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Chapter 5

Removing Doubt About The Unlawfulness Of An Action
When We Have Only Fallible Authority To Guide Us

725. We have travelled a long way, and it is now time to review our journey.
We have examined the rules needed for the formation of a sure conscience by persons who are undecided about the unlawfulness of an action because of their proximate moral doubt.
Such doubt concerns either the intrinsic unlawfulness of an action, or arises from some other relatively remote doubt unconnected with the intrinsic nature of the action.
These remote doubts fall either on the law, or on facts and conditions related to the obligating force of the law.
If they fall on the law, they are founded either on an inherent defect in the law itself or on our ignorance.
If they arise from our ignorance, the ignorance itself is either culpable or inculpable, vincible or invincible.
All these distinctions were taken into consideration when we indicated the different rules of conscience which can be summarised as follows:

1. When we doubt about intrinsic unlawfulness, we cannot act because we must be certain (morally certain) that the action we are about to do is not intrinsically evil. Otherwise, we expose ourselves to the danger of formal evil.

2. Positive law does not oblige if it is uncertain in itself or in its conditions. In order to impose obligation upon us it must either be certain or so probable that it produces a reasonable, opinionative assent in us.

3. If the law is uncertain only for us as a result of our culpable, vincible ignorance, we must remove our ignorance by careful enquiry and research into the truth.

4. When the law or fact is uncertain either because of our culpable, but presently invincible ignorance, we have to act in the safer way (that is, observe the law) if the doubt is evenly balanced or the public good is endangered. When the existence of the law is more or less probable, the safer way will be that which is more probable.

5. If our doubt about the positive law is without fault on our part, we are not obliged to follow the law because it does not yet exist for us.

6. Finally if an inculpable doubt is concerned with a fact as a condition of the law or of its application

a) either the fact cannot be verified, and following the law without verifying the fact would lead to moral impropriety; in this case the law cannot be followed;
b) or the fact cannot be verified, but following the law would not lead to moral impropriety; in this case the law can be followed. But:
i) if the fact itself constitutes a title of obligation, the uncertainty about the fact is equivalent to uncertainty about the law in itself, and does not therefore oblige;
ii) if the fact does not constitute a title of obligation, and the law and obligation are certain so that the fact determines only the limits of the obligation itself (as in cases of time, space, and so on), we should follow the more probable indication because certainty is lacking.

726. These are the rules we have proposed, and we submit them very willingly not only to the infallible authority of the Church, but also to discussion by moralists, which we have always thought extremely useful. Nevertheless, it is clear that even if these carefully thought out but complicated rules were true, they would not provide much help for people in general. The reader may well have asked himself already how ordinary people could be expected to make such distinctions, or learn to classify and solve their doubts with the rules we have offered. Is there no easier way for ordinary people to solve their doubts safely than this complicated system? There is, of course, a sure way for all, and it is that of authority.

727. Certainly not everyone can be obliged to know how to arrive, theoretically and reflectively at least, at the distinctions we have indicated. This is the responsibility of the masters in Israel whose duty it is to distinguish one kind of leprosy from another, and to throw light on these matters.

728. But at this point, a new, captivating question arises: how and up to what limit can we use fallible authority to resolve our moral doubts and to form a conscience for ourselves? We have to give this complex question the most careful consideration on account of its difficulty and because its importance and universal use have made it the source of endless arguments amongst moralists about probable opinion, as detailed investigation shows. It is clear, in fact, that these arguments are finally reduced to weighing up the moralists' authority.

729. The early Fathers, who first wrote on Christian morality, had only reason, scripture and the oral deposit of faith as the sources of their moral teaching. But as time went on, the number of authors necessarily multiplied while the problems they discussed dealt with increasingly particular applications of moral principles to special, detailed circumstances. The inevitable result was a multitude of differing opinions and the foreseeable - and fearful - consequence summed up in the phrase 'There are as many opinions as people'.

There was another danger. Detailed conclusions, and minute distinctions expressed in appropriate language, were not to be found in scripture nor in the Fathers of the Church, the early commentators on scripture. Consequently it was easier in practice to use modern authors, who treated matters in detail and resolved difficulties by considering their obvious circumstances. In the end these authors became the most used and consulted by the majority of confessors and spiritual directors, and provided the textbooks for the education of young men for the priesthood. It is clear that the number of authors, the variety and difficulty of the individual cases they considered, and the distance separating their conclusions from basic principles would lead to an immense quantity of solutions in which opinions would range from extreme laxity to extreme rigidity. Support could in fact be found for every kind of conclusion, and even the most evidently true and sound opinions would have their adversaries. The diversity and contradictions found in priests educated in different schools of thought naturally led in practice to fearful, confused consciences amongst people who did not know where to turn for certainty.

This was the inevitable state of affairs in Christian society when the great question arose: 'How can and must we choose the safe way amongst so many opinions?' This was the tremendous question that the memorable system of probabilism, which will always remain famous in the Church, set out to solve. Its enemies, its allies and those who tried to mediate between the parties were all intensely concerned with this problem, the subject of the present chapter.

730. Is it true that we no longer need to direct ourselves with our reason, but on the sole authority of moralists? As far as I can see, the question has been proposed too broadly and its natural limits removed. When multitudes of moralists acquired more renown than they merited and gathered favourable groups around them, it was thought that everything should be decided on their authority. It seemed rash to use one's own reason in considering moral problems.

731. This is the accusation levelled by Segneri against Tirso Gonzalez, his Father General. Segneri reproves his superior in rather intemperate language for wanting to decide moral cases by reasoning rather than on the contradictory authority of the moralists: 'The law (which the compiler attributes to Father Tirso) seems hard and impracticable. According to him, you should judge the judges themselves (that is, the moralists) who decide in your case. It is you who have to see if their judgment accords with the truth contained in the saying: "The law always presumes in favour of the judges".'(457)
If this reasoning were valid - that is, if it were true that moralists are our judges against whom there could be no appeal - we could never without rashness reject any of their contrary decisions. Moreover, if it were presumptuous to rely upon ourselves rather than upon more learned and more pious people, we would have to conclude:

1. That all moral questions have to be decided on the authority of moralists, without reference to our own reason and to the early authorities whom the moralists would have already examined.

2. That it would not be lawful to condemn contrary opinions upheld by any of the so-called expert moralists. Segneri himself does in fact say: 'The following supremely safe principle is all that is needed for the direction of consciences: "Anything can be done prudently, piously and laudably which the experts commonly think can be done".'(458) With these words Segneri reduces the sole moral principle to the authority of experts, that is, moralists whose conclusions are so often contrary to one another. And these conclusions are good precisely because they are contrary to one another. Rejecting them would be rash in the extreme, and would mean setting up our tiny selves against publicly attested experts whose knowledgeable work we should respect.

732. Another motive for taking only the authority of moralists as our rule of conduct (on the basis of humble disregard for our own reason) is the possibility that we may misuse our reason. According to Segneri: 'We are not able to judge dispassionately.(459) We have to listen to others who are well-known for their knowledge, good-sense and faithfulness. It would be very dangerous to want to judge those (the moralists) who understand so much more than we do.(460) . . . It is no longer possible to pretend that subjective probability is safer for mankind than objective probability. The former entails individual probability on the part of the person who does the action; the latter is universal,(461) formed by persons different from the individual. In whose favour does the presumption lie? In favour of the person judging his own cause, or in favour of the person judged by others?'(462)

Finally Segneri says expressly that the question of probabilism consists in following authorities without reference to one's own reason.
'Until now the question has been: can I follow an opinion which, according to the moralists, is less probable than another? The question has never been: can I follow the opinion I think more probable, although the majority think it less probable?(463)

'The benign opinion does not follow this line. Without hesitation, it requires a person not to act, whatever his attitude, when the reasons brought forward by a number of experts against a contract are so powerful that in the common estimation of moralists(464) the reasons adduced in its favour by half that number of experts have no probability. This is because the person concerned is definitely required to believe one who knows more than he(465) does; he is not permitted to rely on his own opinion, however safe or dangerous it may appear.'(466)

What a humiliation! The only worthwhile opinions are those found in the books of dead moralists. Reason has ceased to command.(467)

733. Nevertheless, I have to say that I do not believe our present generation to be less human than those who preceded us. Before our present crowd of moralists existed, there were no experts to whose word we could refer every difficulty. But scripture and natural reason existed, and little by little the Fathers and teachers appeared. Segneri's moralists became expert only by studying divine revelation, the scriptures, the decisions of the Church and the Fathers. These beacons have not gone out, and I do not see why they can no longer enlighten us directly just as they illuminated the moralists, nor why we have to content ourselves with reflected light when the sun shines upon us.

This does not diminish the worth of those of whom Segneri thought so highly. It simply prevents our reducing all moral norms to their authority as Segneri would have us do, and allows us, long after Sanchez and Macado, to consider the human race as something more than sheep.

