the application of the law to a particular action (the judgment of conscience is formed by means of such an application), we see that every error is always willed and very often vincible. The application is a judgment, an action, by which we affirm the harmony or disharmony of two terms. Now either we see this relationship of harmony or disharmony between the two terms and affirm it, committing no error; or we do not see it, or doubt we see it and are unable to make ourselves fully aware of what we see. In this case only an evil energy of the will influenced by passion can force us to affirm, not merely provisionally and practically (cf. 242, 243) but absolutely, that we do see it. In other words, only an evil will can force us to lie to ourselves, producing a spurious persuasion about something we do not actually see. This is a formal error and cannot be called invincible in our sense of the word.

246. Invincible error must be sought either in an opinion about the law or in a presumed datum or fact, that provides an occasion for applying the law.
In the case of truly invincible error about the law, we must distinguish rational from positive law. We must further distinguish in rational law between our own cognitions and cognitions received on another's authority.

247. A necessary error regarding our own cognitions in rational law is impossible if we exclude the cases already discussed of provisional, practical conclusions (cf. 246). We cannot be forced to deceive ourselves if our will sincerely desires to follow only the truth. Because the first principles of natural law are placed in us by nature, nature does not deceive us. The deductions, however, that we make from these principles of the law in order to arrive at specific formulas, can only result from reasoning. But as we have said, there can be no definite, firm, entirely unwilled error, in our reasoning. No one can force us to draw consequences from premises unconnected with the consequences, or to see a connection which does not exist. If we persuade ourselves that we see some connection when we do not, there is disorder within us in the form of a precipitate will which prefers illusion rather than truth - an illusion which cannot deceive without the support of the will. This is not a truly unwilled, invincible, and inevitable error; it is an error certainly avoidable by a simple, true will, which affirms only what the intellect sees.

248. This does not mean that we deny the debility of our reason or its incapacity for making remote deductions from the natural law. It means that we are not constrained to make the deductions; we can either suspend our judgment, or at most and if necessary make a provisional or probable judgment, or, if we have to act, a judgment in the form of a supposition. In this case we are ignorant, but not mistaken. If we are ignorant, the natural law, in respect of the deductions we are incapable of making, can be given us on another's authority. The natural law then becomes known positively, and takes on the character of positive law, which is susceptible to invincible error.

249. But if the deduction of the natural law is not given us on another's authority, we remain ignorant. Such ignorance can truly be unavoidable and entirely inculpable precisely because it is necessary. Consequently, when we apply the law to our actions, this ignorance gives rise to a directive which in itself is erroneous but without fault and moral defect, because it comes from weakness in our reasoning, not from a distortion of the will. For example, a simple, virtuous person may so weaken himself in his pursuit of some virtue that he shortens his life. If he had reflected on the harm caused to his bodily health by his fervour, and on the duty of conserving his health while not neglecting other duties, he would have moderated his excessive external effort for the love of good without diminishing that love. But he never reached this height of reflection, and so could not deduce the moral formula prescribing greater discernment in his behaviour. He therefore devoted himself totally to the duty and virtue he had in mind, fulfilling the former and sacrificing himself for sake of possessing the latter.(133)

250. Invincible error therefore must be sought:

1. in positive law;
2. in natural law, a) which is received as positive law on another's authority, and is relative to consequences a person cannot deduce for himself from the principles; b) in remote deductions (of the natural law) which are either not deduced because of weakness in reasoning or are assumed as probable, provisional judgments because of the need to act; c) in a particular directive we have formed in invincible ignorance of a remote deduction of the natural law;
3. in a fact, occasioning the application of the law.(134)

251. Everything we have said accords with the principles of the science of knowledge. I have shown that 'material errors have two causes: 1. a judgment based on a datum produced by a blind power; 2. a judgment based on a fallible authority.'(135)

252. In the case of human positive laws or opinions of experts about the natural law, unwilled and entirely invincible errors can easily arise because it is not our reason that acts, but our faith in another's authority. Thus, to assume a conclusion as certain because of our need to act, although we are unable to judge it as absolutely certain, is the action of a blind power in that we choose to suppose the conclusion as certain without any cogent reason. In the same way, we can either know a contingent fact on another's authority or, basing ourselves on certain probabilities, assume it as true. We may need to believe the authority, or accept the probable fact by supposing it hypothetically true. For example, if during a journey a priest tells me it is a fast day in the region, I must believe him if I have no contrary reason. If he tells me it is a non-fast day and I eat accordingly, my error is material, not willed, and therefore invincible. Absolutely speaking, I could have avoided the error, of course; I could have asked someone else. But relatively to my circumstances, I neither could do so nor needed to do so because: 1. I suspected no deception; and 2. I had no reason to suspect deception (I was reasonably bound to suppose that what the priest affirmed was true).

The same can be said about errors of fact. Absolutely speaking, Jacob could have verified whether the woman with him was Lia or Rachel. But relative to his circumstances he neither could nor needed to. It was impossible and unbecoming to think that his father-in-law had betrayed him: impossible, because a reason is required for thinking of such a possibility; unbecoming, because if he had thought about it, he would have to reject it as inopportune, and harmful to Laban.
We can conclude by saying that if error in conscience arises solely from a preceding error about positive law or fact, it can be entirely unwilled and completely invincible.

253. But errors about the law and about fact can come also from rash and formally erroneous judgments. We must therefore investigate the characteristics that determine these errors and make them truly invincible, in the moralists' sense of this word.
I can make a mistake about the law because I am ignorant of it, or believe it to exist when it does not, or do not recognise its extent, and I can do so either through negligence or imprudence or my evil disposition, or without fault if I have diligently and attentively informed myself of the law, performing the act circumspectly and wisely.

Similarly I can be culpably or innocently mistaken about fact. If I have committed no fault and suspect no error, my ignorance is truly invincible. But if the ignorance and error are my fault, my ignorance is vincible, according to my use of the word in this book.

254. Before continuing, we must note the characteristics we assign to invincible and vincible conscience. Conscience is invincible not when it contains an error which can be avoided absolutely, but when the error is such that: 1. it cannot be avoided by its perpetrator, who has no reasonable suspicion of its existence; and 2. is either independent of any distortion of will, or 3. is present in a person with some evil, habitual and necessary disposition of will which however produces no actual effect and is not consented to. In these conditions, the will, despite its error, seeks only the truth in the judgment which it made. It has no intention of detracting from truth through love of falsehood. On the other hand, I call an erroneous conscience vincible when one of these three conditions is absent.

255. A human being may be moved to a rash, erroneous judgment solely by the evil disposition of will that comes from original, not actual sin. The erroneous judgment is not imputable as fault because the judgment is necessary (cf. 83-110) and in fact forms one thing with original sin, just as a branch and tree are one thing. However, the distortion of the will is certainly not good or meritorious, and could be called vincible in the sense that it can be corrected, if not immediately, at least by a constant study of divine law,(136) by prayer which increases grace, and by our co-operation - as scripture says:

256. But if the evil disposition urging us to error is the effect of preceding actual sins, it is also one with them in such a way that whenever we repent of our sins and our will is opposed to subsequent misdeeds, the error is free of fault and does not harm the spirit. Nevertheless it is not good and can still be called vincible through the formation of better habits, continual vigilance of spirit and holy practices.

257. Moreover we must carefully note that the guilt attached to the evil actions of a vincible erroneous conscience is of the same kind and amount as the guilt of the error causing them. In fact their guilt is identical with the guilt of the cause itself, that is, of the erroneous conscience which produced them. Hence, if the error was only a venial sin, the actions can only be venial sins.

258. I shall summarise the different cases of error of conscience in order to establish clearly when error is invincible and when vincible:

1. If error is about the rational law and its rationally deduced consequences, it can never be truly invincible in the full sense of the word, because this kind of error(138) presupposes a distortion of will which in misleading the understanding's judgment makes it act rashly.

2. The distortion of will which causes the rash, precipitate judgment can be either free and culpable, or necessary and therefore inculpable.

3. Certain propositions and opinions, accepted instinctively as true by a provisional but not absolute judgment, cannot be called errors. This is also true of propositions taken as rules of conduct when action is necessary and no definite, theoretical judgment is formed about the matter.

