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Chapter 7

A Comparison Between Our System And Better Known Systems

802. At the end of this study, I want to make a few observations on the more common systems dealing with solutions to doubts of conscience. This will allow the reader to see the advantage of this system over preceding systems.
Some authors clearly condemn reflective principles indiscriminately, but we need not discuss writers who obviously do not understand their subject or the nature of reflective principles, although they unwittingly employ one of these principles (which they abhor) when they say (as they do) that ‘a person in doubt must follow the safer path'. In this case, they are actually laying down a reflective principle suitable for solving the quandary.

803. We can pass from considering those who deny the need for reflective principles, to considering whether the well-known reflective principles are true or false.
While there is no doubt that they are true, their weakness lies in their universality and indeterminateness, which is too extensive, and therefore very difficult to apply. They do not go sufficiently to the heart of the matter and consequently extend much further than the very small, indivisible point of truth which is at issue. However, we must admit that if the principles are proposed more universally than necessary, theologians do in fact restrict their sense and render them more particular with use. But this procedure itself becomes the source of insoluble equivocations and endless disputes, because the principles are not understood by all in the same way.

804. In order to understand better what we are saying and to show how too extensive a meaning renders the principles unsuited for their purpose, we will make some short observations on four of the most well-known:

1. ‘Amongst probable opinions the more probable is to be followed.’

This is obvious. To follow the less probable opinion would be contrary to reason and therefore unworthy of human beings. Pagan philosophers acknowledged this: ‘Where certainty is lacking in any matter, we must, all things considered, follow what is more probable and direct our life accordingly. The wise person must act in this way.’(529) This was the teaching of the Academicians, who used the more probable way as their rule because they despaired of directing themselves with certainty.

But if the rule is so clear, why is it contested so strongly? Because it is too extensive in meaning, and unsuitable for practice. Once applied, its meaning is indeed restricted, but its clear, obvious universal sense is lost when it is arbitrarily restricted or given a meaning it does not have. Consequently the proposition can easily be manipulated by two opponents, each laying claim to it. For example, among the theses upheld at Lavis we see: ‘Our probabilism upholding freedom is clearly more probable than the probabiliorism upholding the law.’(530) Hence probabilists quote the very principle of probabiliorism in their favour and by so doing declare it in contradiction with itself. This was inevitable!

All defenders of probabilism maintain that their system is true, and the contrary system necessarily false. Obviously they believe that when they think they are following the true opinion, they are a fortiori following the more probable opinion. If both sides rely on the same principle taken in its universal sense, a sophisticated reasoning can be put forward by either side to invalidate the opposite system. The probabiliorists argue against the probabilists as follows: the more probable opinion must be followed; but probabilists allow the less probable to be followed; therefore they err badly. The probabilists argue from the same principle but say the opposite of the probabiliorists. The more probable opinion must be followed; but probabilism is certainly the more probable of all the systems of morality; therefore probabilism must be followed, and opponents err.

These two arguments indicate that the principle ‘The more probable opinion must be followed', considered solely as an abstract, logical proposition, is entirely acceptable. But it does not favour one system more than the other, nor solve any problems. Every system, whether probabiliorism or probabilism, is proposed and defended by its authors as the only true system, and therefore necessarily much more probable than all the others. We must therefore find another principle that cannot be applied and defended by either side in its own favour.

805. To understand the matter more clearly let us see how the division between the two parties arises not so much from the rule itself as from arbitrary restriction in its use. The probabiliorists maintain that when the opinion upholding the law is more probable it must be followed. The probabilists say, on the contrary, that even the less probable opinion (provided it is probable) can be followed in favour of freedom. Either side maintains that its proposition is certain and therefore more probable than the other. Thus, both admit that the more probable opinion must be upheld when the principle of the more probable opinion is understood without any restriction. But the probabiliorists arbitrarily restrict the principle to the greater probability of the law. Whether the existence of the law is more probable or not is only a part of the general proposition ‘The more probable opinion must be upheld’; it is simply a reason that must be taken into account without excluding other reasons which can all be used for verifying whether the complete proposition is more probable. The complete proposition is either ‘We cannot act in favour of freedom when the law is more probable’ or its opposite ‘We can act'. Logically, the probabilists win against the probabiliorists who claim that the mere statement of their principle precludes the difficulties.

