Appendix 8. - (177)
[Nominalism]
What a sterile theory nominalism is for mankind! It maintains that all metaphysical and ethical sciences based upon universal principles are essentially vain. But what branch of knowledge does not require universal principles? Every form of knowledge is impossible in nominalism; every noble enterprise, every good in society is declared absurd and fanciful by this system. The consequences of certain doctrines are so far-reaching that, considered in themselves, they seem to be purely intellectual games reserved for a few speculative thinkers whose clever insights make them lose touch with the real world! But this is not the case. Nobody can lose touch with the real world as far as the effects of his thinking are concerned. The error inserted into a seemingly abstract and purely speculative theory, gradually penetrates practical issues, where it develops and produces its consequences. It becomes involved in the human affairs of human beings, in the structure of society. Greatly to our surprise, it corrupts human life, disrupts the order of society and spreads its harmful effects everywhere. It will spread from the ethereal spirit of the most rapt metaphysicians to the labours of peasants and the toil of artisans, leaving its traces, its damage and corruption everywhere.
Present-day nominalism is derived from materialism. Generally speaking, nominalists have always been materialists. Hobbes thrust nominalism forward vigorously. After Hobbes, those who denied the existence of abstract ideas most zealously were La Mettrie (L'homme machine), Helvetius (L'Homme, vol. 1, section 2, c. 5), the author of the Sistema della natura, (c. 10) and others of a similar tendency. Locke, on the other hand, located the difference between human beings and beasts in the human faculty of abstraction (bk. 2, c. 11, par. 10).
Locke accepted abstractions and universal ideas for the same reason that materialists denied them, that is, because they are the great divide separating animals from man. Materialists wished to remove this divide; Locke recognised it, and at least wanted to establish it on a sound footing.
If we are endowed solely with the power of perceiving sensible individuals, human beings are reduced to sense because sense presides over the perception of individuals. Consequently, reason is ruled out. Whatever the principle of bodily feeling, it is always such that its identity, at least, must cease with the dissolution of the material organ. This explains: 'The death of man and of beast is one' (Eccles 3: 5). Stewart certainly did not see the close connection between nominalism, an abstract and theoretical system and materialism, a practical system. If he had, he would not have been a nominalist. This is what I like to think. It is a dubious compliment, but here I have to say that he has acted unthinkingly, like someone who has done little to work out the consequences of his principles. And it is a compliment I am paying him.
In general, I must say that there are certain philosophers nowadays in need of a friend to dissuade them from writing against scepticism - which is the final result of materialism itself - or who would, at least, insist that they write about it more competently. The best friend could be the respectful, careful study of the great masters whom the Church possesses in all these matters, her Fathers and Doctors.