Part Four
Origin of Pure Ideas, which derive nothing
from Feeling
CHAPTER 3
A further explanation of the idea of substance
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Necessity of the explanation |
598. What has been said so far could seem more than sufficient. However, granted the times, it may not be sufficient for everybody. It will certainly not suffice for those who have already accepted any of the various opinions about the origin of the idea of substance and grown used to them. Their opinion will be as tenacious as it is ingenious, like that of the German school, which is rapidly establishing itself in France and Italy, and could extend to the whole world if it puts down strong, vigorous roots here.
I will therefore explain further the teaching I have given, which alone I believe to be true. I will try to make it clearer so that even the prejudiced who do not find it wholly convincing (a very difficult task) will see it as strong and unassailable.
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Systems dealing with the origin of the idea of substance |
599. In the course of this work I have already touched upon four systems offered by philosophers to overcome the difficulty of the origin of the idea of substance. They are:
I. Some philosophers, unable to extricate themselves from the maze, denied the existence of the idea. Their argument can be reduced to the following: 'I cannot explain the origin of the notion of substance; therefore it does not exist.' The reader will know how to answer these philosophers.
II. Some tried to extract the idea from sensations. They claim to follow the facts, and argue as follows: 'All ideas must come from sensations because this alone is the source of all the knowledge we recognise in a human being. Therefore the idea of substance also must come from sensations.' Is this really the most perfect type of rigorously philosophical method in its search for facts?
III. Some said that the idea of substance must be innate because it could neither be denied nor come from sensations.
IV. Finally some, who saw that innate ideas today encounter very strong opposition, thought a third system possible, in addition to the systems which make the idea come from the senses or make it innate. The connection between the idea of substance and the idea of accidents (or accidental qualities) was, for them, so close that these ideas could not be separated. They took this as a primal fact; the human spirit therefore could not conceive one without the other. But the source of their argument is a psychological law, a law of the spirit itself. They do indeed call the connection between substance and accidents ontological, that is, self-contained, but mean that this connection appears such to the human spirit through a necessity intrinsic to the spirit. When they consider the connection relative to the human spirit which conceives and forms it, they call it psychological. In other words, 'The human spirit makes the idea of substance emanate from itself when it perceives accidents, but in such a way that the connection to the accidents appears necessary.' The necessity is objective but only apparently so, which means that it is not objective. It appears objective to the spirit because the spirit cannot see it in any other way. The necessity is subjective objectivity and, they say, we can go no further than this.
A recent disciple of this system (which in the last analysis is Kant's, whatever its modifications), speaks about universal notions, among which he includes the notion of substance.
He says:
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1. 'These notions have a psychological, not a logical origin'; 2. 'No one can ever find the explanation of any of these truths', and 3. 'As soon as I conceive the truth, I conceive it as immutable, eternal, absolute'. |
Hence he describes it as coming from the soul, but offers only necessity, fact, as the sole explanation of its origin. The nature of the spirit is such that of itself it extracts the idea or somehow sees the idea when it sees the sensible qualities. In the eyes of critical philosophy, this mysterious fatalism is where human research ends. In plain language, these philosophers are saying: 'The general notion of substance does not come from the senses, nor is it innate, nor can we say it is nothing. It is therefore an appearance (real only relative to us) which emanates from the nature of our spirit.'(78)
600. This system, whatever its guise, is idealism and scepticism. It rests finally on this argument: 'There are only four systems capable of explaining the idea of substance. The first three are untenable. Therefore the last is true.'
The argument would be acceptable provided the absurdity of a fifth system were demonstrated. Unfortunately, this does not occur to the mind of our philosophers. But if they do not show the absurdity of a fifth system to explain the idea of substance, their method is not an example of modesty but of incredible presumption, though they see themselves as the first to restrain philosophical self-confidence and make philosophy solid and circumspect. Consequently they forget to add 'as far as we know' to the first part of their proposition. This little rider would have been sufficient to make them choose a totally different route.
In my opinion, a modest, discreet philosopher would argue as follows: 'As far as I know, there are only four systems capable of explaining the idea of substance. The first three raise very serious difficulties; the fourth results in idealism and scepticism, which is repugnant to rational natures and therefore flawed. Consequently, I must admit that I am unable to explain the idea of substance.'
