Appendix:

On the choice of bishops by clergy and people.

Three letters of Antonio Rosmini Serbati, priest,
to Canon Giuseppe Gatti.

Letter 3
Rome, November 1st. 1848

Dear Canon,

In my last letter to you I confined myself to answering your difficulty about possible opposition to the restoration of ancient liberties in episcopal elections on the part of rulers who might want to cling to the concessions granted them by the Church. I made no promise about answering the second difficulty which considered disadvantages arising from the desire to activate the precious right of clergy and people in the catholic Church to choose their pastors. I did not promise to answer because I doubted whether it was proper for me to do so. I realised that it was not my business to indicate the least disadvantageous way (there are always disadvantages in human affairs) of restoring and up-dating ancient discipline. There are various modes of procedure for ensuring the active presence of clergy and people in episcopal elections, and indicating the most suitable depends upon the circumstances of different localities. Even in early times, when the canonical form of elections by clergy and people was in force, there were different ways of arranging the elections in practice, although in substance nothing changed.

Moreover, I still hope that the bishops, aware of the circumstances of our time, the great needs of the Church, and the immense possibilities rising from the demand for freedom, will come together in the spirit of the Lord after so many years of disunion and isolation to deal with matters which interest the government of their churches. Today more than ever the Church needs collective wisdom, and unity in spirit and practice: she has to feel the greatness of the Lord's promise that he would be present where two or three are gathered in his name. My hopes grow as I see the bishops of Germany moved by the spirit of the Lord to come together and discuss important religious matters vital to the nation and the salvation of the people. The assembly of Wurzemburg will be imitated by others, and brotherly union will increase among bishops of provinces and nations.

This was the spirit which gave such a wonderfully strong and uniform impulse in the early Church to the sanctification of the flock as it made its pilgrim way through the world and fought as one man in the army of the Lord. I am speaking of catholic bishops, that is, of bishops acting in full communion with and due submission to the pope as first amongst them, upon whom the entire episcopate depends for unity, order and existence. Without a first, there is no second, although being first does not mean existing alone.

The fact is that the plenitude of power founded in the apostolic see lacks no right required to regulate and order the universal Church. Nevertheless, the directives emanating from the supreme head of the Church would be useless without the effective obedience of the other bishops, presiding over the individual churches, whose proposals, advice and wishes when put forward unanimously enable the apostolic see to depend increasingly upon their co-operation and zeal for the Church, and to recognise more clearly what is advantageous for ecclesial discipline. Omnia mihi licent, sed non omnia expediunt: prescribing what the majority of bishops do not want to accept, or find almost repugnant, is neither helpful nor opportune, and hardly in keeping with the requirements of charity and prudence. Reforms, and their appropriate effects upon discipline and order, depend in the first place upon the apostolic see, and then on the help and co-operation given to the apostolic see by the bishops.

As I said, this made me doubt whether it would be suitable for me to express my opinion about the best way of arranging episcopal elections, if the ancient discipline of election by clergy and people were to be restored to the Church. But I reflected that expressing a private opinion is not unlawful, nor harmful to the Church. In fact the Church does not normally decide on great reforms until they have been insisted upon for some time, and universally desired. Their usefulness and necessity has first to be discussed before the Church can make a decision. This is why the Church, acting in accord with inspired wisdom, asks for the opinion of private theologians, even in general councils. Let me finish what I was saying, therefore, and try to answer your second question in some way. In matters of such importance for the good of the Church, permit me to say with Job's friend: conceptum sermonem tenere quis poterit? ["Who can withold the word he has formed within?"]

First of all, the nomination and choice of bishops is so undoubtedly important that those taking part in it, whoever they are, can never be too careful nor too concerned in ensuring that it is done as well as possible. The Council of Trent insists and trusts that "the most worthy be chosen. Their whole life from youth to maturity should be a witness to ecclesiastical bearing and discipline according to the qualifications required by the fathers of old" (1). All those having an active part in the election undertake an immense responsibility before God and man because there is no doubt whatsoever that the well-being of human society, of the Church, the people and the lower clergy go hand-in-hand with the quality of the bishops.