4. If error affecting conscience concerns positive law, or rational law positively received, or concerns fact occasioning the application of the law, it can be either vincible or invincible.

5. If error about the law is not caused by lack of respect for the law or by culpable neglect, and if error about fact is not the result of culpable imprudence, error is invincible. Otherwise it is vincible.

6. Finally, error can come from simple, unwilled ignorance of some rational deduction of the law which we do not suspect and which our weak reason is unable to make. Error of this kind is completely invincible.

259. Clearly, what has been said raises the following questions about erroneous conscience. Concerning vincibly erroneous conscience we ask:

1. Must we follow a conscience that is mistaken about the rational law or the rational application of law when the error is willed and free? What is the morality of an action carried out in conformity with or against such a conscience?

2. Must we follow a conscience that is mistaken about the rational law or the rational application of the law when the error is willed but not free in itself although free in its cause, that is, when the will's evil tendency drawing us necessarily into error is the effect of preceding, actual faults? What is the morality of an action carried out in conformity with or against this conscience?

3. Can error about the law or its rational application be the necessary effect of original sin?

4. Must we follow an erroneous conscience about positive law or law positively received, or about fact, when the error, although unavoidable, was free in its cause, because culpably we did not verify the law or fact as we were bound? What is the morality of an action carried out in conformity with or against this conscience?

As regards invincible or unwilled erroneous conscience we ask:

5. Must we follow an inculpable, unwilled erroneous conscience coming from error about the positive law, or the law positively received, or from error about a fact occasioning the law's application? What is the morality of an action in conformity or not with this conscience?

6. Must we follow an inculpable, unwilled erroneous conscience which is not caused by error but by ignorance of some rational deduction of the law? What is the morality of this conscience?

7. Can we act according to erroneous persuasions which we form by natural instinct without evil intent or suspicion of error?

8. Can we act according to opinions which we suppose true because we need to act in conformity with them or their opposites? What is the morality of this conscience?

260. The final question is proper to our state of soul when we have not yet formed our conscience. We note, however, that the practical propositions used when we have to act are rules that stand in place of conscience, and will therefore be discussed when we speak about the formation of conscience.

261. The seventh question deals with factual error, not with an error of reason.

262. The fifth and sixth questions were dealt with when we showed that inculpable, unwilled erroneous conscience can and must be followed because error, when conditioned by inculpability and absence of will, is invincible (cf. 234).
Here we need only add, as confirmation of teaching commonly accepted by moralists, that this kind of conscience, although erroneous, does not lose its uprightness because of error. The mistake is not found in conscience properly speaking; it precedes conscience, and is supposed, but not formed, by conscience.

263. Cardinal Gerdil, following Aquinas on this subject, expresses the matter very clearly. He says: 'When synderesis(139) is applied to what we do (this is the principal element in conscience), two judgments can be distinguished. In the first, we decide what kind of action we are dealing with, theft, murder, adultery, a lie, or their contraries. In the second, we judge that the action we have considered is lawful or unlawful, just or unjust, and hence to be done or to be abandoned. The first judgment is not conscience, but is presuppposed by conscience . . . A hunter, for example, judges that the object before him is a human being or an animal, and decides accordingly whether the decision to shoot is homicide or simply the slaying of a beast.

But in discerning only the material object of his act he still has to pronounce on its morality or immorality . . . It is true, of course, that before he fires, the hunter has to be careful about the object of his aim, and cannot shoot without due precautions. Nevertheless, judging that his prey is a human being rather than a beast is not an act falling within the ambit of morality, and hence cannot in itself be a judgment of conscience, although it is presupposed in the formation of conscience . . .

'This opinion can be explained fairly briefly. I think that when we accept in a particular proposition some error eliminating knowledge of our act or of what we are about to do, the error itself is absolutely unwilled and inculpable, and does no harm to uprightness of conscience. But when our error is such that we think an act is lawful, although we know it to be murder or lying because it is in fact opposed to moral norms, we unlawfully apply the moral norms. In this case, our judgment is totally incompatible with an upright conscience . . .

'We have no difficulty in granting to those who defend the first opinion (invincible ignorance does not destroy uprightness of conscience) that if a person adoring the Blessed Sacrament publicly exposed is invincibly ignorant of the non-consecration of the wafer, he acts nevertheless with an upright conscience, and in a good, praiseworthy manner. Relative to the norms of morality, the incorrect judgment about Christ's being present in the wafer is in itself neutral. If we add to this judgment the dictate of reason which prescribes that Christ be worshipped under the appearances of bread, the dictate, which is wholly in conformity with the norms of morality, forms our judgment of conscience which, in this case, is wholly upright . . .

'But we can also support strongly those defending the second opinion (an invincible error lessens uprightness of conscience) to this extent: if the error is present through an unwarranted application of the principles of synderesis - when, for example, it is thought that lying for the sake of religion is good - then this error is incompatible with upright conscience.'(140)

264. This fine passage shows that error does not detract from uprightness of conscience if it is concerned with some fact, such as the consecration of the wafer exposed for public adoration; but it does render conscience less upright when it is concerned with the application of the rational law to some fact, that is to say, with the deduction of conscience from such a law.(141)

265. But we also observed that error would be foreign to the judgment of conscience, and consequently not affect its uprightness, if it were concerned with positive law, which can be ignored in an entirely inculpable and unwilled way - if, for example, I were deceived on the authority of a person worthy of trust from whom I had asked some information, or were misled by some responsible book about which I could have no reasonable suspicion.

We also observed that the same could be said about an error concerned with moral formulas which, although deduced of their nature from principles of natural law, take on the nature of positive law. This would happen in the case of a person incapable of deducing the law himself and, as a consequence, receiving it on another's authority, and accepting it solely on that authority.

The same can be said in so far as a person deduces some consequence from the rational law not on the basis of an absolute judgment, but as a practical assumption stimulated by his need to deliberate or act. Finally, we observed that error dependent on simple ignorance of some distant deduction from natural principles does not affect uprightness of conscience or our merit in following it, provided that the mistake springs not from a defective will but from an inactive reason. These are material, unwilled errors, and do no harm to uprightness of conscience.

266. Error in these cases may be compared with the defects present in a block of marble worked by a truly great sculptor whose masterpiece will lose none of its value because of some faulty vein in the marble. If in judging some proximate action of ours, we apply a law with good will and then act according to our upright application of the law, we lose no merit although our error may unwittingly depend, without any fault or will on our part, upon some false presupposition (as in the case of the consecrated wafer or, relative to positive law, when we eat meat after being told by someone worthy of trust that we are not obliged to abstinence) or be the necessary consequence of incupable ignorance on our part.

267. Upright and true conscience are not the same. Upright conscience has a greater extension than true conscience. Conscience may be both erroneous and upright, although a non-upright conscience is always erroneous.

268. Upright conscience, whether true or erroneous, must always be followed. This rule corresponds to the last four questions we have proposed (cf. 259).

269. This teaching allows us to see clearly the reason for the common opinion that uprightness of conscience depends upon its conformity with eternal law. Conscience could not be upright unless it applied eternal law adequately to what is being done. Applying the law adequately means judging and acting without malice, in complete good faith. Eternal law is law purged of every positive and material element, and is expressed in the duty which obliges us always 'to act without malice.' If our error of conscience is without malice of any kind it leaves uprightness of conscience intact.

270. We are left with the other four questions (cf. 259), all of which refer to non-upright conscience. Each of them presupposes a willed, vincible error which can be corrected, at least given time. The error is found in opinions formed about the dictates of the rational law, or in the law's rational application to what we are about to do. In other words, the error, which is present in conscience itself, is always either a rash judgmentor a gratuitous persuasion contrary to what has been inscribed deep in our understanding. We refuse to read what is there in order to deceive ourselves freely.