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Another way of finding the origin of the idea of substance |
601. But there is indeed a fifth system, which I have explained and which avoids all the difficulties of the four systems known to and exhausted by modern philosophy.
The idea of substance comes from the form of human cognitions, that is, from the idea of being.
In this system the idea of substance is neither denied, nor deduced from sensations, nor seen as innate nor proclaimed as apparent and subjective. It is deduced from the first, essential idea of all ideas which alone is innate and, as we shall see better elsewhere (Section 6), justified of itself because it is truth itself.
Hence, the idea of substance is conceived precisely when we have occasion to deduce it from the first idea. This occasion is given us at the very moment of our first sensations and perceptions. Although we do not conceive it abstractly, isolated and free of every other addition, we nevertheless conceive it. Only later, when we begin to philosophise and make abstractions from our concepts, do we acquire it in its abstract, pure form.
This idea therefore has logical as well as psychological antecedents, as Cousin puts it; it does not, as it were, emanate through blind fatalism from the soul. It is deduced, and can be assigned an explanation which justifies it and proves it true. I will now give a more detailed explanation of this idea of substance.
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First proposition: if our understanding conceives, it conceives something |
602. This has already been demonstrated: 'conceiving nothing' and 'not conceiving' mean the same thing.
If our understanding cannot conceive and operate without an object, it must conceive either an ens (through the principle of knowledge, cf. 565) or something. These words are the most universal of all; their opposite is nothing. As we saw, our understanding is 'the faculty of conceiving ens, that is, something having an existence of its own' (cf. 480-482).(79)
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Second proposition: everything can be an object of the understanding |
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Definition |
603. Consequently, 'everything can be an object of the understanding' because everything has a species of existence proper to itself. To say that a thing exists but has no existence is a contradiction in terms (principle of contradiction).
Whatever has no existence either in itself or in another is not thinkable; it is not an object of the understanding. We can, therefore, say frankly that it does not exist, because 'having no existence' and 'not existing' mean the same thing; it is nothing.
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Objection to the principle of contradiction |
604. At this point it is most important for the reader to see the validity of my argument.
Followers of the fourth system will, I am sure, retort: 'You invoke the principle of contradiction to show that the intellect, the faculty of being, can conceive everything. But how do you prove the force of this principle? According to the ancients, the proof was complete because rooted in the principle of contradiction; granted the force of the principle, it was impossible to proceed further. However, we find the argument gratuitous and deny it a parte sui. Furthermore, the nature of the argument requires you to justify the principle of contradiction. In your desire to convince the sceptics, you show that the idea of substance is something objectively true, not merely subjective and apparent, nor a blind, fatal emanation of spiritual nature. If you now introduce the principle of contradiction into your argument as something objectively true, you are supposing that objective truth exists. On the contrary, we maintain that the idea of substance is ultimately subjective and apparent, because there is no possibility in the human being of any knowledge whatsoever endowed with really objective truth. If you begin by begging the question, we are not surprised at your later adding to the idea of substance the same objective truth that you gratuitously bestow on the principle of contradiction.'
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Reply. — The principle of contradiction defended |
605. The objectors fail to note that I deduced the principle of contradiction from the idea of being by showing it to be one with this idea. They have not felt the force of this idea, which is justified by itself, and with its light satisfies and conquers all the doubts of those who gaze directly upon it. Without wishing to repeat what I have already said or anticipating what I will say in Section 6, let me use a more gentle but equally capable way of persuading (if that is possible) our sceptics. This will reinforce and profit the truth I am defending, which becomes clearer and more resplendent the more we see its many sides and aspects.
The only postulate I must be granted is 'the use of language'. If I am forbidden this, I could not add one more word. My adversaries would have rather unkindly forced me to silence, while they themselves could proclaim with full voice that they are right, as if language, or certainly proclamation, was reserved solely to them.
Granted then the use of language, when I say 'a thing', 'a thing' has to be understood; if on the contrary 'a non-thing, nothing' were understood, then the language allowed me would simply be mockery. The use of language demands that what is said is said. When I say 'bread', I say 'bread' and when I say 'stone', I say 'stone'.