It is certain that private judgment, greatly influenced by particular longings and inclinations, is often deceived. Favours and recommendations frequently determine decisions unconsciously. In any case, a person acting alone cannot normally take into account all that has to be considered. On the other hand, a unanimous judgment is not so easily deceived nor affected by prejudice because the truth becomes clear and acceptable as individual leanings cancel one another out, and particular lights and insights gradually grow to completion in unity. As pope Siricius (2) and pope Innocent I (3) affirm: "A judgment confirmed by the comments of many people is complete."

Moreover, when everyone can state his opinion and the majority prevail, any suspicion of favouritism is eliminated, and all are assured that everything has been done to discover the truth. The heightened possibility of finding the truth more easily when many agree, and its clearer recognition and acceptance by all, is a twofold reason prevailing in the ancient discipline governing the choice of bishops. Tertullian writes: "Our chief men and elders hold their positions on the witness of others; they have not bought their honours" (4). Lampridius tells us that the emperor Alexander Severus, although a pagan, was greatly surprised to see how christians succeeded in choosing excellent pastors by universl suffrage, and wanted to imitate their system in the choice of provincial governors. He decided to present written lists of those he intended to promote to this position, and urged the people to make known, with proofs, any wrong-doing they may have noticed in the candidates (5). And I would like to note here how the beneficial influence of the Church on civil government began even under the pagan emperors as they were induced to abandon spontaneously the trappings of despotism.

It will be helpful if we indicate the substance of the question before we tackle it in depth. Removing what is accidental and accessory will greatly simplify the matter. Substantially, the questions consist in two problems: that the best possible persons be chosen as pastors of the Church; and that they be recognised as the best by the flock entrusting to them the care of their souls. Optimum suitability and agreement among the flock about such suitability are the two conditions which, when fulfilled, ensure the best possible choice. The way of achieving these two essential conditions is irrelevant, provided they are achieved. Different times and social conditions indicate some metods of obtaining these conditions as preferable to others, and this explains why the Church's discipline has varied the mode of election in different periods.

But the best and most effective way is undoubtedly that established by Leo the Great: "The person governing all should be chosen by all" (6), although this could not always be adopted because of the accidental disadvantages associated with it through ignorance and barbarism in the people, priestly ambition, and the ease with which mobs were aroused. Qualifications had to be introduced which sacrificed the best mode of election in order to avoid greater evils. Nevertheless, it was used almost unchanged for eight centuries in the eastern church (7). In the western church (8) it was abandoned only after eleven centuries, and then gradually and as little as possible until the elections fell almost entirely into the hands of absolute monarchs eager to reign in the temple which had placed a limit to their authority and proved the constant, unconquerable obstacle to absolutism or, as we should call it, despotism.

At present the question is reduced to understanding whether social conditions have changed for human society since all the episcopal nominations of a nation were abandoned to the sovereign power of a single ruler, on condition of confirmation by the apostolic see. Can the best mode of episcopal elections which, as St. Cyprian writes, "comes down from divine authority" (9) and "is to be observed and retained zealously on the basis of divine and apostolic tradition" (10), be restored partially or completely, or is hope for its revival to be entirely abandoned? The Council of Trent, in speaking of elections, declared that "nothing was to be changed granted the present conditions" (11), but these words make it clear that changes are possible and perhaps obligatory when circumstances differ.

What we have to keep in mind is that the old and best way of choosing bishops, in accordance with divine and apostolic tradition, ceased only with the onslaught of barbarism. As Lupus, abbot of Ferrara, pointed out, the privilege granted by pope Zaccharias to Pepin was in reality forced from him acerbitate temporis (12) ["in bitter times"] as the social structure and organisms dependent upon the Roman empire fell apart and collapsed under the unceasing waves of invasion from the north. But even in this tremendous social upheaval the Church clung to its tradition as long as possible, and frequently tried to restore the ancient discipline which disorder and ignorance had overthrown.