271. A non-upright conscience, therefore, is vincibly erroneous because it results either from our freedom or from our disordered passion. St. Thomas speaks about this in the following way: 'Good intention is not the entire cause of [an act of] will,'(142) and 'malice in the intention is of itself sufficient to vitiate [an act of] will, but the opposite is not true if we are dealing with what makes the will good.'(143)

St. Thomas reasons: 'Evil arises from each single defect; good requires the cause as a whole. The will, therefore, is always evil when a person wants either what is evil under the appearance of good, or what is good under the appearance of evil. Contrariwise if the will is to be good, it must have good as its object under the appearance of good, that is, it must want good and want it because it is good.'(144) Gerdil concludes: 'Willing to lie for a good end means willing something evil in itself although under the appearance of good. But this is not sufficient to make the will good (the whole cause must be good for the will to be good), nor is it sufficient for forming an upright conscience in practice.'(145)

St. Thomas repeats his reasons, confirming them on the authority of the author of The Divine Names: 'Therefore, in order that the object of the will be evil it is sufficient that it be evil of its nature, or that it be thought to be evil; but for the object of the will to be good, it must be good under both respects.'(146)
St. Augustine expresses the same opinion: 'Everything done is a sin if it is not rightly done. Nor can it be rightly done in any way if it does not arise from right reason. Right reason is virtue itself.'(147)

All this shows, according to the mind of St. Thomas and St. Augustine, that a person acting with a non-upright conscience - in the way we have defined it, that is, with an erroneous moral persuasion caused by an evil disposition of the will - cannot be said to act uprightly. Even a good end referred to an evil object, thought to be good, cannot prevent the action from being evil.

272. But we ought to note that in this case the spirit, if it truly abhors sin and would not want to commit any sin it knew of, cannot sin mortally even if the animal instincts and affections remaining from previous cancelled sins trivialise and darken the mind, and prevent its judging with total clarity and uprightness.

273. Before answering our four separate questions about vincibly erroneous or non-upright conscience, I would like to comment on a common teaching about this kind of conscience. The teaching needs to be upheld, and I would not want to be thought opposed to it. What I am about to say is simply intended to put the teaching in its proper light in order to prevent its being misunderstood and used as a basis for false conclusions.

It is commonly held that any erroneous conscience, whether it commands or gravely prohibits an action, must be followed. The reason for this is clear: 'If anyone decides to act against such a conscience as long as it exists, that person, as far as he is concerned, has the intention of not observing the law of God, that is, he sins mortally (if the matter is serious).'(148) The person wishing to sin, sins. If I firmly believe that my action is a sin, and I do it, I sin. This is indubitable.

274. But this is the case only on the following conditions:

1. If someone thinks he sins either in acting or not acting, his belief must be sincere. He must not deceive himself by imagining he believes what he does not believe. If this were the case he would not have an erroneous conscience, but only suppose he had it. Hence St. Thomas' phrase: 'as long as such conscience exists.'

2. The action must be truly opposed to such a conscience; the person must want to sin. In fact, an erroneous conscience which declares an action or omission to be sinful could be accompanied by a contrary conscience. In this case, the person would vacillate from moment to moment as one or other conscience dominated in his spirit, and would not sin if he acted against the erroneous, non-upright conscience at the moment when the true, upright conscience took control. The immediate return of the other conscience, which could seem never to have left him, would not then influence the morality of what he had done.
Because of the speed with which these consciences succeed one another, they are often confused. It is then very difficult to discern which conscience has been followed.

275. It may be objected that by following a non-upright conscience, we posit a morally defective, and even culpable act. How can we be obliged under pain of sin to commit sin?

We preface our reply by noting that many of our acts, which appear simple at first sight, are in fact multiple. Let us say, for example, that someone thinks he is obliged to tell a lie in order to save another's life. Here, two judgments are made, and both of them judgments of conscience. Gerdil is of the opinion that only the second is a judgment of conscience, but a careful examination of the case shows the contrary. One judgment tells the person in this situation that the words he is going to utter are a lie; the other judgment tells him that he is obliged to tell this lie in order to save a human life. Error is certainly present in the second judgment while the first judgment is correct. I maintain that conscience is found not only in the second, but also in the first because the first, as far as I can see, is not a judgment in which only the physical existence of the act is apprehended; its moral existence is also grasped. The words to be spoken are not considered simply as words, but are judged as true or lying words. In judging that the words are lies, as in our case, the person already discerns their moral quality, constituted by their being lying words.

But we must note here an extremely dangerous and facile illusion which deceives many.
The words 'moral good' and 'moral evil' signify abstract and generic ideas. To say moral evil or moral good (or to say sin or fault) is to indicate something in an abstract way because the kind of moral good or evil has not yet been denoted. But have we an absolute need of this abstraction in order to begin acting morally? I do not think so. As I have already shown, we could indeed undertake moral good or evil before the formation of this very general notion, cut off as it is from every particular good or bad action. If, as my understanding develops, I am able to abstract from my very own actions the general notion of moral good and evil, my actions must already have been moral and immoral, good and evil. Otherwise, I could not have abstracted such a notion from them.

We have to keep in mind these two moral states, and the two forms which the moral law takes in successive moments (cf. 32-71). In its first form, the law is simply 'perceived beings' themselves, which require from us a willing acknowledgement proportioned to their entity; in its second form, the law is an abstraction, the exigency of the perceived beings, but now abstracted from them and formulated and expressed in more or less general ways. Moral law, for example, expresses the force of obligation, while moral good and moral evil express the relationship between acts of will and the law. Both expressions are phrased in the most general way.

If we apply this teaching to our present case, we see that in saying 'The words I am about to say are a lie', we indicate their immorality under a specific form. If I say 'These words are obligatory for me because they are a means of saving human life', I indicate their morality under a general form. In both cases, I attribute to them without distinction a moral quality entailing obligation. But in the first case, it is a quality obliging me not to say them; in the second case, a quality obliging me to say them.

Because the obligation and the exigency are not something different from the concept of lying speech, it is impossible for me to conceive the words as a lie without my knowing that I cannot utter them, although the exigency as such will only be expressed in other words and judged by other acts appertaining to a higher level of reflection. When I say 'These words are a lie', I conceive and pronounce the evil present in the words in a less abstract way than saying 'I am obliged to avoid these words'. But in both cases I mentally conceive the malice of the action. If I say 'I am obliged to avoid it', I use the universal idea of obligation, or obligating force; if I say 'This is a lie', I express the same obligating force, but in act, that is, as adhering to the thing, not as abstracted from it.(149) In both cases, I have fully experienced the obligation incumbent upon me, and I am aware of the immorality of these words.

It is now possible to see how confusion, and hence contradiction, between ideas sometimes arises in the human spirit. I can certainly know through a natural, direct judgment that certain words are immoral because they contain a lie. At the same time, I form another reflective, willed judgment overlaying the first. With the second judgment I tell myself that I am obliged to utter these words for the sake of saving human life. We note, however, that the second judgment, precisely because it is reflective, prevails over and obscures the first, but without destroying it. Finding myself in this state, at two levels of reflection, I have two moral formulas before me. One of them tells me that I must not lie, the other tells me that I must lie in order to save human life. The first persuades me that lying is immoral; the second, that lying is necessary if I am to obtain the end for which I have to lie. The first formula leads me to think that I sin by uttering the lying words; the second formula, that I sin by not saving human life. In the first case, I find myself obliged not to use an unlawful means; in the second case, I am obliged to obtain an end.

The conscience which obliges me, therefore, in this contradictory state, is not a simple formula telling me to lie (I cannot be obliged to commit sin). It is a formula telling me to save someone from imminent death and simultaneously persuading me to shut out what conscience itself is telling me about the unlawfulness of the means which I have to use to save the person.