806. The inefficacy, due to excessive indeterminateness, of the principle of the more probable opinion, is proved in another way. Segneri makes the following very acute and true observation: ‘However, this shows all the more clearly the uselessness of the remedy (against laxism) we are discussing. If those who profess broad-minded teachings in their books said on each occasion that their teachings were less probable compared with others, I grant I could easily protect myself against these teachings, according to the rule I have established of not following less probable opinions. But unfortunately they often say their opinions are more probable. In this case the rule about not following less probable opinions is meaningless, and another rule is required to teach me what is broad or not. And so we start again to untangle the skein.’(531)

2. ‘In the case of doubt the safer way must be followed.’

807. This is also clear; no one can doubt its truth. Cicero saw and noted it in his De Officiis. His opinion, taken from earlier philosophers, runs: ‘They command well who forbid anything to be done when there is doubt whether the action is good or bad.’(532) But this does not solve the problem. There is nothing less safe than the system of tutiorism, condemned by the Church. Anyone wishing always to follow the safer way is certainly following an unsafe path. This contradiction arises because ‘the safer way’ is understood in a narrow sense and is not synonymous with ‘safe’ taken in its simple, universal sense. Settle the difference of meaning and the contradiction ceases to exist.

The probabilists therefore claim the safer way equally with the probabiliorists, and so we read again among the theses of Lavis: ‘The use of probabilism is very safe. The use of probabiliorism is very dangerous.’ The followers of probabilism seem to find in St. Alphonsus the reason why probabiliorism is less safe than simple probabilism: ‘Opponents insist that anyone who follows safer opinions acts more safely. I reply that it is certainly unlawful to relax the observance of divine laws more than is possible. But it is no less evil to make the divine yoke heavier than is necessary. Cabassuzio writes that excessive severity, by urging human beings to an excessively difficult task, closes the way to salvation’;(533) thus the safer way is not safe. Segneri maintains that ‘any truly probable opinion is always safe, otherwise it would be improbable and not probable. If the more probable opinion is safer (which is not always true), what evil is there in deciding to follow only safe opinion?'(534) Indeed, simply saying that an opinion is safe means much more than saying it is safer. The latter is relative safety; the former is absolute.

808. The word ‘safe’ therefore indicates of itself a way of acting in which there is no error. All theologians agree that we must act in this way, and this is why the various systems are proposed. But the general meaning of the word is neglected in the proposition: ‘In the case of doubt we must follow the safer way.’ Here, all things considered, it no longer means the safer way in practice, because we are judging the action safer by only one element of the assessment, that is, whether the action is more favourable to the law in question. This does not make our action safe; it offers only one circumstance among many to be evaluated for discovering the safe action.

This rule therefore is also insufficiently determined to help us as a clear guide in our hesitation.

3. ‘A doubtful law does not oblige.’

809. This rule, like the first two, is undeniable, but solves no problems because it is too indeterminate.
In order to determine it, we would have to know first what is meant by doubtful law. Tutiorists say that from the natural law ‘comes a certain law that we must always follow the safer opinion'. Probabiliorists say the same about ‘following the more probable opinion'. Probabilists strenuously reject both, but maintain the principle that a doubtful law does not oblige, and deny that the natural law is certain in the way arbitrarily established by its two opponents.

For the principle to be effective, therefore, other principles must be added. On its own, it solves nothing.

4. ‘Whoever is in possession has the stronger case.’