In the light of these facts does it not seem wholly conformable to the spirit and desire of the Church to maintain that the time is now ripe for the restoration of ancient custom? Barbarism has ceased, society has been reorganised, civilisation has returned and progressed; if the cause is no longer operative, why should the effect be prolonged? The rule can be re-applied when the exception has been set aside. And times have certainly changed the world and social order since the Council of Trent.

Three principal causes necessitated the derogation of the old form of episcopal elections by clergy and people: popular ignorance which made the people indifferent to the choice of bishop (13); riots and disorders marring the election of bishops by the people; and pressures exerted by the barbarian kings who gradually moved towards absolutism and despotism. These monarchs tolerated no rein on their authority and continually disputed the rights of the Church. This in turn provided a new reason for popular indifference about the election of pastors: the people's servile condition accustomed them to carry out the orders of their masters.

Ignorance, the first of the three causes, has vanished; culture is well-nigh universal. The same applies to the third cause; absolutism is daily disappearing in Europe before the advance of constitutional government, in which the people take part. The second cause, the fear of party factions, dissensions and scandals in the episcopal elections, remains a real danger. If elections are left to the people, it is to be feared that bad priests, glad to be courtiers and lick-spittles of absolute monarchs as long as they can distribute episcopal sees, will turn their partisan flattery on the people when the latter's opinion influences ecclesiastical promotion. At this point, our question is reduced to seeing whether it is possible to re-establish the substantial mode of ancient choice without danger from this very serious disadvantage.

The difficulty appears greater than it is as long as the parts played respectively by people and clergy in the choice of bishops are not clearly defined according to the spirit of the Church. According to this spirit, the people never take on the final role of arbiters; the people never decide absolutely who is to be their pastor. Pope Celestine affirmed this in writing to the bishops of Puglia and Calabria: "The people are to be led, not followed. Nor should we consent to whatever is unlawful, but rather warn them, in their ignorance of what is unlawful" (14). Hincmar, the great archbishop of Rheims, unambiguously instructed the people and clergy of Beauvais that their choice of bishop was to be submitted to him as metropolitan for examination and confirmation: "I want you to realise beforehand that you will not obtain as bishop anyone you knowingly send to me as canonically irregular. Moreover, you will be punished for your disregard of the canons in such an unlawful election. If your unlawful choice of bishop is refused by us and our suffragan bishops, we shall choose someone in accordance with the canons of Laodicea who will not bow to your wayward desires" [cf. PL 126, 260].

But if the people are not to have a definitive word in the choice of their pastors, what are their duties and natural rights in the great work? Altogether, there are three basic responsibilities, all interconnected.

1. To bear witness to the virtue and suitability of the pastor they are to receive. Their testimony should have great weight with the person who has to choose the pastor. Consequently, the people also have the right to make known defects "so that in the people's presence good and evil may be discerned," as St. Cyprian says (15).

2. To express their desire and request for the pastor whose virtues they witness to. Hence the bishops of Alexandria, in suypporting the election of St. Athanasius against the calumnies of the arians, maintained that he became bishop at Alexander's death when "the entire crowd, together with the whole assembly of the catholic church, united as one body and soul, cried out and shouted for Athanasius as bishop of the church. They publicly begged this of Christ, and beseeched us for it for many days and nights, neither leaving the church nor allowing us to leave it. We ourselves, this city, and the whole of the province are witnesses of the fact" (16).

3. To refuse a bishop who has been chosen, provided the refusal is the work of the majority or the more reliable part of those belonging to the diocese. St. Celestine prescribes that "no bishop shall be given to people unwilling to receive him" (17). This is a kind of veto recognised by the Church as a right belonging to christian people.

The Church is guided by supernatural wisdom in leaving these responsibilities to the people when they choose their pastors. As I have said, and I would like to repeat, such an important choice is subject to deception if it is left in the hands of a single person or small group. Negligence in cases like this is easily possible when public opinion cannot be roused, or can be overcome without difficulty. On the other hand, the principal cause of good effects in pastoral government is the love, esteem and trust that the faithful have for the pastor who is to guide them to eternal life.

