Appendix 44.
(fn. 245) [Malebranche's basic difficulty]
This observation [about the distinction between the simplicity of the principle and extension of the term] escaped Malebranche's notice. Consequently he did not see the possibility of communication between soul and body. Arnald, in his dispute with Malebranche, made the following fine observation where, however, we see the usual confusion of concepts concerning sensations and ideas, that is, concerning sense perception and intellective perception:
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Nothing seems stranger to me than saying that bodies are too large to be seen directly by the soul. If it were a question of making bodies know, we would be justified in bringing forward their size and imperfection, but if they are only to be known, the imperfections of material things cause no problems. Knowledge is clearly a great perfection in anyone who knows: the lowest level of intellective nature is incomparably greater and more admirable than what is most perfect in corporeal nature. But to be known is simply a name for a known object. Provided the object is not pure nothingness, which is incapable of being known, it is sufficient that it exist. To be knowable is an inseparable property of existence, like the properties of unity, truth and goodness; indeed, to be knowable is the same thing as to be true. (Des vraies et des fausses idées, c. 10) |
The basic difficulty in Malebranche's teaching consisted more in considering bodies as sense-perceived rather than as known. Nevertheless Arnald's opinion can have some validity for sensation in a sensitive, intelligent ens.