Appendix 6.

(467) [St. Thomas on union of the spirit with the idea of being]

We could ask what kind of union exists between the idea of being and our spirit. In some places, St Thomas seems to consider the union similar to that of ideas lying in our memory but not actually present in our thought; he says they form 'habitual knowledge' (De Verit., q. 10, arts. 8-9). Similarly, St. Thomas' speculative and practical innate principles are habitually in us (habitus principiorum) and, on the occasion of sensations (phantasmata), are immediately drawn into act by the acting intellect, as if we were recalling something. Note however that in addition to these innate notions habitually in us but not in act, St. Thomas posits an acting intellect which is truly in act and, with its light, makes everything actually present to thought. I believe that this light of the acting intellect, hidden under the metaphor and never (or very rarely and only fleetingly) uncovered by the ancient writers, is indeed the idea of being. This is certainly St. Bonaventure's opinion. One passage of St. Thomas could at first sight raise doubts about his opinion on this matter and about complete agreement with his great friend, St. Bonaventure. However I think the two great men can be reconciled by a careful understanding of St. Thomas' words. The passage I refer to states:

This passage raises doubt about St. Thomas' opinion: he places the concept of ens among things directly seen by the acting intellect but on the occasion of phantasms. According to him therefore ens does not form the acting intellect itself, as in my conjecture. I would, however, suggest the following interpretation.

St. Thomas' words indicate that having the concept of ens (ratio entis) is one thing, having ens pure and simple is another. Having the concept of ens would mean understanding its force, that is, understanding how it can be applied and produce different cognitions in us from deep within itself. I, too, think that the force, fecundity and energy with which the idea of ens is applied cannot be known until we actually apply it on the occasion of sensations (phantasms). In this case, the idea is no longer solitary and inactive but operative. We consider it attentively and with new concentration, and become aware of its notion or intimate nature (ratio entis). However, whatever the case may be, we must grant that the idea of being adheres either actually or habitually to our spirit. When I have the idea, I can deduce from it every speculative and practical principle, and therefore explain the fact of human knowledge. When I lack the idea, either God must reveal it to me or I must create it for myself in the act of sensation. Both of these explanations are unacceptable.

Finally I note that St. Thomas himself uses the same expressions as I do and hence considers them true. For example, he says that the light of the acting intellect formaliter inhaeret intellectui [adheres formally to the intellect] (S.T., I, q. 74, art. 4) and, speaking about the habitual knowledge which the soul has of itself, says ipsa eius essentia intellectui nostro est praesens [its essence is present to our intellect] and again, anima per essentiam suam se videt [the soul sees itself through its essence] (De Verit., q. 10, art. 8) etc., although this seeing, for St. Thomas, is habitual not actual knowledge.

If I had time to explain more clearly, I could establish the following truth, which must seem obvious to those well accustomed to observing and reflecting upon themselves: 'Every act of our spirit is essentially unknown to itself.' The opinion that 'we have an actual vision of indeterminate being at every moment of our existence', including the very first moments of which we have no memory at all, may indeed be difficult and awkward for some, but the difficulty would totally disappear and the opinion be accepted (even if with a certain wonder) without any recourse to habitual or dormant knowledge. However, because the mode of conceiving the union between the idea of being and ourselves is not of great relevance, I add nothing further provided the union itself is acknowledged.