If I do not save the person's life when I believe I am obliged by God's law, I sin. But I do not sin by omitting to tell the lie (the only means of saving that life); this would be absurd. I sin because I refuse to save a human life which I firmly believe I am obliged to save under pain of grave sin. But if in saving the person by means of the lie, I do not sin against the conscience commanding me to save life, I sin nevertheless against the conscience indicating moral improbity in the lie.(150)

276. The thought of two contemporaneous consciences, one included in the other, leading us to sin whether we act or abstain from acting, may occasion some surprise. St. Thomas, however, has a very appropriate comment on the matter. 'Given one mistake in a syllogism, other mistakes will follow. In the same way, if one mistake is posited in moral matters, others will necessarily follow. For example, if a person does his duty out of vainglory, he will sin if he does his duty, or if he does not . . . In the same way, if an error of reason or of conscience is posited, evil follows in the will.' 'Nevertheless,' adds St. Thomas, 'the person is not perplexed. He can abandon his error because his ignorance is vincible and willed.'(151)

277. The same teaching is confirmed by other authorities, and in particular by St. Bernard in a remarkable passage answering the question: 'Why does the erring conscience not change evil into good as it changes good into evil?'(152) The question itself shows St. Bernard has no doubt that conscience changed good into evil by thinking good evil, but does not change evil into good by thinking evil good. The saint replies: 'You think it strange and unjust that in human intention what a person thinks has more power relative to evil than to good. If I replied that this occurred justly in evil matters because the eye was evil, you would ask why the same should not be true, relative to what is good, when the eye is simple. He who said that the darkness of the body was dependent upon a defective eye, also maintained that light in the body was dependent upon a simple eye.' St. Bernard goes on: 'But be careful. If the eye deceives, it is perhaps not truly simple. Both the person who thinks good evil, and the one who thinks evil good, are deceived. WOE is prophesized of each of them: "WOE TO THOSE WHO CALL EVIL GOOD AND GOOD EVIL". . . As far as I am concerned, I BELIEVE THAT TWO THINGS ARE NEEDED for simplicity in the interior eye: CHARITY IN OUR INTENTION AND TRUTH IN OUR CHOICE.'(153)

St. Bernard's way of indicating that the eye of the intention may not be truly simple where the intention is erroneous seems to me both beautiful and profound. Certainly neither the intention nor conscience is simple in the case we examined above. Such a case is present, however, only when truly rational law, or rational law reasonably deduced, is in question. St. Thomas seems to be speaking about this when he says: 'If a person knew that human reason commanded something against God's precept, he would not be held to follow reason; but in this case reason would not be totally mistaken.'(154) The last phrase would mean that conscience, in order to be truly erroneous, should have no suspicion of erring relative to the law of God (the same can also be said relative to the rational law) because a conscience that perceives an act to be against the law of God or the rational law cannot in good faith believe the act good. This is equivalent to saying that the person's conscience cannot be totally and simply mistaken.

278. St. Thomas seems to say the same when he comments: 'If a person's conscience tells him to avoid adultery, he cannot set aside this conscience without committing grave sin.'(155). I think we can infer from this that a conscience which errs about the rational law (for example, one declaring adultery to be lawful or praiseworthy) is by that very fact sinful. But if deceiving oneself about a dictate of the rational law is sinful, the erroneous conscience responsible for the deception is not altogether sincere nor truly invincible. If it were, it would not be sinful. Just as a person perceiving a horse cannot be forced to tell himself that he has perceived a cow, a person conceiving an intrinsically disordered action - a lie, for example - cannot tell himself that he has conceived a good, well-ordered action. Moral disorder in the actions of which we are speaking is inherent in the actions themselves and necessarily conceived together with these actions.(156)

279. We have proved there cannot be a totally invincible and unwilled error relative to the rational law rationally conceived except in cases where the need to act impels us to judge (cf. 242, 243) (which means, of course, that the rational law has not been rationally conceived). Consequently, such an error cannot give rise to an altogether sincere, simple, erroneous conscience without fault, or sin, or some moral defect.

There can, however, be ignorance about the remote deductions from the natural law; not everyone is capable of drawing distant conclusions from basic principles. Such ignorance, if it results from natural debility of understanding,(157) and not from a defect in the will, does not make conscience less upright, nor diminish merit in the act. This is especially the case when a person, who may know the value of beings, is incapable of calculating relationships between them.(158) However, the act remains materially good, taken as a whole, while its material defect consists in the absence of certain refinements that would render it morally perfect.

280. In addition to ignorance about a part of the rational law, there may also be unwilled inadvertence(159) about certain more remote or minute dictates of this law at the moment when a person acts. Such inadvertence does not arise from any defect in the will, but from some limitation of physical or intellective forces which renders a person incapable of observing all the circumstances of his action and of applying the law completely.

281. Error, however, cannot be considered in this way. As we said, no one can force another to assent to what is false; only his own will, inclined to what is false, can do this.

'Error', says St. Thomas, 'means approving what is false as though it were true, and consequently adds some kind of action to ignorance. Simple ignorance is present when a person passes no opinion on what he does not know; in this case he is ignorant, but not mistaken. On the other hand, when he pronounces judgment on things he does not know, he errs properly speaking. Because sin consists in an act, error obviously takes on the notion of sin. It is indeed presumptuous to pronounce about what is unknown, especially in dangerous matters.'(160)

282. Many authors, unaware of this important truth, have been led to support very strange opinions. They have even concluded that invincibly erroneous conscience could be extended to the natural law and convert what is essentially evil into good.

Daniel Concina argues strongly against this position, which would destroy all morality, and is particularly vehement against the absurdities of Claude La Croix and Antonio Tirillo who taught that erroneous conscience even had the power to make lying good. He shows the extremes inherent in such a system: 'Tirillo and la Croix, who state that lying is morally good if conscience errs invincibly, must necessarily say the same about every other kind of wickedness, however abhorrent. Atheism, idolatry, heresy, masturbation, and theft will all be good and meritorious because, according to these authors, there can be invincible ignorance in their regard.' Concina rightly continues: 'If invincible conscience is possible in matters of natural law, an invincible, erroneous conscience can certainly be present relative to divine, positive law and, consequently, to true religion . . .

Granted this, willed unbelief and pagan, Islamic, Arian, Macedonian, Lutheran and Calvinistic teachings could come from God because the will of people holding such doctrines may be the result of invincible ignorance. At least by accident, therefore, the Priscillian, Lutheran and Calvinistic heresies could be founded in God. Even atheism will depend upon God if, as Molina and Arriaga maintain, it is possible to be invincibly ignorant of God himself. Finally, according to our opponents, fornication, sodomy and other crimes can spring from an invincible, erroneous conscience. So I would have to conclude: lies declared lawful by an invincibly erroneous conscience are good and meritorious; and the same applies to every other horrible sin about which invincible error is possible.

'Instruction, preaching, admonitions and missions would all be superfluous if an erroneous persuasion were capable of infusing goodness into an evil action, as true knowledge can into a moral action . . . What better theology could be found than this modern teaching which places on a par with virtue all kinds of immorality carried out under the veil of ignorance?

'Father La Croix asks what difficulty prevents these horrible acts from being good and meritorious. If they are evil in themselves, he says, as lying and other sins are, they can still be represented as good; the will, in fact, does not receive its species from objects as they are in themselves, but as they are presented by the intellect.'(161)

283. La Croix's objection, or the objection attributed to him, would indicate a lack of sound philosophy. It would show that La Croix and those like him were ignorant that the intellect in its first operation conceives things as they are.(162) - a most important philosophical truth. Lying is necessarily conceived as the opposite of truth and, therefore, as dishonest. 'Opposed to truth' and 'being dishonest' are synonymous.(163) Hence, a formal lie can never appear necessarily as something good. On the contrary, it is necessarily conceived as something evil by the intellect (conceiving something as evil means conceiving it in its nature as evil; it does not mean that we apply the word evil to it). But the intellect, after conceiving something as evil in itself, can reflect upon it and, through the reflection, either judge it as evil by acknowledging reflectively the direct knowledge that the intellect has or, contrariwise, judge it as good (for whatever motive). Because this second intellectual operation is always directed by the will, it is possible for us to accept what is evil as good, and what is good as evil - just as it is in our power to accept as good what we have conceived as good, and as evil what we have conceived as evil.

The objection would also show that La Croix and those like him were ignorant both of the great principle of all goodness in human beings, which consists in willed, practical acknowledgement of what we have directly apprehended and known, and of the great principle of evil which consists in our refusal to acknowledge what we know, and in the internal, willing distortion of what our intellect has necessarily received and conceived. The Holy Spirit says: 'Woe to those who call evil good and good evil,'(164) and Christ wants our eye to be simple, that is, he wants us to behold in simplicity what we have conceived mentally, without alteration or forgery. An inflamed, diseased eye impresses its colour and defect on what it sees. This explains why those who do not affirm to themselves interiorly in their willed, practical judgment what they have seen in their direct, natural, mental conception do not affirm the truth: 'they do not obey the truth, but obey wickedness.'(165)

284. Father La Croix, and others holding the same opinion, start from a false premise; 'evil objects can present themselves as good to our understanding without the intervention of our will.' The true teaching, however, is this:

1. Essentially evil objects cannot present themselves as good to the understanding. Hence, the direct knowledge we have of them is always in conformity with the truth.
2. Our will, by means of reflection which could and should conform to direct knowledge, may alter what we know, and utter an interior lie, the true source of all human iniquity.

