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Chapter 2 - (Part 2)

Erroneous Conscience

314. 4. 'Culpable, erroneous consciences are principally connected with the rational law or the rational application of the law.' We have seen that the erroneous consciences of the Pharisees consisted in:

a) neglecting the rational law despite their exaggerated care about certain parts of the positive law;
b) badly applying the positive law to their actions.

If we now examine the general tenor of the chief places in which ecclesiastical writers speak about willed, erroneous consciences, we will see that they refer for the most part to the rational law, or to the way in which this law, or any other law, is rationally applied to action. Let us consider some of these references.

Tertullian says: 'Everyone grants that what is against nature is monstrous; amongst us it is also termed "sacrilege" because it is against God, the Lord and Creator of nature. Are you searching for the law of God? You will find it as the common law of the open universe, written into nature, to which the Apostle appeals when he speaks of women's veils: "Does not nature itself teach you?" or says to the Romans: the "Gentiles do by nature what the law requires". He is indicating both natural law and lawful nature.'(197)

Augustine says: 'The person who sins without knowing could suitably be said to sin without willing, although that which he does without knowledge he does in fact with his will because even this person's sin cannot be void of will . . . He does it, therefore, because he wills to do it; he sins although he does not know that it is a sin. The sin, therefore, cannot be void of will: the fact is willed, although the sin is not, and the fact is a sin. It is the fact itself that should not be done.'(198) These words would have no force if they were applied to some fact which was not intrinsically evil. But in the case of an intrinsically evil act, to will the fact is to sin because the fact itself is sin.

Again: 'Sins committed in ignorance or by people under pressure are said to be involuntary, but cannot be said to be done without the intervention of the will. Even people who sin through ignorance act of their own will in judging that they should do what ought not to be done.'(199) In this passage St. Augustine presupposes that the will has the power to judge uprightly or evilly about the probity of an action. This is true in the case of the rational law, or the rational application of the law.

St. Thomas, commenting on Romans, where the Apostle teaches that the use of certain foods becomes sinful if they are eaten against conscience, but not sinful if conscience does not disapprove,(200) says: 'You have to understand the meaning as: "if a person judges with upright faith that this can be done." But if he decides on the basis of false belief that something has to be done — if, for instance, he thinks that he honours God by killing the disciples of Christ — he is not excused because he has judged himself irreprehensible, as John says, 16: 2. He would, in fact, be in a happier state if his conscience pricked him because he would be drawn away from evil. What the Apostle says here(201) must be understood in reference to LAWFUL matters alone. In this case, a person's glory consists in not being reproved by conscience.'(202)

315. 5. Erroneous consciences are inexcusable related to the rational law because we possess by nature the principle of law, that is, the conception of the entities of things. This is a norm of action. In addition we have the faculty of deducing natural laws in an upright way and applying them rightly to our actions within certain limits. And beyond the limits of this faculty, it is impossible for a sound will to be forced to consent to error. This is true also of rational application to our actions of natural and positive law.

We can prove this on the authority of divine scripture also, upon which ecclesiastical writers depend. In Deuteronomy, God stimulated the Hebrews to keep the natural law of love of God and neighbour, which he had promulgated positively, by reminding them of its natural presence in intelligent spirits. He says to Israel: 'For this commandment which I command you this day is not too hard for you, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that you should say, "Who will go up for us to heaven, and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?" Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, "Who will go over the sea for us, and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?" But the word is very near you; it is in your mouth and in your heart, so that you can do it. See, I have set before you this day life and good, death and evil. If you obey the commandments of the Lord your God, by walking in his ways, and by keeping his commandments . . . then you shall live.'(203) It is clear that those failing to keep the natural law on the pretext of an erroneous conscience are inexcusable. They should be told to reject their substitute conscience in order to find beneath it a better norm of wisdom. They will find the truth close at hand in their heart.

316. This truth or law, when loved, is called wisdom (it is always present to our intelligence because it is in its essence the first concepts we have of things).

The holy scriptures speak of wisdom in the following terms:

In affirming that 'wisdom is easily discerned by those who love her', the text reaffirms that when love of what is good and love of truth move the will, the will in turn directs the eye of the understanding which sees and acknowledges the object of its direct cognition. This object is clear and unfading because the conceived entities of things cannot be falsified. Willingly thinking of truth, instead of fictions created by our passions, and of the true worth of things, rather than of what we invent about them, is 'perfect understanding'. Our conscience is upright and secure when we are really diligent in reflecting in this way in order not to deceive ourselves. As scripture says, we are then vigilant, and he who is vigilant on her account will soon be free from care.'

317. The Gentiles had formed many false consciences for themselves: they thought fornication was lawful, and idolatry an act of piety. But the blindness of their erroneous consciences did not excuse them. St. Paul says they were altogether without excuse: 'So they are without excuse'. But why were they without excuse? Were they not obliged to follow their erroneous consciences?

They were not, and could not be obliged to do what was intrinsically evil; nothing can oblige a person to do this. They were, however, obliged to set aside such consciences, just as they were obliged not to form them in the first place. But was it possible for them not to form false consciences? Yes, says St. Paul; this is why they are without excuse. It was enough for them to have adhered with their will to the notion of divinity undoubtedly present in their first, natural, direct knowledge.

This notion should have been the sole norm of their actions.

The Apostle describes how the pure, true notion of God was to be found in the depth of their spirits, and how they had distanced themselves from it by following reflection based upon imagination. 'For what can be known about God' (that is, what can be known about him naturally speaking) 'is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and divinity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made.'(205) By means of what we have called (in the Origin of Thought [fn. 14, 623, 624]) the integrating function, they passed from created things to the notion of the uncreated principle, the Author of the universe. This was direct knowledge, according to which they were held to act in their relations with God. Because they possessed this norm, says St. Paul, they were able to follow it. But they behaved very differently. 'For although they knew God, they did not honour him as God':(206) they did not acknowledge him; they did not cling lovingly to this divinity which they had known. And this precisely is their sin.

Its effect was mental blindness. The vision which they had now willingly made for themselves was no longer that of the God whose notion resided in their soul, but of an idol created by their passions. This was the source of their erroneous consciences; their depravity of will made its influence felt in their understanding. 'They became futile in their thinking,' says St. Paul.

As long as willed thought remains based on direct knowledge, which is always true, it has a sure foundation. But when, instead of referring to the content of direct knowledge, it affirms what is not present to the intelligence, or denies what is present, the thrust of such thoughts ends in pointless nothingness: they become futile indeed.

He goes on: 'Their foolish heart was darkened.' The heart is the reflective will, that is, the willed reflection. This willed reflection is obscured if it does not receive the light of truth found in the notion of direct knowledge — and the will does not receive it if, instead of gazing at the light, it is taken up with its own fantasies.
'Claiming to be wise, they became foolish.' This is a third grade of human corruption. The first is sin; the second, willed, erroneous conscience; the third, glorying in this erroneous conscience, as if it were the repository of wisdom.

318. The nature and source of what St. James calls, 'earthly, unspiritual, devilish wisdom'(207) is found here. It is the deceitful wisdom so frequently mentioned in holy scripture. St. Paul says of its admirers: 'They glory in their shame, with minds set on earthly things,'(208) and of their knowledge: 'The Lord knows that the thoughts of the wise are futile.'(209) St. Paul's description of true wisdom is very different: 'But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God . . . none of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.'(210) St. Paul attributes the crucifixion of Christ to a false conscience, and hence to a false wisdom.(211) Christ had pointed to the same cause of his death when he said: 'Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they do.'(212) This kind of wisdom and false conscience could never save the world, as scripture says:

Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?'(213)

319. What are the special, characteristic effects of this erroneous conscience in which humanity treasures its wisdom? St. Paul in describing the Gentiles indicates two of these effects, idolatry and lust. Of idolatry he says: 'they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles.'(214) The word 'exchanged' is admirably suitable for showing how such a change in the notion of God depended upon the work of their own will. They exchanged it, says St. Paul; hence they must have possessed the notion of God ('what can be known about God is plain in them').(215) They changed their right notion of God's glory and his surpassing divine nature by refusing to acknowledge it; they substituted vain appearances in its place; and they turned their practical reflection from the notion of God to vanity. The effect was foreseeable and inevitable. The vile, vicious false gods they had made were a prelude to unbridled licence.

The notion of the true God, pure spirit, all truth and holiness, requires pure and holy worship. But guilty human nature did not want purity and holiness; uncleanness was its aim. It was more useful, therefore, to alter the notion of true divinity, which could not be acknowledged without the profession of a pure life, and to substitute in its place a false notion, the acknowledgment of which would permit subjection to the desires of passion. In desiring this impurity, humanity also wanted a false notion of God. This, according to St. Paul, explains the origin of idolatry: 'Therefore' (that is, as a result of idolatry) 'God gave them up in the lusts of their heart to impurity, to the dishonouring of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth about God' (that is, the true, divine nature which shone in their direct knowledge) 'for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever!'(216) St. Paul continues with a long description of the wickedness prevalent amongst the Gentiles.

