Appendix 30. - (322)
[Reid on principles and ideas]
We have already seen that Hume's classification of universal truths also led to the elimination of a posteriori knowledge (cf. 315).
Reid was particularly concerned to demonstrate those principles which assure us of the reality of external bodies. Rather than principles, they should be called applications of principles to the real existence of things. These applications have the form of multiple judgments.
Moreover, such judgments were considered by Reid as necessary, blind instincts of nature.
Consequently, his teaching did not succeed in actually defending the principles of reason and their unshaken authority. On the contrary, he inevitably fell victim to a number of contradictions, as follows.
First contradiction. - Universal principles depend upon our idea of the essences of things (cf. 307). If we denied any knowledge of their essences, principles too are ruled out. Unaware of this, Reid agreed with Locke on this point and maintained that we have no idea of the essences of things (Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, Essay 1, c. 1). However, when he later discussed how we perceive the existence of bodies, he said that, thanks to a law of our nature laid down by God, we are led to add a subject (substance) to attributes, and then admitted that we possessed a vague notion of the nature of things or of their essences (ibid., Essay 5, c. 2). This is an example of the same inconsistency noted in Locke.
Second contradiction. - Reid eliminated ideas. He accepted the operations of the spirit which, in his view, immediately conceives real objects. This implied the destruction not only of universal ideas but also of universal conceptions; it meant reducing intellectual knowledge to pure subsistent individuals. Reid states specifically in some passages that mere possibility is nothing because, he maintains, that which is merely possible does not exist, and that which does not exist is nothing. This argument was inevitable from the moment he ruled out ideas and left in place only what is real. Possibilities were eliminated because they are only ideas. But it was impossible to be consistent when saddled with such a system. This would have been beyond the power of human beings who need to think the possible in all their conceptions; no intellective act is feasible without the idea of the possible. The following passage from the Scottish philosopher clearly shows him in open contradiction with all that he taught elsewhere on the subject of essences, on the possible and on objects of the mind. He says openly:
|
|
We know the ESSENCE of a triangle and from that essence can deduce its properties. It is an UNIVERSAL and might have been conceived by the human mind though no individual triangle had ever existed (we are in the realm of the possible). It has only what Mr. Locke calls a nominal essence, which is expressed in its definition. But everything that exists has a real essence which is above our comprehension; and, therefore, we cannot deduce its properties or attributes from its nature, as we do in the triangle |
I should point out also that Reid certainly does not take Locke's nominal essence as a mere word. He states explicitly that words, if they do not express thoughts, are mere sounds and useless (ibid., Essay 5, c. 1). He also says that there are general concepts, and that this generality is not found in the conception itself, that is, in the act of the mind, but in its object (ibid., Essay 5, c. 2).
In Reid's view, therefore, there are universal objects which are not ideas or mere possibilities. They are not existent things, and yet not nothing. What can they be?