Appendix 17.

(548) [Solid foundations needed in philosophy]

It would be poor method if I regulated my observation of nature by deciding to record only the most obvious facts. If I were to omit to verify observations requiring repeated, tedious experience and were satisfied with approximate results, I could rightly be accused of wanting to make a fool of nature and of those I am trying to instruct. It would be incredible presumption for me to attempt to construct theories without trying to lay solid foundations for them because facts were too difficult to ascertain or too obscure to clarify. This, however, is the method adopted by the materialist and sensist philosophers who have allied themselves with Locke, and it has even rubbed off on serious students like Bonnet, who prided himself on rigorous method. Bonnet dismisses feeling of our own existence for the following reason: 'It is not good to admit any feeling of our existence of which we cannot form an idea. There is no doubt that it is better to confine our attention to CLEAR MATTERS we can reason about.' (Analyse abrégée de l'Essai analytique, II). But affirming that we want to accept only what is altogether clear in nature is equivalent to admitting very little. Nature, as we know, is full of mystery and obscurity. And if we set out to look for what is good rather than what is true, who knows what each will take as matter for his philosophy. What is the good or the better to which we will confine our attention? In fact, it is the philosopher's responsibility to observe nature whole and entire, just as it is. Not only must he admit what is clear, he must accept and clarify, through hard work if necessary, what is obscure. The true philosopher, when faced with difficulties and mysteries, increases his efforts to penetrate the secrets of nature. If he still does not succeed in making progress, he admires the wisdom that has made nature so sublime and so profound. Certain questions cannot be neglected, whatever facile philosophy asserts. They must be faced courageously, and modestly. In particular, the fundamental feeling is a matter of such importance that its exclusion from philosophical observation on the grounds of its obscurity destroys any hope of progress in the theory of knowledge.