Popes St. Celestine (18) and Leo (19) take special note of this reason when they order bishops to be chosen from the clergy of the diocese over which they are to rule. This very ancient decision of the Church was approved by the kings of France in their Capitularies: "Bishops should be chosen by clergy and people from their own diocese according to the decrees of the canons" (20). But when the people no longer had a voice in the elections, this outstanding arrangement was frequently neglected. It cannot be neglected if the election depends upon the testimony and choice of the christian people because they can only choose from amongst the priests of their own diocese whom they "have known in their daily lives, and seen in action" (21), or from eminent persons famous in the Church for virtue, learning and prudence, whose merits are universally recognised. In this last case, the exception does not exclude the rule because it maintains its spirit.

It will help here if we first determine the composition of the people or christian populace called by the spirit and canons of the Church to exercise in the choice of bishops the three responsibilities previously mentioned. Unbelievers are certainly excluded; bishops are sent to evangelise them. In this case, the people are incapable of giving an opinion, and missionaries are sent by the Church according to the model given by Christ to the apostles commissioned to convert pagan nations to the gospel. St. Athanasius, for example, ordained Frumentius bishop for the Indians, and popes often commissioned men in the same way.

Heretics and schismatics are also excluded from the christian people who give their witness at episcopal elections. The impious and indifferent play no part because of their disinterest in the choice of a good pastor. Persons guided in their preference by worldly aims or interests cast a vote null and void of its nature. The damage they could cause is to be rectified by the clergy who, as judges at the election (as we have hinted above), can exclude such votes. The christian people or populace, therefore, are to be understood as the good, more enlightened members of a diocese. Only their vote will have any weight, and it is the clergy's duty to decide wisely who they are. In his first letter to the Corinthians, St. Clement, bishop of Rome and immediate disciple of the apostles, states expressly "he was glad, as the whole Church could witness" that the apostles had ordered the most suitable and illustrious men in the Church to be appointed bishops after their death. Later, when the ancient discipline was modified and the choice of bishops was entrusted to the cathedral chapters alone, church law indicated that the person elected should be the one chosen "unanimously or by the larger and more reliable part of the chapter" (22).

All these factors intimately persuade me (although it is only a private opinion, of course, and unauthoritative) that it is possible and necessary in the modern circumstances of catholic nations to restore fully the great norm of St.Leo the Great: "The person governing all should be chosen by all." The choice of bishops, therefore, should depend upon:

How can the christian populace take part in the elections without the risk of the disorders and riots detested by the Church and condemned by several councils, especially by canon 13 of the Council of Laodicea (23)?

I think this depends upon several factors, one of which I mention here. A register could be opened by each parish priest of the diocese where the faithful who so desired could give their opinion about the choice of bishop, indicate the canonical irregularities incurred by those who might be chosen, and nominate the priest they think most worthy to be future pastor of the diocese.

The people would have to be convinced of the importance of choosing the best possible pastor. This could be done by public prayers and appropriate instruction in sermons, especially about the need to vote with a right intention. I would also like the parish priest to invite twelve of the older parishioners to discuss the matter with him when the registers have been closed (they could perhaps be left open to the people for eight days). Those invited should have made their Easter communion and be available for the meeting (which would also encourage respect for old age, not a bad thing nowadays). The priests of the parish should also be present at the discussion. The registers should be scrutinised and the result sent, with the minutes of the discussion, to the rural vicar or the dean. In this way the people would have ample opportunity for expressing their wishes by witnessing to the best persons available, without the dangers of mob rule and factions.

Let us examine the part to be played by the diocesan clergy. I think it would be advantageous and helpful if the diocesan clergy were to meet in the episcipal city or cathedral where canons of the cathedral, rectors and spiritual directors of seminaries, lecturers in letters, philosophy and theology (who should not be accorded more authority or importance than usual) and rural vicars or deans could be designated as electors. This assembly would be sufficient to indicate clearly the preferences of the diocesan clergy.