If I say a word and immediately retract and deny it, I have not said anything; I have recalled and cancelled what I said. If I draw a line on paper and then erase it, the paper is clean again. If you allowed me to draw something provided that I immediately erase it, no one would say I have been allowed to draw. Similarly, if you grant me the use of language only on condition that every word I say must be immediately withdrawn and cancelled, I have not been granted the use of language. Language is not a casual conjunction of sounds; it is an order of sounds indicating ideas. The possibility of my use of language requires that I avoid contradictory, contrasting expressions. A language composed of expressions of this kind is not the language whose use is granted me.
Hence, if I speak about 'a thing that does not exist in any way', I am not concerned whether the phrase is logical or not. I am saying that it is not language because it says nothing. I am saying that the person who says it, is making noises, not words, and making noises even better than the person who retracts and denies the word he has spoken. In fact, the meaning attached to the word 'thing' is precisely the idea of some existence. When I say 'thing' therefore, I express the idea of some existence, and when I add, 'that does not exist in any way', I destroy the idea I first posited. The word 'thing' is now as if I had never said it; the phrase is similar to the algebraic formula a-a, which equals zero.
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The demonstration concluded |
606. Granted all this, my proposition that 'everything can be the object of the understanding',(80) seems clear; every system, because it requires only one postulate, must be granted by all who speak. Sceptics indeed have never shown themselves disposed to silence, any more than all the other classes and kinds of philosophers.
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Third proposition: the understanding can perceive qualities only in a subject in which they exist |
607. The reason is that the understanding's proper mode of perceiving is to perceive things in the existence with which they are endowed (cf. 602).
Sensible qualities, however, do not have any existence in themselves, but in a subject different from us.
The understanding therefore (which can perceive anything whatsoever because anything whatsoever has some kind of existence (cf. 603-606)) must, in perceiving sensible qualities, perceive them together with the subject in which they exist. Otherwise it would not perceive them; they would be imperceptible - they are perceptible only because their subject is perceptible.
On the other hand, let us suppose that the understanding does perceive them. In this case it would perceive something (cf. 602). If it perceives something, it perceives an existence, something existing. But something existing is the same as saying a substance, because substance is the act by which an ens exists (cf. 587).
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The distinction between Hume's idealism and Berkeley's |
608. My argument runs counter to the idealists of Hume's school.
Hume, unlike Berkeley, was not satisfied with positing the doubt that bodies may be nothing more than ideas. He went further and wondered whether perhaps ideas could exist by themselves, without any subject, so that the whole universe was simply an infinite number of ideas in random motion, like waves of a great ocean or atoms in an immense vacuum.
There are two questions therefore: 1. can sensible qualities (whether ideas or anything else) be conceived without a subject? 2. is the subject of sensible qualities (whether mere acts of the spirit or not) the human spirit or something different from the spirit (bodies)?
Berkeley is content to say that sensible qualities (which for him are synonymous with sensations) exist only in the spirit. Our spirit is therefore the only subject of sensible qualities, and there are no sensible qualities outside the spirit. This means that Berkeley recognises the need for a subject; sensible qualities could not naturally exist alone. Consequently, they can be thought only in something else, that is, in a substance.
Hume however, in contrast to Berkeley, decisively rejects the need for substance. We must therefore first refute Hume's idealism and show the obvious contradiction inherent in his opinion that sensible qualities exist but without a subject or substance in which they exist.
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Hume's idealism refuted |
609. Let us suppose that Hume's thesis is true, that sensible qualities can be conceived alone, without a subject. What is the result?
If we thought sensible qualities alone existed in the universe, we would certainly conceive (according to the hypothesis) that something exists; these sensible qualities, existing alone, would be the object of our understanding.
