Introduction
1. An orderly exposition of moral teaching must begin by establishing a principle of morality from which all moral responsibilities can be derived. This has been our aim in the two works forming the first volume of Moral Philosophy.(1)
The principle of morality must then be applied to human beings whose responsibilities and obligations must be deduced from it. This cannot be done, however, without a prior study of human beings themselves and the elements constituting their intelligent, moral nature. In particular, the relationship between human nature, morality and the supreme principle of morality has to be clarified. We have described the human being as the subject of morality in Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science, the second volume in our series on moral philosophy.
After considering the principle of morality and the human being to whom it must be applied, we should now apply the principle to its subject in order to set out human moral responsibilities, precepts and laws in an orderly system of ethics. But this will be carried out, we hope, by others. We need to note, however, that such an application cannot be carried out safely, without danger of error, unless great care is taken to follow the rules of reasoning arising from rigorous logic. this is especially true in the many difficult cases we shall meet.
2. We have seen that, in addition to general logic, a logic of ethics is possible, just as every other discipline can have its special rules of logic.(2) These particular bodies of logic are the dictates of general logic as applied to individual disciplines. Through this application, the dictates become more appropriate for determined circumstances, and more manageable. They are now mediate propositions, as the classical authors called them, and as such serve to guide our reasoning more closely in particular disciplines.
The principles of general logic, which does not concern itself with individual classes of things, cannot of themselves take cognisance of actual natures; special logic, on the other hand, takes from actual natures the data for determining the general principle.
An architect, for example, will not roof many buildings if he uses as his sole principle: 'The means must be proportioned to the end.' Nevertheless, when he has worked out the different special rules needed for roofing in arctic or equatorial regions, he will find that his work consists in determining this principle according to circumstances, and that his special rules, for example about the pitch of the roofs in regions with heavy snowfall, depend upon this principle for their truth and force.
In the same way, special rules that togethe form the logic of ethics depend upon the application of the general rules of thought to moral matters. The moralist uses these rules when, through his application of the supreme principle of morals to human beings, he deduces their moral precepts and responsibilities.
Our present work will examine some of the rules proper to the logic of ethics, which we cannot consider here in all its extension. We must begin, therefore, by setting out the necessary limits to our study.
3. By applying the supreme law or moral principle to human beings, it is possible to deduce more or less general laws according to the different ways of considering human nature. For example, if I apply the supreme principle to human beings considered solely from the point of view of their human nature, without considering any relationship or determination in this nature, I will conclude rather generally that 'I must respect this intelligent nature'. If however I take into consideration not only human nature as common to all individuals in the species, but also the relationships between parents and their children, my conclusions will be concerned with the less general laws expressing the responsibilities between parents and children. I may then go on to think of more restricted relationships, such as those between sick parents and their children and, as a result, consider the responsibilities now owed by the children, and so on. This will become clear when we have occasion to speak about it later in this work.
Finally, if I am asked what are the most particular laws and moral precepts that can be deduced from the supreme principle, I would have to say that they regard the individual actions which a given person is about to carry out. These most particular laws would tell us how this person is obliged to act here and now. But in every case, whether the laws, precepts and obligations deduced from the supreme principle and applied to human beings be general, special or particular, it is always necessary for this deduction to be directed according to the rules provided by good logic. It is clear, therefore, that the logic of ethics extends to govern and direct all the deductions, general and particular, made from the principle of morality.
Our study cannot embrace the total extent of the logic of ethics. We intend to set out the logical rules restricted to directing the deduction of the most determined of all particular obligations. Our work is concerned with the final step in the application of the supreme principle to human beings and their actions, that is, with the deduced precept which has as its object an individual action accompanied by all its circumstances and subjective relationships.
Thus, not all individual actions are taken into consideration in this book. We shall deal only with those actions which are a person's own. We shall restrict our investigation to the logical rules according to which a person has to make a judgment about the goodness or malice of his own actions, and about the freedom or obligation he has to carry them out or omit them if he wishes to avoid uncertainty and error in a matter of such importance.
But when a person has judged that an action of his conforms or not to the law, he necessarily becomes conscious of the moral nature of what he is doing. Because of this, the rules we intend to examine in this book are rightly called rules of conscience.
4. The study of conscience is of its nature philosphical. It is in fact a part of the special logic of ethics. Nevertheless it has been carried out entirely bt Christian theologians without much assistance from philosophers. It may seem strange that philosophers have consistently neglected the study of the rules directing human moral conscience. But because abstractions and generalities are their preoccupation, it is not easy to bring philosophers down to earth. Christian theology, on the other hand, is exclusively concerned with the moral reform of humanity. It came into being in order effectively to guide the human race to virtue; it did not originate for the sake of offering pronouncements in pompous language or for showing off its logical capacities.
