Appendix 31.
(851) [Reid and the concept of body]
If the concept I have given of body is borne in mind, we can see how unreasonable the following words of Reid are:
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We ought not, therefore, to conclude that such bodily organs are, in their own nature, necessary to perception; but rather that, by the will of God, our power of perceiving external objects is limited and circumscribed by our organs of sense; so that we perceive objects in a certain manner, and in certain circumstances, and in no other. |
It is certainly true that in entia which lack corporeal organs knowledge of bodies can be more perfect than ours, but the opinion that the sense perception of bodies can be better without organs is sustainable only by those who have not made a perfect analysis of this perception. I have shown that what we call body is precisely what we perceive with our organs. Organs are just as necessary as corporeal nature for the sense perception of corporeal nature. Reid's words clearly show that according to him and all modern philosophers after him, bodies are an idea of something unknown and mysterious. This vague, confused and totally mysterious idea of bodies allowed thinkers to phantasise as they wished. It gave rise, in fact, to all the extraordinary theories of modern philosophy, particularly idealism. But the only thing the word body expresses and can express is that which we know and perceive sensibly. Hence our notion of bodies is conditioned by and strictly bound with our organs. In this respect Reid's error was the opposite of Newton's. Newton considered it necessary to attribute infinite space to God as a sensory, but Reid considered that extended organs were unnecesaary to divine knowledge. The majority of these faults can be avoided if sensation and sense perception are clearly distinguished from the idea and word of the understanding.