Part One

Origin of the Idea of Being

CHAPTER 2

Nature of the idea of being

400. Because the argument has to be free from every possible ambiguity, I must first point out that in affirming human capacity for possessing the idea of being, isolated and separate from all other ideas (cf. 394-395), I do not wish to say that we form for ourselves a sensible image of that idea. A sensible image cannot be formed of anything unless the thing itself is: 1. determinate and individualised; 2. corporeal, and perceived by the senses.

401. Some modern philosophers have denied abstract or indeterminate ideas simply because it is impossible to form images of them.
This is a material reason unknown to true thinkers who understand the necessity of observing nature and acknowledging all it presents. The existence of something cannot be denied just because it does not conform with laws imposed a priori on the nature of things by our fantasy. Simple, unprejudiced observation would have easily recognised three series of thoughts within the human spirit:

1. Thoughts representing indeterminate ideas, that is, objects which cannot be presented under the form of images, nor exist in reality on their own, but which can nevertheless be considered on their own;
2. Thoughts about spiritual entia which have everything required for subsistence but offer no basis for sensible images;
3. Thoughts about bodies or corporeal qualities which alone are capable of being expressed by sensible imagination.

The existence of these three classes of thoughts is a fact, independent of any system and must be admitted even by those who deny the existence of spiritual beings, an altogether different question from that implied by concepts of spiritual beings.

To establish gratuitously the principle, 'What we cannot imagine sensibly, we cannot even think', and to draw from this gratuitous assertion the consequence: 'Hence, universal and abstract ideas do not exist', is a false method. Its starting point is a prejudice to which we wish to subject the facts; it implies a determination to dictate laws to nature, rather than a desire to listen to nature, and interpret it wisely.

402. We must also distinguish the idea from the judgment about the subsistence of things. This is a cardinal distinction in ideology.
When we form the idea or concept of an ens, we can possess a perfect concept of the ens, with all its essential and accidental qualities, without judging that it really exists. This is sufficient to assure us that, when intuiting the idea, we perform a different operation from that involved in making a judgment about the subsistence of an ens.

Let us take the idea or concept of a horse containing every individual internal and external feature necessary for its existence (body, head, neck, legs, and so on), and imagine that this could really exist, if I were capable of creating it, without need of any addition to the particulars contained in the idea that serves me as its exemplar or type.

If I wished to bring this horse into existence, and were capable of doing so, and if my concept still did not present all the minute particulars of the individual horse I intended to make, I would be obliged as I went ahead with my work to think of the parts lacking to the concept, which I would gradually perfect as the external reality was formed.
Let us imagine now that the concept has been perfected, and that the horse has been materialised in such a way that it corresponds exactly with the concept used to bring it to this state and make it exist. There is no doubt that the material horse would depend upon the thought and concept from which I had copied it.

403. The next step is to ask whether my perfect concept has received anything from the real subsistence of the horse. Undoubtedly, it has not. The concept had to be perfect before the horse could exist in order that I might have a standard or exemplar from which to produce and forge it. The concept derives nothing from the perfected horse, nor can it do so, because its own perfection first comprises without exception all the particulars of the horse. So much is evident.

404. This fact throws light on the nature of ideas which are independent (as far as their nature is concerned) of the real existence of individuals in such a way that they can be perfect irrespective of the real existence of individuals. Moreover, when individuals come into existence, their subsistence adds nothing to their idea or concept. Whatever grade of perfection the individual has is already contained in its concept.

405. This truth concerning the independence of the idea of an external thing (we are speaking about the nature of the idea, not its origin) enables us to grasp the difference between possessing an idea, and judging that the thing of which we have the idea really exists.
This second operation of thought is a judgment on the subsistence of the thing we are thinking about and as such is entirely different from its idea or concept.
As we said, our idea of anything is equally perfect and complete whether the thing subsists or not, whether we judge of its real existence or not, whether we make this judgment in one way or another.
The judgment of a thing's subsistence supposes the idea of the thing, the judgment, therefore, is not the idea, and does not add anything to it.
Such a judgment forms within us only a persuasion of the subsistence of the thing we judge to exist in real mode. Persuasion is only assent, an operation sui generis which must not be confused in any way with the intuition of the idea.

