Appendix 42.

(982) [Galluppi's and Descartes' perception of self ]

The thrust of all Galluppi's arguments is to prove that the perception of myself is direct. But this perception, I must add, can be considered either simply as feeling or as an intellective act. In the first case, it does not have the nature of intellective perception because an intellective perception of myself requires a synthesis; it requires a judgment between myself as feeling and the idea of existence. By making the judgment, 'I exist', I have an intellective perception because I have perceived not only myself in particular but myself as an ens, in a relationship with universal existence. Granted the possession of this intellective perception of myself, I must now take another step and advert to the perception. I am drawn to this act of advertence, which is itself another reflection on myself, by an unusual, vivid modification of my active feeling; it is precisely this feeling which attracts my attention -in other words, I am drawn by my acts. This is the starting point of Descartes' philosophy: 'I think, therefore I exist', which has the same force as: 'I am aware of my existence through my thoughts'. The argument is valid for awareness but not for intellective perception, and much less for sense perception. Intellective perception can and must be the starting point of philosophy. We are certainly not thinking and definitely not beginning to philosophise when we have nothing more than sense perceptions. When we have intellective perceptions, we think but do not reflect that we think; this is the level of intellectual life of the mass of people. The time comes however when we reflect that we are thinking; philosophy begins here. But the starting point for our mind can only be the state in which it finds itself. Those who begin to philosophise are in the state of reflection and advertence, and begin there. Descartes himself began there when he said, 'I think, therefore I exist'. However, previous to this state, are the states of direct knowledge and of advertence. It was natural therefore that Locke's philosophy should follow Descartes', that is, philosophy regressed from the examination of thought to the analysis of sensation, upon which thought is founded. By pursuing this course, it was easy to jump the stage of first, direct knowledge, because this stage is very difficult to observe and advert to, for the many reasons I have indicated. In fact Descartes and Locke jumped it intentionally: Descartes began from reflection; Locke investigated sensation. They both omitted the analysis of simple knowledge, which lies between the phenomena of reflection and sensation and serves as their key to both. In this work I have tried as well as I can to supply for the omission.