285. We must return to our questions (cf. 259) about what we have called vincible error.

The first three differ only in the cause of the error, or more precisely in the condition of the cause. The error is always caused by the will which is inclined to lie to itself, calling good evil and viceversa. It does this either through some necessity or through an entirely free act. In both cases the mind, while reflecting, is directed by a distorted, defective will. Consequently an upright conscience is unobtainable, as theologians correctly say: 'An upright conscience conforms to upright desire.'(166)

286. St. Basil himself notes the practical energy we have for making internal judgments, and how our will esteems the value of things we conceive. He says: 'Because we posses a natural energy for judging ( ¦Ÿ¨¦Ÿo£ ª(c)§Ÿ Ó£) and distinguishing good from evil, we have to discern justly in the choice of what we must do, seconding virtue and condemning what is wrong, in the way that a fair-minded, unbiased judge pronounces sentence on contrary claims.'(167) He says again: 'With all diligence we should interiorly, in the hidden forum of our thoughts (note these words carefully), make upright judgments about things. Our spirit should be like scales which weigh unbiasedly what is to be done, and give the victory to God's law against sin.'(168) It is always true, therefore, that in these three cases, in which the will causes error in our conscience, immorality is present because the will is distorted and defective.

287. But each case can be subdivided because the error can consist either in judging as good what is evil, or judging as evil what is good. Furthermore, when we judge as good an action that in itself is evil, we can judge it in three ways: as lawful, as meritorious and supererogatory (in addition to being lawful), or as obligatory.

288. Moreover, the three erroneous judgments can be made for different reasons:

1. From a passionate, unjust love of an evil action, when we desire to form a conscience that will allow us to do the action. In this case the evil is clearly evident and deeply rooted. The Holy Spirit is speaking principally of this ugly lie that we pronounce in our hearts, when he says: 'Woe to those who call evil good and good evil',(169) and also: 'There is a way which seems right to a man, but its end is the way to death.'(170)

2. We make erroneous judgments, not for a disordinate love of some action, but for love of something to which the action is a means. This kind of judgment also has a triple morality; the thing we desire can of its nature be lawful, meritorious (as well as lawful), or evil. For example, if I judge that I can tell a lie to obtain some advantage which in itself is just, what I desire is not evil in itself. If, however, I judge I can tell a lie for some unjust advantage, the case would be different. Finally, if I thought I could lie to obtain an alms for some poor person, my purpose would be of its nature meritorious.

These distinctions must be made if we wish to determine as well as we can the moral state of the less than upright, erroneous consciences we are discussing.

289. The same kind of distinctions must be made when we judge something good as evil. The good in the thing can be simply lawful, or meritorious (as well as lawful), or obligatory. Moreover I can judge the good to be evil because of my hatred for the action; in this case the hatred is as immoral as the action is holy and obligatory. Or I can hate the action and desire not to do it because of my attachment to something which the action prevents me from obtaining; and again, the thing itself can be lawful, meritorious or evil.

The same applies in both cases (that is, whether we judge good evil, or evil good) if, by omitting an action, I am able to avoid either an evil or something I detest. The same three situations would be possible: I could judge such an action either simply lawful or meritorious (as well as lawful) or obligatory.

290. We see, therefore, that the accidents affecting erroneous conscience are many and various. Every accident changes the moral state of a conscience at least in degree if not in its nature. Anyone wishing to determine the moral defect affecting a vincible, erroneous conscience must therefore carefully distinguish each case and form a particular opinion about each. On the other hand, anyone wanting to give a general opinion about vincibly erroneous consciences would be acting too vaguely, and confusing very different concepts.

Reverting to our three questions, therefore, let us note the two things we asked in each of them:

1. Must we or must we not follow this erroneous conscience?

2. What is the morality of an action performed according to such a conscience?

We shall answer by taking each of the three questions, and first examine what each requires of us, and then the moral value of actions regulated by the consciences in question.

291. Is it possible for error about the rational law or the rational application of law to follow necessarily from original sin?

The concupiscence that remains in us after baptism, is certainly not sin or fault (cf. 105); it is an impetuous inclination to false, natural good, continually tempting the will, urging it to consent to evil. The following question therefore presents itself: 'Can the will sometimes be so necessarily inclined that it cannot avoid forming one of those false, secret, interior judgments which constitute a false conscience and are a false rule of action?' For example, would a child attracted by the love of food necessarily judge the food (compared to other things) a greater good than it is? And as a consequence of this practical, erroneous judgment, would the child internally consent to the sin of greed, or hatred of companions?

292. I make the two following observations about the question: first, we must distinguish between the child's conscience and his false, interior judgment about the food. To value mistakenly the pleasure of the food more than it merits is a disorder, but this is not conscience. A false conscience would be the child's judgment that he can lawfully esteem the food more than it merits.

I am convinced that after baptism, as long as we are not harmed by actual sins, we cannot be necessitated to form such a conscience. Forming a conscience is the function of the personal principle, which is sound after baptism - only the power of our free will can harm us. Therefore we cannot be necessitated to commit such an error.
Moreover, I am certain that consent to evil by a practical judgment cannot be necessitated after baptism; we need to have lost grace through free, actual sins and become once again servants of sin. The redemptive effect of baptism, which renews us, would evidently not be full and perfect if there still remained in us a principle so dominant that it made us desire evil.

I think therefore that the two hypotheses given above offend against the grace of baptism and cannot be reconciled with Christian faith. In particular, it seems obvious and in keeping with God's goodness, that a soul having God as its master and protector is never abandoned and left in such desparate straits except through its own fault - as St. Paul says: 'God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able.'(171)

Nevertheless the Apostle clearly admits by these words the possibility per se of human nature being tempted beyond its strength, a possibility, however, that is not actuated because of God's provident care. God governs external circumstances so that they do not exercise an attraction and excitement to evil stronger than our powers.

293. What remains after baptism, besides the fomes of concupiscence, is ignorance of the consequences of the supreme principle of the natural law. But because this ignorance is independent of our will, it is not sin, as we have said and St. Augustine teaches.(172)

294. Sluggishness of mind also remains. Our mind moves slowly to deduce moral formulas derived from the supreme principle of the law impressed in our soul. This sluggishness is the origin of the mind's ignorance and of its absorption in feelable objects, but it remains outside the sphere of morality as long as it does not depend on the will.

295. We think these observations answer the question by showing it to be without foundation. We must add, however, that although the will of a baptised person, free of new sins, is safe from temptation beyond its power, there is no doubt it can be tempted by concupiscence and, as it were, charmed into evil. Furthermore, we certainly have a duty to be vigilant against this propensity of the will which frequently leads the intellect into false judgments and even to the formation of a false conscience. We must heed the words of Christ: 'What I say to you, I say to all: Watch',(173) and invoke divine help: 'Watch and pray',(174) using all means to deprive our passions of their power: 'Be sober be watchful.'(175) Above all, the eye of our mind must accustom itself to rectitude by loving and contemplating truth with sincerity and clarity.

296. We must now examine the second question: must we follow an erroneous conscience concerning the rational law or the rational application of law when the error is in itself willed and free? We cannot omit the question without causing confusion in the development of the argument. Moreover, an actually free, formal error of conscience (the kind of erroneous conscience referred to in the question) is one that can and must be avoided without delay.

297. But we either advert to the error or not. If, when forming a conscience, we are aware of being deceived but want our error and fully consent to it, we advert to it. For example, a person who loves money makes a contract. If necessary, he can reveal to friends and relatives certain details of the contract which make him appear more generous than the other party. In the depths of his heart, however, he knows something seen only by God, that is, that the contract contains an injustice. If he were the other party, he would certainly know how to exploit the knowledge to his own advantage. His conscience is not sincere and, properly speaking, is not a conscience. Hence he is not obliged to follow it because he has not yet formed it; in fact he must follow the opposite conscience that lies deep in his heart, a reflective, vivid conscience easily available to him, if he wishes.