Its first duty would be to examine carefully the votes of the people presented by the rural vicars. After the votes have been counted and the names of those chosen made known, the assembly should first decide if it agrees with the most popular choice. If this is impossible, because of canonical irregularities or other causes, it should examine the remaining names and try to choose one of them. If this is impossible, another person should be chosen by majority vote and the causes prompting refusal of the people's nominations and substitution of their own nominee should be made known. The dean of the chapter, the vicar capitular or a canon chosen by the assembly should sign the proceedings which should always contain the name of the people's first choice, and that of the assembly of the diocesan clergy. The proceedings are to be forwarded to the metropolitan.

The provincial bishops should meet as arbiters with the metropolitan on the day appointed and after examining the account of the election confirm the people's nomination or that of the diocesan clergy. If neither of these persons possesses the canonical qualifications, or the bishops decide to choose an obviously more worthy priest, the result of this decision should be submitted to the pope as supreme judge for his confirmation and final decision. If the provincial bishops, diocesan clergy and people agree about the choice, this person should be presented to the pope. If two persons are nominated by the three groups of electors, both should be proposed. Finally, if there are separate nominations from people, clergy and bishops, all three should be submitted to the pope's decision.

Please don't say that this way of choosing a bishop is long and complicated. It has a definite order, and can be arranged quickly if those in charge carry it out properly. And even if it were to take time, this would be compensated by the guarantees provided for good episcopal elections in an atmosphere of universal satisfaction: "[this holy synod] believes that their sublime office can never be sufficiently well provided for... " (24).

One thing needs to be noted carefully. There should be no change at all in the mode of election prescribed for the papacy. It is the wise, orderly outcome of long and mature experience, where electors, already sufficiently numerous, are always eminent, illustrious men in the Church of God, familiar with the needs of the universal Church whose interests they have to consider. The Council of Trent insisted emphatically that they should be chosen for their excellence from christian nations at large: "the supreme pontiff should choose suitable persons from all christian nations in so far as this can be done conveniently. It is highly necessary that the Roman pontiff, who by his office has care of the whole Church, should exercise his concern by calling to his side educated and cultured men as cardinals" (25).

The election of a pope is altogether exceptional in so far as it is not a question of choosing only a bishop of Rome, whose clergy is represented by the cardinals, but also of electing the head of the universal Church. The condition of the Church as a whole is inevitably best known to the sacred college which, as the pope's senate, assists him in governing it. No change or new law, therefore, is needed in the pope's election. The best choice of supreme head of the Church is fully guaranteed and assured provided the laws regulating it, confirmed by experience, are put into practice together with the prescriptions of the Council of Trent.

It may be objected that there is no mention of the intervention of civil authority in the description of what appears as the most advantageous way of choosing bishops. Should civil authority have no weight in the choice of bishops?

First, let us distinguish civil power, which can be expressed in various forms, from the person of the king. The latter is personally only one of the faithful and as such must be judged by God and the Church according to his merits or demerits. Riches and power give him no advantages before the law of God or before spiritual power. Of himself, and abstracting from privileges, he is a member of the faithful in the diocese where he resides and can register his vote, together with his reservations and recommendations, in the same way as others. The person whose responsibility it is will consider and weigh it freely.

If civil authority or power wishes to assist the Church, it must do so when the Church desires and in the way she desires, not arbitrarily. If the Church asks for the intervention of civil power in order to uphold legitimate episcopal elections already carried out, civil authority will act well by supporting the execution of what the Church has decided. In times when episcopal elections were disturbed by mob violence, the Church sometimes asked the civil authorities to maintain order, and prevent factions from impeding the chosen bishop in taking possession of his see. On the other hand, civil authorities often took advantage of these requests by the Church to intervene in the elections themselves beyond the bounds permitted by the canons and desired by the Church. This was a deplorable, baneful abuse of force (26).

You may insist that civil power has great interests at stake in the election of bishops whose moral influence will not upset public affairs, and consequently would seem to have good reason for claiming some part in such elections.
I do not deny this, but the matter has to be considered from all points of view in order to arrive at a balanced conclusion.