We now have to examine the exaggerations of such a daring opinion which requires us to depend entirely for a moral norm of life on the opinions of modern moralists. When the exaggerations become clear, we shall also be aware of the limitations present in the question we have proposed: 'What part is to be played by authority in the removal of doubt and the formation of conscience?' The 'authority of recent authors' will no longer be the universal principle in the application of laws, but a special principle to be associated with other principles such as that of the light of reason which is impressed upon us by the Lord in the very act of our creation.(468)

734. What we have said in this work is already sufficient to put limits to our question about authority. We have seen that
1. Intelligent human beings cannot make use of authority without first using their reason. How does Segneri know that authority must suffice unless his reason tells him so? How can we recognise authority for what it is, and distinguish one authority from another, unless we necessarily judge authority? The individual reason (and there is no other kind of reason) is not acting rashly when it judges authority. It cannot do otherwise. It could not go on to subject itself to authority without first making a judgment about the situation.

735. 2. The first norm governing moral duties is the idea of things.
It would, for example, be impossible for me to value a human being for what he is unless I had the idea of 'human being'. I could not know that human beings are not subject to animals unless I could evaluate human dignity through the idea I have of it. My reason, therefore, clearly indicates my duty to me. With regard to the first principles of what we call natural and rational law - because nature and reason reveal them to me - I have no need of express authority, provided my reason has been developed in some way. I know these principles for myself, just as I know the proximate consequences of these principles.

736. Indeed, authority often does nothing relative to these first duties except obfuscate the clear light of reason through false maxims developed by human weakness. Only God can judge if this frequently deceptive use of authority excuses human beings from their sin. It is surely very difficult to be altogether free from guilt when we carry this law in our hearts and can know it simply by looking at it.

737. The confines of authority are therefore already restricted by these principles. The first place in human moral government belongs to the light of human reason; and all duties enclosed in the practical acknowledgement of individual beings perceived by us are so clear (at least where evil authority does not vitiate our vision) that we cannot ignore them even if we want to do so.
Obscurity begins when we need to deduce duties from relationships between several entities, not when we deduce duties from individual beings. Amongst these relationships, some are more difficult to know, and demand different powers and levels of reflection.

738. We must use every possible means to overcome this obscurity, and call in aid: a) our own effort at reflection, and b) the authority of others. Our aim is not only to know how something must be done but, if possible, to see the clear reason for it by deducing it from its principles.

739. Authority helps us not only as authority, but also as a guide to reflection. It is obvious that the precepts of the natural law became clearer to human understanding after the declaration of the ten commandments when God acted as teacher as well as legislator of his Israel.

740. It is true we cannot always attain rational knowledge of our duties. Sometimes the nature of the duties themselves prevents this, as for example in the case of certain positive obligations which depend upon information about strictly factual matters that must be obtained in the way we gain knowledge of all facts. Sometimes we do not succeed in discovering, understanding and applying even rational laws for ourselves. In all these instances we have necessarily to depend upon authority but not unrestrictedly.
Either we are totally ignorant of the duties in question, or we have doubts about them. Only in the first case do we rely fully on the help of authority, which however we should choose with care.

741. In the second case, where we possess doubtful knowledge about our duties, the role of authority is severely limited. We have recourse to it for resolving only the essential element of our doubt.
As we have seen, doubt does not always affect the same point in moral questions. It can be concerned with the intrinsic unlawfulness of an action, or with some external cause. The latter can be either the material aspect of an action or any aspect of law as positive law. Again, relative to the positive law, doubt can fall on its existence, on our knowledge of the law, on a fact which serves as a condition for the application of the law, or on our knowledge of a fact. These distinctions, and others which result from them, constitute doubtful elements which can be solved by use of the rules already given. If, however, we are unsure of the kind of doubt we are dealing with, or which rule should be applied in resolving it, recourse to authority is necessary.

742. The authority we consult can answer in two ways. It can resolve the doubt either directly if this is possible, or indirectly by applying the reflective principles we have set out. If, for example, we doubt about the existence of a law, it is sufficient that the authority to which we submit the question reply in one of the two ways we have indicated. Nothing more is needed because the rest is clear. With this light alone, our reason can now proceed to solve the doubt.

It is not always necessary, therefore, to ask our authority for a definitive answer to the question: 'Must I do this action or not?' It is sufficient to enquire about the doubtful points in my series of thoughts. If we rely on authority beyond these limits, it will either simply confirm what we are thinking, or be accepted on our part as a teacher freely leading our thought forward without imposing blind obedience on the will, which has no need of it. In this way, limits are placed on the necessary use of mere authority and we, as intelligent beings, are not in danger of becoming autonoma, as some would have us. We must not be deprived of the great merit bestowed upon us by our prompt, careful and unhesitating obedience to the light of reason and of grace given to us by God.

743. According to us, therefore, the authority of moralists is always useful, and their opinions more or less acceptable. But we have to insist that it cannot exstinguish reason in intelligent beings, and that it cannot oblige anyone to take as guide 'only and all the opinions of the most noted moral theologians of a given period.' It is not right to accuse of open pride those who refuse to accept this rule as a guide when they think it lawful or even obligatory to make good use of their own reasoning. Nor does Segneri's accusation of lèse majestée - against those wishing to examine the moralists' opinions - have any validity. It is not a question of people wanting to judge their judges, but of fallible human beings who mutually wish to discuss certain problems [App. no. 11].

744. As far as I can see, we are dealing here with an abuse of a good principle, that is, our need to be diffident in our own regard. This sublime attitude is a principle of logic and of religious humility, but it has sometimes taken material forms and what I call conventional expressions. We are led to believe that we are humble only if we think we know nothing, and firmly hold (or at least say we hold) that others know more than we do in every case. These 'conventions' were changed into maxims, and the new precept of humility was preached to the letter. Each person thought he had the right, without injuring his own humility, to accuse others of pride and presumption if they used the light shining within them. This talent had to be hidden, and the opinions of modern theologians accepted. The good people who shamed others by arguing in this way imagined they had won the battle before it had started.

745. Something has to be said against taking the praiseworthy feeling of self-abasement to such extremes and, may we add, against such falsification of true, holy humility. We need to reply to the objection that 'it is rash to bring one's own reason, in addition to the opinions of theologians, into decisions about moral cases.' If this prejudice is not overcome, the teaching we have developed will not be accepted, nor produce its hoped-for benefits, whatever its truth.

I wish to state, therefore, that when we see any truth whatsoever by means of the light of reason, we are obliged to acknowledge it. But we can see the truth with the light of reason in two ways: either by receiving knowledge on another's authority, or by conceiving it of ourselves. We must therefore respect not only the truth communicated on the authority of others, but also that which we may find for ourselves.

This obligation becomes clear when we consider that truth must always be respected, obeyed and kept before each and every one of us as the light of all we do. It is not rash to follow the truth when we see it directly, nor can it be said that doing so means believing in ourselves. It is absurd and false to maintain that we believe in ourselves in adhering to the truth which shines before us; we do not of ourselves produce true opinions. Whenever we adhere to the light of our reason, we follow a principle altogether different from ourselves. In this case we certainly have no human being as a teacher, but we do have the truth which is in God himself, 'your sole master'. Why instead are we so attached to what Christ calls 'human precepts and commands'?

We have to insist that there is no rashness or pride in the submission we give to the truth itself and to the Word of God rather than to human beings. We simply defer to the greater not the lesser authority. I suspect that secret human pride, disguised as humility, is present in the totally gratuitous assertion that 'every moral rule must be reduced to the opinion of moralists (who are themselves human).' The aim of this pride is to substitute what is divine with what is human, and to extinguish the sole light from which all good opinions are drawn by moralists, and with which all errors can be overcome.

746. 'You suppose that we see the truth directly.' That is the obvious objection to what has been said, and it goes on: 'And even if we do at times see it, how can we be certain that we see it? How do we know that we are not deceiving ourselves? Isn't it simpler and safer to rely on the judgment of others, and safer to let others judge in our own case?'

At first sight, this appears a very serious difficulty. In fact, it has no weight, although I will reply to it fully. First, however, I would like to recall certain statements of good, holy people which confirm our right and duty not to pull down the shutters on the light God himself places and shines in us through the window of our reason.

The author of the Imitation of Christ certainly cannot be accused of favouring rashness. Yet he writes: 'The teaching of Christ precedes the teaching of all saints. He who possesses the spirit finds hidden manna within it.'(469) The writer sends us directly to the source without scorning the authority of saints. He simply says that there is more to be found in the teaching of Christ than in that of others. And he would not have hesitated to assert his diffidence about the teaching of moralists who are not holy, or at least not yet sanctified. He adds: 'Happy is he whom the truth itself teaches not through passing examples and words, but as it is in itself.'(470) Once more the author rises above human authorities, and invites us to hear the truth which itself teaches us. He goes on: 'The one to whom the Word speaks frees himself from many opinions . . . No one understands or judges correctly without the Word . . . O God, you who are the truth, make me one with you in everlasting love! So often I tire of reading and hearing many things. All I want and desire is in you. Let all teachers be silent, and every creature be dumb in your presence. You speak to me, you alone.'(471) If this is rashness and presumption, it is holy and highly desirable!

747. We can see the same teaching reduced to practice by the most celebrated writers in the Church's history. For example, St. Augustine, after speaking of the infallibility of the sacred scriptures in a letter to St. Jerome, goes on to describe the degree of reverence he has for other writers: 'When I read others, I do not think that what they say is true, however holy and learned they are, simply because they feel it is true, but because they have succeeded in persuading me of its truth on the authority of canonical authors or on the basis of a good reason which reflects the truth.'(472) No moralist could turn these words of St. Augustine against him by accusing him of wanting to trust in himself, or make himself judge over the judges. And St. Augustine certainly does not want to rely upon himself in preference to others cleverer than himself. What he says is true, modest and humble. And it clearly shows more humility than that demonstrated by persons who continually insist upon humility in their fellows.