810. This is accepted by everybody, but within limits. As a juridical, not a moral rule, it cannot be denied. If we wish to use the same expression metaphorically in deciding cases of conscience, there is no difficulty, provided we understand it in its full universal sense. Without restriction of meaning, it adapts easily to all systems. Whichever system we follow, if we define the law as obliging, we simultaneously define it as in legitimate possession, and freedom without possession. Antoine rightly refutes this: ‘When we doubt whether a prohibitive law exists, we thereby doubt whether we can lawfully act, and hence whether we are in possession of our freedom. But this is to beg the question; the very thing we are questioning is offered as a principle.’(535) This rule, like the others, is not Ariadne's thread, and cannot lead us out of the labyrinth.

811. We conclude therefore that all the reflective principles proposed so far for solving the difficulties are right and true in themselves, but used alone they are too indeterminate and equivocal to help us with our problems. The reader will be able to judge whether the argument we presented earlier has succeeded in determining the principles so that not only is all misunderstanding removed about their use, but also each has had assigned to it its previously indeterminate object. We tried to do this by accurately distinguishing the objects into their naturally different classes.

812. A reflective principle is established as true only by this precise determination of the sphere of the objects it governs. A principle not established as completely true is a mixture of truth and falsehood, and cannot be certain. Certainty is something true which, accepted by the human mind, produces a reasonable persuasion of its truth. A reflective principle which is not certain is completely meaningless, because its sole use is to remove doubts and reach a definite answer. What is uncertain can only produce equally uncertain consequences. In this respect we must recognise that the opponents of reflective principles are right when, in order to eliminate them, they attack them as uncertain and therefore useless, like all other opinions.

813. No one can deny that this reasoning carries much weight against those who accept the principle of probabilism in all its extension and affirm that all truly probable opinions can be followed, and that probable opinions are those given by respected authorities. Such probabilists accept all this as certain, and willingly grant that if it were not completely certain, there would be no safe principle capable of saving us in practice from the hesitations of probability and doubt.

We can now see how the probabilists are justly accused of contradiction by the anti-probabilists.

Reflective principles proposed for solving doubtful cases of conscience must be certain. This is agreed by everybody and is self-evident. But the probabilists maintain that any opinion supported by many authoritative teachers is probable. Yet it is an irrefutable fact that many teachers of great authority deny reflective principles or at least their effectiveness. Therefore it is probable that the principles are false, and consequently not certain. Probabilism is thus torn apart by its own principles. This argument is definitive, and unanswerable.

814. The subtle error always lies in the arbitrary proposition that ‘everything must be decided on the authority of experts, and that if some of them deny the certainty of an opinion, the opinion is not certain.’ It seems to me that the moral system has to be restated in the way I have suggested, and reduced to the following propositions:

1. The most reflective of all reflective principles used by human beings for judging the lawfulness of their actions(536) must be certain.

2. This certainty must not be obtained solely by consulting the authority of experts, but by examining all the sources of human certainty available for judging the actions we are about to do.

3. More probable or less probable opinions are possible, but they are subject to this principle of highest reflection, which is the measure and judge of their moral force. Hence, their uncertainty does not make the final decision of our conscience less certain and less safe [App. no. 13].

815. Let us conclude. When we act uprightly, certainty is always present at both ends of the sequence of persuasions and opinions that occupy our spirit. It is present in the supreme principle, which is the highest principle directing our reflection at the moment of our judgment, and in the final judgment which constitutes conscience. Between the supreme principle and the particular judgment derived from it uncertain opinions of greater or lesser probability can exist without the least prejudice to the moral safety of our actions.

Notes

(529) In Phaedo.

(530) These theses were publicly defended on the 10th June 1760 in the Church of Lavis by Fr. Agostino Bonora, priest of the Canons Regular of S. Michele all'Adige. They were condemned by Rome on the 26th February 1761 [. . .].

(531) Lett. 1, n. 12.

(532) Bk. 1.

(533) Th. M., De Consc., Morale Systema.

(534) Lett. 1, n. 23.

(535) De Consc., c. 4, quaest. 3, resp. 2, ad ob. 1.

(536) Careful attention must be paid to the teaching we gave in AMS, 859–863: the action of a person (who is the subject of the imputability of actions), always stems from the highest of the reflections he makes when acting.