Appendix 20. - (252)

To overcome this difficulty, the Scholastics resorted to saying that the mind perceives particulars per quamdam reflexionem [through a kind of reflection]. Anyone can see that although the pronoun, quidam, quaedam, quoddam is respectable enough, it is also often used as a plank for shipwrecked philosophers. It cannot always calm the human understanding in its desire to find sounder arguments. As I see it, the difficulty is the same as that noted relative to common sense. The solution is as follows: sense and intellect are potencies of a single subject. The same myself, modified by sensations, thinks about them. There is no need, therefore, to assume that the understanding, a particular potency, perceives sensations, as if sensations were perceived by two potencies. Consequently, there is no need to assume two species of phantasms, one like the other. This would mean multiplying entia unnecessarily, and lead to infinite progression. It is sufficient for us to concentrate upon the unity of MYSELF, a unity which contains sensations, ideas and thoughts. Aristotle assumed that sensation from an external organ was one thing, and that sensation conveyed to the common centre was another. Thus there were two potencies, proper sense and common sense. The fact is however that there is no sensation in the external organ separated from the soul; it is always the soul alone which feels. There is only one kind of sensation, and no bodily senses other than organic senses. However, because it is always the soul alone which feels, it follows that the soul simultaneously participates in several sensations (from this point of view, it could itself be called a common sense). The soul also reflects on these sensations, and thus thinks. The understanding is the faculty of thought; it does not perceive particular sensations; the soul, which is the seat of understanding, perceives them. It is not sensations, but the judgment which the soul makes on them which is called intellectual perception. The soul, which makes this judgment - and subsequent judgments - is to this extent considered as endowed with the potency of reason.