St. Augustine was not guilty of pride in following the rules he had laid down for himself, nor in wanting others to use the same rules when they examined his own works. And he did not accuse others of pride when they did so. In holding to his rule for judging non-inspired writers, and stating that he desired others to do the same with him, he showed himself equally just and prudent to all and manifested a supreme love of truth. It gives me great consolation to be able to quote his beautiful words in favour of my own opinion: 'I do not want anyone to accept everything I say for the sake of following me. Let him accept those opinions in which he recognises clearly that I have not erred. This is why I am presently engaged in writing books which provide corrections to my previous works. It will be seen that I have not even followed myself in everything.'(473)

748. St. Gregory of Nazianzen also, in refusing to impose on others the yoke of probable, fallible human authority, declares they have a duty to use their own reason. We will be judged, he says, on the good or evil use we have made of our reason. 'You will say that others think differently. But how does that affect me who love the truth more? It is the truth that will condemn or absolve me.'(474) St. Gregory clearly affirms that although the truth may be contrary to what others teach, it can nevertheless shine before our minds in such a way as to judge us.(475)

749. St. John Chrysostom speaks with the same good sense, balance and farsightedness. He does not think that we should make obeisance to vague, probable opinions, but instead offers us the following extremely wise rule: 'Let us not be content with the opinions of many, but investigate things themselves, that is, the effective truth. If we are dealing with money, we do not think it absurd to count it ourselves rather than rely on what others say. Surely we should act in the same way in more important matters and not simply be content with what others decide, especially if we have for our norm, measure and rule what the divine laws assert? I beg you all, therefore, to put aside human opinions and seek your answers in the study of the holy scriptures.(476)

750. The early Church and its great teachers never committed the indiscretion of obliging its members to abandon their own reason and allow themselves to be led blindly and exclusively by the probabilist authority of 'moralists' (an indeterminate name with no precise meaning). It was commonly held in the great centuries that human beings have in themselves a clear light which they can see if they want to, especially in the case of the natural precepts. If they do not want to, they sin. Moroever, supernatural light will be given to the individual in proportion to his desire for it.

St. Cyprian says: 'Your written law should not depart in any way from the natural law. Condemnation of evil and right choice is divinely impressed in the rational soul in such a way that no reasonable person can offer lack of knowledge or of strength as an excuse for ignoring it. We know very well what has to be done, and we can do it.'

St. Thomas certainly does not restrict the sources of our light to the miserable rule of probabilist modern authorities. He maintains that everyone with an upright heart can have enough light to know what is true if he asks for it. 'Unless we are degenerate, we all love the truth and desire to know it above all things. And truth reveals itself to those who desire it with a sincere heart, and seek it in simplicity of heart. God, who has promised it, is faithful and gives it to those who love it, as we read: Wisdom "hastens to make herself known to those who desire her,"(477) and: "Son,(478) if you desire wisdom, keep justice; and God will give her to you".'(479)

751. It is not zeal for the gospel but childish pedantry that wishes to subject the human race to instruction from the probabilist authority of moralists. But treating mature people as children will not make them remain in the schoolroom. Careful observers of human affairs, who can discern the roots of distant events in causes that normally go undetected, will have noted that the immense leap of human ingenuity which took place from the middle of the last century with such harm to piety was, in great part, the natural outcome of the yoke imposed upon mankind especially in the 17th century. Human beings were arbitrarily subjected to every kind of confusion emanating from teachers who were neither infallible nor masters of their material, although public opinion acknowledged them as such. They had no exclusive right to command others, nor to pronounce juridical or even authoritative decisions. Reason, despised and abandoned, took its revenge. It rose forcefully from its degrading humiliation and chose the opposite extreme. Not everyone will agree with this, but those who see its truth will find in it a very salutary lesson.

752. But we must return to the great objection: if we act as judges in our own cause, we will be led by passion. Segneri maintains: 'When an educated person hesitates between two sides of a question, he will easily find reasons for persuading himself that the truth is more likely to favour his inclination: "We easily believe what we desire," as St. Thomas says.'(480) The objection seems to support the rigid rather than the benign opinion, and appears at odds with Segneri's fear of imposing over-heavy burdens upon people.

But we have to remember that we are discussing a matter of moral conscience, in which only God and the individual play a part. It is not sufficient, for example, for a person to be persuaded that a contract is untainted with usury if his persuasion springs from blind love of money rather than the light of truth.

We have to insist that passion can only blind, not convince the intellect. Truth alone can guide us. Those who judge on the basis of passion will be punished although they neither know nor realise how blind they are. As we have said so often, our first moral duty is to judge uprightly, which is certaintly possible for us. We are not excused if through culpable passion we deceive ourselves about the probity of our judgment. We simply need to keep in mind:

1. that the truth about very many things shines in each of us;
2. that we are obliged to follow this truth loyally, promptly and courageously, without renouncing it.

753. 'When it is evening,' Christ said to the Pharisees and Sadducees, 'you say, "It will be fair weather; for the sky is red." And in the morning, "It will be stormy today, for the sky is red and theatening." You know how to interpret the appearance of the sky, but you cannot interpret the signs of the times.'(481)

Christ thus declared:

1. that the Hebrews were capable of knowing many things about the kingdom of God by using the light of reason with which they judged the facts of nature;

2. that they were obliged, under pain of sin as an evil and adulterous generation,(482) to hear the voice of their natural reason, although they excused themselves on the pretext of observing the traditions of their fathers.

754. Our divine Master goes further in clarifying the command about using our own reason in matters of salvation, and using it well - which is not impossible (if it were, not using it would cease to be a fault). He says: 'When you see a cloud rising in the west, you say at once, "A shower is coming"; and so it happens. And when you see the south wind blowing, you say, "There will be scorching heat"; and it happens. You hypocrites! You know how to interpret the appearance of earth and sky; but why do you not know how to interpret the present time?' He means that by considering the signs, they would understand that the time for salvation had come.

He concludes: 'And why do you not judge for yourselves what is just?'(483) Christ says that they could and should have been able to judge with their own reason ('for yourselves') what was just; and they sinned gravely in not doing so. He adds that they should indeed have freed themselves from the passion which led their judgment into error, and themselves to the edge of the abyss. He compares this passion to an accuser who brings a guilty person before the law: 'As you go with your accuser before the magistrate, make an effort to settle with him on the way, lest he drag you to the judge, and the judge hand you over to the officer, and the officer put you in prison. I tell you, you will never get out until you have paid the very last copper.'(484)

Christ does not dispense us from using our reason and good judgment. Indeed he commands us to do so, and to shrug off the affections perverting our reason and judgment. He demands just judgments, so often commanded of reasonable human beings in the Old Testament. Zechariah proclaims: 'Thus says the Lord of hosts, Render just judgments, show kindness and mercy each to his brother.'(485) Despite being subject to the obscurity of passion, we cannot say to the Lord that he has commanded the impossible, nor complain about his wanting us to trust our own judgment. If passions themselves are not removed, any other rules, including all the opinions of the most highly regarded moralists, are useless.

755. We are not in fact asking whether it is difficult to follow reason, but only whether a precept exists in those cases when truth presents itself to our reason. 'But how can we ourselves discern when the truth speaks to us and when it does not?' This is the usual sophistry, the normal reply. But even if we cannot distinguish, God can, and it is he who will judge us. 'But if we cannot distinguish between truth and passion when they speak to us, how can we be obliged to listen to the truth, and turn a deaf ear to passion?' Let me repeat the divine command about subduing our passions, intimated long before modern moralists appeared: 'But desire shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it.'(486) Cain had no schools of theology to consult, but he was able to distinguish the voice of passion from that of reason. If not, how could he have been obliged to do the impossible? Such an absurdity shows that we can, if we wish, distinguish passion and its raucous cry from reason and from the divine word. Confusion between the chaotic roar of passion and the gentle attraction of reason and grace arises only from the faults which blind us. Remove the faults with the means at hand, and the cataract that obscures our vision is eliminated. The light-filled sky is unveiled to us in all its beauty.

756. But besides destroying our passions, we must also defend ourselves against opinions which would destroy our hold on truth. These opinions may be eminently authoritative, but if we discover of ourselves that they deceive us and combine with our passions to detach us from truth, we must abandon them by following the light we have been accorded. There is no excuse for not doing this.