320. The Gentiles were guilty of all this wickedness, and without excuse, although they had acted with an erroneous conscience, which was in fact the chief sin and root of all their other sins. Let us conclude with a passage about the natural law from St. Thomas which confirms our thesis in its entirety. 'This law is simply the intellectual light placed in us by God, through which we know what has to be done and left undone. God gave this light and this law to mankind at the moment of creation. Nevertheless, many think they can excuse themselves from the observance of such a law on the grounds of ignorance. But the prophet addresses them in the psalm: "Many say: Who shows us good things!", as if they did not know what to do. But the prophet replies: "The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," that is, the light of the intellect through which we know what has to be done.'(217)

We have shown on the authority of St. Paul, who speaks of the notion of God, that there is present in us a living, resplendent principle of law, together with the incorrupt notions of beings; we also have the faculty of applying uprightly, if we wish to do so, the law known to us,(218) and deriving from it more particular laws. We conclude that we are without excuse in forming erroneous, non-upright consciences for ourselves where upright, true consciences could be formed in their place.

321. 6. 'Because advertence is not necessary in our use of reason and will, we can form erroneous, non-upright consciences without being aware of them.'
As we have said,(219) it is possible to sin when following our culpably erroneous conscience. Consequently it is possible to sin without advertence because the possession of an erroneous conscience not only leaves us unaware of the unlawfulness of our action, but makes us believe it lawful.

322. But our proposition goes further. It affirms that we can form erroneous consciences without advertence. This arises because knowing, and willing what we know, does not require advertence. Actions of this nature can be done inadvertently.

We need to ponder what I indicated in The Origin of Thought [cf. 927]: knowing is not the same as being aware that we know; willing something as a result of knowledge is not the same as being aware that we will. If we are in the habit of observing what takes place within us, we are almost certain to have surprised ourselves now and again in the act of thinking although at the time we were not aware that we were thinking. What we call distractions form part of this phenomenon. The culpability of our action, I must insist, requires us to know the action and will it freely, but adverting to it is not necessary. As a result, an erroneous conscience in matters of rational law is intrinsically evil when it springs from error (not of course from mere ignorance). Anyone willing such a conscience sins, although he may not have reflected upon his act of will and become aware of his sin.(220)

323. What I am trying to show here (through careful observation of the way in which our internal operations arise and by an exact distinction between a moral act and a reflection upon it) has already been demonstrated by moral theologians through the authority of sacred scripture and the Fathers.(221) The need for actual advertence in order to sin is an opinion not found expressly and clearly in the writings of moral theologians before 1581, when Gabriel Vasquez published his work.

324. In fact, it is my own opinion that this teaching was already condemned by the Church in the case of the Pelagians, as we can see clearly in several places of St. Augustine and St. Jerome who consistently combated this heresy.(222) The error of the Pelagians is made very clear by my distinction between mere knowledge of our moral act, and the reflection upon it by which we make ourselves aware of it. Only the first act (knowledge) is necessary for sin, not the second (reflection). This distinction has not been grasped clearly by Concina or other modern writers.

325. St. Gregory's words, therefore, have the authentic ring of truth: 'Our "hidden path" has another meaning because we do not know if the things that seem upright to us will present the same appearance when subject to examination by the severe judge. Often what we do, as we said above, is a cause of damnation to us although we think it an advance in virtue. Often what we imagine placates the judge rouses him rather to wrath. As Solomon says: "There is a way which seems upright to man, but the end thereof is death." Holy people, even when they overcome evil, fear their good actions lest while desiring to do good they are deceived by the appearance of good in what they do.'(223)

326. It will not be out of place to take our analysis of this mysterious operation a stage further. By coming to know its nature better, we shall form a firmer persuasion of its existence. The mystery lies in the nature of habits which, as principles of spontaneous action, are either adverted to with great difficulty or not at all.

Let us take as an example the condition of a person in whom an habitual affection to self-interest, or lust or ambition, is firmly rooted. This affection gives rise in his spirit to a constant reaching-out for possessions or pleasures or praise; it is a permanent assent to evil, an immanent act giving rise to adventitious acts. Every time the opportunity offers, he has a constant will to enjoy the satisfaction to which he is addicted. When an occasion of such enjoyment presents itself, therefore, he has no need to deliberate; his mind is already made up. His act flows like water when a valve is opened. The water is already there, continually exerting pressure; all that is needed is to turn on the tap.

When a person acts according to wilful passion without need of further deliberation, he does not initiate anything new. His will, which had previously been blocked, now rushes forward in the course opened to it. If he does nothing to impede it, no new act or new state of spirit is found in him; he has no need for consideration in order to act, nor does he have to produce any new energy. He simply has to let himself go by not positing any obstacle to the movement of activity already within him and bursting to expand. Because nothing new takes place within him, he is not roused to reflect on what he is doing. A sensual person, for example, thinks and gives consent to what is impure without any awareness; an avaricious person deceives himself, and without reflecting tells a thousand lies in pursuit of gain. His self-deceit and mendacity are so familiar that he cannot even remember lying. The same can be said about people enslaved by other passions.(224)

327. Nevertheless, a sermon, or some accidental recall of an eternal truth, could occasion disquiet in the lives of those habitually taken up with some vice. Although they do not advert distinctly to many actions in particular, it is difficult for all their actions to remain unobserved. If, on hearing the call, they accept the grace of conversion, they abandon their evil way of life. But if the eternal truth they hear only causes them some natural fright, without arousing a resolution about true conversion, several things happen, one of which is often as follows.

Fear of losing their soul, with all that entails for the future life, causes great anguish, as we would expect in people whose sole desire is to be comfortable and satisfy passion. Their will now turns therefore to a new desire, that is, they want to remove from their spirit the trouble caused by remorse and by fear of what is to come in the future life, but without losing the satisfaction of their passions in the present life. This satisfaction is their true end, and it is diminished by any disquiet accompanying it. They now ask themselves how they can continue doing what is wrong and at the same time quieten their interior discomfort of conscience.

This is their great problem, and they turn their energy to solving it in the most subtle ways. Having entangled themselves in the solution, they look for help from friends and flatterers whose advice is acceptable, from other persons and above all from priests whom they call to direct their spirit. They put every effort into using such means and eventually, after untold sophistry, they finally form extremely comforting conclusions which, under the appearance and title of decency and piety, leave the most horrible vices hidden in the depth of their heart. And in talking to God about these matters, they delude themselves even further: 'We shall adopt every appearance of religious behaviour ("I fast twice a week, I give tithes of all that I get"(225)), but you, our Lord, will turn a blind eye in the matter of charity, compassion, temperance, chastity.'

In this way they profit by lax teaching, sophisticated reasoning, badly applied examples, instant answers, and every word of comfort they hear from those with vested interests and affections. They also take advantage of the weakness and ignorance of the sacred ministers they choose and protect, and of the connivance of other sacred ministers as depraved as themselves. There is no room left for truth as they fill their heads with satisfying reasons and authority. Contrary opinions, which they either ridicule or dismiss with specious gravity, weigh nothing in their balance. Remorse, which could devour their heart, is silenced except for an occasional, strangled whimper.

The imprudent person, who with gospel freedom proposes true, frank morality to them, will either be considered an oddity or answered with the kind of nod that indicates how foolish he is. If he were to go further and sustain the truth with firm persuasion and good, forceful reasons, he would soon find himself touching some remarkably sensitive areas. Meek, composedly peaceful countenances would rapidly change into the faces of furies, ready to attack and overwhelm the poor soul for the rest of his mortal existence. False consciences about the rational law, which destroy the very core of humanity, develop in this way. But they still lie crouched and hidden under the appearances of religion and external composure.(226)

328. But because God scrutinises the heart, he knows us in this state and judges us. We may indeed imagine ourselves just and pious by relying to a great extent on certain religious acts or on human good works, and by covering evil actions with the shield of the erroneous consciences we are discussing. But in this miserable condition we can only lead a life of perdition as St. Augustine says: 'It is just punishment of sin for a person to lose what he did not want to put to good use when he could easily have used it if he had wanted. I mean, if someone does not act uprightly when he knows how to, he may lose his knowledge of what is upright; and if he does not want to act uprightly when he is able to do so, he may lose the power of doing so even when he wants to.'(227)

329. 7. 'The possibility of non-upright, inadvertent consciences in the human spirit was the source of the saints' fear in all that they did.' We read in the book of Job that he feared in all his actions: 'I feared in all my works.'(228) We have already quoted the commentary of Gregory the Great on another phrase of Job, 'To a man whose way is hid',(229) where the holy doctor asserts: 'The just fear even in their good words, and pray continually, lest through some hidden error they fail in their very works.'(230) Holy King David felt the same fear, and prayed to the Lord: 'The sins of my youth and my ignorances do not remember.'(231)

St. Augustine, in a letter to Paulinus, shows himself fearful of the blame that ignorance and non-upright conscience, the subtle outcome of our secret passions, could bring upon him. He goes so far as to accuse himself of sin: 'As far as I am concerned, I confess that I sin in these matters, and do not know when and how I can fulfil the commandment "In the presence of all, correct those who sin." Oh, Paulinus, holy man of God, what terror and darkness envelops these matters! Surely it is of these things that it is written: "Fear and trembling are come upon me: and darkness has covered me".'(232) St. Augustine's words show clearly the danger of sinning without advertence. Our secret self-love and other passions easily deceive us, as we said, and either block our vision by spreading darkness around us, or — and this is more terrifying still — lead us to form erroneous consciences.(233)

330. 8. 'We are obliged to lay aside our vincible, erroneous conscience by rectifying our will.'

