Appendix 1.

(438) [D'Alembert, Falletti and Galluppi on the feeling of myself]

D'Alembert in France and Falletti in Italy thought they could deduce the idea of existence in all its universality from the feeling of myself, that is, of the existence of ourselves. D'Alembert says:The abstract notion of existence is formed immediately by means of the feeling of myself which comes from our sensations and thoughts. We think that it is possible to separate this feeling of myself from the subject containing it without the subject's being destroyed. This gives us the abstract idea of existence which we then apply to entia different from us that seem to cause our sensations.

The inaccuracies in this passage are almost impossible to list in a note. I will deal briefly with the principal errors:

1. The feeling of myself is confused with the idea of myself. These two things are totally different, as I will show in the next paragraph [439].

2. The feeling of myself is said to be acquired along with sensations and thoughts. If this were true, MYSELF would begin to exist only when I begin to be modified.

3. The subject containing the feeling of myself is said to be distinct from myself and considered divided from myself although myself alone is the subject.

4. Two things are therefore made out of one: the one subject myself is made into a non-subject myself and into a subject united with myself. The subject thus separated from myself (or rather created by the imagination), is said to be the same as the idea of existence in all its universality, although subject and existence are in fact two totally distinct things.

5. Finally a contradiction is gratuitously supposed as possible, namely that the idea of universal ens can be drawn from a particular ens (like myself), although what is universal is the contrary of what is particular and that which is does not in any way include that which is only possible.

Falletti, in his attempt to produce the idea of existence in all its universality from the feeling of myself, is more cautious and discerning than D'Alembert. He is aware that myself, as a fundamental feeling, must be essentially in us from the very first moment of our existence because we can never be without ourselves. He is also aware that, in his own words, 'the idea of being in all its universality must always be present to the soul' (Saggio sopra l'origine delle umane cognizioni dell'abate Condillac, tradotto - colle osservazioni critiche di Tommaso Vincenzo Falletti, Rome, 1784, vol. 1, p. 4). He supposes that the soul extracts this idea from itself through a primal, natural act. This is unsustainable because the soul, lacking the idea of existence in all its universality, cannot draw this idea from a particular ens such as itself. However, we see the extent to which Falletti sensed the truth which I have tried to explain at length in this work.
Among living Italian philosophers, Galluppi evidently agrees with these two thinkers, but his perspicacity sometimes puts him in opposition to them and draws him to cast doubt on the very doctrine he professes. For example, he says:

Although the spirit begins its actions with the perception of individual existences, it cannot say 'I exist' unless it has acquired the most universal idea of existence. Thus when we see a fig tree or orange tree, we say it is a 'tree' only when we have acquired the general idea of 'tree', UNLESS WE WISH TO SAY THAT THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE IS INNATE IN US. But even in this hypothesis the spirit needs consciousness of reflection, of which I have spoken above, in order to be able to say 'I exist'

In this passage Galluppi acutely touches the true system but lacks the courage to grasp it.