757. Amongst the Hebrews, those exercising the office of doctors of the law possessed the most authoritative voices. Nonetheless Christ called them blind guides who led others into the pit with themselves: 'If a blind man leads a blind man, both will fall into a pit.'(487) Christ imposes upon us all the duty of guarding against direction from blind guides. Their authority will not save those who fall into the pit with them. Christ wants his disciples to keep their eyes open, not to walk in darkness, nor to sleep, but to watch. It is not the one who leads who has to see, but the one who is led; and in the kingdom of Christ all is light. We must not allow ourselves to imagine that we can pick and choose opinions from well-known moralists. Our duty is to choose the best opinions with the greatest possible care and diligence in order to avoid the kind of sin which, as St. Bonaventure says, 'is more dangerous than open transgressions. If a person knows that he falls, he can correct himself easily enough. But if he does not know, and goes so far as to persuade himself that what he does is lawful, he has no real change of heart even at death. Holding to the false hope that what he had done was permitted, or at most was a small sin, he finds himself clinging to a broken reed.'(488)

758. The principal duty of every human being is to love and seek moral truth, as scripture says, 'that he may understand what he does.'(489) It follows, therefore, from all we have said that we must not neglect any means that provide the knowledge which serves to direct our life.

759. The natural order of these means, or sources, which enable us to decide doubtful cases of conscience is as follows:

1. Reason, with its natural light. This is of considerable help because it enables us to know the first moral principles and their immediate consequences. Knowledge of remote, moral consequences varies from individual to individual.(490)

2. Reason assisted by the light of revelation and the infallible decisions of the Church. This assistance brings strength and vital persuasion of the truth to reason, and also helps it to understand previously unknown, remote consequences of the principles of the natural law. It also indicates many positive precepts.

3. Reason assisted by the interior light of grace. Grace helps reason to understand better what it already sees, and puts it on the road to discovering other moral matters.(491)

4. Finally reason, already supported by the lights indicated under 1. and 2., is also helped by the fallible authority of other people, which varies considerably.

760. It is clear that this final aid, although useful, is subservient to those preceding it, and that any solution obtained with certainty by use of the first three sources eliminates any need for the fourth, which has a role only when our own defects and weakness frustrate the work of the first three.

761. We have now determined exactly the question we set out to answer in this chapter. When natural light, aided by revelation, the authority of the Church and grace shows human beings their duties, they have to adhere to it without hesitation. In this case, there is no need to search for other teachers who could at most only confirm the known truth, and at worst muddle it. But when we do not know or we doubt about what to do in given circumstances, how are we to rely on the authority of others? What kind of authority can offer us sure consciences? This is our question.

762. Our question has two parts, as we have seen, because we seek assistance about our rule of life from experts when we are either in doubt or in ignorance.

763. Let us deal first with doubt: how must a person who doubts make use of expert opinion? We begin by removing the fairly common, false opinion that we must make use of the opinions of experts to produce doubt, not to solve it. Such an attitude would render authority dangerous, not helpful; it would distance us from certainty rather than bring us closer to it.(492) Unfortunately, when we assert that one opinion is held by Thomas and another by Bonaventure, we tend to conclude that the matter is doubtful. It is, of course, for anyone who acknowledges no other source than expert opinion for solving doubt; in this case there must be doubt when authorities differ. But let us imagine that someone, without knowing the opinions of Thomas and Bonaventure, has resolved the question with the light of reason and with some of the aids we have described above, and only then comes to know what Thomas and Bonaventure have said. Is he obliged to relinquish his firm, certain persuasion and begin to doubt before he has examined the reasons for the differing opinions? Those who want to reduce everything to expert opinion answer with a definite affirmative. In this way, and in this way alone, mankind, faced with the innumerable opinions of so many authors, finds itself adrift in an ocean of moral scepticism, bereft of all knowledge and certainty. Mankind is thus well prepared for indifference and modern scepticism.

764. The inevitable outcome of such universal and desolate uncertainty, in which human beings lose every trace of firm, certain persuasion, is the necessary substitution of a probable norm, such as the decisions of experts,(493) for the norm of certainty which emanates naturally from the light and sense of reason, and especially from the light and sense of reason when it is infused supernaturally.

765. This hesitant, unstable reign of fallible authority produces characterless, cowardly individuals, incapable of straightforward action. The inevitable result is the extraordinary discord which causes different voices to affirm: 1. that the most probable opinion has to be followed; 2. that the safest opinion (the one most favourable to the law) has to be followed; 3. that all opinions, however contradictory, are good provided they have the support of at least one serious teacher.(494) The last affirmation is the most coherent although it is ultimately self-defeating.

766. Why is the third affirmation the most coherent? On the one hand (the argument runs), divided expert opinion causes doubt in such a way that if, in the face of some contrary opinion, we did not doubt, we would commit a sin of rashness; on the other hand, only expert opinion can remove that doubt because it alone is the sure criterion of the differing opinions about a moral case. The probabilists hold the only coherent view, therefore, because they alone are completely right in asserting that all opinions are good provided they have some support from a respectable teacher. In fact, because expert opinion exists simply to resolve the doubt it fabricates, the so-called principle of fallible authority cannot do more than give rise to doubt.

It is also clear that if one serious moralist is sufficient as a guide to my moral conduct, another serious moralist dissenting from the first can himself be my guide. But in this case I am necessarily left in doubt because, although there are two opinions, there can be only one truth. In such a doubt, however, there is no reason except my own well-being(495) for choosing the opinion of one expert rather than another. To say that I should hold the more probable opinion is gratuitous because the more probable opinion is not certain if it is opposed by one or more serious moralists. By adhering to the more probable opinion in this circumstance, I would be rashly despising their opinions as insufficient, and putting myself forward as a judge of people cleverer than myself. Moreover, it is impossible to know which is the more probable opinion. No one can be familiar with all the authors, but even if it were possible to know them all, it would still be extremely difficult to work out and compare their various degrees of authority. In fact, it would be better simply to take the easy way and use our God-given criterion.

767. 'Choosing the safest way' provides no securer principle because following this path, too, is gratuitous when we are dealing with precepts rather than counsels. Use of this principle entails implicit condemnation of all moralists, however famous, who hold opinions favouring freedom. But if they are wrong, they have erred, and the suppositions - that every dissent about opinions amongst serious moralists must leave us in doubt, or that we should resolve all questions on their authority - is untrue. It is not authority, but reason, that leads us to knowledge of the safest path.

768. The probabilism, therefore, that we oppose - what we may call the 'system of false humility' - offers no thread of hope in the labyrinth where we find ourselves. It may seem consistent with the great principle of authority when it accepts as good all the contrary opinions of reputable authors, but its internal contradictions inevitably destroy it, as we said. There are reputable authors who maintain that probable opinions are not sufficient in every case but sometimes need to be replaced by more probable or safer opinions. Such assertions undermine and throw into doubt even the reflective principle 'All opinions are good provided they emanate from reputable authors', with which we are supposed to eliminate doubts and find certainty. Let us look at the problem once more.

If Thomas reaches one decision and Bonaventure another, what brings them to their decisions? Neither author is doubtful: their decisions show that. Each of them believes that he has to reach his conclusion by the light of reason shining in him unsullied by passion.(496)

We, however, if we have only their authority to rely on, are left in doubt. But besides their authority we have available all the sources they themselves made use of; we can also examine their arguments rather than accept their naked authority. There is nothing to prevent our profiting by the light they have diffused and adding our own tiny rational contribution to the work of their genius; a pigmy standing on the shoulders of a giant sees further than the giant. We ourselves are able to use the sources that enabled our authors to reach their firm persuasion of certainty and through these sources to reach certainty about one or other of their decisions. All that remains is for us to accept and follow this decision. If, however, we cannot arrive at any certainty, we have necessarily to depend upon expert opinion. And this is the subject of the present chapter.(497)

Our problem, therefore, has been considerably restricted: we depend upon expert opinion only in those cases where reason, despite the different kinds of assistance available, cannot resolve our difficulties. But if we have in fact reached the firm persuasion of certainty, we should on no account allow the confused authority of muddled, solemnly academic moralists to disturb our tranquillity.

769. Nevertheless, this can happen either through our own fault or not. We can abandon the truth shining clearly in our spirit for the sake of some expert opinion that appeals to our passions. In this case we act with despicable hypocrisy by submitting our own judgment to that of another. We bury the talent of our reason, and God will give us what we deserve.
Sometimes, however, it is not our evil passion that impedes our assent to the truth we see and to which we are in duty bound, but some weakness that excuses us, at least from grave sin.

770. Although the truth shines before us, we, the subject, are free to give it our assent and, as subject, have more or less power to do so. The degree of power available, which gives a certain level of decisiveness and greatness to what we call a person's character, may be so weak that our assent to the truth before us is shaken and disturbed by the ulterior reflection we make on authors who disagree with our conclusion (we note that the degree of power also corresponds partially but not completely to the grade of light imparted to our intellect by the truth). It is not surprising to find authors' 'respectability' leading us to doubt and vacillate about our previous, firm certainty. More elevated reflection, if it becomes a principle of action, is then rendered personal to such an extent that it alone is considered the source of good or evil. That is, the good or evil of an action is attributed to us in so far as we reflect and act on the basis of that reflection.(498)

At this point, in order to find certainty once more, the doubter has to make use of the authority which by eliminating the reason for his certainty roused his doubt. He takes his place amongst those for whom we wish to provide a sure norm of action.

771. A necessary, safe norm for a good moral life is not and cannot be absent in the Church of Jesus Christ which is the 'pillar and bulwark of truth.' But where does each of the faithful find it?