This follows from what has been said. If the vincible, erroneous conscience, as we have described it, is itself a sin, it is clear that we must overcome it and form for ourselves a true, upright conscience. But how can our evil conscience be put right? We shall discuss this shortly. For the moment we may conclude and affirm that:

331. 9. 'The teaching we have examined is of great comfort to holy, God-fearing souls; it is frightening only for those who are habitually evil.'

The explanation for this final proposition depends upon what has been said about the nature of moral habits (prop. 6) as principles of inadvertent action. It is clear that if an habitually evil person can commit sins knowingly indeed but without reflection and hence without adverting to his act, so an habitually good person can often do what is good, and do it without in fact reflecting upon what he is doing.

According to this principle, God-fearing souls who abhor sin can be happy because they have every reason for believing: 1. that if they doubt about having assented to sin, they have not in fact given it their assent, and 2. that when they fear they have made little progress in virtue, they have in fact made progress (this is normal in the case of such persons, although they do not notice their daily progress).(234)

Experienced spiritual directors will have observed that the unease suffered by good people comes in great part from their being unaware of following the right path. Good people remain in darkness and uncertainty about their moral state and their salvation. But what has been said above, if it is rightly understood, destroys all foundation for such disquiet by showing that there can be, and certainly is, progress in good even though the subject of this progress cannot always be aware of it.
Opposite reasons should lead those who are habitually evil to find in this teaching solid motives for rousing themselves and for fear about their own state and the outcome of their eternal salvation. Teaching of this kind provokes in those who think about it the states described by St. Paul, 'There will be tribulation and distress for every human being who does evil . . . glory, honour and peace to those who do good.'(235)

332. We now come to the second part of our enquiry: 'What is the moral state of an action done with a less than upright conscience concerning the rational law or the rational application of the law.'

I. Moralists first ask whether an evil action following from an evil conscience forms one sin with the sin inherent in the conscience, or whether it is a separate sin.

It is not my intention to discuss the relative importance of this question but to show that knowledge of the presence of one or more sins in a person does not provide knowledge of his true moral state. The moral condition resulting from a single sin could be worse than that resulting from two. In fact, distinguishing two sins implies analysing a moral state already known, which remains the same whether we analyse it or not. I deliberately mention this because some people seemingly place too much importance on defining the number of sins involved in a particular action. Very often they are simply speculating without throwing any light on the sinner's true state of soul.
But I cannot omit the question altogether because I hope it will clarify the teaching about the evil contained in certain erroneous consciences. The more the evil is hidden, the more we should make an effort to reveal it.

333. Moralists are divided by three opinions on the question. Some maintain that a sin committed with a vincibly erroneous conscience does not differ from the sin contained in the conscience. Others say that every time we act with a culpable erroneous conscience we commit a new sin, different from the sin inherent in the conscience. The third opinion lies between these two. It says that an erroneous conscience, in itself or as a result of ignorance, either contains a full species of sin (for example, unbelief, heresy, schism) or does not, if the ignorance or error consists simply in neglect to instruct oneself. In the first case, they say, the sin in the conscience is distinct from the particular sins of actions dependent upon the conscience. In the second case, the ignorance, or the erroneous conscience caused by the ignorance, forms one sin with each subsequent blameworthy act.

334. It seems to me that none of these three opinions entirely answers the question. This will be clear if I list the various distinctions which, in my opinion, must first be made in order to give a clear, unequivocal, complete answer to the question.
The first and most important distinction is the distinction I have made between rational and positive law. Intrinsically evil actions are not the object of positive law as such. To perform actions that are forbidden or to omit actions that are commanded positively is a sin only because of the law or will of the legislator forbidding or commanding the actions.

Therefore every time we are ignorant of the law, we do not sin in desiring such actions. The only sin (whose gravity would vary, as I will explain below) would consist in our culpable, willed ignorance of the law, and our neglect to inform ourselves about it. If the ignorance were sought in order to avoid the obligation of acting in conformity with the law, the sin would be multiple, and its gravity would correspond to the degree of clarity or confusion with which the defects of the action were foreseen. There would also be all the various kinds of evil that are possible in an evil will. Hence, relative to positive law, the following words of Fr. La Croix are substantially true: 'Although ignorance and lack of forethought are culpable, a subsequent action has no particular evil except the negligence itself or negligence to recognise or advert to the evil.'(236) His mistake is to give the words too general a meaning by applying them not simply to positive law but to rational law as well.(237) On the other hand, his opponents err in saying that the words apply neither to rational nor positive law.

335. But relative to rational law there is no doubt that an action can be intrinsically evil. To wish such an action is a sin totally independent and separate from the sin inherent in conscience. We want what is intrinsically evil and truly conceived as evil, although we judge it as good through a culpable error of reflection. Every time we perform an action evil in itself, a new sin is committed different from the sin committed when we form our blameworthy conscience.

336. Another distinction we must make, and have already discussed, is whether an erroneous conscience relative to rational law is caused by ignorance or by error.
If it is caused by culpable error in judging lawful what is unlawful and seen by our spirit as intrinsically blameworthy, clearly a sin of rash, unjust judgment is committed in forming our conscience. If we act according to this judgment we commit an altogether different sin, because we desire an act that is intrinsically evil independently of the judgment. The matter is totally different, however, when an erroneous conscience is preceded by ignorance. In this case, as we saw, there may be no moral defect in the erroneous conscience if: 1. the ignorance producing it is an effect of the limited power of our mind in deducing the remote consequences of rational law from its principles; for instance, when a person notably and without necessity hastens his own death because of zeal in doing good works; 2. the ignorance concerns a fact requiring application of the law, for example when Jacob believed he could lawfully live with the woman who was with him the first night of his marriage. But if the ignorance were the effect of freely neglecting to inform oneself, and therefore culpable, the negligence would be sinful although any erroneous conscience resulting from it, and any subsequent action based on the conscience, would not be a new sin. Granted preceding ignorance, the will acts uprightly, having no culpable object in view either when forming the conscience or acting according to it. Hence subsequent sins do not differ from the first sin.

337. Bearing in mind these two distinctions, it is my opinion that relative to rational law a less than upright conscience which judges lawful what is intrinsically wrong perpetrates three totally distinct sins. They are:

1. the cause of the erroneous conscience, that is, the disordered tendency which moves us to the judgment, whether it is avarice or another capital sin;
2. the unjust judgment we make when forming the conscience; by it we affirm to ourselves the lawfulness to act which we do not truly see or know;
3. the intrinsically evil, particular action we do according to the conscience we have formed.

338. These sins differ because they are three different acts of will, but they can also differ specifically among themselves. Thus, an unjust, interior judgment is a sin whose object is falsehood and untruth, although the cause of the judgment may be avarice or covetousness. In addition, the intrinsically evil act that is carried out is a new act of will desiring an evil that, although generally belonging to the same genus as the cause of the evil conscience, can sometimes differ in species and genus. For example, a man ruled by ambition may judge it lawful to kill someone who insults him; here the murder would be of a different genus from that of ambition, and only accidentally part of the ambition, that is, because of the purpose for which the murder was committed.

339. I said these sins were at least three, because a fourth can easily be added: we can convince ourselves of acting uprightly when we are in fact acting evilly with a false conscience. This was the case of those pagans of whom St. Paul says: 'Claiming to be wise, they became fools,'(238) and also of those Jews about whom Christ said: 'If you were blind, you would have no guilt; but now that you say, "We see", your guilt remains.'(239)

340. On the other hand, we should distinguish at least two sins relative to the rational application of positive law which was erroneous because of some sinful affection: 1. the first would be the cause, and would consist in the sinful affection, evil from its beginning, which perverts the uprightness of the judgment; 2. the second would be the distortion of judgment, constituting the erroneous conscience. Because the object of any action done according to this conscience is not evil in itself, the action does not form a distinct sin but is one with its cause.

341. II. After describing the number of sins involved in an erroneous conscience, we must now turn our attention to their level of gravity which must be measured by the norms governing the gravity of other sins. Consequently their matter, and the evil present in the will, can be light. I believe that these slightly culpable, erroneous consciences and their subsequent acts form the larger part of those minor, inadverted faults into which the just fall, as scripture affirms: 'A righteous man falls seven times.'(240) These are much lamented by holy people who apply themselves so diligently to purify themselves of these consciences.

