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Rules To Be Followed
When We Have Still Not Formed Our Conscience

Chapter 1 - The Problem

463. We now have to undertake a study of probabilism, perhaps the most controversial question in the whole of moral theology. The first requirement, if we want to walk securely, will be to follow rules furnished by exact, logical method.
The principal rule in dealing with intricate problems is to present them as simply as possible and view them in their essential features.

464. We begin by excluding everything extraneous to the question of probable opinion, and by defining its terms as carefully as we can.
Doubtful and probable opinion are certainly present in the human mind but is probable conscience present? As we have said, the briefest consideration shows that it is inexact to speak of doubtful conscience or probable conscience. Conscience is a judgment about the morality of a particular action, and it is clear that as long as we doubt the probity or improbity of an action which we are about to perform, no judgment is pronounced and no conscience is formed. The same must be said if we do not reach a decision about a particular, probably upright action because of reasons which, although they incline us to say that an action is probably moral, are not sufficient to give us certainty. A probable conscience is no conscience because it entails a suspended judgment.(322)

465. In speaking about doubtful conscience or probable conscience moralists attribute to conscience descriptions that belong properly speaking to opinions, that is, to reasons determining the spirit to hold its judgment suspended or inclined to one side without the full weight of a final decision. They do this, I believe, for the sake of brevity.(323) But my opinion is that we have to renounce brevity for the sake of clear ideas and follow Horace's advice, especially in complicated questions: 'I try to be brief, but I become obscure.'

466. If we wish to speak accurately, therefore, we have to say that doubtful consciences and probable consciences do not exist. What they refer to is a state of our spirit in which we have not yet formed a conscience, but remain hesitant and suspended between judging an action moral or immoral because there are equal reasons for both sides or because the weight of reason inclining us to one side rather than the other is insufficient for a final decision.

Our heading: 'Do doubtful consciences and probable consciences exist?', can therefore be changed to: 'What are the rules according to which we must act when we have not yet formed a conscience about the rectitude of some action, and are still uncertain whether it is upright or not?' Hence the title we have given to this whole section: 'Rules to be followed when we have still not formed our conscience.'(324)

467. The non-existence of doubtful conscience destroys the distinction between speculatively and practically doubtful consciences. This distinction should, however, be considered from another point of view. Because theologians usually define conscience as a practical judgment we now have a practical judgment which is divided into speculative conscience and practical conscience. Most modern moral theologians have in fact lost sight of their original definition when they go on to divide conscience in this way. Their negligence and mental limitations show up badly in comparison with the extreme care taken by the Fathers of the Church in their use of words.(325)

According to the moralists, the question under discussion concerns doubtful conscience and practical conscience; according to us, it concerns the state of our spirit when it is uncertain about the rectitude of an action. We are concerned with so-called practical doubt, which is in no way related to speculative doubt. In other words, we are asking: 'What must we do when our spirit is uncertain about the morality of an action?', not: 'What are the motives or reasons that make our spirit uncertain?' The second question follows upon the first, but is not the first.

468. An example will illustrate the distinction I have made. I am uncertain whether I commit a sin by omitting to hear Mass today. My uncertainty can be produced by different reasons, some of which may be true and hence a solid basis for my uncertainty, and some false and weak and hence not a solid basis for uncertainty in my spirit. In fact I am asking two distinct questions: 1. 'What must I do when I am uncertain of the morality of an action?' 2. 'How can I distinguish valid from invalid motives for my uncertainty?' In the second question, I want to know whether my uncertainty is reasonable or whether it can be set aside as unreasonable. As we said, the questions, although interconnected, are distinct, and will be dealt with separately.

469. We have to simplify our question still further. When we ask: 'Can we posit an action about which we have not yet formed a conscience?' we are not in any way asking if we can act morally before reflecting upon the morality of our action. In speaking about this problem (cf. 30-37), we showed that conscience is not an absolutely necessary element in morality. Two elements are sufficient for morality: direct knowledge, which holds the place of law, and willed acknowledgement, the basis of our moral act. A state exists therefore in which we can act morally or immorally prior to the higher level of reflection necessary for the formation of conscience within us. This moral state of spirit is anterior to reflection on its morality, and is not therefore a state of uncertainty similar to doubt or probability in which we falter between belief and disbelief in the lawfulness of an action. We are dealing with a state of uncertainty, strictly speaking, not with a state of total absence of reflection on the morality of our action. We are enquiring about the state in which we actually reflect on the morality of an action, but without forming a judgment or conscience about it. Our state is one in which reflection, because it does not find sufficient reason or motive for pronouncing definitively, remains suspended.

470. Finally, the doubt of which we are speaking is about commands, not counsels. We are not asking which of two actions I propose to do is better in itself, or which can be counselled in preference to the other. We ask simply: 'What must I do when I doubt whether in doing a given action I sin or not?'

Notes

(322) How often what we say makes a mockery of our mental judgment! For example, 'I judge this action doubtfully or probably moral. I am making a judgment about the morality of the action and therefore form a conscience.' It is true, of course, that our words express a judgment, but we must not be satisfied with what we hear: we have to ponder what is expressed by our words. If we consider what we are referring to, we will see that our words do not indicate any judgment constituting a conscience. To judge that an action is doubtfully or probably moral is equivalent to judging its probity as uncertain from our point of view and this, in turn, means that we have not yet formed a definitive judgment about it. The real meaning of a judgment declaring an action doubtfully or probably moral is that we have decided to suspend our definitive judgment on its morality because our reasons for pronouncing it are insufficient. Our judgment simply tells us that we do not, and cannot as yet, form a conscience about that action.

(323) Some moralists are conscious of this impropriety of language, but they lack the courage to avoid it. Paul Gabriel Antoine, for example, speaks of perplexed and doubtful conscience, but then adds 'although this is not truly conscience' (De Consc., in princ.).

(324) Theologians give the following definition of doubtful conscience: 'Doubtful conscience is that which, suspending its assent about a doubt, remains unresolved and hesitant' (Liguori, De Consc., c. 2, n. 20). But if conscience is a judgment, we can only conclude from this definition that it is a judgment where assent is suspended, that is, an unjudging judgment, a judgment that is not a judgment.

(325) Speculative doubt is sometimes defined by moralists in this way: 'Speculative doubt is present when we doubt about the truth of something, for example, whether a war is just or unjust; whether painting on a feast-day is servile work or not; whether baptism conferred with distilled water is valid or not, and so on' (Liguori, De Consc., c. 2, n. 21). But such doubt has no relationship to conscience.

First, it is not concerned with a particular action to be done here and now. Second, it is a doubt pertaining to what theologians call synderesis, that is, the whole complex of moral principles in our spirit. However, the definition of practical doubt given by moralists does concern a particular action to be done here and now. This definition alone has some relationship with conscience. Liguori states it as follows: 'Practical doubt is present when we doubt about the morality of something, for example, whether I can lawfully fight in such a doubtfully just war, or paint on this feast day; or baptize this child with distilled water' (Liguori, ibid.).