298. The degrees of advertence, however, can vary a great deal and thus cause the degree of fault to vary. Only God can measure these differences but whatever their degree, the person by deceiving himself betrays his own soul.

299. But a formal error of conscience which is free but not adverted to can also exist. For example, a person is suddenly overcome by a raging passion which limits his right use of reason; unaware of his self-deception, he can at that moment persuade himself that he is able without sin to perform some reprehensible action. However, he was free not to surrender to the passion diverting his attention of mind. If he had maintained his calm of spirit and mind, he would not have had to make the false judgment of conscience, which was free because the preceding or accompanying act that produced it was free.

The rule, therefore, to be followed in this case is evident:: 'No one must allow a passion to change the state of his spirit. When disturbed, he must avoid any disorder by doing nothing until he has regained the calm lost through his fault.'

300. Must we follow an erroneous conscience about the rational law or the rational application of the law, when this error, although willed, is not free in itself but free in its cause, because the evil inclination of the will which necessarily attracts us towards error is the effect of previous actual faults?

For the sake of clarity we shall summarise what we have already said in a series of propositions, to each of which we shall add some explanation or proof. We shall then move from proposition to proposition until we find the correct answer to our initial question.

1. 'The formal, vincible error of conscience we are speaking of, which does not excuse people from sin, differs from simple ignorance of certain deductions from moral principles, and differs from natural mental sluggishness in making these deductions.'

Only the will is the seat of moral good and evil. Neither good nor evil morality is present if there is no question of will but only of an understanding incapable of foreseeing the consequences of moral principles. St. Thomas shows that this kind of ignorance is possible: 'Every judgment of speculative reason comes from the natural knowledge of first principles. In the same way every natural judgment of practical reason comes from certain natural known principles . . . But there are different ways of moving from these principles in judging different things. Some things are so explicit in human acts that they can easily be approved or disapproved on the basis of common, first principles. Other matters, however, can only be judged after careful consideration of their various circumstances. Not everyone is capable of doing this; only wise people can carry it through, just as philosophers alone can examine the particular conclusions of scientific matters.'(176)

301. Nor is sluggishness of understanding, upon which such ignorance normally depends, to be confused with formal error. A person is incapable of deducing remote consequences from the principles of natural law, not because the eye of his intellect is inept at seeing them, but because he is slow in using and focusing his mental vision on the consequences. If he could fix his eye upon them, he would undoubtedly see their splendour in the principles. But if this sluggishness is unwilled, and natural, it has no good or bad moral characteristics because it is extraneous to the will. This would not be so if the sluggishness were willed by the supreme will (cf. 89).

In this case, sin would be present, as St. Thomas affirms in speaking about mental debility which differs little from the mental sluggishness that we are examining. 'A person is said to be sharp, intellectually speaking, when he can apprehend what is proper to a thing, or even some effect of it, and immediately grasp its nature and succeed in considering its least conditions. Contrariwise, a person is said to be intellectually weak when he can arrive at the truth he is dealing with only after lengthy explanations. Even then he does not grasp perfectly all that can be found in the concept of the thing. Debility of intellectual feeling implies a definite mental weakness in considering spiritual matters; but mental blindness indicates total privation of knowledge of these matters. Both weakness and blindess are impediments to the gift of understanding by which a person comes to know intimately the spiritual matters he grasps, but they entail the notion of sin only in so far as they are willed. This is clear in the case of a person who is bored with spiritual matters and neglects to examine them with care because of his love for carnal things.'(177)

302. 2. 'Willed and sinful false consciences exist.'

This is shown by the previous quotation from St. Thomas. We need note only that although sinful false consciences can spring from two causes, ignorance and mental sluggishness or weakness together with real error, we are not dealing here with consciences dependent upon ignorance and mental weakness. We shall deal with them more extensively under the heading 'positive law'. At the moment our concern is consciences containing a true, actual, willed error. We can however corroborate our general proposition on the basis of certain authorities.

First, we have the theological and legal adage: 'Ignorance of the law does not excuse.' If legal theorists alone used this phrase it could perhaps be understood in the sense that ignorance of the law does not excuse in the external forum. Theologians, however, also use it and apply it expressly to the internal forum. Here, however, it has to be restricted for the most part to ignorance of the rational law - ignorance of the positive law can easily be present without sin. But even related to the rational law , the adage is restricted to cases in which ignorance itself is willed in some way.

303. St. Thomas says: 'A person can be unaware of his sin in two ways. In one of them, he is at fault either because through ignorance of the law, which does not excuse, he thinks something not to be a sin which is sin (someone who commits fornication may think that simple fornication is not a mortal sin) or because he neglects to examine himself . . . Hence a sinner, although he may not be aware of his sin, sins in receiving the body of Christ because in this case the ignorance itself is sin.'(178)

Here St. Thomas distinguishes two cases in which a person is not aware of the sin he commits. In one, examination of self is neglected; in the other, a false dictate springs from ignorance of the rational law which does not excuse from sin. St. Antoninus has the same comment: 'In evil matters, ignorance can be twofold: ignorance of the law and ignorance of fact. If ignorance of the law, divine or natural, is in question, or ignorance of matters that a person is bound to know because of his state, the evil action done through such ignorance does not excuse from all, but only from part of the fault'.(179)

304. 3. 'Willed, sinful consciences exist which depend not only on previous culpable ignorance, but on error which itself is an evil act of the will.' It is easy to understand the existence of sinful, erroneous consciences dependent upon previous culpable ignorance. If we willingly neglect to instruct ourselves about our duties, we are obviously in a state of culpable ignorance.

305. If this were the only kind of erroneous conscience, the Fathers of the Church would not have attached any particular difficulty to explaining the sins of ignorance indicated in sacred scripture. In fact, these sins are considered so difficult to understand that according to the Fathers it is better simply to accept what the scriptures say about them than to try to explain them.

In the dialogues of St. Jerome against the Pelagians, Chrisobalus makes the following objection against sins of ignorance: 'Tell me, is it just for me to be bound by sin relative to an error of which I am not aware?' St. Jerome makes no attempt to explain the matter: 'Are you asking me about God's decision and disposition? You will find the answer to your foolish question in the book of Wisdom: "Seek not what is too difficult for you"(180) . . . Listen to the Apostle who sounds the gospel trumpet with the words: "O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!"'(181) For St. Jerome, as we can see, sins of ignorance, so frequently mentioned in divine scripture, were especially difficult to explain.

Concina, an excellent theologian, rightly says: 'It is extemely difficult to explain how we can sin in ignorance.'(182) And Francisco Suarez was right to be suspicious when he saw how easily sins of ignorance were explained by modern moral theologians who maintained that no sin could be committed inadvertently, and that sins of ignorance were only present through negligence in instructing oneself. For the writers criticised by Suarez there was no sin in the actual error sometimes committed without advertence by the will, which would however itself be present with a less than upright act. Suarez saw this easy explanation as an open contradiction of the teaching of the greatest of the Fathers, who themselves confessed the difficulty of the problem. He commented: 'Precisely because this opinion solves the difficulties in such a subject, I doubt the explanation, which I am not prepared to accept' [App. no. 3].

306. It is quite certain that very careful attention is needed if we are going to understand how the human will can move the reason to decide on a false judgment by uttering an interior lie. We have to observe what takes place within us, and not allow ourselves to be led astray by imagination, fantasy or preconceived common opinion. As far as I can, I have tried to contribute to the progress of philosophy by faithful adherence to what interior observation reveals, and hope that it is now possible to understand the nature of sins of ignorance which until the present has necessarily remained a mystery.