342. An upright conscience is undoubtedly a judgment, but to judge properly is very difficult, as we gather from Christ's great praise of Nathanael: 'Behold, an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile!'(241) If judging uprightly were easy there would be no real force in David's assertion that he is addressing God with 'lips free of deceit.'(242) Christ's words indicate that guile resides in the spirit where we fabricate our own deceits; and what David says is so true that not even the one who saw the depth of his heart found fault with it. A tiny weight placed on perfect scales will tip them; the same happens on the scales of justice. Anyone making a judgment must be free of any inclination that does not come from sincere truth in his heart.

But who can do this with a pure spirit, free of all passion, in the midst of so many attractive pleasures, so many frightening evils, deep emotions and other influences that demand an immediate judgment? Is it possible for the most innocent human mind to be free of the heart's aversion or inclination? What holy person has never offended a hundred times a day against the dictate of justice and truth, and in spirit given more value to things and actions than they really merit? What holy person has never been indulgent to himself, followed his own inclination, or for a moment not shut his ears to the dictate of pure truth? All this is so impossible to human powers that we have to say ceaselessly with St. Augustine: 'What terror! What darkness!'.

I am certain that anyone to whom God might have specially granted the gift of avoiding all sins of erroneous conscience would already be at the summit of perfection and live in pure light. The only sins he could commit would be those which he adverted to and assessed clearly in his interior conscience, and such sins are easily avoided by good and upright people.

343. III. We now consider the role of ignorance and mental darkness (always present in the less than upright conscience we are discussing) in determining the moral state of human beings. Our discussion will demonstrate two things:

1. that ignorance and darkness greatly multiply our sins;
2. that they diminish the actual evil of every sin committed with a less than upright conscience.

344. The first proposition needs no special demonstration. It is clear that, if we consider what is unlawful to be unlawful, or even meritorious, we act without difficulty; and if the actions are pleasant, we act as often as we can. The proposition, it seems to me, is supported by the following authorities.

St. Bernardine says: 'In the present, wicked world, the devil has no greater friend than ignorance. The minds of Saracens, Turks, Jews and a countless number of Christians are deceived and fettered by ignorance' (deception and error, as well as ignorance, are involved). 'Thus, in a certain sermon, Richard says: "The doors to hell are two, ignorance of what is good, and desire for what is evil"; and again, in distinction 38: "Ignorance is mother of all errors". Isidore says: "Ignorance is mother and nurse of vice; the ignorant person sins every day." Gregory, in his morals, says: "Anyone ignorant of the purity of the light, approves as light what is dark." And St. Augustine, on the psalms, says: "No one is more incurable than the one who thinks himself healthy."'(243) This is what happens to anyone who has a less than upright conscience; it is worse if they think themselves informed and just.

St. Laurence Justinian says: 'Which person diligently searching for himself will ever expel from the fount of his intelligence the flood of ignorance within him about good and evil, about true and false, and about what is fitting and unfitting? . . . Lack of virtue indicates either the error of ignorance or abundance of evil, and both are harmful, both hated by God. This is true regarding the good that is virtue, but what about evil? Evil is in itself always sin. Sin is a prevarication of divine law. There is no one without this ignorance' (note carefully this very serious statement). 'Hence the Prophet says: "Who understands crimes? Cleanse me, Lord, from my hidden misdeeds." How often virtue is considered vice, and vice considered virtue!' (this indicates the many erroneous consciences we form). 'Thus, anger is called zeal, presumption authority, voluptuous pleasure brotherly love, gluttony moderation, indolence humility, insensitivity strength, righteousness cruelty, malice wisdom, meekness timidity, audacity freedom, etc.'

This is the way the saints speak; whether we like it or not, they have the truth, and their opinions are of great value. We should note carefully what Justinian adds: 'It would be especially noticeable if this ignorance dominated only in sinners . . . But those who call themselves just possess another kind of ignorance of what is true and false, which is no less harmful. Who can ever express the extent of their ignorance? They blindly follow the spirit of error, ensnared by the deceptions of the devil whom they regard as an angel of light. They give their wills full rein and fall into the pit. They are unable to discern or judge anything honestly. They pursue their desires for virtue without any discipline, and believe every spirit.'(244)

This explains why culpable, erroneous consciences are common in people of all conditions, and why, consequently, so many sins are committed inadvertently every day. But the eyes of holy people, enlightened by divine light, see differently from earthly eyes. The saints salutarily advise us to keep watch over ourselves, to scrutinise the depths of our hearts, and to fear and lament.

345. Regarding the second proposition — ignorance diminishes fault — we must distinguish carefully.
We have indicated at least three kinds of sin against the rational law dependent upon vincibly erroneous conscience: 1. previous sins that produce a sinful affection in us, obscuring and corrupting our judgment, and causing us to form a false, evil conscience; 2. the unjust act contained in the false judgment which constitutes the blameworthy conscience; 3. the unlawful actions we perpetrate with this conscience.

We must note that anyone burdened by this triple sin is in a much worse state than someone who, with eyes open and against his conscience, perpetrates an unlawful action. The second person would sin, but unlike the first, the sin would not be continually inherent in his erroneous conscience. His spirit would not be held and bound by a hardened affection to evil, which perverts judgment, suppresses remorse and, as it were, envelops the human heart in damnation (to use the psalmist's expression). The person with the vincible erroneous conscience would have festering wounds, the other, bleeding but clean wounds, although we are frequently deceived into thinking that the condition of the second is worse because he commits the act with more actual knowledge and deliberate will.

346. From one point of view, any particular action involved in the triple sin but considered independently of the previous actions connected with it, can certainly be less blameworthy. But unfortunately the action cannot be separated in any way from its previous actions. It can certainly be a lesser evil, but it has deep roots and is the offspring of a greater sin, or more accurately, of a complex or mass of sins. The blameworthy affection which incites the action and gives it form is much more culpable than the affection of someone who sins once, even with open eyes.

347. Having clarified these important points, we can say that unlawful actions, such as usury, fornication or any offence whatever, done with an ignorant and mentally blind erroneous conscience, are less evil than actions done with clear, actual knowledge, and still less evil than actions done with full advertence.

The reason is evident. The more clearly we conceive the guilt of an action, the more our will is determined to evil if we do it. But in the case of blindness of conscience, although truth is present in the depths of our spirit to be followed if we wish, its light is not present to our reflective vision. The intention of our spirit is directed to the concept of probity that we have incorrectly formed about the unlawful action. Hence our act of will cannot be perfectly evil, nor simply have evil as its object. But this does not alter the moral state of a person with a culpable, erroneous conscience whose condition remains far worse than that of a person who has a true conscience which he does not follow. I am simply saying that the former's particular act, considered in itself, is less blameworthy than the latter's act, because the darkness in which he has enveloped his spirit has removed some of the evil.

348. Thus Jesus Christ could pray for those crucifying him: 'Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.'(245) Those crucifying Christ did not know what they were doing simply because they were blinded by their own passions. Hence: 1. they seriously and undoubtedly sinned; but 2. their ignorance, although culpable, diminished the fault of the particular act of crucifixion, because it prevented their knowing who it was they were nailing to the cross, and drew them instead to think they were honouring God.

349. Similarly, St. Paul, after saying he had been a contumelious blasphemer and persecutor, adds: 'But I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.'(246)

The authority of the Fathers confirms this teaching. St. Basil demonstrates it by quoting Christ: 'God's judgment on those who sin through ignorance is truly clear in the words: "He who did not know, and did what deserved a beating, shall receive a light beating".'(247) In another place he says: 'Christ does not judge as entirely free of retribution the person who sins through ignorance.'(248) St. Augustine says: 'Perhaps there is no sin of ignorance and therefore no need for cleansing? But what is the meaning of: do not remember the sins of my youth, and my ignorances? Things knowingly committed are more harmful, but if there were no sin of ignorance we would not read what I have recalled: do not remember the sins of my youth, etc.'(249)

350. Granted that ignorance and darkness of mind, although not free of fault, reduce the evil of an act posited with an erroneous conscience, without entirely destroying the evil, in which part of the act is the evil diminished and in which does it remain entire?

We must first recall that a less than upright conscience presupposes 1. direct knowledge, which is the true norm of action, and 2. reflective, invented, willed knowledge which by overlaying the direct knowledge obscures it and constitutes an erroneous conscience. I concluded that this kind of conscience is not entirely sincere or well-founded, because contradicted by a principle in us that silently appeals against it. This vacillation of erroneous conscience, this lack of sincerity accompanied by the prompting of truth in the depths of our heart, varies in degree, and is seen and measured only by God. It is clear therefore that the amount of fault in an erroneous conscience is proportionate to its lack of sincerity, to the light emitted in the sinner's spirit by the truth he possesses interiorly, and to the vague or distinct, confused or sharp, disquiet it causes him.

351. Moreover, the extent to which ignorance reduces the sin of a particular act done with a less blameworthy erroneous conscience, can be determined only by distinguishing the cause in some way responsible for the ignorance. The cause can be threefold: 1. neglecting to reflect; 2. our own evil affections; 3. the authority or practice of others.

