Part Four

Origin of Pure Ideas, which derive nothing from Feeling

CHAPTER 2

Origin of the idea of substance

583. So far I have shown that ideas taken as a whole, together with the principles of reason and in particular the ideas which I called elementary concepts of being that serve as conditions for the use of reason, have their origin, on the occasion of sensations, in a first idea naturally present to our spirit. As we saw, this theory overcomes the difficulty of the origin of ideas on which so many philosophers, and philosophy itself (cf. 539- 551), foundered.

I also noted that the difficulty, set out by me in a general way, presented itself under particular forms to others who attempted to explain the origin of special classes of ideas. It would be helpful, therefore, if I carried on to show how the theory could resolve not only the general difficulty but also its individual manifestations. This implies that all special ideas, which have caused endless trouble to so many philosophers, can be deduced from the supreme idea of being.

I have, however, already dealt with the elementary ideas of being. I can turn, therefore, to the ideas of substance and cause as the closest to the first ideas, and the most difficult and necessary to examine.

584. The difficulty encountered in indicating the origin of the idea of substance is compounded by the inexact, confused concept of substance many philosophers have created for themselves. They confuse the idea of substance as a genus with the ideas of specific substances. For example, they maintain that because we cannot know the substance of bodies, we cannot have the idea of substance. This is far from being a rigorous argument.

It is also clear that we could have the idea of substance as a genus without knowing intimately any substance connected with particular things. It is as though we saw a weight suspended from a column without knowing whether its support was a piece of chain or a length of rope. We could be ignorant of the material and shape of what holds the weight and nevertheless realise that there must be some kind of support.

Our own case is somewhat similar. In order to know that a substance must be present, it is not necessary to know that it is the substance we call 'body' nor do we need to understand its nature fully. Conversely, we do not have to conclude that in general we have no notion of substance if we do not know what forms substance in bodies. Indeed, we could not know that some substance was necessary to bodies if we had no notion of substance.

585. As someone said not long ago, to demonstrate that we possess the notion of substance is to beg the question.(72) We have to ask those who deny the existence of the notion of substance how they can deny what they do not know.(73) As I have noted many times, the idea of substance is a fact witnessed to by the human race, including those who deny it in words. Even if mankind were deceiving itself, and believed it possessed an idea that it did not in fact have, it would still be necessary for it to think it had it. But thinking it has an idea, and having one, are equivalent because an apparent idea is no less an idea than any other. Further than this one cannot go.

586. First, we must ascertain the facts by verifying our cognitions and thoughts about substance. It is these cognitions or thoughts which must be explained.

One fact is this: the mind thinks of substance. To say: it is an illusion, or it is a false thought, gets us nowhere and is irrelevant to our discussion. Our mind has its thoughts, true or false, illusory or real, and it is our task to explain their origin. The philosopher must indicate the cause of what the mind thinks it does, as well as what it does. When we find the origin of the thoughts that we believe we have about substance, we shall be able to weigh their value and decide what legitimate use we can put them to. Their origin determines their authenticity and truth, or shows them to be spurious illusions - at least in their applications (it is impossible for them to be illusions per se). Our first step, therefore, is to analyse everything the human mind conceives about substance.

587. Substance is 'the energy by which an ens and all that it possesses actually exists', or 'the energy in which the actual existence of the ens is grounded'. The relationship between substance and accident is not fully developed in this definition, and will have to be dealt with later.

588. Let us analyse the concept to find how many ways the mind conceives this energy.

We note two elements:
1. the act of existence, or that energy by which an ens exists;(74)
2. the ens itself that exists (essence).

The distinction depends upon an abstraction, which is exactly what we need because we are speaking of what exists in the mind, not outside it. What is in the mind is not seen separately from other things except by means of abstraction which is incapable of producing division in things subsisting outside our spirit. Abstraction is a fact, an operation of the spirit. It is also a fact that many thoughts can be abstracted from a single thought. Although our attention is first directed to one entire thought through a single act, attention can then split into as many acts as there are parts of the thought to turn to. It would be unreasonable to object here, as modern sophists often do, that we are abusing abstraction in order to create imaginary entia. The objection is an attempt to evade the core of the question which requires us to explain the fact of abstraction and its products. We cannot prescind from abstraction, nor avoid noting and describing the different thoughts and concepts it forms and originates in our spirit. Whether ideas respond or not to something outside the mind, they remain ideas, and we have undertaken to explain them all as the title of this work indicates.

589. What modes can be assumed by our idea of substance?

1. We can think the energy, by which entia exist, in all its universality. In this case, we do not think any particular ens, but any possible ens whatsoever, without any determination except that necessary for its existence. This is the idea of substance in all its universality.

2. We can think the energy of an ens furnished with some generic determination. This is the idea of generic substance.(75)

3. We can think the energy predicated of a specifically determinate ens. In this case, we think the actual existence possible to the individual of a determinate species furnished with everything necessary to its existence, that is, with what is common and proper. When the mind thinks the possibility of such an individual's actual existence, without knowing whether it really exists, it has the idea of specific substance which is either an idea-exemplar or can be reduced to the state of idea-exemplar.

