SECTION ONE

Chapter 3

35. The radical shift in ideas brought about by Locke and his followers does not consist in any great renewal of philosophy, but in the successful rescue of philosophy from the closed precincts of the Schools and in its proclamation to ordinary people.
This I consider not so much the personal credit of Locke as a requirement of his whole age, for which alone it will always be remembered.

36. For myself, I can think of nothing more gratifying than being able to draw mankind to sublime teachings which elevate the mind and ennoble the heart.
On the other hand, I consider it depressing and most painful to see how the outstanding teachings that mankind cherishes most dearly are restricted to a tiny group of what could be called privileged persons who have made such teachings their own exclusive property. As a result of some unspecified right of conquest, all mankind, it would seem, is denied access to these teachings. There is something distasteful and irritating about this shady, academic branch of studies which seems to shun the light of day. It behaves rather like a sect, making use of language, or rather private jargon, to which ordinary people have no access. It behaves in an ambitious, odd manner which seems to conceal some secret, mysterious purpose. This self-absorbed philosophy is evasive, contemptuous of humanity, selfish and, it would seem, heaven-sent to the few whom the rest of mankind has to follow like sheep. The great body of humanity is thus deprived of any opinion on which its own nobility and happiness depend.

Such thoughts, which readily occur to an untainted spirit, make one extremely grateful to those who give their all to enable as many persons as possible to scale the summits of knowledge, to develop this knowledge, and to present it to the general public in the simplest and most obvious way. Even ordinary persons are thus able to enjoy these fascinating truths and reach a higher state previously attained by only a minority of the most clever, inquisitive and fortunate individuals. The greater part of humankind, like a stern, experienced judge, can then bring common sense to bear upon the interminable questions of scholars whom they summon back from the vain pursuit of fame to more worthwhile work and sounder views. I say 'vain' because such fame is achieved by hollow, momentary triumphs over opinion rather than any real contribution to the human spirit or to society.

37. However, despite being impelled by an irresistible power of good human nature to look kindly on such human views, we sense some inherent difficulty. Some nagging doubt restrains us perhaps from nursing exaggerated hopes. It is obvious that there are real problems in such an undertaking. The attempt to teach, in a short time, the majority of mankind to philosophise is surely absurd and an example of philosophical credulity.
I am referring, of course, to philosophising on the most difficult issues, about which few scholars have ever been able to agree and have frequently accused each other of not even understanding the point at issue. If the extension of elementary education - which is still not available to all children - has occasioned so much concern and given rise to so many problems, it is surely unreasonable to expect ordinary folk to understand philosophy properly even when it is expounded in language they can understand. I am not referring here to the odd views of those who would like philosophy to be judged by the populace (as though a case against the rulers of the literary world could be brought before the common people).(41) Such an attractive, rosy prospect for society, even if it is not a dream, is so far in the future and so vague that even the most discerning minds cannot envisage it in practice, although its possibility cannot be discarded without setting arbitrary limits to human perfectibility and divine Providence.

38. It was quite natural that anyone wishing to introduce philosophy in everyday language to the common people - who were not yet ready to receive it - would also have imparted to it an approach and a method of argument somewhat similar to that of his readers.
This is why Locke's philosophy 1. shows signs throughout of inadequate observation, especially of those facts which, to be grasped, require lively, constant self-reflection and, at times, a whole series of reflections on our reflection, for which the average person is completely unfitted; 2. shows little sign of discernment in establishing characteristic facts, that is, facts constituting a new species, and distinguishing them from similar facts which vary only accidentally (writers belonging to this school all suffer from the same fault: they are scrupulously accurate in gathering and amassing similar facts and multiplying examples but totally careless in indicating the different species into which the facts are grouped); 3. lastly, the members of this school hardly ever see the main issue of a problem. As a result, they readily exhibit contempt for the works of earlier philosophers and spurn the precious legacy of teachings transmitted to us down the ages. In speaking of the great philosophers who spent their energies on finding appropriate solutions to the most difficult problems, the members of this school dismiss them as dreamers. Because they do not understand the reason for their efforts, they do not see the need for the choices made by the ancients in responding to proposed questions. Theories are dismissed with a few seemly words, perhaps with a smile to indicate one's good fortune in being immune from the dreadful itch to philosophise!
The mistake made by this school, especially in its initial stage, depended far more on over-confidence in trying to explain facts of the spirit without adequate arguments than on the use of unnecessary elements in explaining such facts. Soon, however, such writers, conscious of difficulties unnoticed by their early teachers, strove as hard as they could to resolve them, but without success.

39. This shortcoming in Locke's philosophy devalued it in the eyes of some of his great contemporaries.(42) Nevertheless, he won popular favour and gained the support of a party which even then was becoming powerful by passing itself of as the friend of the people. Locke's brief triumph was, in fact, almost universal. The conditions of the period in which he published his philosophical work were highly favourable. The philosophy of the Schools had been corrupted, one might say. Descartes, who had dealt it the final blow, offered in its place certain profound concepts which, however, were insufficient to produce the complete system required by society. Moreover, as people in general became more literate, and acquired greater weight in society, their opinion came to prevail in those areas involving not only their own interests, but philosophical judgment also.

40. A brief reference to the shortcoming I attribute to the school of Locke may be found in the problem I am about to discuss. In other words, to justify my attribution to human reason of a single form which I call the form of truth, I have to demonstrate that only with such a system can we avoid the twin reefs on which various modern theories have so far been wrecked. I must mention, first of all, the system proper to those who do not assume sufficient to explain the origin of thought; after that, the system of those who admit far more than is needed. Finally, I have to prove the theory of the single form of reason which steers an even course between these twin reefs and show that, of all the full explanations of the problem I am discussing, this is the simplest, that is, the one which assumes and presupposes less than the others.
However, since my purpose is not to offer a theory of all that can be observed in the human spirit but solely to explain the origin of ideas, I shall first need to explain as briefly and clearly as I can, the intimate nature of this fact, and enable my readers to understand the status quaestionis and the difficulty faced in solving it.

(41) It is repugnant, and a contradiction in terms, for uneducated people to judge their rulers, and common people their masters. It is obviously absurd to raise on high the lowest section of mankind; it means overturning order in everything. However, absurdities like this should not be confused with the approach of those who, as a general rule, feel obliged to invoke common sense as though it were a high judge. The whole thrust of this approach, when properly understood, is to check the foolhardiness and self-assurance of individuals and to enthrone society, mankind as a whole, so to speak. It does, however, leave the orderin society and in mankind as the bond and form established by divine providence. But while I point out the difference between these two approaches and hold the former absurd and repugnant, I do not intend to attribute my interpretation of the latter to any particular writer. I am referring purely to teaching. I am not pointing to the personal opinions of anyone.

(42) Leibniz considered Locke's philosophy a shabby system. However, while contradicting it, he realised that its popular character was advantageous and pointed this out in the preface to New Essays concerning Human Understanding: 'He (Locke) is more popular than me; occasionally I am obliged to be more esoteric and more abstract, which is no advantage to me, especially when writing in a living language.' Nevertheless, Leibniz did choose to write the Essays in French in order to make them popular. It proved too difficult, however, to make ordinary what is sublime.