1. Neglecting to reflect and to apply the rational law so that a particular dictate is neither applied nor deduced from principles, does not necessarily produce an erroneous judgment in itself. It only brings about a false conclusion due to lack of data or means. Hence negligence to reflect is culpable to the extent it depends upon sluggishness of natural virtue, a given quantity of will, and perhaps previous evil passions.(250) In this case these passions would also be sinful. It remains true, however, that where the terms of the judgment have been justly united, although some datum is lacking which causes the conclusion to be erroneous, the sin does not lie in the judgment but in its sinful cause or causes. Nor is there sin in any acts that depend on the judgment, because the immediate object presented to the will's desire by the essentially upright judgment is not intrinsically evil.

352. 2. The other two causes, evil affection and authority or common custom, not only render the conclusion erroneous but distort and harm the judgment itself.

St. Thomas clearly distinguishes and notes both causes: 'First, there are the most general precepts, known to everybody, which belong to the natural law. Then secondary, more particular precepts, which are proximate conclusions to the first. Relative to the general precepts, the natural law cannot in any way be extinguished in the hearts of human beings in general. But it can be obliterated in particular actions if reason is prevented by concupiscence or some other passion from applying the general principle to the particular action. Relative to the secondary precepts, the natural law can be cancelled in the hearts of human beings either by evil persuasions, in the same way as we have errors about necessary conclusions in speculative matters, or by depraved practices and corrupt habits, in so far as robbery and unnatural vices, for example, are not considered sins, as the Apostle tells us.'(251)

353. Amongst the affections which lead to sin, the desire for possessions undoubtedly blinds human beings more than anything else, and perverts their judgment. Scripture calls it 'the root of all evils.'(252) All the saints denounce it as the source of less than upright consciences. St. Bernardine of Siena says: 'Love of temporal things blinds conscience. Today many people think they can make usurious contracts, sell their time, and do similar things with a good conscience!'(253) The capital sins are called the 'head' and source of other sins precisely because they blind us. Thus, erroneous consciences arising from sinful affections can be divided into seven groups corresponding to the seven capital sins.

354. 3. Authority and custom (the other source of less than erroneous upright consciences) give rise to idolatry, the best example of their evil consequences. Scripture says: 'In the process of time, wicked custom prevailing, this error was kept as a law; and statues were worshipped by the commandment of tyrants.'(254) Inveterate custom furtively insinuated serious error and non-upright consciences amongst the chosen people. So Christ said to the Apostles: 'The hour is coming when whoever kills you will think he is offering service to God.'(255)

Generally speaking, it is certain that, while the culpability of a false conscience increases in proportion to its dependence on depraved affections and previous sins, it decreases in so far as such conscience is influenced by the example and authority of others. For this reason, Christ prayed on the cross particularly for the people who had been deceived and blinded by the authority of the priests and scribes who had urged them to accomplish his death. To this prayer we must undoubtedly attribute the conversion of the many Jews who accepted the grace accompanying the Apostles' preaching.

355. However, if an evil conscience, influenced by authority, custom and example, concerns remote consequences of the rational law not rationally deduced but received solely from such authorities, it becomes, as I have said, a matter of positive law precisely because positively received without any willed error of judgment.

356. IV. But a cause of erroneous consciences exists in us from the beginning, prior to acquired, depraved affections and misleading authority. It is the inclination to evil that comes with original sin. We have already spoken about it but must refer to it again for the sake of good order in our study.

All human, moral evil can be said to begin with this evil tendency which, because it is placed in in us by corrupt nature and does not spring from freedom, can, granted God's goodness, contribute quite considerably to reducing the culpability and demerit of our transgressions. For example, in order to move God to compassion and mercy, Job reminds him of the innate misery of human beings conceived in sin;(256) the psalmist shows great confidence in the mercy of the Lord who knows 'our frame';(257) God himself indicates that he takes account of the inborn weakness of human nature when he says after the Flood: 'I will no more curse the earth for the sake of man: for the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth: therefore I will no more destroy every living soul as I have done';(258) the book of Wisdom testifies that God mitigated the punishment deserved by the Canaanites because the principle of their perverted iniquity lay in their very seed.(259)

Nevertheless, God punishes. For although the natural inclination to evil diminishes the culpability of sin in so far as it diminishes freedom and clarity of understanding, and thus introduces something false into consciences, it does not entirely remove culpability, nor completely cleanse us of our transgressions. In particular cases, the nature and extent of the diminution of culpability is known only to God. But our obligation, as mortal human beings, is to continue, with the power of grace, to oppose and conquer the depraved inclination of our nature.

357. After the general discussion on the moral state of actions done with a less than upright conscience, we must consider the special accidental qualities that distinguish this state. We listed the principal accidents and their individual problems (cf. 259, 285-290), when we divided all possible erroneous consciences into two groups: those that judge evil good and those that judge good evil. We begin with the first group.

We noted the possibility of three accidental qualities, that is, we could judge what is unlawful

1. lawful,
2. meritorious or supererogatory (as well as lawful),
3. obligatory.

In order to examine the moral state of a person with these consciences we must distinguish two questions:

1. Is it a greater sin to judge an unlawful action lawful, or to judge it meritorious, or to judge it obligatory?
2. What is the different moral state of acts posited according to these three kinds of consciences?

358. Answers to the first question depend upon the certain principle that a fault is as great as the willed error (all things being equal). Consequently, to judge what is unlawful as meritorious and obligatory is more blameworthy than to judge it as simply lawful. For example, it is a more repulsive sin to judge that the divinity could be honoured by prostitution than to believe prostitution is simply lawful.

359. But determining the greater error of the other two judgments, that is, judging the unlawful as meritorious or obligatory, requires consideration of the circumstances, although to judge the unlawful obligatory seems of its nature more monstrous than to judge it meritorious. 'Meritorious' simply means pleasing to the divinity, whereas 'obligatory' means expressly willed by the divinity, and posits depravity in the concept of the divine nature.(260)

360. But we must judge differently the actions dependent on these consciences. Each action is the result of two acts and has therefore a twofold morality, so to speak. On the one hand, morality comes from the will terminating in the erroneous conscience (as we have said, this kind of morality is always to some degree blameworthy); on the other hand, morality comes from the act of our will terminating in an action presented by a reflective, false conscience. This morality can vary. If the action is presented as lawful, the will, in so far as it desires what is lawful, neither sins nor merits; if the action is presented as obligatory, the will, in so far as it intends carrying out the law, can (in some way) merit, and merit considerably when the action is difficult, for example, suffering death or some great pain; if the action is presented as supererogatory, the will, when it genuinely desires and apprehends it as such, can (in some way) also merit relative to the action's difficulty. However, there is no merit in these two last cases unless the purpose is truly good and not influenced by a capital sin, and provided, therefore, that only venial sin, not mortal sin, is involved in the formation of the erroneous conscience. Masters of the spiritual life are speaking about this case when they say that even the holiest deeds are not always free from the veniality of false judgment in an erroneous conscience. The same could be said about imprudent zeal: the action may basically be good, despite the veniality of a false conscience urging a person to do more than is appropriate [App. no. 4].

361. We now have to consider what causes a less than upright conscience. The stimulus tempting us to deflect our judgment from the right path can, relative to each of the accidental qualities, be a disordered love of what is intrinsically unlawful, a disordered love of what is in itself lawful, or finally a disordered love of what is good and meritorious. These three cases of disordered love constitute three degrees of malice, of which the first is much greater than the second, and the second (all things being equal) greater than the third.

362. In the other class of erroneous consciences we judge as evil what is truly good. This judgment can be primarily due to hatred of good and to our effort to avoid doing good, granted the passions that enslave us. Here we must recall the nine differences in the first kind of conscience. Any good we wish to do is either lawful, or supererogatory, or obligatory. Malice in the last case is greater than in the other two, and greater in the second than in the first. Moreover each case can have one of three causes: a disordered love for an object that is blameworthy in itself, a disordered love for a lawful object, or a disordered love for an obligatory object. If we omit disordered love for a lawful object, at least two differences remain, and therefore six cases in all, which are governed by the rules already stated.

363. At this point it will not be out of place to mention what seems to me a strange example of the subtleties which produce laxity in morals.
Certain authors, including Sanchez and Cardenas, ask whether 'a person who intends to commit a fault, fornication for example, but is unable to do so, is excused solely because he mistakenly believes that to intend evil is not sinful if the action does not take place.' They reply that he is more probably excused!

St. Alphonsus comments excellently on the matter: 'I have never considered this opinion probable. I could never understand how those who deliberately wish to do an action they know to be offensive to God could innocently believe that God is not offended by the genuine desire for an action known for certain to alienate a person from God. We may ask how such people sin formally by their desire if they do not know it is evil. They may not know that the internal act is evil, but they certainly know that the external act is. So how can they be excused from sin if they wish to carry out the external act? All human beings know by the light of nature that they are obliged to obey the Creator. If people therefore deliberately wish to carry out what they know is forbidden by God, they also know simultaneously and necessarily that they do evil. They may not sin reflectively because they believe that only the external act is a sin, but they sin in effect and in fact. They deny the obedience due to God while they are thinking of carrying out the sin.'(261)

We should also note St. Alphonsus' response to the assertion that many ordinary people do not confess evil desires because they think they sin only when performing the sin externally. He says: 'They deceive themselves when they believe they need not confess sins they have not fully carried out. A prudent confessor must judge that in willingly consenting to carry out a sin, they truly and formally sin, alienating themselves from God by their evil will.'(262) In this well-known passage the saint agrees that ordinary people deceive themselves when they believe their evil desire is lawful. Nevertheless they sin. Although they have an erroneous conscience, which in itself would seem to be invincible, they have a second erroneous conscience concerning the external act. This conscience gives the lie to the first, which becomes a vincible conscience, as we have called it, although such consciences could perhaps be better described as non-consciences or disregardable consciences.