590. Before going further, let us examine carefully these three more or less abstract ideas of substance. We have called them: idea of substance in all its universality, idea of generic substance, and idea of specific substance.
In all three of these conceptions we think an individual, that is, a single, undivided ens, furnished with everything necessary for existence. The difference between the conceptions lies in the mode according to which each one is thought, that is, with or without its determinations.
A question may help to clarify the matter: when I think substance in all its universality, what am I thinking? What is comprised in this idea of substance in all its universality?

I think any ens whatsoever (an individual, therefore) that possesses the energy called actual existence. I am not asking to which class, or genus, or species it belongs; I think only its energy or actual existence. Along with this, I think implicitly that the ens is determinate with everything required for existence, without, however, mentally determining these determinations or properties or asking what they may be.

The idea of substance in all its universality contains, therefore: 1. the thought of actual existence; 2. the thought of the individual which exists; 3. the thought in all its universality of the determinations it must have in order to exist, that is, the thought that it must be complete, with everything necessary for existence. But there is no attempt to know what is necessary for making it a determinate ens, a complete type.
Similarly, these three elementary thoughts can be distinguished in the idea of generic substance: 1. the thought of an energy constituting its existence; 2. the thought of an ens possessing this energy in itself; 3. the thought of the determinations necessary in order that this ens be complete relative to existence, that is, an individual.

The third part of these two ideas is variable, and the different modes in which we mentally conceive the third element accounts for the difference between the two ideas.
In the idea of substance in all its universality we think the ens as having in itself all the determinations or properties necessary for existence, but without specifying these determinations in any way. In the idea of substance as a genus, however, we think certain generic determinations of the ens. For example, we think of a spiritual or corporeal substance. We are not thinking of an individual in all its universality, but of an individual of a determinate spiritual or corporeal genus.

Finally, the idea of specific substance, if full, contains the individual with all its determinate generic and proper characteristics. If I think the substance of an individual tree, and not of any tree whatsoever, I must think a tree furnished with all its distinct notes and characteristics.(76)

In all three ideas of substance, therefore, we think something totally determinate in its relationship to being. This thing, which lacks nothing except subsistence, I call 'individual'. An architect who designs a house with all that it needs for existence thinks a perfect house. Building it, he adds nothing to its idea, which already embraces every part of the house; what is new is the house itself which is given existence in itself without loss to the ideal existence in the mind of the person who has conceived and thought it out in all its details.
Hence, we can think the individual in all its universality when we think all that is necessary for an ens to exist, but without determining any of its characteristics.
We can think the generic individual when, in addition to what is necessary in general for its existence, we begin to think of the generic qualities of an ens.
Finally, when we add specific to generic qualities in addition to what is necessary in general for its existence, we can think the specific individual. In a word, we can think 1. any individual whatsoever, 2. an individual of a determinate genus, and 3. a special individual.

If I think the energy by which an individual can subsist, I think substance in all its universality; thinking the energy by which an individual of a given genus can exist, I think substance as genus; thinking the energy by which an individual of a given species can exist, I think of special substance. The idea of substance in all its universality, of generic and of specific substance are always ideas of energy constituting actual existence, which can only pertain to individuals.

591. I cannot think the actual existence of an ens unless I think simultaneously that this ens receives every determination necessary for its existence.
The idea of individual, therefore, is intimately connected and associated with the idea of substance. Explaining the origin of the idea of substance presents us with the explanation of the origin of the idea of individual.
But there can be no other ideas of substance or individual in our mind except the three we have listed: substance in all its universality, generic substance and special substance. Our next task is to describe the origin of each of them.

592. Nevertheless, we have not yet explained all our thoughts about substances.
Besides ideas, we form judgments on the real subsistence of substances.
Like the architect with a complete idea of the house he is about to construct, we present ourselves with an (as yet) non-subsistent ens in our idea. As long as we think only of the possible subsistence of the individual, we have still not embraced anything that really subsists.
But let us grant that an individual corresponding to our idea really subsists, and that we can perceive it. How does our perception take place? We have already seen that we affirm, by means of a judgment, the subsistence of the individual we think of in the idea.

Let us be quite clear that the act by which we say, 'Such a thing subsists', is an operation of the spirit essentially different from simple intuition. It unites to the idea of the thing a persuasion or belief in the subsistence of what has previously been thought as possible.(77)
It follows that as there are three ideas of substance, so there are three judgments that we can make about the subsistence of these substances in so far as we can judge: 1. that a substance subsists; 2. that a substance of a given genus subsists; 3. that a substance of a given species subsists.

593. Our thoughts about substances consist in ideas and judgments, both of which embrace three species: the idea of substance in all its universality, the idea of generic substance, the idea of special substance; judgment about the subsistence of a substance in all its universality, judgment about the subsistence of a substance of a given kind, judgment about the subsistence of a special substance.
We have to describe the origin of all these ideas and judgments, showing how they are possible to the human mind.

