Appendix 43.

(994) [Reid's censure of other philosophers]

Reid deserves great merit for his censure of some philosophical expressions which are fundamentally inexact and result in materialism. For example, to say that sensation is due to the impulse of the nerve in the spirit expresses hypothetical, material imagery. Speaking about Locke he says: 'Mr. Locke affirms with great certainty that the ideas of external objects are produced in our minds through impulse because this is the only way we can conceive the possibility of bodies acting', and then goes on to show how gratuitous Locke's expression is. Note however that Reid acknowledges that Locke retracted this opinion in his first letter to the bishop of Worcester and promised to correct the passage in the next edition of his Essay. Nevertheless Reid comments:

Reid also notes the ambiguity contained in 'outside or inside the mind' and other expressions, which are apply to the extrasubjective perception of bodies. If 'outside or inside the soul' is to have exact meaning, it cannot mean ideas of place; it can only mean that ideas are or are not in the subject. However sometimes I think Dr. Reid is too severe in his censure of some expressions. There are expressions which, as far as I can see, have a true meaning even when taken in their proper sense, for example, 'representation' applied to the mind -this word generally means what is placed and drawn up in space before our eyes. But I note that when I am immersed in my own thought, I can and must conceive that whatever my intelligent spirit thinks is represented to it. My spirit has no power over the object of its thought; it cannot pervade the thing it is thinking or become one with it; my spirit remains distinct. The thing I am thinking is in my spirit in such a way that it cannot be confused with my spirit. This mode of presence is, it seems to me, well expressed by 'representation' and similar words. For the same reason I think that certain expressions used in connection with the sense of sight also have a proper, not a metaphorical sense relative to the understanding. Although sight and understanding are by nature two totally different faculties, there is nevertheless a kind of analogy between them.