Appendix 27. - (302)

It really is odd to see how Kant gratuitously accepts this principle and believes that it requires no proof whatsoever. He sets about constructing his philosophy upon this initial foundation: 'There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience.' These are the opening words of the Critique of Pure Reason in Mantovani's Italian translation. No reason is given anywhere in Kant's work for this non-critical and highly dogmatic basic principle except the following question which comes immediately after:

He then confidently concludes:

It is clear, therefore, that the entire principle of critical philosophy was received by its author as a truth generally accepted in his age, that is, as a definitive judgment which consequently needs no further proof. In other words, critical philosophy is based entirely on a principle not subjected to any critique whatsoever and accepted as a mere prejudice! If this first proposition were to be investigated and found unreliable, it would bring about the downfall of Kant's whole vast enterprise. What can be stated for the moment, however, is that the reason given by Kant to verify such a principle is inadequate. He asks: 'Is it possible for our faculty of knowledge to be awakened into exercise by anything other than external objects?' The question shows that he assumes as already proven 1. that there are external objects independently of our faculty of knowledge; 2. all our cognitions are formed by the exercise of our faculty of knowledge. If there were any innate knowledge, the cognitive faculty would not need to be stimulated to form them; he supposes, therefore, as true what he intends to prove.

Moreover, a similar supposition is immediately denied him by a number of thinkers from Descartes onwards. Descartes holds that understanding lies in essential activity, in continual thought. He denies that he needs to be stimulated by external things in order to think. Leibniz also was to reject it most vehemently. According to him, sensible entia cannot stimulate the mind to think, because they cannot have any real communication with it. Every action of the spirit proceeds from an inner activity, from instincts which are intrinsically subject to some determined development. Again Malebranche, with all those thinkers who deduce the spirit's ideas from direct action upon it by God, would deny Kant his principle. To claim that all such opponents should be ignored is going too far. Nor is it in keeping with Kant's usual method of stooping to confute the views of philosophers much less important than those of whom we are speaking. On the other hand, if the first proposition needs no proof, it must be said that critical philosophy as a whole needs none because the whole kernel of critical philosophy is contained in that proposition. In fact, it amounts to saying: 'It is certain that Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, etc., and all those who accept the existence of innate notions, or notions derived from some being other than bodies, are wrong.' If we accept such a proposition as true, we need to resort to Kant's system to explain how we acquire cognitions. Kant therefore begins by positing as certain a principle which renders his system necessary. This means accepting that the system is true from the outset prior to any proof. Such an error is common amongst philosophers. They begin by establishing a proposition which seems obvious and implicitly contains their theory, yet dispense themselves from proving it. Next, they deduce their theory from the proposition. The theory is now declared proven, although it has been deduced from an assumed principle passed off as accepted.