A Humist could however come into conflict with a follower of the old philosophers. Tasting victory right from the start, he would probably conclude: 'It is not true therefore that sensible qualities, in order to exist, need a subject in which to exist. That is a prejudice of the ancient philosophers. This subject, this substance is simply a product of their imagination. Why can't sensible qualities exist by themselves, having their existence in themselves and not in something else?' The dialogue might continue as follows:
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Follower of ancient philosophers: I grant that once you have boastfully rid yourself of old prejudices, you have formed the idea of sensible qualities existing by themselves and making up the whole universe. I presume that I may analyse this new and wonderful idea of sensible qualities in order to understand it better. You agree, I am sure, that analysis, or the breaking-down of our ideas, is the process by which we gain deep knowledge of them. Is it true therefore that these sensible qualities, which you conceive as unattached to any hint of substance, exist? Humist: Yes. They are in fact the only things that exist in the universe. Follower of ancient philosophers: That means they exist in themselves, because you have excluded any kind of subject, any kind of substance in which they might exist. Humist: Yes. This is precisely the discovery of the new philosophy, Hume's discovery. Follower of ancient philosophers: Before we go any further, I must recall what the ancients understood by substance. Do you know the definition of this entity, which is perhaps, as you say, a product of their uneducated imagination, but necessary if our reasoning is to progress. Humist: The Scholastics defined it as 'that which subsists per se'(81) (ens quod per se subsistit), that is, not through something else, like accidents, which subsist (according to their expression) in substance and therefore through substance. Follower of ancient philosophers: If that is the case, you yourself grant substance. Humist: How? Follower of ancient philosophers: Although you claim to have removed all substance from sensible qualities, you have yourself made these qualities subsist in and through themselves, which is precisely the definition of substance. You have changed them into substances because you supposed them to exist in and through themselves, independently of everything else. You have got yourself in a tangle and it is difficult to get out. You don't deny sensible qualities. You acknowledge their existence, and then say they exist by themselves. Any addition, you say, would be the result of arbitrary imagination. In other words, you are saying that sensible qualities are substances because substance is that which exists in itself and through itself without need to think it in and through something else. Consequently it is clearly impossible to grant the existence of anything whatsoever and at the same time deny substance. The proposition, 'Sensible qualities alone exist; substance does not exist', is a clear contradiction in terms; it means, 'Sensible qualities are existing substances, and substance does not exist.' This is the great thought of your master, Hume, fully exposed and stripped of its multiple, over-expressive words which often hide the contradictions inherent in arguments. I really do not see any way of escape. Your argument leads you in a direction totally contrary to the one you wished to take at the start. You declared yourself an enemy of substance - an obsolete, useless word devoid of meaning -and a supporter of sensible qualities alone, or accidents (as the ancients normally call them). But the result is the opposite of what you intended. You have, as it were, enthroned sensible qualities and wished them alone to rule the world, yet unawares have found them changed into substances. Only substances exist now; you have destroyed all the sensible qualities you held so dear, by changing their nature and, as it were, annihilating them through the honour you gave them. In fact, if sensible qualities are substances, as you come to claim in your philosophy, you have posited a thesis directly opposite to the one you intended to defend. Your thesis is: 'Only sensible qualities exist', but the thesis you have demonstrated is: 'Only substances exist'. If in reality sensible qualities exist in and through themselves, only substances are present in the universe. In conclusion, I think I see the origin of your error. Instead of upholding the ancients' definition of substance, you have contested an imperfect, gross idea of substance conceived by you. In order to constitute a substance, you have required something solid and material, that is, more than what is really required; in short, you have turned some supposed nature into an idea by giving to certain normal words a different, metaphorical sense to be understood with great caution. For example, the words 'foundation', 'substrate' and 'substance' itself, understood etymologically, mean something located under something else, as if what forms substance lay in a place more internal and intimate than the place of the accidents. These are all dangerous ideas and expressions, capable of confusing minds when ideas and expressions are not explained and understood. |
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Origin of the idea of accident |
610. I am not sure how a Humist would reply to this argument. In my opinion, it proves rigorously that if something exists, a substance must necessarily exist, and that if we think the existence of something, we necessarily think a substance.
Let us suppose however that our Humist is a reasonable, discerning person, and has accepted the observations made by the follower of the ancient philosophers. Let us also suppose that after solving the apparently insoluble opinions that divided them prior to their discussion, they have overcome their original mutual antipathy and are ready to continue their dialogue.
What still remains to be said to the Humist? How could both of them, now bound together by feelings of esteem and friendship, gradually be guided to the same doctrine by evidence of the truth which is sparked off, as it always is, by friendly arguments?
