Appendix 26.

(fn. 126) [St. Thomas and phantasms]

Understanding this [the chronological order of feelings and of thought] enables us to reconcile different passages of St. Thomas Aquinas on the need for phantasms if we are to think.
Sometimes he is adamant about the necessity of phantasms in our thought (S.T., I, q. 86, art. 7), affirming: quidditas rei materialis est proprium objectum intellectus [the proper object of the intellect is that which makes material things what they are] (S.T., I, q. 85, art. 5) or natura rei materialis est objectum intellectus [the object of the intellect is the nature of material things] (S.T., q. 87, art. 2). He then concludes that habits are not objects of the intellect, but are present ut quibus intellectus intelligit [as things enabling the intellect to understand].

Taken by itself, this teaching appears the opposite of that attributed to St. Thomas in this book, and proved with his own words (cf. fn. 24 and App., no. 14) that is, that the matter of our cognitions is furnished by the interior feeling as well as by the external sensations. Although presenting some difficulty, St. Thomas' teaching about two sources is of great importance, and should be evaluated carefully. Let us try to explain St. Thomas with St. Thomas.

According to him, the material thing is not the sole object of the intellect, but simply first in chronological order. This is precisely what I am saying. St. Thomas asks (S.T., I, q. 87, art. 3) 'whether the intellect knows its own act,' which is certainly not material, and replies affirmatively. He adds, however, that it does so after knowing material things. In this, the human being differs, according to Aquinas, from angels who with their first act understand both themselves and the act with which they understand themselves. He says: 'Another intellect exists, the human one, which does not furnish its own understanding (as the divine intellect does). The essence of this intellect is not the first object of understanding' (as happens with the angels, according to St. Thomas). 'Its first object is something external, that is, the nature of material things. Hence, the first thing known by the human intellect is material. Only secondarily does the human intellect know the act with which it knows the object, and through this second knowledge come to know itself' (Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est OBJECTUM PRIMUM* ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod PRIMO* cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est hujusmodi objectum, et SECUNDARIO* cognoscitur ipse actus, quo cognoscitur objectum: et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus). He says the same thing more clearly shortly afterwards in summing up his teaching: 'The object of the intellect is something common, that is, ENS and TRUTH, included in which is the act itself of understanding. The intellect, therefore, can know its own act, but not as its FIRST object which, in our present state, is not any ens and truth, but ens and truth considered in material things' (S.T., I, corp. ad 1). He confirms this with a phrase from Aristotle: 'Objects are known BEFORE acts (PRAECOGNOSCUNTUR), and acts BEFORE powers' (De Anima, bk. 2, test. 33). It is clear that we are dealing with priority in time alone, and this is precisely what I have been saying.

But I also observed that in order to reach the state of intellectual development necessary for reflection on one's own interior feeling, it is not enough to know bodily things first. It is also necessary to arrive at abstract thoughts (which is normally impossible without the use of language) and through them obtain dominion over one's attention which can then be directed at will. Only after this can a human being reflect upon himself, and advert to his interior acts. First amongst these acts, as we have said, is the fundamental feeling which, however, is reflected upon last, after advertence to its accidental acts. The chronological order of our advertence runs as follows: 1. we advert to what is sensible in a bodily sense; 2. form abstract thoughts; 3. advert to our act of feeling (sensations) and our act of understanding; 4. finally advert to the fundamental feeling, the first act and common root of both sense and intelligence.

It is now very easy to reconcile other passages of St. Thomas in which he makes it clear that the sources of our cognitions are not the senses alone. Some examples may be useful.
'Sensitive knowledge is not the whole cause (TOTA CAUSA) of intellective knowledge. We should not be surprised, therefore, if intellective knowledge extends beyond sensitive knowledge (ultra sensitivam se extendit)' (S.T., I, q. 84, art. 6). Amongst these things which go beyond sense knowledge, and to which only intellective knowledge reaches out, first place belongs to all that is in our understanding. Quod intellectualiter cognoscitur, per se est notum, et ad ipsum cognoscendum natura cognoscentis sufficit ABSQUE EXTERIORI MEDIO [What is known intellectually is known of itself, and the nature of the person who knows is sufficient, WITHOUT ANY EXTERIOR MEANS, as a means of knowing it] (Contra Gent., I, q. 57). For example, we cannot know where our affections lie except by consulting our heart. External, material things can tell us nothing about them: Etsi fides non cognoscatur per EXTERIORES CORPORIS MOTUS, percipitur tamen etiam ab eo in quo est per INTERIOREM ACTUM CORDIS [Although faith is not known through EXTERIOR MOVEMENTS OF OUR BODY, it is perceived by the person possessing it through AN INTERIOR ACT OF THE HEART] (S.T., I, 87, q. 2). Again, if we knew only material things, we could not form any idea about spirits, knowledge of which has to be drawn from our own soul, as Thomas says, following Augustine: Ex illa auctoritate Augustini haberi potest quod illud, quod mens nostra de cognitione incorporalium rerum accipit, PER SEIPSAM* cognoscere possit. Et hoc adeo verum est, ut etiam apud Philosophum dicatur, quod scientia de anima est PRINCIPIUM* quoddam ad cognoscendum substantias separatas (De Anima, bk. I, test. 2). Per hoc enim quod anima nostra cognoscit seipsam, pertingit ad cognitionem aliquam habendam de substantiis incorporeis, qualem eam contingit habere [We have Augustine's authority for saying that the mind can know THROUGH ITSELF the knowledge it receives about incorporeal things. Indeed, even Aristotle says that knowledge of our soul is a certain PRINCIPLE enabling us to know separated substances (De Anima, bk. 1, test.2). Hence the knowledge our soul has of itself is an element in the knowledge of incorporeal substances as our soul must have it] (S.T., I, q. 88, ad 1).