The Church is divided into the Church teaching and the Church taught. The former consists of the bishops, masters in Israel, who teach and guide souls personally or by means of priests whom they appoint as parish priests and confessors. Any Christian, although he cannot have recourse to the bishop in every case, can choose as guide a priest approved for confessions. The choice must be made maturely. After invoking the Holy Spirit, the Christian must choose, according to his own ability and knowledge, the most holy, learned and prudent priest available. The choice must be made without secondary motives, and solely for the sake of having the surest guide on the road to salvation. If the choice is made in this way, I am sure that the Christian will never err in cases of ignorance and doubt (this is the limit to which we have confined our problem) by following the authority disinterestedly. The confessor thus resolves the doubt in the subject, if it is a case of doubt, or supplies for the ignorance of the penitent, if it is a case of ignorance.

772. Without being dispensed from our obligation to listen to, and obey the voice of our own reason, we are thus securely helped by the authority of the priest when there is need for assistance. At the same time, we avoid appealing to this assistance under the disguise of false humility rooted tenaciously in a secret refusal to face up to our passions and vices.

773. On the other hand, we must not believe that this teaching gives us licence to think just as we please by weaving for ourselves a web of sophistries entangling us in disobedience and evil. This would merit the severest condemnation by God because the holy voice of reason and grace would have been shouted down in our heart by the unreasoning bellow of evil desire. Doubt about such possible deceit should be sufficient to make us submit the case frankly to judgment and instruction from our master.

774. The reason enabling us to affirm that we follow the surest authority in opening uprightly to our confessor the matter of our doubtful duties or ignorance is that we are not following probability but what we have called normal and moral certainty. This is sufficient as a rule of life and moral behaviour. We have already seen that authority is of itself a source of normal certainty because it is nothing more than the communication to us of another's certainty. I assume that the confessor, in telling me that something is lawful, is himself certain of what he is saying. I am not asking here and now how he has obtained his certainty; but I am obliged to believe that he would not have declared the action lawful unless he himself was sure of its lawfulness. Because I cannot ascertain the matter for myself, I seek the assistance of someone who possesses the certainty I lack, and I make use of it. The only difference between the certainty I have gained for myself and that obtained on the authority of the confessor is that in the former case I use my certainty and in the latter the certainty of someone else. In both cases, I have certainty as my rule. I cannot and must not believe that the confessor is telling a lie in communicating his own certainty to me; and if he did, it would be his fault, not mine.

775. The intrinsic reason for our conclusion is as follows. In seeking advice finally from the confessor, we have left nothing undone in our search for the truth. First, we consulted the interior light of reason and of grace. Where this has shown no clear direction, we sought the assistance of the Church and chose the minister whom we thought best suited to us; we were ready to accept whatever this divine minister prescribed for us, and to obey him promptly in our desire to do what is right; we did what we should have done. Errors which may then occur do no harm to our soul because they are at most material. As St. Thomas, the 'Angelic Doctor', says: 'The truth of the practical understanding is found in its conformity with upright desire,'(499) not in the conformity between the understanding and the thing. We were looking for moral good, and we found it; and having found it, we found the truth for our practical, if not always for our speculative, understanding.

776. A possible objection, which we shall refute, is that by entrusting ourselves to a confessor's fallible authority, we place ourselves in danger of positing some intrinsically evil act.

As we have said, we are either ignorant of, or have some doubt about, the moral implications of a situation. If our doubt is concerned with the natural law and consequently places us in danger of performing an intrinsically evil act, we must do all we can to guard against the danger. No one can be ignorant of this obligation which the natural light of reason reveals even to the least educated;(500) no one need depend on authority to be sure of this. But in all other cases, I must insist, lawful authority can do us no harm even if it deceives us.

The danger of which we are speaking has already been excluded in the case of ignorance relative to remote consequences that we ourselves cannot deduce from the principles of natural law. It is also excluded relative to positive legislation, and to the facts upon which the application of positive law depends, as well as the way in which it should be applied. Even the consequences of natural law, if unknown to us and available only by means of information from others, have lost their rational characteristic as far as we are concerned, and are entirely on a par with positive laws.

In all other cases, the director's reply is straightforward: he passes judgment on the lawfulness of our actions and says: 'You can do this; you cannot do that.'

777. Because we distinguish between authors of moral works on the one hand, and confessors and spiritual directors on the other, nothing that has been said so far is related to the question 'Does the authority of a single reputable moralist make a decision probable?' . The Church of God has absolute need of the latter, but not of the former.

When we wanted to indicate how each of us could work out his salvation, we spoke of directors or confessors as the sure means of avoiding harm that might result from any ignorance or doubt on our part. We insisted that a single director or confessor was sufficient when we approached him in good faith and with an upright intention. Although he is never infallible, speculatively speaking, he is infallible in practice because 1. he is the lawful minister of the Church, our natural teacher, and as such is amongst those to whom it was said: 'He who hears you, hears me'; and 2. he was the best we could find amongst the Church's ministers.

778. This is outside controversy unless serious, positive doubts arise in the penitent's spirit about the veracity of the confessor's decisions. If these doubts are well-founded, and not useless fantasies, they should first be put to the confessor himself. Then, if his replies still leave room for well-founded doubt in the penitent's mind about his being deceived by the confessor, or about positive self-deception on the part of the confessor in important matters, the penitent may ask someone else or even change his confessor. But if more than one of those asked agrees with what has already been said, and those questioned have a reputation for learning and holiness, the doubtful penitent can and must trust their decision and take what he has been told as certain.

779. The problem about obtaining certainty through guidance by a confessor must not be confused with the other question: 'Is the authority of a single reputable moralist sufficient guarantee that we are not misled?' because:

1. The written works of moralists, who are not essential ministers in the Church, lack the practical certainty present in confessors who are.

2. Living confessors decide cases which occur in our daily lives according to the circumstances in which they occur. Authors are concerned with theoretical cases only.

3. It is possible to think and talk at length about the case with a confessor who can also be informed about all the relevant circumstances, including the state of our spirit. This is impossible with books.

4. Above all, there is a world of difference between choosing a single confessor, whom we prudently believe is the best available, and upon whom we rely in all our doubts, and taking en bloc as guide, or claiming to do so, innumerable 'reputable' authors amongst whom we can pick and choose as we please and, in doing so, mock truth, virtue, God, and reality.

780. At this point it will be useful to consider more fully the authority proper to moralists in helping us form firm persuasions about moral matters. This can be done conveniently through our examination of the knowledge proper to a confessor or spiritual director. It soon becomes clear that the question: 'Does a single reputable moralist suffice to render an opinion probable?' is totally useless. It would not be useless, of course, if it were true that in order to accept an opinion immediately it were sufficient to show that the opinion was probable. In this case the entire question would be reduced to knowing when an opinion was probable.

This was Fr. Segneri's view (I consistently take Segneri as my target because of his outstanding reputation, which I hold in great respect): 'The whole point consists in determining which opinions can be called probable and which not. This is the real difficulty. Provided we are dealing with truly probable opinions, it is indifferent whether they are more or less probable. All probable opinions fall under our consideration.'(501) And this is undeniable because the word probable has already been defined by Segneri as approvable or worthy of the assent of a wise person. 'The term probable in our present discussion means an opinion which has proved itself such by meriting the assent of a prudent person.' (Segneri leads us into a vicious circle here. He has already established that 'a person acts prudently if he follows a probable opinion', but now defines probable opinion as one meriting the assent of a prudent person). Segneri continues:(502) 'The foundation of moral theology consists in agreeing about the constitutive elements of probable opinion, that is, opinion worthy of acceptance (as previous writers thought); moral theology cannot be based on squabbles about the lawful use of what by comparison may be a less probable opinion.'(503) He thinks that this is sufficient to win the field for probabilism, and continues: 'The term probable can undoubtedly be accepted in an upright sense. Just as 'lovable' is that which is worthy of love, and 'estimable' that which is worthy of esteem, so 'probable' is that which is worthy of being approved. It is clearly contradictory to declare an opinion probable in practice, and then go on to deny that it may lawfully be followed.'(504)

This is indeed obvious, and its clarity should have enabled Segneri to see that the meaning he gave to the word 'probable' was not that normally given in the question under discussion. If it were, the whole problem could be reduced to this ridiculous query: 'In practice, can we follow a decision worthy of approval?' Segneri is playing games, as orators often do, by juggling with the twofold meaning of the word probable. It is of course true that in Latin this word also means 'worthy of approval',(505) but that is not the meaning it bears in theological and philosophical schools, as we shall show.

781. Segneri himself defines its meaning in the probabilist dispute: 'Probability is that semblance of truth which any uncertain opinion whatsoever possesses in its favour.'(506) He does not say 'the probability of a proposition is that which renders it worthy of approval.' He now wisely abandons that meaning which certainly cannot be proper to any opinion whatsoever which has a semblance of truth in its favour.

782. This also explains Segneri's contradiction when he wishes to defend himself against accusations of following the proposition condemned by Innocent XI: 'Generally speaking, we always act prudently when we do something in doubt provided that the intrinsic or extrinsic probability of the case, however slight it may be, does not exceed the bounds of probability.'(507) If probability means that which renders an opinion worthy of approval so that it may be accepted and followed, any probability whatsoever, however slight, is sufficient for action, 'provided it does not exceed the bounds of probability', because we are then following an opinion worthy of approval by a prudent person.