This, I think, is how the discussion could develop and how they could finally reach full agreement. To make the presentation simpler, I will use 'H' for the Humist and 'F' for the follower of the ancient philosophers.
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H: I'm grateful for your observations about Hume's philosophy which I had chosen as my guide. I have no reply. However, I think we are still a long way from the core of the problem. I grant that we cannot deny the existence of substances, in the sense that we have defined and explained them. Nevertheless, I do deny the distinction between substances and so-called accidents. It may be impossible to deny substances but you have not shown that it is impossible to deny accidents. In fact, accidents could themselves be substances, which would mean that the ancient schools' distinction between substance and accident does not exist. They defined substance as 'that which exists through itself', and then added 'and supports the accidents' (ens quod per subsistit, et sustinet accidentia). In short, sensible qualities are all that exists, whether they are called substances or something else. This is the core of Hume's philosophy. F: Your difficulty will be solved by the analysis we began, and interrupted, of your concept of sensible qualities according to Hume's system. In your concept, sensible qualities are like substances: they exist independent of everything else. Now, do all the qualities exist in this way, or only one? H: All of them. If I said a few, I would be accepting the distinction between substance and accidents, which I want to eliminate from philosophy as troublesome. F: But when we say 'sensible qualities of a body', are these qualities grouped together to form a single ens, the body, or do they exist in different places without a bond to unite them? H: They are united and cannot be divided. A body cannot be broken up in such a way that the quality of whiteness is in one place, the weight in another, the sound elsewhere, etc. If the qualities are not united, they cannot even be conceived as subsistent. F: Right. Consequently all the sensible qualities noted in a body have something in common, that is, the energy which makes them subsist, and subsist joined together, in such a way that once separated they can no longer be thought as retaining the energy by which they exist. H: I agree. F: Now, note carefully whether the following inference is correct: the common energy making these qualities subsist is neither any one of these qualities, nor all the qualities together. H: Yes, that's true. F: In fact it is so true that the energy, if it were one of the qualities, would make all the others subsist, that is, this quality would contain them all, which is absurd. Alternatively, the quality would at least have to be distinguished from all the others because it alone, not the others, would be the energy. H: That's correct. F: Again, all the qualities are not the energy because they are multiple and the energy is one. This has to be the case if it has to join all the qualities into one. H: I fully agree. F: All your sensible qualities therefore have a common element which is not one of the qualities nor all of them; it is the energy which makes them subsist, makes them exist in and through themselves; in a word, it is substance. H: Yes, all right. F: But are they distinct from each other? H: Certainly. The characteristics proper to each sensible quality are the distinguishing elements. F: What do you mean? H: Well, red is different from yellow; it's another colour. Sound differs from colour, and similarly for all the other qualities of things. These differences are clear, and they are best explained simply by indicating them to the imagination. F: Very good. Do you agree then that in the qualities which, according to you, existed alone in the universe, there is something in common and something proper, and that the common element is the energy which unites them and makes them subsist? H: Yes. F: I repeat therefore: we agree that red, yellow, etc., different sounds, odours, etc., and all other qualities have this in common: they have in them an energy, a force, through which they exist. Indeed, when we say a thing exists, we are expressing an act, an action, a force, while non-existence expresses the absence of every action, of every force whatsoever. H: But I wish to make an observation here. 'To exist' expresses an energy or, better still, existence is synonymous with a certain energy. But I would presume you do not consider the existence and the energy as two different things. The energy we are discussing is existence; it is one, individual, identical thing, an act itself. This is important. F: I agree entirely, and the explanation is as follows: saying that all the qualities equally have the energy which constitutes their existence, and that only the characteristics you have indicated distinguishes them, is exactly the same as saying that the proper, different characteristics which distinguish the qualities from each other exist through the energy all equally have in common, as you yourself have admitted. H: But aren't you really saying that the characteristics exist because they exist, because they have the energy called existence? You're not really saying anything. F: I may not be saying anything new but what I am saying is clear. If our discussion begins by saying they do exist, we cannot later deny, as the argument develops, that they exist. If we did, all reasoning would be impossible; we would not be reasoning but simply uttering sounds at random without any meaning; we would play at building up and knocking down. But if it is true that the sensible qualities all exist together, it is also true that they have an energy through which they exist; possession of this energy is, as I have observed, synonymous with existence. I ask you therefore, can what is proper be simultaneously common, and what is common, simultaneously proper? H: Not at all. F: Do you know then what the ancient philosophers meant by 'accident'? H: Well, they defined substance as 'that which subsists through itself and supports the accidents', and accident as 'that which subsists in or through another' (quod in alio subsistit tamquam in subjecto). F: Haven't we also seen that the proper characteristics distinguishing