In modern forms of government all citizens are free to express their opinion in administrative and political affairs, and bishops as persons enjoy the same freedom as others. It is not a defect in a bishop if he disapproves injustice and abuses in public administration, or refuses to be silent about them. On the contrary, bishops as teachers of nations should hold the balance of justice, and prudently and lawfully protect the oppressed against the abuses of public authority. They should love great and small alike, rulers and subjects, governors and governed. It is clear that if the government were able to exclude the best and sincerest priests from the episcopate, or choose those whom it thought loyal and blindly indifferent to public ills, men of perfect justice would never occupy positions as bishops. There would be no bishops possessing public confidence and capable of safeguarding governments from popular excesses, nor bishops capable of protecting the people from arbitrary government. Neither side would hear the truth from bishops, nor find in them mediators and teachers of concord and peace.

By all means let the civil government have an influential part in episcopal elections in order to exclude those who could truly damage public order. But this must not be an arbitrary faculty destined to exclude anyone it happens to object to - much less to choose its favourites. It should not be a faculty exercised secretly, nor an absolute or arbitrary power, but one obliged to declare its reasons for excluding certain persons. The causes for exclusion should be formulated beforehand; accusations should be proved factually; arbitrary acts damaging individual citizens in the new forms of government must be completely rejected.

If the civil power is to exercise its right as well as possible, I would suggest that the metropolitan notify the civil government of the names of those chosen when he communicates them to Rome. Defects or political crimes imputed by the civil authority to those persons could be submitted by way of protest to the pope, the supreme tribunal of the Church, within a fixed time, and the pope could decide whether the political accusations were well founded (27). The accusation would then be accepted or rejected, but its acceptance would depend upon positive facts presented by the government proving that the person nominated had overstepped the limits of freedom, by manifesting opinions subversive of public order or had been guilty of some political misdoing.

Outside these cases, government representations would have no weight, especially in view of the form of elections proposed here which would make the choice of a dishonest or dishonourable person almost impossible. After all, he will have been considered the best person for the episcopate by decision of the people and the bishops. In this way, all will have their due: the Church will regain her freedom, and governments their legitimate influence; reasonable and christian concord will be established between civil government and church authority.

My dear Canon, you have herewith my opinion about the way in which episcopal elections would best be carried out. I hope it has answered your question.

Notes

(1) Sess. 6, De Reform., c. 1.

(2) Ep. 4 [PL 13, 1157, ep. 5].

(3) Ep. ad Victricium Rathomagensem Episcopum [PL 20, 471].

(4) Apolog. 39 [PL 1, 532].

(5) Vita Alexandri Severi, c. 45.

(6) Ep. 10, ad Episcopos Viennenses [PL 54, 634].

(7) The seventh and eight synods deprived the people of their right to a place in the election of bishops.

(8) Generally speaking, choice of bishop by clergy and people was continued after the 8th ecumenical council, especially in the west. Gregory VII fought desperately to maintain the ancient custom, as his letters show, and it was retained in great part even in the following century. Cf. St. Bernard, Ep. 12, 17 [PL, 182, 116-117].

(9) Epist. 58 [PL 3, 1025-1027].

(10) Ibid.

(11) Sess. 24, De Reform. c. 1.

(12) Epist. 81 [PL 119, 546-547].

(13) Domenico Cavallerio in his Commentaria de Iure Canonico [Naples 1786] notes how the people had become completely indifferent to the choice of their pastors towards the end of the 12th century: variis et frequentibus regum ad episcopos constituendos nominationibus suffragia populi ferme ceciderant, et quo tempore sub Callisto II (ann. 1120-1125) canonicae electiones restitutae sunt, populi non multum videntur fuisse suffragiorum appetentes (p. 1, c. 22, par. 13)

(14) Can. 2, d. 62 [PL 50, 437].

(15) Epis. 68. [PL 3, 1025-1027].

(16) Vita S. Athanasii in nova edit. eius operum [PG 15, 628-629].

(17) Epis. 2, c. 5 [PL 50, 434].

(18) Epis. 2, ad epis. narbonens. [PL 50, 434].

(19) Epis. 12 ad Anast. [PL 3, 1027].