And this is indeed how Segneri defends less probable opinions: 'Simply because they are less probable, such opinions never cease to be probable. They are probable in the way more probable opinions are, but not to the same extent.'(508) But if this is sufficient, the proposition requiring any probable opinion, however tenuous, for action, has been wrongly condemned. Segneri is now forced to contradict himself, as I said, in order to avoid the censure attached to the condemned proposition. He says: 'The condemned proposition would allow any probability, however slight; the common view (that of the probabilists) excludes slight probability, and allows the less probable opinion which, considered in itself, is sometimes the most probable . . . Generally speaking, it is not sufficient for wine to be wine if it is going to be put on the tables of the nobility. It has to be the kind that meets with the approval of connoisseurs as soon as they put it to their lips.'(509) This is the opposite of what Segneri has so often maintained in insisting that probable opinion 'has only to be probable' in order to be worthy of approval. It is not necessary to ask whether that probability is great or small.

783. But if, on Segneri's own admission, it is not sufficient to know that 'an opinion is probable' in order to follow it in practice, it is clear, as we said at the beginning, that the question: 'Does the authority of a single reputable moralist suffice to make an opinion probable?', is altogether useless. It also follows with equal truth that a confessor who is conversant only 'with probable opinions in moral matters' would not have sufficient knowledge to direct souls: 'probable opinions alone are not a safe, infallible norm of upright living.'

784. St. Alphonsus rightly rejects as false, therefore, the generally accepted rule: 'A person acts prudently if he follows a probable opinion.'(510) The saintly bishop also says: 'Before accepting any opinion, the confessor has to weigh its intrinsic reasons. If he finds some convincing reason in favour of the safer opinion for which he has no reply, he cannot accept the less safe opinion, despite the favourable authority of the majority of the moralists, provided the authority is not of such weight that it seems to require more respect than the reason which he has seen . . . But this happens very rarely.'(511)

St. Alphonsus, a holy moralist, is not happy that confessors should be content with knowing the opinions of particular authors, and he does not think that he is encouraging pride by urging them to extend their knowledge beyond these authors. It is not enough for confessors to count opinions and weigh authorities (which is perhaps more dificult than trying to solve the question directly(512)). Purely historical knowledge of moralists' opinions cannot provide the clear ideas and firm persuasion of certainty required in the spirit of a priest as teacher of the Christian people. It leaves priests hesitant over probabilities; what little persuasion they have is often about misunderstood formulas.

785. Priests who represent the Church, on whose behalf they act as teachers and judges, must make every effort to obtain certainty, or at least certain persuasion, which enables them to set aside infinite, contradictory and more or less equally weighty opinions for the sake of taking a safe road along which they can walk confidently and securely.

786. St. Bernard distinguishes clearly between the founts of certainty from which a spiritual guide must draw and the sources of mere opinions which leave the soul hesitant and unsure. 'Understanding is founded on reason; faith on authority; opinion is safeguarded only by its probability of truth. The first two (reason and faith) possess certain truth, but opinion, which expresses no certainty, prefers to search for the probability of truth rather than affirm truth . . . Many people think their own opinion is understanding, but they are mistaken. Opinion can, of course, be taken for understanding, but understanding cannot be taken for opinion. Why? Without doubt because opinion can be deceived, and can deceive itself. But if it can deceive itself, it is opinion, not understanding. True understanding not only possesses certain truth, but is informed of truth.'(513)

787. The confessor must, therefore, acquire the knowledge that can render him a light for the people whom he directs. He should not seek authorities alone, but the intimate understanding of moral questions that comes as he makes good use of his reason to reach firm, sure decisions. He can achieve this by doing what we have already indicated, that is, by drawing the truth from sources which are available to everyone. They are 1. the natural light of reason; 2. the light of revelation; 3. the light of grace; 4. the decisions of the Church. To these he must add his own study and meditation which, as Liguori says, will enable him to weigh together intrinsic reasons and moralists' authority. He should often ask advice, and attend conferences of more learned confessors; he should have recourse to bishops themselves if this is necessary; he must leave nothing undone that will help him find the truth and attain the wisdom that should be his.(514)

Finally, if he still has doubts that he cannot overcome, he will be able to resolve his difficulties and be sure of avoiding error by means of the rules we have set out in this book [App. no. 12].

788. But we have to point out here the great difference that exists between applying to oneself and applying to others the rules we have set out.

789. This diversity depends upon 'our knowing the state of spirit of another in a way different from that in which we know our own.' We know the state of our own spirit - our knowledge, our persuasions and our doubts - by means of the internal awareness that we have, or can have, as a result of reflection. The internal state and persuasions of others, however, can be known only through external signs and through what people tell us of themselves. It is this very important difference which obliges us to modify these rules considerably in applying them to others rather than to ourselves.

790. The point at issue will be clearer if we first note that the rules we have given are all founded on the interior state of the person who must act according to them. This may be a state of doubt or certainty; if a state of doubt, the doubt may be close to or remote from action. We can now express the questions as follows: 'Are these rules to be applied according to the penitent's persuasions and dispositions of spirit, or according to the confessor's persuasions and dispositions of spirit?'

791. A careful examination of the problem shows immediately that, in dealing directly with the salvation of the soul of the penitent, the rules must not be applied merely according to the confessor's persuasions, but at least in great part according to those of the penitent in such a way that they become fruitful to salvation. It is not unreasonable, therefore, nor repugnant (as many would like us to believe), that 'the confessor should at times adhere to the persuasion manifested by the penitent', provided this statement is rightly understood.

792. We take as our premise, therefore, the following principle: 'The confessor must always seek the moral good of the penitent', and the assumption: 'The moral good of the penitent is often attained by applying our rules (with the qualifications we shall describe later) according to the state of his spirit.' Such principles allow us to understand correctly St. Alphonsus' declaration: 'I do not know how one can teach in good conscience that generally speaking (this qualification must be noted carefully) the penitent, who has already acquired a definite right to absolution by confessing his sins, can be denied absolution because he refuses to follow the safer of two equally weighty opinions.'(515)

The saint supports his statement with the authority of other moralists. He quotes:

1. Pontas: 'Nevertheless, the confessor who is convinced of the probability of the opinion held by the penitent, can give him absolution because in this case he would not be acting against his own conscience.'(516)

2. Cabassuzio: 'All confessors must absolve penitents who do not want to abstain from something declared lawful on the authority (not reproved by the Church) of several pious, learned moralists, even if the probable authority of others followed by the confessor declares the same act less probable.(517) This is the opinion of Navarrus, Silvius, etc., and is founded upon the fact that the confessor, although acting against his own opinion, does not act against his own conscience. Rather, he is bound to absolve any well-disposed person.'(518)

3. Vittoria: 'If both opinions are probable and upheld by moralists the confessor is bound to absolve the penitent whether he is the penitent's regular confessor or not.'(519) And he cites Paludanus in his favour.(520)

4. Adrian: 'If several moralists of greater or equal authority hold a contrary opinion, the priest must not presume that he can restrict matters to the limits of his own opinion which perhaps is mistaken.'(521)

He continues with quotations from other authorities: Navarrus,(522) Angelo, Silvestro, St. Antoninus,(523) Gerson(524) and Soto.(525)

793. However, the saintly moralist adds that this theory holds only in general. We now have to try to outline its necessary limitations as carefully as possible, indicating the cases where it is or is not applicable. In this way, we shall provide confessors with some guidelines in what appear to be very complex circumstances.

First, 'The confessor must resolve the penitent's doubts with the rules we have given by applying them to the state of persuasion in which the penitent finds himself.' The confessor's immediate responsibility, therefore, is to discover the state of those persuasions of the penitent to which the rules must be applied. In this case the general principle of verification is: 'The confessor, unless he has suspicions to the contrary, must give credence to what the penitent says.' He must presume that the penitent is speaking the truth, and be careful not to form rash, harmful judgments about him.

794. Nevertheless, he must proceed with great caution, and prudently ask the penitent questions that help to elicit enough information about the state of his persuasions.

795. When this has come to light, the confessor should note whether the penitent is suffering from any mental blindness or obscurity produced by passions or vicious affections which confuse or distort his judgment, or whether his persuasions are completely sincere and upright, free from artifice and illusion. If his persuasions were the result of passion, the penitent would be in a dangerous position, and the confessor would have to enlighten him about his bad state in order to help him secure salvation.

796. But apart from this case, and granted that the penitent's state of persuasion is altogether sincere, the confessor must apply to him the rules we have already given.

If the penitent doubts about the intrinsic unlawfulness of an action, and the confessor can resolve the doubt by showing that the action is not unlawful and persuading the penitent of this, the penitent may be given permission to act. But if the penitent thinks that something is lawful which the confessor judges or doubts is intrinsically unlawful, the confessor must explain his reasons to the penitent, listen to those of the penitent and only permit the action if he is convinced that there is nothing immoral in it. If 'it is certain that no one can expose himself to the danger of doing what is intrinsically evil, it is equally certain that he cannot give another permission to do so.'