the sensible qualities from each other exist through one single energy which makes them exist together and constitutes their existence? H: Yes. F: What prevents us therefore calling 'substance' the energy through which the characteristics, or rather the qualities we are discussing, exist, and what prevents us calling 'accidents' sensible qualities in so far as they clearly differ from one another and have another mode of existence? H: If that is all you mean by the distinction between substance and accidents, I have no objection, but who on earth understands this distinction simply as an abstraction? F: Any good philosopher. Take any of the ancients you like. All I have done is to remind you of the old definitions you yourself have indicated. Keeping strictly to these, I think I can now conclude as follows. We have to acknowledge two things in the qualities of a body, which you have imagined as existing through themselves: 1. a force constituting their existence, which must be a single force common to them all, and 2. the qualities which exist, each with its own characteristic, through the force. This is exactly the distinction made by the ancients. They distinguished two elements: the first they called 'substance', the second 'accidents'. If you want to be coherent with yourself, you must confess that although you express yourself differently from them, your teaching is the same. Consequently, your proposition, 'Only sensible qualities exist', necessarily implies a contradiction. Although we pretended that the proposition was true, and that only sensible qualities existed, we found, after analysing these imaginary sensible qualities, that they necessarily resulted from two elements: something which makes them exist (imparts the act of existence to them, united as they are) and something which exists (receives existence). In other words we found something which is existence itself, the very energy of existence, that which exists in and through itself (substance); we also found something which this thing has, something which is not existence, and therefore exists through the energy which makes it exist, that is, something that exists through and in this energy (accidents). Hence, your proposition ('Only qualities exist') is just as absurd as the other proposition, 'Qualities exist but do not have existence'. Look at it another way. We are talking about ideas. Analyse the words of your proposition. When you say 'qualities', you do not know whether they exist or not, but when you say 'exist', you express and bestow energy upon them and make them exist. These two things are therefore distinct from each other even in the words you use. You could in fact think and name the qualities without thinking that they exist in reality. In this case you would not be thinking of the substance. On the other hand, if you thought of the existing qualities and of the energy through which they exist, that is, through which they become capable of existing, you would also think of their substance, through which alone they exist. I think I can now explain why modern philosophy has arrived at the extraordinarily bizarre opinion that there is no distinction between substance and accidents. |
611.
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H: Tell me, just as you have explained how Hume wanted to annihilate substances. F: The cause, I think, was an erroneous understanding of the ancient teaching. We must admit that in recent times Scholasticism has taught ancient philosophy very materialistically. The Schools have presented the language, or jargon if you prefer, of ancient philosophy rather than the philosophy itself. In addition, the world was for many reasons ill-disposed towards ancient philosophy. As a result, new philosophers mocked and mangled it for the sake of bon ton, as the French say, without any attempt to understand it. If some silly, ridiculous meaning suggested itself to their mind, even when they first heard the Scholastic dicta and axioms, they avidly accepted and granted it, without any investigation, as the most suitable for their intention. They were happy to have found an opportunity to devour and ridicule such arid teaching; in place of ancient authority, they could now triumphantly proclaim their new discoveries. They could boast about a new light, and with one fine, authoritative leap change their lowly position as disciples to that of ambitious masters of the universe. Apply the general practice to those who tried to do away with the ancient distinction between substance and accidents, and you will find that they were battling against a distinction drawn from their own head rather than a true distinction. They imagined that substance and accident meant things totally separate from each other, like two real, equal elements which make up a third thing. These two elements were taken as two things and therefore as two substances. They were unaware that this contradicted the Scholastic definition of these two elements. If I think some existent thing, I have the idea of something indivisible. I can however mentally analyse my concept of this thing, and thus break it down. In other words, I turn my attention to a part of it and ignore the rest. This certainly does not mean that any parts I discover in the concept are separable in se, or that as parts they have the same nature; they may simply be aspects, or internal or external relationships present in the concept of the thing. Thus, the distinction between substance and accident is made solely by mental abstraction; the mind sometimes considers a thing under the aspect of energy of existence, sometimes under the other respect of the mode of existence, prescinding from the energy through and in which the mode exists. |
I conclude. It is impossible to think an actual ens(82) without distinguishing in it 1. the energy of existence, and 2. the mode of existence, that is, accidents. To think an actual ens means to have the concept of an actual ens. In that concept the mind can always distinguish, if it wishes, the activity causing existence, and the mode of existence. Hence, we form two elementary concepts of 1. substance, and 2. accidents or, more generally, mode of existence. This distinction, made by the mind, is really contained in the idea of the thing itself and is therefore true and real.