364. When the question is expressed in these terms, dissent amongst moral theologians probably concerns fact rather than theory because both parties admit that theoretically a person can sometimes have two consciences, one true, the other erroneous. Although considered in itself the erroneous conscience seems invincible, a true conscience renders it vincible. Opinion is in fact divided about the number of these cases, but this depends on how shrewdly we observe and discover these double consciences in the depths of the human heart. Unfortunately they seem to me very frequent.

365. Finally, the error of judging what is good as evil can also occur because of a scruple, and disturb peace of mind. I should therefore discuss the scrupulous conscience at this point, but will do so more conveniently at a later stage.

366. 'Must we follow an erroneous conscience concerning positive or positively received law, or concerning fact, when the error, although actually invincible, was free in its cause because of culpable failure to verify the law or fact? What is the moral state of an action done with this conscience?' This was our fourth question (cf. 259), and I think it has been sufficiently answered in what has been said. In fact, we saw:

1. that we should follow an erroneous conscience which does not involve an intrinsically evil action, when we cannot actually correct it or know it is erroneous, although it was caused by our neglect to instruct ourselves about the positive law or about a fact requiring the application of natural law;

2. that neglect to acquire necessary knowledge about our duties is culpable; but because the act of the will is directed to a proximate object good or lawful in itself, an action done with this conscience has no added malice, if the action is not evil in itself;

3. that if we knew, or merely suspected, our conscience were false, we would no longer have a convinced, fully formed and completely safe conscience; our duty would be to abandon or correct it.

367. I will add an observation of some importance for necessary progress in virtue. Erroneous consciences concerning both rational and positive law are frequent in human beings. They are sometimes temporarily invincible, but can be overcome by means of unceasing, general effort. For example, I may not know at any given moment what particular erroneous conscience I have and cannot therefore free myself of it simply by a specific, direct act. But, generally speaking, I know that I probably have many such deceptive consciences. Hence, distrusting myself and with constant love of truth, I will be able, by a careful study of my duties, to free myself from them gradually.

368. We can therefore conclude:

1. There are erroneous consciences that are here and now vincible; they can and must be corrected immediately.

2. There are invincible erroneous consciences, which cannot be corrected because of the circumstances and the limitations of our reasoning.

3. Finally there are erroneous consciences that are here and now invincible but vincible by means of constant acts, by study, and by continual endeavour to know the truth; these must gradually be set aside, and their successive abandonment indicates the stages of spiritual and moral progress in our soul.

369. There are two grades of evil in culpable ignorance about the positive law. They depend on the two kinds of ignorance distinguished by St. Thomas:
'Ignorance is consequent upon the will in so far as the ignorance itself is willed. This happens in two ways . . . First, when the act of the will relates directly to the ignorance, for example, when someone wants to be ignorant in order to have an excuse for unbridled sin, as we read in Job:(263) "We do not desire the knowledge of thy ways." This is called affected ignorance. Second, when ignorance concerns something we can and must know.'(264) It is obvious that the first kind of ignorance is worse than the second.

370. The second kind of ignorance is twofold, as St. Thomas tells us immediately afterwards. We are ignorant of what we ought and could know either because we do not actually attend to what we are doing, or because, through our own neglect, we completely lack the necessary knowledge.(265)
St. Thomas says that we sin in this second case when we fail in our duty to instruct ourselves: 'The sin of ignorance is the same as other sins of omission, that is, we actually sin only at the time an affirmative precept obliges. A person who is ignorant does not sin actually all the time but only when he should acquire the knowledge he must have.'(266)

371. These words of St. Thomas confirm indirectly our own opinion. We maintain that when an action is evil not in itself but only because of the positive law prohibiting it, actual ignorance of the law, although culpable in its cause, does not make the act a new sin. According to Aquinas, the sin of ignorance is committed only when we could and should have instructed ourselves. Consequently if we are truly sorry for our ignorance and justified through confession, the ignorance is considered invincible, and our defects not imputable, even if it remains for a time (because it cannot be banished in an instant) and makes us liable to fall again. This is the common opinion of moral theologians.(267)

372. St. Thomas says of the sin of inadvertence in the application of the law, which is the first of the last two cases we distinguished: 'Defect in an upright judgment is a sin of lack of consideration in so far as we contemptuously disregard and neglect to attend to those things on which an upright judgment depends. Hence, lack of consideration is clearly a sin.'(268)

We must, however, note that such a case falls outside our present heading. It belongs rather to the preceding heading where we discussed the erroneous conscience coming from an error in the rational application of positive law. An error committed in applying the law does not depend solely on previous ignorance but on a true distortion of our judgment. Defect and sin are certainly present in this distortion.(269) Whenever we make an error of false judgment, the elements of truth are still in us, enabling us to emend the judgment. Thus, the actions that follow from such a false judgment, although innocent in themselves, cannot always be excused of new sin because the culpably mistaken judgment is renewed in each action.

373. Let us now summarise the division we have made of erroneous conscience as a further step to identifying its different kinds. The division is founded on the action of the will producing the conscience: if an erroneous conscience is produced by the will itself, it is sinful; if it is not produced by the will, there is no moral defect.
The will can cause an erroneous conscience either by positing the cause or by erring in forming the judgment constituting the conscience. The cause can be either willed ignorance or disordered affections.

In the case of positive law ignorance is sometimes willed, in two ways: either we do not wish to know the law expressly, or our negligence and indolence prevent us from learning it.

In the case of rational law ignorance can be involuntary relative to the remote consequences of the law, if we lack the necessary degree of intellective power to deduce them or are ignorant about a fact requiring the application of the law. However, ignorance can be willed in the same two ways as in positive law: by express decree of the will wishing to be ignorant 'in order not to do good', or through negligence. In the case of an express decree, the ignorance springs from a previous passion that gives us an aversion to law and truth.

When there is ignorance or invincible doubt about remote consequences of the rational law, and we have to act, we provide an ordinary norm for ourselves which, if followed in good faith, is not a true error and therefore does not involve any sin. This is an example of cases, to be discussed later, when we have not yet formed a conscience.
Sometimes, however, passions or disordered affections are the direct, willed cause of an erroneous conscience. They cause not only the ignorance which becomes the source of an erroneous conscience, but also and directly the erroneous conscience itself. They pervert and seduce the faculty of judgment, drawing it to make an unjust judgment. These passions, once present in the human spirit, become tyrannical masters of our faculties of judgment and reasoning and, although they vary, can be reduced to their ultimate genera in the seven capital sins.

374. In the language of divine scripture the different, disordered affections which distort our judgment are aptly called spirits of error,(270) in the way that inclinations and habits of behaviour are called spirits. Consciences resulting from these spirits of error are called stained minds or stained consciences.(271)

375. We must, however, take careful note of what has already been stated, namely, that the errors which the will, influenced by some passion, immediately commits in forming a new conscience, are very often venial rather than mortal sins. What we should note here is that all degrees of fault can be present, from the smallest and imperceptible to the greatest and most diabolical. Hence, the greatest circumspection is required for judging interior faults of this kind (cf. 341, 342).(272)

376. We also have to distinguish between an error committed fleetingly by a hasty judgment, and one dependent on the continual pressure in us of a dominating, disordered affection.

377. But a transitory hastiness of judgment can also be due to a disordered affection, which, although slight, may be sufficient to produce a habit of hasty judgment, resulting at times from physical causes and from the original harm suffered by human nature. Thus, if we watch children at play, dashing and dodging about, bumping into each other, tumbling on the ground, hitting their friends and tearing their clothing, then defending them and finally coming to blows, we can see that their ceaseless change of attitudes and gestures is not governed by reason. How is it possible that persons, endowed with reason, are so extraordinarily offended that the light and force of intelligence becomes almost completely incapable of directing them in an orderly way? On the other hand, animal instincts are disproportionately able to attract human activity and, so to speak, make it perform as they please. Just as the movements of the body are outside the reasoning control of the will, so the faculty of judgment itself is largely unbridled because of natural defect, and influenced in its conclusions by instinctive stimuli. This certainly diminishes, although it hardly removes entirely, the moral defect of the error.(273)

378. All these causes produce a conscience made erroneous either by judging as sinful what is not sinful (a rigid conscience), or by judging not sinful what is sinful (a lax conscience). The norms for judging the degree of moral defect in these two consciences and the presence of such defect can be determined from what has been said earlier.