This philosophy has produced the following results. It has shown that the will has an extraordinary efficacy in determining our faculty of judgment, especially when we make decisions about the value of things; it has allowed us to understand how the will, affected by passion, corrupts the judgment by drawing it to pronounce in the way the will wants rather than as things are; it has affirmed that the inevitable consequence of an unjust judgment by the will, which persuades us that the unlawful is lawful and the bad good, is an intrinsically and inexcusably erroneous, evil conscience, and itself a sin; it has also affirmed that we do not have to reflect when we make a judgment, and that advertence to a judgment is not a necessary element of its immorality. Such immorality is constituted when we are capable of speaking the truth to ourselves interiorly, but wish to lie, simply because it pleases us to do so. Whenever we are in possession of direct knowledge, we can tell ourselves the truth if we wish to do so. And this is the case relative to rational law in so far as it is present to the human mind, and therefore known to us directly.

307. Ecclesiasticus puts the matter very plainly:

The sacred author says that 'he who seeks the law will be filled with it' because, if we wish, we can draw many conclusions from the principles of rational law, which is present to us all. He goes on: 'but the hypocrite will stumble at it' because in forming a non-upright, insincere conscience for himself his cunning will not pass unpunished.

He continues

Fear of the Lord, and a spirit unaffected by passions and sins, enables us to pass just judgment.(183) Those who fear the Lord form a just judgment, that is, an upright conscience, because they judge uprightly, without passion. They kindle justice like a light because an upright conscience is a light; as we form it we become like persons who kindle a light in themselves. Forming an upright conscience is an act of justice which truly entitles the upright consciences we make for ourselves to be called resplendent justices.

308. By following disordered passion, we form erroneous consciences for ourselves which tell us that something is lawful when it is not. Our situation is now very serious. St. John says: 'He who says he is in the light and hates his brother is in the darkness still.'(184) The Evangelist is writing about people who deceive themselves by thinking they are just in carrying out a part of the law while neglecting, without scruple, love of their neighbour by subtly dispensing themselves from their duties of charity. In other words, they are forming an erroneous conscience that condemns rather than excuses them.

309. Jesus Christ was more indignant about the false consciences of the Pharisees than about any other sin. Our Saviour had to use violence almost to uproot false conscience and reveal hidden corruption; this kind of conscience is in fact the most hidden sin, and the true root of innumerable other sins. Jesus calls the Pharisees blind on account of the false consciences they form for themselves. They were 'spent lamps' not because they did not know the law,(185) but because they did not want to know it and erred in applying it.

He said to them: 'But woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because you shut the kingdom of heaven against men; for you neither enter yourselves, nor allow those who would enter to go in' with your false ways of applying the law and judging what should be done.(186) 'Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for you devour widows' houses and for a pretence you make long prayers; therefore you will receive the greater condemnation.' They thought that virtue consisted in long prayers, and blinded by self-interest thought it lawful to get rich at the expense of poor widows . . .

'Woe to you, blind guides, who say, "If any one swears by the temple, it is nothing; but if any one swears by the gold of the temple, he is bound by his oath".' This false application of the law about oath-taking enables them to form a false conscience which would lawfully free them from the oath made by the temple. Christ goes on: 'You blind fools! For which is the greater, the gold or the temple that has made the gold sacred? And you say, "If any one swears by the altar, it is nothing, but if anyone swears by the gift that is on the altar, he is bound by his oath".' This is another example of false conscience by which they hoped to free themselves from their obligation to maintain the promises sworn by the altar. 'You blind men! For which is greater, the gift or the altar that makes the gift sacred? Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for you tithe mint and dill and cummin, and have neglected the weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and faith; these you ought to have done, without neglecting the others.'

This is yet another example of erroneous conscience which made them rigid upholders of certain things appertaining to the positive law, and excused their laxity, as they thought, in matters regarding the natural law. 'You blind guides, straining out a gnat and swallowing a camel!' (that is, you are subtle and scrupulous about certain matters that leave your passions unhindered, and even augmented; but when your vices are in question, you show extraordinary elasticity of conscience). 'Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for you cleanse the outside of the cup and of the plate, but inside they are full of extortion and rapacity. You blind Pharisee! first cleanse the inside of the cup and of the plate, that the outside also may be clean,' that is, first make clean the internal injustice which causes false consciences, each of which is itself an injustice. Then alone will your external works be upright and innocent. The foolishness and blindness attributed to the Pharisees by Christ is found in the formation of false consciences which instead of acting as lighted lamps to the soul are smoking wicks that make the darkness more intense and suffocating.(187) These false consciences and this darkness are the work of cunning, blatant malice, and account for Christ's description of the scribes and Pharisees as 'serpents and brood of vipers.'(188)

310. It will be helpful now, after indicating willed, false conscience as the seat of spiritual blindness, if we speak more at length about this blindness.
Our divine Master uses the metaphor of leaven to illustrate how this spiritual blindness originates in previous malice obscuring the light of truth: 'Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees.'(189) By 'leaven' Jesus means the teaching of the Pharisees, as the sacred text explains. In other words, as leaven alters the nature and the condition of flour by making it first ferment, then rise, and finally corrupt, so passion serves to ferment teaching, knowledge and opinion by changing it from what it was and subjecting it to interior alteration and upheaval in all its elements. There can be no better illustration of the power of a perverse will to change direct knowledge and distort judgment by making it apply the law in a way altogether different from sincere, natural uprightness.

311. We can be sure, therefore, that it is an evil disposition of spirit which produces in the mind the teaching called 'leaven' by Christ. If we want to examine the way in which this false teaching is produced by human self-deception (as scripture says: 'Iniquity has lied to itself'(190)), we find that a person in the grip of passion sees in a distorted fashion not because he lacks an intelligent principle (which he cannot lose), but because 1. the light of grace does not guide him away from such vision; and 2. he is impeded by his passions(191) from acknowledging the truth which is in him (his direct knowledge), but from which he flees.

312. St. Thomas, speaking of truth, the final principle of natural vision, says: 'The human mind can either understand or not understand by means of this intelligible principle. Non-understanding takes place in two ways. Sometimes the person's will spontaneously withdraws from considering the principle. As the Psalmist says: "He did not want to understand in order to avoid doing good."(192) At other times the person's mind is so taken up with things he loves that it is distracted from the principle. As the Psalmist says: "Fire has fallen on them, and they shall not see the sun."(193) In both cases, this mental blindness is a sin.'(194)

313. This distinction between those who reject the truth because they cannot be bothered to conform to it in their actions, and those who turn away from contemplating it through the force of passion, should be noted very carefully. Those under the pressure of passion are much less guilty than the others.

The Fathers of the Church often spoke about these varieties of ignorance. Isidore says: 'There are those who sin from ignorance and those who sin knowingly. There are others who do not want to know in order to excuse their ignorance. These however deceive rather than defend themselves. Not knowing is simply ignorance; not wanting to know is stubborn pride. Not wanting to know the will of one's Lord can only mean despising the Lord out of pride. Let no one excuse himself through ignorance, therefore. The Lord judges both those who turn away from knowing him, and those who do not know him.'(195)

Bernard says: 'Malice generates ignorance, and ignorance conceals malice in such a way that often a person who does not know, either does not do some evil he would like to do, or does some good he would not want to do. The heart of such an unwise person is darkened. As the prey of wayward understanding, he reaches a point where he is totally unable to love or discern what is good.'(196)

Notes

(130) Certainty, 1279-1334.

(131) I have shown in AMS that errors can be willed without being free [738-744].

(132) Certainty, 1302-1306.

(133) The same limited reasoning applies to the difficulty of the first Jewish converts to the Christian faith: they could not understand the abrogation of the ceremonial law of Moses by the new law of Jesus Christ. It also explains the condescension shown them by the Apostles who understood their ignorance. Cf. the letter of St. Paul to the Romans, chapter 14, and the First to the Corinthians, chapter 8.

(134) This is true even though we are dealing with natural law, as in the case of Jacob taking Lia for Rachel — the law is not formally involved in the error.

(135) Certainty, 1309-1314.

(136) St. Thomas defines invincible ignorance as that 'which cannot be removed by study' (S.T., I-II, q. 76, art. 2).

(137) Ps 118: 9.

(138) It should be noted that we are talking here about error committed when deducing consequences from principles of rational law, not about ignorance concerning these consequences.

(139) Synderesis comes from Snterev I keep, Salvini says elegantly that this word 'serves simply to preserve and guard the first notions, that is, those rational, natural lights that are the souls's heritage. Syneresis is our rule of action'.