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An observation on the invariability of substance |
612. As far as I can see, this argument renders undeniable the distinction between what exists relatively in and through itself and what exists relatively through and in something else, in other words, substance and accidents. The whole force of the argument consists in a simple explanation of the notions of these two things, accompanied by a determination not to introduce into the discussion about them any imaginary, foreign element which serves only to distort them.
If the ideas of substance and of accident are considered as two abstracts in which the thing itself is thought at one moment as the force that makes the thing exist and at another as the mode in which it exists (prescinding from the force), the distinction under discussion is no longer difficult, mysterious or repugnant.
Our imagination however, which acts on and, as it were, plays with our ideas, easily adds something extra to the simplicity of our ideas. In this case, our first, clear ideas of substance and accident become confused. We mix with them properties which may indeed follow but are not the ideas themselves. One of these properties is the invariability of substance and the variability of accident. These two, unnecessary additions must be understood with great care and discernment because the clarity and simplicity of our notions depend on how, at the start of our reasonings, we strip them precisely of all that is unnecessary.
613. Let us suppose that the discussion we described earlier now turns on this secondary property, so to speak, of substance and accidents. Beginning with the Humist, the dialogue would, I think, proceed more or less as follows.
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A: According to ancient teaching, substance is something invariable; accidents, variable. If, according to the hypothesis, the sensible qualities existed through themselves, they would not be variable. Red could not change into yellow without being destroyed, and the same would be true for all the other qualities. We cannot say therefore that, in Hume's hypothesis, these sensible qualities are accidents; they might cease to exist, but could never change. B: Before I reply, you must recall the definition of substance and accident. A: Substance is that which exists through itself; accident, that which exists in and through something else. B: Note, the definition says no more than that, so do not add to these notions anything not contained in their definition. We must remember that the first characteristic of substance, which forms the essence of substance, is existence through itself relative to the accidents. This means that we ourselves think some existent thing without a subject other than itself, because substance is the activity of its existence.(83) On the other hand the essence of an accident consists in its existing in something else as in a subject. This means that an accident is an abstract concept in which we think the mode of a thing's existence and prescind from the activity which makes it exist. Hence we can think the accident really exists only when we think of this mode of existence joined with the activity that makes it exist, that is, with its substance or (if we prefer) with the substance in which it exists. Now, I have shown that a sensible quality, as imagined by Hume, can be only a thing in which we think 1. an activity constituting an actual existence, and 2. a particular mode of existing, a mode which exists only through the activity. Consequently I have shown that when analysed, Hume's idea consists of a substance and an accident, that is, of the activity of existence itself and the term of this activity, and that the term exists only through and in the activity. After this, if we allot other properties to substance and accident, we have to speak of them separately and see whether they derived from that property or not, that is, from the essential, primal characteristic. And if these properties which are attributed to substance and accident are implicitly contained in the primal, essential property, they also must be essential to substance and accident. If however they do not derive from the primal property, they cannot be absolutely necessary to the notion of substance and accident. For example, in the case of variability, is what exists in something else as in a subject necessarily variable? If so, there is no problem; you have discovered a necessary property of accident, variability. If however it is unnecessary, you cannot conclude that variability is necessary to the concept of accident. And if through experience you know that accidents do in fact vary, you will say that this happens through some particular circumstance, not because it must always happen like this. But to analyse Hume's concept of qualities which exist through themselves, and to show how that analysis provided a concept composed of the idea of substance and the idea of accident, I only needed to show that the two elements into which that idea breaks down present the notion of substance and accident respectively, according to the definition of these notions. My task therefore is complete |
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Sensible qualities do not exist through themselves, that is, they are not substances |
614. One question remains: despite everything we have so far said, do Hume's speculations improve the ancient notions of substance and accident? On the one hand, the ancients supposed that a totally invisible force underlay the sensible qualities which it maintained and supported. On the other, according to Hume's analysis, the opposite has to be said: the sensible qualities exist through themselves. In this case, although the concept of sensible qualities provides something existing in itself (the energy of existence, substance) and something existing in something else (mode of existence, accidents), there is nothing hidden or mysterious about this. Everything is clear and visible, just as the sensible qualities themselves are clear and visible.