This is, perhaps, the only case in which the confessor cannot follow the penitent's persuasion. Nevertheless, if the penitent has already operated in accordance with his persuasion, and the confessor thinks that guilt was neither seen, nor understood, nor feared by this agent, he can give him absolution because such a case can be concerned only with remote consequences of the natural law. These consequences may be totally ignored or virtually non-existent either because they are so remote from the principles, or because they require more reflection than the penitent is capable of (cf. 279-331). Outside this case, the confessor cannot expose the penitent to the danger of doing what the confessor himself thinks or doubts is intrinsically unlawful. This is the exception indicated by St. Alphonsus when he said that the confessor can rest in the opinion of the penitent generally speaking, although not always.

797. If the penitent's doubts about the lawfulness of an action are not proximate but remote - such as those concerned with the existence of positive law, and others previously listed by us - the confessor who thinks differently can again dialogue with the penitent in a mutual, reasonable search for what appears nearer the truth. If, however, the penitent maintains his own opinion in all sincerity (not out of evil affection), the prudent confessor can rely upon this opinion in applying the rules already given.

Let us imagine that the confessor holds that a positive law is completely certain and reliable, but that the penitent, even after hearing the confessor's explanation, continues to think it doubtful for apparently good reasons. In this case, the confessor can apply the rule connected with doubtful positive law to the penitent's doubt, although he cannot apply it to himself in his state of certainty.

798. This explains why it is commonly said of holy people that they are 'austere with themselves, but gentle with others';(526) it also confirms the saying that moralists should not too easily affirm the presence of mortal sin if they are not totally certain of it.(527)

Notes

(457) Lett. 2, pd7.

(458) Lett. 2, pd7.

(459) Is there any guarantee that we will be dispassionate in choosing to follow one moralist's opinion rather than that of another? Even if we choose to follow the opinion of the most noted moralist, we can still be led by our feelings. It would be foolish to deny this.

(460) Who understand so much more than we do. Who are we? Fr. Segneri is describing himself, and although I admire his act of humility, he seems to exaggerate. I consider Segneri far more intelligent than the moralists whom he praises so highly. But Segneri cannot be the only one included in that we. Fr. Tirso, Segneri's superior general, is also included and judged, together with the teaching of the great moralists. We can go further. If the argument is to have any weight, that we must mean many others besides Segneri and Gonzalez. It must embrace all those who have cases of conscience to resolve. How then does Segneri know that the moralists he quotes understand so much more than those who still have cases to resolve? Here Segneri not only plays the judge, but the prophet.

(461) This is rhetoric. The opinion of some accredited moralists other than ourselves is not universal. It often happens that 'the will's tendency is to seek AUTHORITY for wrongdoing; it persuades us either that evil is good or nearly good.' Because of this tendency, St. Augustine wants Christians to be as vigilant as possible: 'And not TO BE DECEIVED BY OPINIONS THAT APPEAR TRUE, nor misled by clever words, nor blinded by the darkness of error. For good is not to be thought evil, nor evil good' (De Civ. Dei, 22, 23).

(462) Lett. 2, pd7. We are not dealing with presumption but with conscience. A judge cannot see into the heart, and often has to pronounce sentence on the basis of presumption. But God does not act like that. When he judges, 'presumption has to give way to truth'. Two very dissimilar matters are confused here, and as usual the reader's mind is being led astray.

(463) Letter 2, pd7.

(464) The common estimation of moralists is always a powerful argument, but probabilists follow the less common, not the common opinion because, according to them, even the less common opinion is often very probable.

(465) Once more, who is this he? Is Segneri rashly judging people whom he does not know? Throughout his work he demonstrates a very low regard for his contemporaries, and a very high regard for dead moralists. He seems to think that reason, which previously existed in the world, even in recent times, had altogether vanished.

(466) Lett. 2, pd7.

(467) Segneri's view that the best of living moralists are greatly inferior to their predecessors and should give way to them is clearly shown in the following quotation: 'There are many moralists either incapable of examining, discussing and weighing reasons in their own field or, if they are capable, have insufficient time to do this! - as we have already said. And if they did have time, would they do it as well as St. Antoninus, Suarez, Sanchez, Macado and other illustrious writers? Why do they not rely on these much wiser moralists?' (Lett. 1, pd5). This kind of argument effectively disallows all opposition. And Segneri, in considering himself capable of judging the moralists of his own and the preceding century, does not cut too good a figure.

(468) This desire to resolve every problem solely according to the opinions of moralists is the true foundation of probabilism. If every solution to difficulties has to depend upon the simple authority of moralists, it becomes impossible to find what is certain in many questions, and even what is more probable. Segneri uses this argument to defend probabilism. If we grant him his major proposition, the argument is of course valid and convincing. He writes: 'Only in very rare cases, therefore, do we find moralists in agreement about the more probable of two truly probable opinions. In the majority of cases each of the contending authors claims greater probability for his own view. Granted this, how can a scarcely probable opinion be declared improbable when it is so like the most probable opinion that it is taken for such by some people?' (Lett. 1, n. 9). In n. 18 he shows even more clearly that in many cases it is impossible to distinguish the more from the less probable opinion. And this is what I meant when I objected that Segneri judged opinions good precisely because they are contrary to one another. Such scepticism in moral science, accompanied as always by scepticism in the study of law, was the prelude to universal scepticism.

(469) Bk. 1, c. 1

(470) Bk. 1, c. 3.

(471) Bk. 1, c. 3.

(472) Ep. 82 (al. 19), c. 1, pd3. Note that the word probable does not bear the meaning commonly given to it by probabilists. We shall speak elsewhere of the ambiguity in this word, which has been grossly misused to the growing detriment of the question under discussion. St. Augustine himself, whose immense knowledge was no bar to deep humility, considered this very important matter in another passage: 'We must not consider the arguments of other authors, although holy and praiseworthy people, as on a par with the sacred scriptures. While we duly respect these writers, it is always lawful to object to or reject anything in their works which we find inconsistent with the truth which, with God's help, has been understood by ourselves or others. This is my attitude to the writings of other authors, and that which I hope others have towards mine' (Ep. 148 (al. 111), ad Fortunantianum, c. 6, pd15).

(473) De Dono persev., 21.

(474) Orat., 27.

(475) This, however, must not in any way diminish the esteem which we should have for others. It does not follow from our seeing some truth overlooked by many others that we are superior to them (although we could be, without any reason for vanity - it is God who endows our nature with its gifts; we do not merit them). Sometimes one who knows less can see further than a more knowledgeable person; a child is perfectly capable of noting a philosopher's error. St. Augustine, the humblest of men, shows us why in words of great wisdom: 'In very obscure questions it is not impossible for an individual or a few people to be nearer the truth than the majority. Nevertheless, without considering the matter deeply and forcefully, we ought not to decide in favour of the individual or the few against the overwhelming majority of erudite, extremely intelligent men who hold the same religion and unity' (bk. 3, De Bapt. contra Donat., c. 4, n. 6). St. Augustine means: 1. that an individual can see a truth that cannot be seen by many great people; 2. that seeing it, he can uphold it against many; 3. but that he can do this only after great consideration and mature study of the matter in question. If we were all content with this moderation and wisdom, things would go well. Difficulties arise when lesser men than St. Augustine are prevented from recognising such moderation and wisdom in their anxiety to say what they think. They see good only in exaggeration.

(476) Hom. 13 in Ep. 2 ad Corinth. n. 4.

(477) Wisdom 6: [13].

(478) Sir 1: [13].

(479) Opusc. 73, de Usuris, in Proemio. Henry of Ghent's comment on the duties of those who write on moral questions is applicable and useful here. He not only provides further confirmation of the obligatory moderate and prudent use of one's own reason that we have urged, but also indicates the kind of feeling for moral duty that has led me to express in this study openly and frankly (as my temperament and custom normally require me to do) what I think conforms to the truth. Henry says: 'A teacher sometimes does not clarify the truth as he knows it when this seems opportune, that is, when he realises it would be useful and advantegeous for his hearers. He talks around the subject instead, proposing what OTHERS hold, not what he feels himself. In concealing the truth (perhaps as a result of fear or hatred), he SINS MORTALLY, I think, both against the truth and against his responsibilities as a teacher . . . This is particularly the case in difficult and dangerous questions. where arguments for and against open an abyss which, by not revealing the truth, he fails to close' (Quodl., 10, q. 16).

(480) Lett. 2, pd6, n. 17.

(481) Matt 16: [2, 3].

(482) ibid.

(483) Lk 12: 54-58.

(484) Lk 12: 58, 59. John 7: 24 is similar: 'Do not judge by appearances' (this is what is forbidden), 'but JUDGE WITH JUST JUDGMENT': this is what is commanded.

(485) Zech 7: [9].

(486) Gen 4: 7.

(487) Matt 15: [14].

(488) St. Bonaventure, Opusc. de process., 5, pd3).

(489) Deut 29: 9.

(490) St. Antoninus rightly distinguishes positive precepts known on authority from natural precepts known through reason. He writes: 'Ulricus says that a person who doubts about what is lawful or unlawful in relationship to some possible fact, and by consulting EXPERTS' (the experts spoken about by Segneri, whom St. Antoninus finds unsatisfactory, as we shall see) 'does what is in his power to discover the truth, is excused if, on the basis of what he is told, he follows what is contrary to truth. He labours under invincible ignorance, as for instance in a schism when he doubts about whom he should accept as pope, or as in the case of subjects faced with a doubtful war, and so on '(these are remote consequences of the natural law, dependent upon positive facts). 'But if in his ignorance he follows even the BEST ADVICE contrary to the truth about natural or divine law he is not excused from sin when he acts because there cannot be invincible ignorance about these matters in one who has the use of reason' (P. 2, tit. 5, c. 9, pd2).