406. I call the subsistence of anything its real, actual existence.

407. The heading of this Article is, therefore, a corollary of the preceding Article which affirmed the essential distinction between the idea, and the judgment we make on the real existence of things.
In fact, if the idea is complete and perfect without its containing any thought of the real, actual existence of things (cf. 399-400 [402-407]), it cannot help us in any way to know things as subsisting. It presents them to us only as possible. The subsistence of things is known by means of another operation of our spirit, called judgment, which is essentially different from the intuition of the idea.(3)

408. 'Idea of being' does not mean the thought of some subsistent ens whose qualities, apart from actual existence, are unknown or abstract, like x, y and z in algebra. Nor does it mean judgment or persuasion about the subsistence even of an indeterminate ens; it simply means idea of being, mere possibility. This is a corollary of the preceding Article.
After the last possible abstraction on an ens as thought, possibility remains. If we think of a subsistent ens without knowing its qualities, we can still abstract from it the persuasion of its subsistence while retaining the thought of its possibility.

409. The most universal idea of all, therefore, which is also the last abstraction, is possible being; we can call it simply idea of being.

Demonstration

410. Although this obvious statement needs little consideration, few people have given it sufficient attention.
Modern philosophers (cf. 50-57, 278-282) have been at pains to analyse the faculties of the spirit, although few have analysed their product, that is, human cognitions. Faculties are known only by their effects which, therefore, must be analysed first; we examine the faculties after investigating cognitions. The opposite way is taken by Locke, Condillac and generally by those who begin by examining the faculties and then move on to cognitions.
This inversion of the process is possibly the principle source of their errors.
I have started from the effects and tried to analyse a known fact. By doing this I have endeavoured to find the cause of the fact, that is, to determine the faculties necessary for producing all human knowledge in all its parts.

411. Now the analysis of any cognitions we have always gives the same result: 'We cannot think of anything without the idea of being.'
Indeed we can have no knowledge or thought separate from the idea of being. Existence is the most common, universal quality of all.

Take any object you wish. First, abstract its particular qualities, then its less common qualities, then its more common qualities and so on. In the end, the last quality will be existence, by means of which you can still think something, an ens, but without its mode of existence; the object of your thought is a perfectly indeterminate something, unknown as regards its qualities, an x. But it is something because existence, although indeterminate, remains; it is not nothing, because nothing has no existence, not even possible existence. Either you are thinking that an ens exists, or can exist, with all the qualities necessary for its existence, although these remain unknown to you, or you are not thinking of them. Nevertheless what you are thinking is indeed an idea, although totally indeterminate.

On the contrary, if you finally take away being, the most universal of all qualities, nothing is left in your mind; all thought has disappeared and along with it any idea of the ens.

To give an example. Let us take the concrete idea of a particular person, Maurice. Now when I take away from Maurice what is particular and individual to him, I am left with what is common to human beings. Next, by a second abstraction, I remove the human elements such as reason and freedom, and now I have a more general idea, that of an animal.
Abstracting animal qualities I am left with a body that has vegetable life without sensitivity. After this I take away all physical organisation and vegetable life, fixing my attention on what is common to minerals; my idea is now that of body in general. Finally I withdraw my attention from what is proper to body; my idea is now of an ens in all its universality. But during this process of abstraction, my mind has dealt with something, and has never ceased thinking; it has always had an idea as the object of its action, although this idea has become consistently more universal until my mind arrived at the most universal of all ideas, the idea of an ens, undetermined by any quality known or fixed by me. I can finally think that this ens is an ens because it has being. Abstraction can go no further without losing every object of thought and destroying every idea in my mind. The idea of being, therefore, is the most universal idea, and remains after the last possible abstraction; without it, all thinking ceases and all other ideas are impossible.

412. This statement is the converse of the preceding statement and follows naturally from what has been said (cf. 406).
We have seen how the idea of any ens whatsoever can be broken down, as it were: first, the particular qualities are removed, then the less common and finally the most common. After reducing it to its bare minimum, we are left only with being as the basis of all the other qualities and the most abstract of ideas: take this away and every other thought and idea becomes impossible. Yet this single, bare idea, revealed by our abstractions, remains in the mind as an object of contemplation. Able to be intuited and known of itself, it needs no other idea for its intuition.

This consequence is of supreme importance.

Notes

(3) I will have the opportunity to analyse the operation of judgment when I attempt to explain the origin of our idea of body.Note: the observation I have made here about the distinction between ideas, and persuasion of the subsistence of something, confirms what I said (cf. 177) about the false teaching of those who claim that ideas take and enclose subsistent things themselves - on the contrary, ideas present only mere possibilities of things.These philosophers exchange one truth for another. There is indeed a faculty in us which grasps and encloses, as it were, subsistent things. This is not the faculty of ideas but the faculty of feeling joined with the rational operation of judgment, a faculty totally distinct from that of intuiting ideas.