379. Let me add an observation. It nearly always happens that those who have a rigid conscience about certain matters regarding positive law, are lax in conscience regarding the natural law. This was the case of the Pharisees, who were excessively severe in some positive rulings but very broadminded on the substance of the law. The substance of law is the natural, immutable part, and people are mistakenly called rigid if they are lax in its regard.

380. Sometimes consciences broadly interpret both positive and rational law so that the only difference between these and the first kind of conscience is a broader, more coherent laxism relative to the rational law. Therefore all wrongly formed consciences are lax, and rigorism in cases like these exists at most only as a protective veneer.

381. I would call 'rigid' those whose rigidity is due 1. to their inability to deduce certain ultimate consequences of the law, which would mitigate their moral approach, or 2. to their ignorance of some factual circumstance of human nature, or 3. to a minor but morally defective mistake by which they persuade themselves that they please God more by their inclination to rigidity. This rigidity occurs in good people, who are not without some defect, and sometimes helps greatly to purify them; at other times the rigidity itself is subjectively true holiness.

382. Returning now to the lax consciences of people who seem rigid, or seem and are truly lax, I want to affirm that the names given these consciences ( somnolent, dull, cauterised, or pharasaical) were suitable for designating the general state of the consciences but of little use in determining their malice.

383. A somnolent conscience is negligent in learning the truth.

384. A dull conscience has difficulty in feeling remorse either because the person has a habit of vice, or is ready with subtle excuses, or judges vice lawful and good.

385. These two defects debase the faculty of conscience by impeding its development. The faculty is susceptible of progress and education. In fact, we see that in different human beings it has different levels of activity and alertness. But if the restricted development of the faculty does not depend on an evil will, it does not necessarily detract from our moral perfection.

386. Educated people, however, have a moral duty to educate their faculty of conscience; they must not allow it to grow worse and insensitive. Because they already act reflectively, they have a duty to know themselves and to guard their actions which, before being posited, must be weighed in the scales of justice and righteousness.

387. A dull conscience is not only undeveloped, negligent and somnolent; it is also one to which we pay no attention and from which we permit no disturbance despite remorse.

388. These defects of conscience are in contrast to the noble qualities of a keen and truly sensitive conscience, qualities acknowledged by common sense and splendidly illustrated by the author of the Divine Comedy where he exclaims in praise of his guide:

389. A cauterised conscience not only judges evil good in practice but makes a maxim of its error for teaching others.

390. Finally, a pharasaical conscience delights in teaching error, thinking itself holy because it practises this teaching, and wise because it teaches error to others. It thus despises other people of sound opinion and pure life, persecuting them and rashly condemning them.

391. Material error, which renders conscience erroneous but leaves it free of moral defect, is known by three names: simply erroneous, perplexed, and scrupulous. We have spoken sufficiently about the simply and invincibly erroneous conscience.

392. A perplexed conscience is present when we believe we sin by following one of two opposite opinions. Analysis shows that this conscience is not simple but the result of many simultaneous consciences. These can co-exist in a person in the way that different levels of reflection co-exist. We noted, for example, that people who believe that they are obliged to tell a lie to save someone's life and at the same time sin by lying, believe they sin whichever action they follow. They have formed two judgments and so two consciences. With the first judgment, they say they sin by lying; with the second, they say it is sinful not to save a life when they can. They conclude that to save the person's life they are obliged to tell a lie. It is obvious that this second judgment is more reflective than the first, because the first belongs to a lower level of reflection than the second. But both judgments cannot be true; at most only one is true, the other false. To this false judgment we must apply all we have said about erroneous conscience in general.

393. I have said that at most only one of the two contrary judgments can be true. Both could be false if they concerned an action which was simply permitted, and involved no sin whether the action were done or not. This case of two erroneous consciences, one contrary to the other, co-existing in the same person, is rare, but can be solved easily by recourse in the first place to another's authority.

394. When one of the judgments is true, the perplexed conscience can be removed either through the authority of a spiritual director or through one's own individual study.

395. Here we can state a very helpful rule, known to sound philosophy: 'Error nearly always lies in the most reflective judgment; truth in the most direct, least reflective judgment.'

396. But not everyone can understand this rule or apply it. To such people we suggest:

1. They check their certainty that sin is present on both sides of the difficulty. It can happen that they are certain of sin in one respect but feel less certain regarding the other. They should then avoid what they clearly see as sin.

2. If they are unable to decide in this way, and still seem to see certain sin in both cases, they should find out what law on both sides appears to oblige them under sin, and always avoid the possibility of sin against the rational law. If the rational law seems to be broken in both cases, they should investigate which of the two laws obliges more, and avoid the greater sin.(275)

3. But if both laws seem to oblige with equal strictness and force, they should prefer not to act or do anything new, so that if they are on the verge of doing the act, they should continue, and if they have not yet begun the act, they should refrain.

Nevertheless it is better, as I have said, to have recourse to another's counsel, if possible. Failing this, we should examine which of the consciences is more direct and less reflective, that is, which law obliges first and which second, and follow the first.

397. Finally we must speak about the scrupulous conscience. We will discuss it only briefly because many excellent authors, to whom we refer the reader, have treated the subject fully.

A scrupulous conscience is always at the third level of reflection at least, as follows:

1. The practical judgment, basis of morality, which belongs at least to first-level reflection;
2. The first conscience, which judges the morality of the practical judgment, and belongs to second-level reflection where scruples never occur;
3. The scruple, which is a judgment made about the goodness of the first conscience, and therefore belongs at least to third-level reflection.

398. A scruple is an error; if it were not an error, it would not be a scruple. But a scruple does not always form a scrupulous conscience. Sometimes it causes only a state of fear in the spirit without involving a true judgment or persuasion that the action is lawful or blameworthy. For this reason theologians normally discuss scruples when considering what they call doubtful conscience, which in fact is not conscience. Nor is a scruple a doubt; it is a fear that there is sin where there is none, a vain fear that arises in us without a sound reason.(276)

399. This fear, however, can sometimes produce a persuasion and judgment that certain or doubtful sin is present. If a firm persuasion arises that there is sin in an action, we must not act before relinquishing the persuasion. We must do the same if we are persuaded of the danger of formal sin, because in this case an erroneous conscience, called scrupulous from its cause, would be formed on the basis of the scruple.

400. Gerson, therefore, correctly distinguishes scruple from conscience, stating that we should respect conscience and despise scruples.(277) He says: 'Conscience is formed when after discussion and deliberation we finally judge definitively, and firmly establish that we must do or continue something, or not do it but avoid it. To act against a formed but erroneous conscience of this kind is sinful. But fear in conscience, or scruple, is present when our judgment after discussion and deliberation is not definitive, and does not establish what is to be done or continued, or not done and avoided. The mind vacillates, not knowing what is best nor what is more to be upheld. At the same time, there is no desire to omit what might be known to be pleasing to the divine will. It is not always sinful to act against this fear or scruple of conscience, although it may be a very dangerous fear which should be banished and eliminated as much as possible.'(278)

401. In my opinion, the proximate cause of scruples is always a disturbance in the imagination or at least a disturbance in the nerves. Philosophy demonstrates that 'there is a particular bond between mental images, feelings and reasonings', so that certain feelings or phantasms awaken particular ideas, reasonings and persuasions. This means that a physical cure for a scrupulous person is very helpful, if carried out prudently and sensibly.

402. The remote causes of the nervous disturbance are one or more of the following:

Each of these has to be opposed by contrary remedies.

403. An important observation, helpful for understanding the nature of scruples as an illness, is that the fear or apprehension called scruples concerns certain determined matters and not others, or at least only rarely. We would have to examine carefully the objects of scrupulous fear, because they could probably reveal the intimate pyschological nature of the illness. The matters most frequently involved regard:

404. A consideration of these matters, which are the most frequent in cases of scruples, gives the following results:

1. The scruple is nearly always about internal things.
2. It mostly concerns things in the past.

These two observations involve to some extent the imagination, which easily apprehends the possibility of evil and stimulates the consequent anxiety.

3. It springs from a will that wishes not only to do good but to feel that it has done good, and to attain certainty and satisfaction about the good it has done. This indicates some attachment to self, an intention that is not entirely pure, and a faith lacking in total abandonment to God.
4. There is always a fixation about certain determined things.

405. These observations indicate that the best remedies for scruples are:

1. Recreation and good, honest distraction so that the mind is obliged to move quickly through many disparate ideas and change its feelings often and rapidly.

2. Solid instruction that teaches scrupulous persons to rid themselves of the will to feel good before God. It is sufficient for them to be in a good state although they may not feel it, and to abandon themselves to God with complete confidence, that is, to the supremely good Lord who helps the weak and blesses the good desire even of those who do not achieve all they would like. We could add exercises in detachment, gradual humbling of oneself, etc.

3. Perfect obedience, as taught by all the masters. This demands submission of mind, something that is precisely contrary to the fixation of the scrupulous person, which makes obedience difficult.

Notes

(197) Lib. de Coron. Militis, c. 5, 6.

(198) Retract., bk. 1, c. 15.