(491) St. Augustine says that this light, united with the previous two, provides the surest way of acting uprightly: 'More than anything else, we need judgment and discernment so that Satan may not draw us to evil when he transforms himself into an angel of light . . . But who is capable of avoiding the devil's mortal deceits except by God's rule and help? Such a difficulty is useful, however, in preventing us from trusting in ourselves or IN ONE ANOTHER and in leading us to place all our hope in God. No devout person would hesitate to assert that this is our greatest need' (Enchir. ad Laurent., c. 60).

(492) St. Thomas says that the many differing opinions of moralists are dangerous: 'In moral matters differences in attitudes and OPINIONS are dangerous (De Usuris, opsuc. 73 in proemio). Elsewhere he says that anyone 'led into doubt by CONTRASTING OPINIONS, and holding multiple benefices while the doubt persists, puts himself in danger and certainly sins . . . ; or he is not led into doubt by CONTRASTING OPINIONS, and so avoids danger and does NOT SIN' (Quodl., 8, q. 6, a. 13). St. Thomas supposes therefore that a person can have firm certainty despite the discordant authorities of others, and in following it does not sin.

(493) Many people who found probabilism repugnant from this point of view vigorously protested against it. Antonio Merenda in his treatise on probable opinion (Praef. n. 14) says: 'The use of probable opinions is the devil's own way of relaxing the power of the commandments.' Alexander VII and other popes complained for the same reason. The decree of September 7th 1665 states: 'His Holiness (Alexander VII) has heard with sorrow of a great number of opinions, some old and some new, which circulate to the detriment of Christian discipline and cause harm to souls. He is also disturbed by the daily increasing licence of dissolute, clever people whose OPINIONS, altogether foreign to gospel simplicity and the teaching of the holy Fathers, have found a place in matters pertaining to conscience. Christian life would be greatly corrupted if the faithful were to use such licence as a safe rule.'

(494) This conclusion was taken further when some maintained that any opinion could be taken as probable provided it had the support of at least one modern author. The proposition was condemned, however, by Alexander VII in the decree of September 24th 1665 (7th proposition). 'An opinion must be thought probable if contained in any book of a minor modern author, provided there is no proof that it has been rejected as improbable by the Apostolic See'.

(495) But what if one or several of these serious teachers say that this is not sufficient? Scotus, for example, writes: 'There are many doubtful matters in human affairs which may be mortal sin even after the teachers and commentators have said all they can about such subjects' (In f. 2, Q. Prol. Sent.). This assertion, coming from such a respected authority, must also be probable. If it is probable, the opinion that following every opinion of serious teachers is not sufficient for salvation is at least less probable. In this case I am not only doubtful which amongst several opinions is true, but also whether I can lawfully pick and choose amongst opinions, all of which are doubtful.

(496) As we said, inculpable self-deception is not morally harmful.

(497) St. Thomas himself restricts the necessity of expert authority to cases in which a person cannot follow the argument for himself: 'A person with little knowledge is more certain of what he hears from a knowledgeable person than of what his own reason seems to present' (S.T., II-II, q. 4, art. 8, ad 2). He says 'a person with little knowledge', not 'all'.

(498) Cf. AMS, 854-864.

(499) S.T.,, I-II, q. 57, art. 5, ad 3.

(500) In fact, the simple-minded normally believe themselves obliged to follow the safer path even in the case of positive laws. We need to consider carefully this phenomenon whose explanation is found in the intimate, clear conviction present in all human beings that 'we must never place ourselves in danger of willingly breaking the law.' The simple-minded are unable to make the explicit, obvious distinction between rational and positive law, and consequently lack the distinction between material and formal violation of the law. Lacking this distinction, they generalise excessively the tutiorist principle originating from the natural light. This principle is good, as we shall see, relative to the state of their spirit. We should not be surprised at the absence of this distinction amongst the simple-minded. Theologians themselves avoided it for a long time in solving cases of conscience, and tutiorists (or a very close equivalent of tutiorists) still exist.

(501) Lett. 1, pd1.

(502) Lett. 2, pd2.

(503) Lett. 2, pd3. Fr. Segneri requires the authority of several moralists for declaring an opinion probable. He writes: 'No one thinks it unlawful to undertake it (the contract) if its justice is rightly thought probable, that is, worthy of approval not only by himself but also by several learned moralists who have examined it carefully. This is what the more benign opinion demands of each of its followers' (Lett. 2, n. 24).

(504) Lett. 1, n. 6.

(505) St. Leo, for example, forbids turning to the sun in adoration so that converts might not think their old idolatrous practice probable, that is, worthy of approval. But this is very different (obviously different, we may add) from the use of the word probable as contrary to certain in the discussion about probabilism.

(506) Lett. 1, n. 8.

(507) Pr. 3 of the condemned propositions.

(508) Lett. 1, n. 8.

(509) Lett. 1, n. 46.

(510) 'Hence, in the above-mentioned study I concluded that the common affirmation of probabilists: "A person acts prudently if he follows a probable opinion", was false' (Morale systema etc., after n. 55 of the Tract. de Consc. in Th. M.).

(511) 'The confessor must weigh the INTRINSIC REASONS before accepting any opinion, etc.' (Th. M. de Consc., Syst. Mor.).

(512) Bolgeni puts the matter well: 'Educated persons who are capable of understanding intrinsic reasons clearly and profoundly will not find moral certainty by depending solely on the number and authority of people who think differently from them. Note the words: solely on the number and authority, that is, separately from intrinsic reasons. Error generally has its first source in a single reputable author. It spreads both orally and in the written works of followers, who accept it either because of their little knowledge or because of blind reverence for authority or laziness in examining the matter in depth, or finally through passion or esprit de corps. A little stream will flow on to become a great river' (Del Possesso, c. 7, n. 31).

(513) De Consid. ad Eug., bk. 5, c. 3.

(514) The confessor, therefore, should not rely only on his own or another's judgment, but should in good faith try to unite both in an all-out effort to obtain a firm conclusion that will serve as a safe guide. On certainty as a guide to practice, and on its constitutive elements, cf. Certainty, 1351-1353.

(515) Th. M. De Consc., Morale Systema.

(516) Pontas, at: Confessarius, c. 2.

(517) Here St. Alphonsus himself moderates this statement by noting that the phrase 'less probable' is to be understood as 'not noticeably less probable'.

(518) Theol. jur., bk. 3, c. 13, n. 13.

(519) De Confess., n. 109.

(520) 4, pd17, q. 2, a. 1.

(521) De Confess., q. 5, dub. 7.

(522) 'If moralists' opinions differ, and the confessor believes that he has a clear text or evident reason on his side, and the penitent a doubtful opinion, he must not absolve him' (this merits careful attention); 'but if the penitent depends upon a reason equal or nearly equal with that of the confessor, and has a reputable moralist in his favour, he can absolve him . . . If, however, there is any doubt whether the penitent must indeed rely upon, or give such a reason, the confessor must choose what is more favourable to the penitent' (Nav., Manual., c. 26, n. 4).

(523) 'Godfrey of Fontaines seems to agree where contrary opinions are tolerated by the Church, as we have said; he also thinks that the confessor should require the penitent to study the matter well in order to form an opinion for himself by consulting prudent authorities if others hold a contrary opinion. This is especially the case when the penitent confesses to someone not his ordinary confessor. He can then be absolved. Richard is very clearly of the same opinion, and makes no distinction between the normal confessor and others' (St. Antoninus, part 1, tit. 6, c. 10, pd10). 'If anyone refuses such advice . . . let him freely hold his own opinion and be granted absolution' (Idem, part 2, tit. 1, c. 11, pd29). 'If, however, he (the confessor) is not sure whether mortal sin is present, he should not, as a result, immediately rush, as William says, to deny absolution, or to make the penitent aware that it is a question of mortal sin. If the penitent were later to offend in this way, even though the sin were not mortal, it would be mortal for him because everything which offends in conscience is worthy of hell (28, q. 1, pd Ex his). Laws are more ready to absolve than bind . . . It would seem, therefore, that he should be absolved and left to divine judgment' (Idem p. 2, tit. 4, c. 5, pd In quantum).

(524) 'Doctors of theology must not be over-eager to assert that mortal sin is present unless they are completely certain that such is the case' (Gerson, De Vita Spirituali, less. 4).

(525) 'If the penitent's opinion is probable, it excuses him from fault; and therefore he has a right to ask absolution which the chaplain is bound to give' (Soto, in 4, d. 18, q. 2, art. 5, ad 5). 'And when reputable moralists have different opinions, you may follow one or the other in good conscience' (Idem, bk. 6, de Just. et jur., q. 1, a. 6, towards the end).

(526) 'Be austere in your own life; but gentle with others' (St. John Chrysostom in can. Alligant.; Decret. Grat., p. 2, caus. 26, q. 6, c. 12).

(527) 'Doctors of theology must not be over-eager to assert that mortal sin is present unless they are completely certain that such is the case' (Gerson, De Vita Spirituali, less. 4).