Appendix 19. - (251)

Aristotle, explaining the formation of the objects of the intellect, refers in passing to a DORMANT UNIVERSAL IN THE SOUL. In his attempt to show how all our ideas are derived from the senses, he maintains that memory is produced by sensations which leave the imprint of their traces, and that when a number of memories are compared, experience gives rise to the deduction of principles or ideas. But, as though dissatisfied by the term experience which is confined to particulars, he adds, 'from experience and from every universal dormant in the mind' (Poster. 50, bk. 1, final chapter). At this point, our philosopher, contradicting his premisses, needs to add to experience some other element in the soul. Despite the vagueness of Aristotle's views in this passage, St. Thomas's comment and explanation of the origin of ideas could not be more accurate and precise. Knowing how to describe the fact exactly, already means great progress on the way to explaining it. St. Thomas points out that experience can only be of particular things and that, consequently, one needs to proceed further and draw out principles from some universal: ULTERIUS EX UNIVERSALI QUIESCENTE IN ANIMA [further from the universal dormant in the soul]. He also points out that this universal is produced by an operation of the soul through which the soul receives something which is in reality particular, as though it were a universal: (quod scilicet accipitur ac si in omnibus ita sit, sicut est experimentum in quibusdam). Outside the soul, therefore, there is nothing universal; the soul adds universality and receives as universal what is in se particular. Moreover, this universalised object is described by Aristotle as UNUM PRAETER MULTA [one beyond the many]. According to St. Thomas, it is the intellect alone which adds this specific unity to many individuals. This unity has nothing to do with the many; it is outside them, PRAETER MULTA. This universal is therefore not part of those individuals, not something really extracted from them, but independent of them. In short, it is an idea completely different in nature from that of subsistent individuals, which are particular substances. It seems to me, therefore, that St. Thomas, in affirming that there is nothing in the intellect which did not previously come from sense, did not exclude from the intellect the form of universality which the intellect adds to things. It draws this form, which makes it the intellect it is, from within itself. Later, we shall see what this form is. This interpretation becomes certain, and even obvious, if we come to consider the light which St. Thomas grants to the intellect for its very existence, as we shall see.