Christian theology has to weigh the very smallest human action on the scales of perfect justice, and offer human beings rules for doing good in every circumstance and condition in which they may find themselves spiritually engaged. The responsibility incumbent on Christian theologians is more than human; they have to look to God, the divine Judge, and obtain from him the moral decisions and rulings to be taught to human beings. God is not like a human judge, nor does he speak simply for the sake of speaking; he pronounces his verdict on the real actions of all people according to the fullness of truth. Rulers and citizens, the learned and the unlearned, have all alike to render him an account according to the principles which have guided their lives. For this reason, Christian law has compelled everyone to take seriously, not academically or theoretically, the sure, certain rules indicating the moral life obligatory on every human being. The learned and ignorant, the intelligent and non-intelligent, all need the practical rules isolating and dividing the moral element from other circumstances in such a way that it stands independent of every exterior accident and of every non-moral condition of mind and soul in the person who acts.
Only in this way can we all avoid condemnation by the universal Judge.
Christian teachers, who are in everyone's debt because they are sent to attract all to what is good and upright, had necessarily to investigate the norms according to which all would be judged. In other words, they had to investigate the obligatory force of the law according to individual consciences, and give each conscience its own rules. As a result, teaching about conscience, although it belongs per se to philosophy, has a divine origin, divine content and a divine aim. Its purpose, which has consistently escaped the attention of philosophers, is to render all human beings morally good. And this is God's purpose.
The Saviour, Redeemer and Master of the world sent scribes to co-operate in his work by teaching us to direct our lives according to truth and justice. Their doctrine was not intended simply to satisfy our curiosity. These scribes have provided modern times with studies about rules. Consequently, there is a great deal of learning which, although philosophical of its nature and within the possibilities of natural reason, has to be hailed justly as a benefit of revelation, not because revelation has expressly declared it, but because revelation strengthened by grace has stimulated the human heart to undertake studies that would otherwise have been totally neglected. Later in this work we shall explain why Christian theologians themselves came only very late to study ex professo the rules of moral science.
5. For the moment, I need only note that the discussion on conscience has continually increased in importance since it was first proposed publicly by certain theologians in the 16th century. Today the study of conscience is generally accepted as the principal and most difficult part of the whole of moral science.
It is the principal part because the right understanding and use of all ethical laws and teaching depends upon the rules of conscience. This is true for simple Christians who need these rules in order to walk through life securely according to moral goodness, and for confessors and spiritual directors who have to make judgments about the good and evil of others' actions and suggest to souls the paths of goodness along which they can safely venture without adding to the difficulties they may find there.
6. Conscience is also the most difficult part of moral science. This can be seen by glancing at the innumerable works written on the subject in the last three centuries, or by noting the heated controversies still dividing theological schools on the matter. The difficulties experienced by those wishing to give a proven, coherent and universal solution to the problem of conscience is a further indication of the intricate labyrinth presented by the question.
7. For myself, my own efforts at understanding the nature and state of this question have convinced me that the greatest obstacle to a clear, satisfying solution lies in the lack of suitable language for establishing unequivocally and exactly ideas that will remain stable throughout the discussion. We need ideas that will compel, as it were, the listener's mind to think the very concept the speaker thinks and wishes to express. Too 0 ten, adversaries are talking about different things while using the same words, and continue their discussion without ever being able to agree or even understand one another. The major work on this problem, as on many others, has been done, I think, when the nature of the question has been clearly and manifestly established.
8. Consequently, I am entering the field with the intention of endeavouring above all to provide a precise way of speaking, proper to the argument. I trust that the wise will be indulgent to me, if 1 stray from the mark, especially in view of the intricate difficulties of the subject, and that followers of any particular school of thought will not hold it against me if I disagree in part with what they hold. My state of life, my way of conducting myself and my manner of writing are completely alien to controversy with any school. My longing is for immortal truth which 1 am happy either to teach others in so far as 1 know it or to learn from others when they teach me. If anyone is displeased by the ardour with which truth draws me to write, I now offer that person my hand as friend and comrade; and 1 know I shall feel pain if anyone tries to disturb with even a touch of agitation the peaceful atmosphere in which love and truth offer only warmth and light.
Notes
(1) The two books are entitled Principles of Ethics [PE, Leominster 1988, ISBN 0-85244-148-7], and Storia comparativa e critica de' sistemi intorno al principio della morale [Intra 1867].
(2) See the Preface to the Works of Moral Philosophy [PE, 12 ss.].
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