(199) Retract., bk. 1, c. 15.

(200) 'Happy is he who has no reason to judge himself in what he approves' (Rom 14: 22).

(201) 2 Cor 1: 12.

(202) In Ep. ad Rom., c. 14, 22.

(203) Deut 30: [11-16].

(204) Wis 6: 13-16 [12-13, 15].

(205) Rom 1: 19, 20.

(206) Rom 1: 21.

(207) Jas 3: 15.

(208) Phil 3: 19.

(209) 1 Cor 3: 19.

(210) 1 Cor 2: 18 [7, 8].

(211) The Pharisees were ambitious to be called teachers and to sit in the chairs of learning (cf. Mt 23: 6), and showed their monstrous pride in saying to the man born blind: 'You were born in utter sin, and would you teach us?' (Jn 9: 34).

(212) Lk 23: 34.

(213) 1 Cor 1: 19, 20.

(214) Rom 1: 23.

(215) Rom 1: 19.

(216) Rom 1: 24 ss.

(217) Opusc. 4, De praeceptis charitatis, et decem legis praeceptis (foreword).

(218) According to St. Thomas, 'Certain very common precepts, known to everyone, hold first place relative to the natural law; certain secondary, more particular precepts, hold second place as proximate conclusions from the principles. The natural law cannot be universally erased from human hearts in so far as it is contained in the first, common principles; but it can be erased relative to a given particular action in so far as reason is impeded from applying a common principle to the action because of concupiscence or some similar passion' (S.T., I-II, q. 94, art. 6).

(219) 'That which is carried out against the law is always evil, nor is it excused because it is according to conscience' (St. Thomas, Quodlib., 8, art. 13).

(220) It will be said that if we do not advert to our sin, we cannot avoid it. This is false. It is possible to know without adverting to the fact that we know. And what can be known can also be wanted or rejected. Freedom therefore is present prior to advertence to our act. It occurs at the level of moral reflection which precedes advertence to this reflection.

(221) Cf. Daniele Concina, bk 2, De Conscientia, disc. 2, c. 4, pd4-11.

(222) A list of these places may be found in Stefano De Champs and Card. Noris.

(223) Moralium, bk. 5, c. 7.

(224) Cf. AMS, 750-763, for a longer treatment of this spontaneous, inadverted action of the will.

(225) Lk 18: 12.

(226) We fall into the same trap today although passions have changed. Nowadays we quieten our remorse of conscience with acts of beneficence and charity. We say to God: 'I will do these works of charity, but leave me free to satisfy the desires of the flesh, and dispense me from the laws of the Church.' This is the opposite of what was done previously when God was addressed as follows: 'I will observe the laws of the Church, but dispense me from being charitable, and let me be avaricious.' Whichever way we act outwardly, we remain the same internally, although we think we have changed considerably.

(227) De lib. arb., bk. 3, c. 18.

(228) Job 9: 28.

(229) Job 9: 23. Cf. 426 [325].(230) The text itself reads: 'Holy people . . . fear even their good deeds. While they desire to do good, they may be deceived by what they see outwardly. What looks healthy may sometimes disguise a festering sore' (Moralium, bk. 5, c. 7).

(231) Ps 24: 7 [Douai].

(232) Ep. 250, Ad Paulinum.

(233) Mortal sin is not present, however, if we are sincere in deploring our sin, and would rather die than commit it (provided we knew it) (cf. 272), although we cannot avoid all the small deceits interwoven for us by our passions. The act with which we deplore our sin is at a more elevated level than the self-deceits into which we fall, and is therefore personal. It is the disposition of the person which renders the human condition morally good or evil (cf. 85).

(234) In his biography of St. Francis de Sales, Canon Gallizia says that the Saint taught his penitents not to be distressed when they could not recall all their faults. He used to say to them: 'You fall frequently without noticing, but you also get up without noticing. The Wise Man did not write that the just realises he falls seven times a day, but that he falls. And if he falls without noticing his fall, he gets up also without reflecting upon it. So do not worry. Confess humbly and frankly what you remember, and leave the rest to the mercy of him who supports those who fall without malice. He ensures that they do not hit the ground, and then raises them so swiftly and gently that they are unaware they have fallen, and equally unaware of their rise. His hand is under them as they fall, and raises them immediately without their realising it' (bk. 3, c. 9).

(235) Rom 2: 9, 10.

(236) Bk. 5, n. 16.

(237) Another error in the quotation makes advertence constitute the evil of sin. As we said, knowledge is sufficient without any need for advertence, that is, knowledge of knowledge.

(238) Rom 1: 22.

(239) Jn 9: 41.

(240) Prov 24: 16.

(241) Jn 1: 47.

(242) Ps 16: 1 [Douai].

(243) T. 2, Feria IV post Dominicam Palmarum, art. 1, c. 1.

(244) De casto connubio Verbi et Animae, c. 17.

(245) Lk 23: 34.

(246) 1 Tim 1: 13 [Douai].

(247) In Reg. brevior., Regul. 56; Lk 12: 48.

(248) Orat. 3 de peccato.

(249) De peccat. merit., bk. 1, 36; Ps 24: 7 [Douai].

(250) St. Thomas writes excellently about this point. I refer the reader to S.T., I-II, q. 77, where he shows how the intellect can be bound and distracted by passion.

(251) S.T., I-II, q. 94, art. 6.

(252) I Tim. 6: 10.

(253) Vol. 2 Quadrag. post. Domin. palm., art. 1, c. 1.

(254) Wis 14: 16 [Douai].

(255) Jn 16: 2.

(256) Job 14.

(257) Ps 102: 14 [Douai].

(258) Gen 8: 21 [Douai].

(259) Here I must quote those fine words in the book of Wisdom which tell us how God punished the inhabitants of Canaan more gently than their actions merited: ''Yet even those you spared AS MEN, and sent wasps, forerunners of your host, to destroy them by little and little. Not that you were unable to bring the wicked under the just by war, or by cruel beasts, or with one rough word to destroy them at once: But executing your judgments by degrees you gave them place of repentance, not being ignorant that they were a wicked generation, and their MALICE NATURAL, and that their thought could never be changed. For it was a cursed seed from the beginning: neither did you for fear of any one give pardon to their sins' (Wis 12: 8—11 [Douai&]).

(260) The result is the same whether the depravity is measured according to the violation of the moral law or according to the injury done to God.

(261) De Consc., c. 1, 9.

(262) De Consc., c. 1, 9.

(263) 21: 14.

(264) S.T., I-II, q. 6, art. 8.

(265) 'It is said to be this kind of ignorance either when a person does not actually consider what he can and must consider (this kind of ignorance is due to an evil choice, passion or habit), or when a person does not make the effort to acquire the necessary knowledge' (S.T., I-II, q. 6, art. 8).

(266) S.T., I-II, q. 76, art. 2, ad 5.

(267) Concina himself says: 'Personal, vincible and blameworthy ignorance is absolved with other sins by sincere repentance. In the justification of a sinner, known sins or evils cannot be wiped away without the absolution of sins of ignorance. Ignorance therefore remains in a justified Christian (if indeed it remains and there is no infusion of light together with the grace of justification) as a kind of penalty, just as ignorance due to original sin remains in those reborn. If ignorance remains after justification, it is neither sin nor a cause of sin, except material sin only, which is very different from formal sin. In this sense we say it changes from vincible to invincible ignorance' (Lib. 2 de Consc. Diss. 3, c. 2, q. 3).

(268) S.T., II-II, q. 53, art. 4, concl.

(269) In the Summa (II-II, q. 54, art. 3) St. Thomas asks: 'Can negligence be a mortal sin?' He answers: 'Negligence is said to arise from a certain sluggishness of will, such that reason is not stimulated to perceive the things it should, or in the way it should. Hence, negligence can be a mortal sin in two ways. First, concerning what is neglected; if this were something necessary for salvation (whether an action or some circumstance), it would be mortal sin. Second, concerning the cause; if the will is sluggish regarding divine things so that it fails altogether in its love of God, the negligence is mortal sin. This is especially true when the negligence springs from contempt.' In this passage I note that St. Thomas posits two seeds or principles of the morality of actions: 1. the action itself, which is the intrinsically moral object; and 2. the act of will. This distinction is very important and we will use it often.

(270) 1 Tim 4: 1, 'giving heed to spirits of error' [Douai].

(271) 'Their mind and conscience are defiled' (Tit. 1: 15 [Douai]).

(272) St. Thomas himself teaches that 'sins consisting of interior acts are more likely to be hidden' (S.T., II-II, q. 54, art. 3, ad 3).

(273) Cf. AMS, 727-744.

(274) Purg., 3: 8, 9.

(275) Decr. Grat., p. 1, dist. 13, c. 1.

(276) Silvestro, under the word scruple, calls it pusillanimity of spirit.

(277) Clearly, Fagnani speaks very imprecisely when he says: 'A person who judges that something is probably lawful but also has a scruple that the opposite is true, acts contrary to the dictate of his conscience and sins' (Dissert. de opinione probabili, num. 246).

(278) De natura et qualitate conscientiae.