(140) Tractatus de actibus humanis, III, q. 1. c. 2. We shall continue later our analysis of the act by which we form an erroneous conscience.

(141) Cardinal Gerdil gives the following reason for this conclusion: 'Conscience is said to be the law of our intellect. St. Thomas explains this in the passage we have already admired. He says that IT IS A JUDGMENT OF REASON DEDUCED FROM NATURAL LAW. According to St. Thomas, therefore, conscience is a law, and consequently upright in so far as a judgment of reason deduced from the natural law. But a judgment which concludes, for any reason whatsoever, that a lie is a worthy act, is not a judgment of reason deduced from the natural law. Therefore, etc.' (Tractatus de act. hum., III, q. 1, c. 1).

(142) I-II, q. 19, art. 8, ad 2.

(143) ibid., ad 3.

(144) I-II, q. 19, art. 8, ad 3.

(145) [Gerdil, Tractatus de actibus humanis, 3, c. 2, Opere edite e inedite, Naples 1856, vol. 6, p. 89]

(146) S.T., I-II, q. 19, art 6, ad 1.

(147) De utilitate credendi, c. 12, 27.

(148) St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, art. 4.

(149) See my Storia comparativa e critica de' sistemi morali, c. 8, art. 8, for a clearer exposition of the teaching on titles of obligation.

(150) It may be objected that the second conscience prevails over the first and destroys it; in other words: 'When a person thinks of saving life, he judges it licit for him to lie.' I would answer that the concept of lying and immorality include one another, as we have seen. One necessarily implies the other. The 'prevailing' conscience, therefore, would be a judgment stating: 'When it is a case of saving life, I can commit sin.' Such a conscience contains knowledge of the commission of sin; the person knows he sins although on reflection he excuses himself, and scarcely adverts to it. Contradiction is present in this conscience which includes another, contrary conscience. Finally, I point out that the example I have adopted presupposes that lying is intrinsically evil. Consequently, the example would not be valid in the opinion of those defending the morality of 'lies of necessity'. But it is impossible to say in a note all that I think of such a relevant question, and I would refer the reader to Filosofia del Diritto, D. 1.

(151) S.T., I-II, q. 19, art. 6, ad 3).

(152) Lib. de Praecept. et Dispensat., c. 14.

(153) Lib. de Praecept. et Dispensat., c. 14, nn. 34, 35.

(154) S.T., I-II, q. 19, art. 5, ad 2.

(155) De Veritate, q. 17, De Conscienta, art. 4.

(156) St. John Chrysostom says: 'No one can offer the absence of a teacher or of some guide along the right path as an excuse for neglecting virtue. Conscience is a sufficient guide, and no one can lack such help within' (Gen., Hom. 54). This passage can be understood only of direct knowledge, which is always present in us and can be considered as a kind of potential first conscience.

(157) St. Thomas says: 'Blindness excusing from sin depends upon a natural defect in the person who cannot see' (S.T., II-II, q. 15, art. 1, ad 1).

(158) St. Thomas comments very subtly: 'The special ignorance which totally excuses is ignorance of SOME CIRCUMSTANCES which the person cannot know, even granted due care on his part' (S.T., I-II, q. 77, art. 7, ad 2).

(159) We have to distinguish, therefore: 1. error, 2. ignorance, 3, inadvertence. Error is present when I affirm something contrary to the natural law, either by denying the principles, or deducing pretended consequences on the basis of defective reasoning. Ignorance is present when I have no knowledge about some consequence of the principles of the natural law. In this case I err simply because I judge and act as though the consequence did not exist. Inadvertence is present when in theory I know a consequence of the principles of the rational law, but in acting do not reflect or pay attention to what I am doing, and have no intention of opposing the law.

(160) De Malo, q. 3, art. 7. Nevertheless, although I accept that formal error is the work of the will, I believe that the will can, in certain cases, be drawn necessarily into error, as I have said.

(161) De Conscientia, diss. 1, c. 4.

(162) Prospero Fagnani is not altogether accurate when he writes: 'The intellect is not free to think the less probable opinion; it has to follow the stronger motives of the more probable opinion. As scales inevitably drop on the side of the heavier weight, the intellect weighing dispassionately the reasons for both opinions is necessarily drawn to the side where stronger motives are to be found' (Comment. in I lib. Decretalium). The intellect has to act when it is moved by nature. This happens in its first operation when it apprehends things. But the intellect, which should here be called reason, is free to draw its conclusions when it is moved by the will. This takes place in reflective, practical judgments in which we estimate the value of things as we please. This is the great source of human errors, precisely because 'each easily believes what he desires', as St. Thomas says (S.T., II-II, q. 6, art 3, ad 4).

(163) Opinions may vary about the moral duty of expressing the truth in words, but what we affirm here about a formal lie cannot be gainsaid.

(164) Is 5: 20.

(165) Rom 2: 8.

(166) 'An upright conscience conforms to upright desire. Theologians commonly teach that upright desire, which follows upright reason, leaves no room for doubt' (Gerdil, Tractatus de act. hum., III, q. 1, c. 2).

(167) St. Basil, Hom. in principium Proverb., n. 9.

(168) St. Basil, ibid., n. 10.

(169) Is 5: 20.

(170) Prov 14: 12.

(171) 1 Cor 10: 13.

(172) Contra Jul., bk. 6, c. 16.

(173) Mk 13: 37.

(174) Mt 26: 41; Mk 13: 33.

(175) 1 Pet 5: 8.

(176) S.T., I-II, q. 3, art. 1.

(177) S.T., II-II, q. 15, art. 2 [App. no. 2].

(178) S.T., III, q. 80, art. 4, ad 5.

(179) Part I, tit. 4, c. 14, pd3. The wise reader will notice immediately that my principle aim in citing theological authorities and holy scripture is to indicate how these authorities are to be understood and interpreted. The chief reason for the interminable discussions provoked by the use of authority in difficult questions is lack of care in obtaining a well-balanced understanding of the authorities quoted. Conscientious understanding sometimes indicates that certain general propositions are to be restricted to the object under examination; that other, apparently opposite, propositions are to be reconciled; and that finally the solid meaning of the authors' fundamental opinions is to be given more attention than the slippery sands of their material words.

(180) Sir 3: [21].

(181) Advers. Pelag., bk. 1, c. 10, Dialog.

(182) D. Concina, bk. 2, De Consc., c. 1, pd3. Suarez asks: 'Does actual inattention make unwilled an act whose condition is unknown?' He says that the question is difficult, and still scarcely discussed amongst writers on morals. 'There is not much to be found directly on this question in the authors . . . and the question is PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT' (Tract. de Voluntar. et Involuntar., Disp. 4, sect. 3). And the question proposed by Suarez is only a branch of the whole question about sins of ignorance and inadvertence.

(183) Sir 32: 19, 20 [32: 15, 16].

(184) 1 Jn 2: 9.

(185) At the beginning of his discourse Christ clearly stated that the Pharisees knew the law only too well: 'The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat; so practise and observe whatever they tell you' (Mt 23: 2-3).

(186) Elsewhere he says of the lawyers: 'Woe to you, lawyers! for you have taken away the key of knowledge; you did not enter yourselves and you hindered those who were entering.' (Lk 11: 52). With these words Christ indicates two errors. The first lies in the pretentious presumption of the lawyers that they alone understood the law; the second lies in their interpreting and applying the law according to their own passions — the cause of perdition for themselves and their disciples.

(187) Christ reproves the Pharisees for neglecting 'justice and love' (Lk 11: 42). Because they were dominated by blameworthy, internal affections, they were incapable of making upright judgments, the foundation of all morality. As a result, they judged badly the importance of love.

(188) Mt 23.

(189) Mt 16: 11; Lk 12: 1.

(190) Ps 26: 12 [Douai].

(191) St. Thomas, speaking of the blindness of mind produced by sensual pleasures, says: 'The flesh acts in the intellective part not by changing it, but by impeding its action' (S.T., II-II, q. 15, art. 3, ad 2).

(192) Ps 35: 4 [Douai].

(193) Ps 57: 9 [Douai].

(194) S.T., II-II, q. 15, art 1.

(195) Levit., bk 2, c. 17.

(196) Lib. de Praecept. et Dispensat., c. 14, n. 39.