The question vanishes if we note that the energy through which sensible qualities exist is not visible and cannot fall under our senses. It is seen and abstracted only by the power of our mind. In fact the Humist could be convinced by the following argument:
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B: We agree then that sensible qualities have properties by means of which, aided by our senses, we distinguish and know them? A: Yes. B: We also said that these properties, through which we distinguish sensible qualities from each other and which constitute the sensible qualities themselves, are accidents because they need some energy to exist, energy which is not present in their concept? A: Correct. B: Now, when I asked you to list these proper characteristics, do you remember what you replied? A: I appealed to the senses. I said that by means of our senses we clearly saw that yellow was not green, etc., that colour was not sound, and sound not taste. B: Good. Well, aren't yellow, green, red, sounds, tastes, odours, etc., truly sensible qualities? Or are sensible qualities something other than these? A: They are definitely sensible qualities. B: And can we call what does not fall under the senses a sensible quality? A: Certainly not. B: Now remember: characteristics by which sensible qualities are distinguished from each other are accidents, but these proper characteristics are everything that in the sensible qualities falls under our senses . Conversely, everything that falls under our senses is called sensible quality, and cannot be called this unless it falls under our senses. 'Accidents' therefore is a correct designation for sensible qualities; calling them 'substances' would be nonsense. We also saw that they truly exist and have a force which makes them exist. Hence in addition to sensible qualities (accidents) there is a substance, which does not fall under our senses, but is the energy producing sensations in us and our perceptions of sensible qualities. This substance is known only by the mind, which analyses the concept of 'existent sensible qualities'; only the mind, not the senses, has the aptitude to perceive ens. It is the concept therefore which, when analysed, gives us some sensible, existent thing. If we then divide the force of existence from what is sensible and think of it alone, we call it 'substance'. Because this force is an abstraction, it clearly cannot fall under our senses. I have demonstrated this by abstracting from it everything that falls under the senses. If I were to say that the substance, after the abstraction, is still sensible, I would be contradicting myself; I would destroy the thought I had first formed of it and would no longer be thinking. To form a thought and immediately cancel it is not thought; it is, as I have constantly stated, nothing. But when I turn my attention to sensible qualities, prescinding from the force that makes them exist, I think of things essentially sensible, that is, of accidents, not substance. |
Notes
(78) Even Galluppi has gone along with this, like all subjectivists.
(79) The intellect is the faculty of conceiving things as having an existence of their own. It can certainly be mistaken about the real existence of things. But even when mistaken, it conceives them as having an existence of their own.
(80) I think that even those who deny objective truth must accept my definition of understanding and the proposition that it can conceive everything, even though they are compelled to give these two propositions a subjective truth, as they call it, that is, apparent to the subject.
(81) Subsistence per se must be understood as subject. The definition will be discussed later in clearer and more precise terms.
(82) I am speaking only of limited entia.
(83) I define substance as 'the activity of existence of an ens', or 'a thing of which we can form the first concept without having to think of something different from the thing'. I say 'first concept' because if we thoroughly examine any created substance we will find that we cannot think it independently of a primal cause. But in the first concept we form of things, we think only of their essence, not of the conditions through which they exist. In the first concept, which is as it were outline knowledge of things, we do not expressly conceive their necessary bond with the first cause.
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