(20) Lib. 1, Capitular., c. 85 [PL 97, 521, c. 78]. The emperor Honorarius had also forbidden: ne clerici ex aliena possessione vel vico, sed ex eo, ubi Ecclesiam esse constiterit, ordinentur (lib. 33. C. Th. de Episcopo).

(21) St. Cyprian, Epis. 88 [PL 3, 1027].

(22) Cap. Quia proter. c. 57. Cavallerio writes in his Commentaria de Iure Canonico (p. 1, c. 22, 14): Dignitates ecclesiarum conferendae sunt dignioribus, et hinc potius ponderanda quae numeranda suffragia. Sed ne in rixas et turbas suffragiorum ponderatione evaderent electiones, moribus receptum est, ut maior pars exprimat totius corporis consensum. cf. Cabassut, Theor. et Prax. Iur. Canon, lib. 2, c. 24 [Lyons 1660].

(23) Peter de Marca (De C.S. et I, lib. 8, c. 6. n. 2) [De Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii Paris 1641] is wrong when he states that this canon excludes from election the lowest class of the people. Oxlous, which he translates as vilem plebeculam means "riots and seditions", as others have pointed out. Cf. Thomassin, op. cit., p. 2, lib. 2, c. 2.

(24) Sess. 24, De Reform. c. 1.

(25) ibid.

(26) Pope Simplicius seems to have warned Basil, pretorian prefect of Odoacre, to stand by during the elections of bishops in order to suppress riots and seditions with force. Basil then seems to have claimed that elections could not take place without him. Cresconius, bishop of Tivoli, complained about an edict of Basil in the Roman synod of 502: Hoc perpendat sancta synodus, si praetermissis personis religiosis, quibus maxime cura est de tanto pontifice, electionem laici in suam redigerint potestatem: quod contra canones manifestum est [SC 5, 473]. Theodoric, king of the Goths, nominated Felix III as pope in order to bring to an end two months of dissension and fighting at the death of the bishop of Rome. Felix was the most qualified amongst the Roman clergy, and the senate and people spontaneously accepted him, as king Atalaricus' letters make clear (cf. Cassiodorus, lib. 8, ep. 15).

For the same reason, John IX laid down in the Roman synod of 898 that the new pope should be consecrated, not elected, in the presence of the civil magistrates and the public forces of order: Quia sancta romana ecclesia plurimas patitur violentias, pontifice obeunte: quae ob hoc inferuntur, quia absque imperatoris notitia et suorum legatorum praesentia fit CONSECRATIO: nec canonico ritu et consuetudine ab imperatore directi intersunt nuntii, qui violentian et scandala in eius consecratione non permitterent fieri... [PL, 69, 748].

The councils themselves frequently asked wise rulers, devoted to the Church. to choose bishops in order to avoid serious disturbances. However, rulers wanted this exception to be a normal right which they could exercise as they wished. Instead of helping the Church when disorders and violence forced her to turn to them for assistance in suppressing the disturbances, they claimed as of right the continual power to choose bishops, even though they themselves might have fallen into heresy. This explains the Church's unending complaints and repeated efforts to reclaim from rulers the freedom to choose her pastors. Ubi ille canon, ut ex palatio mittatur is, qui episcopus futurus est? aut quod genus canonis quo licitum est militibus Ecclesiam invadere et episcopos constitutere? (Epis. ad solitariam...) [PG 15, 1223].

(27) Cavallerio writes [op. cit., 1. 23, par. 2] of the royal assent required under the Franks before consecration: Consensus autem regius, electioni accedens, non nuda erat probatio, sed potius ex causis facta confirmatio, licebatque ideo regibus factam electionem expendere et ex causis reiicere. He adds shortly afterwards: Causae autem, quibus licebat regibus electos excludere, erant illa ipsae, quae electiones minus legitimas faciebant, petebanturque vel ex electionum vel personarum vitiis. This is unexceptional, but he then continues: si electus minus aptus esset servitio regis. This sprang from the feudal system, but could not be required in modern times when bishops are not, and cannot be, servants of kings or civil powers.