594. Let us see if we can facilitate our study by avoiding separate treatment of each of the ideas and judgments we form about substances. First, we can lighten our work by noting the connection which binds the three ideas in such a way that one gives rise to another. If, therefore, we can explain the origin of one of them, we have explained the origin of the other two.

Let us take for granted the idea of special substance. In order to possess the ideas of generic substance and of substance in all its universality, it is now sufficient to abstract them from the idea of special substance which provides us with the idea of the actual existence of an ens, fully determinate in its common and proper characteristics. If we set aside its special characteristics we are left with generic subsistence; setting aside generic determinations, we are left with the universalised idea. In a word, the ideas of generic substance and of substance in all its universality are only abstractions of the idea of special substance. When we have explained this, we will have explained the other two.
We have already used this method in clarifying the status quaestionis (cf. vol. 1, 41-44): explain one idea, and the rest can be explained by means of abstraction. If we restrict the problem to that of substance, it can now be stated as follows: 'We need to explain the idea of specific substance; the explanation of other ideas of substance will then be clear.'

595. What is the origin, therefore, of the idea of special substance?
As we search for the origin of this idea, we find it connected with the judgments we make on the subsistence of entia. If we focus our attention on this connection and penetrate its meaning, we notice that a single explanation will satisfy two questions: what is the origin of the idea of special substance? and what is the origin of the judgments we make on the subsistence of substances?

We have already pointed out that we make three judgments about the subsistence of substances. If we consider their connection, we shall see how the same difficulty is present in all three.
In judging the subsistence: 1. of any individual ens whatsoever, 2. of an individual of a certain genus or 3. of a certain species, we have to be prompted by some reason which determines us to affirm the subsistence of individuals.
This reason is our perception of the individuals, and once found it explains how these judgments are formed by our spirit. In all three kinds of judgments, therefore, the single difficulty we have to solve consists in showing what prompts us to say 'Such an individual subsists.'

596. We must, therefore: 1. indicate the manner in which we form the idea of specific substance; 2. show the reason leading us to judge of the subsistence of these substances. This is our problem, stated simply (cf. 594-595). But granted the connection between the two questions, it can be put even more simply if we take account of the reason prompting us to posit the subsistence of an individual.

We say to ourselves, 'Such and such an individual subsists.' Included in the perception of this individual is the idea of substance. But substance is simply the energy by which an ens exists. We cannot therefore conceive a subsistent ens without conceiving it together with the energy by which it exists, that is, with its substance.
Hence the two questions can be reduced to one: how can I judge that an ens subsists? If I make such a judgment and perceive this ens, I inevitably perceive its substance and easily form or rather have already formed an idea of it.

597. We have already explained carefully how intellective perception of individuals takes place, and how we form our ideas about them as we make the judgments affirming their subsistence (cf. 528-534). We are now in a position, therefore, to sum up and resolve our present question:

1. We form ideas of individuals by means of the judgment we make about their subsistence.
2. We can draw the abstract idea of special substance from the intellective perception of individuals. From this idea we can draw the more abstract idea of generic substance, from which in turn we can draw the idea of substance in all its universality.
3. The intellective perception of individuals has already been explained.

No difficulty remains, therefore, in explaining both the origin of the three ideas and of the judgments we make about substances.

(72) 'I know I am guilty of begging the question when I discuss such a matter. I set out to see if the notions of substance and cause are present to the human spirit while I, a human spirit, suppose these notions before me; furthermore, I posit them after defining them. It is clear that I am begging my own question, just as it is clear that I am objecting to myself. As Pascal put it so well: "Evidence is not to be proved"' (Cousins, Fragments philosophiques, p. 425).

(73) Sceptics create their own difficulty in imagining that idea is external, and mediated. On the contrary, it is totally interior and immediate and, as such, outside controversy. In other words, a fact.

(74) The energy that constitutes the actual existence of entia and the energy by which they exist are one and the same. The first expression explains the second. In a word, we must not make two things of the energy we are speaking about and the actual existence of entia. The actual existence is the energy itself.

(75) It is necessary to recall what has been said about genera and species (cf. 499-500), and the way in which we mentally conceive these classifications.

(76) We shall see later (cf. 646-659), in dealing with genera and species, that it is not necessary for me to offer another class of ideas of substance to accommodate imperfect individuals in a species. Ideas of this kind are ideas of perfect individuals (specific, complete idea) from which certain valuable characteristics have been removed.Moreover, we are not speaking here of any affirmation about subsistent individuals; we think these not with ideas alone, but with our judgment. We shall speak of subsistent individuals later.

(77) To object that in doing this we acquire a new idea, the idea of subsistence, would be out of place because this was already present; without it, we cannot think 'An ens can subsist.' Persuasion about real existence is something entirely distinct from mental conception; the nature of persuasion is totally different from that of ideas.