Section Five
Theory of the Origin of Ideas
PART FIVE
Origin of Non-Pure Ideas, which derive Something
from Feeling
from Feeling
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Section Five |
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Theory of the Origin of Ideas
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PART FIVE
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Origin of Non-Pure Ideas, which derive Something
from Feeling |
Contents
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Origin of the difference between the ideas of corporeal substance and spiritual substance |
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The opinion already expressed about substance and cause |
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The subject of the following investigation |
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The difference between the idea of cause and the idea of subject |
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A further analysis of sensations |
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The purpose of this analysis |
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There is in the sentient subject something other than the act by which sensations exist |
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The subject of sensible qualities must be an act involving more than these qualities |
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The difference between the ideas of substance and of essence |
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Definition of essence |
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Specific, generic and most universal essence |
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Specific essence |
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Generic essences |
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A more perfect definition of substance |
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Resumption of the question under discussion |
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A perceiving subject, MYSELF, exists |
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The concept of MYSELF, a perceiving subject, is entirely different from the concept of corporeal substance |
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There are two series of facts in us, in one of which we are active, in the other passive |
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We are cause and subject of active facts but only subject of passive facts |
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What we call 'body' is the proximate cause of our external sensations |
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Our spirit is not body |
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Simplicity of the spirit |
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Origin of our idea of corporeal substance |
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The way to demonstrate the existence of bodies |
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The existence of a proximate cause of our sensations |
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Any cause different from ourselves is a substance |
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The substance causing our sensations is immediately joined to them |
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The cause of our sensations is a limited ens |
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We name things as we conceive them intellectually |
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How to use words without making mistakes |
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Bodies are limited entia |
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God is not the proximate cause of our sensations |
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Bodies exist, and cannot be confused with God |
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Berkeley's idealism refuted |
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Reflections on the demonstration of the existence of bodies |
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Origin of the idea of our own body, as distinct from exterior bodies, through the fundamental feeling |
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First classification of the qualities observed in bodies |
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Classification of the corporeal qualities which immediately constitute the relationship of bodies with our spirit |
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The distinction between life and the fundamental feeling |
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Two ways of perceiving our body: subjective and extrasubjective |
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The subjective way of perceiving our body is twofold: the fundamental feeling and modifications of this feeling |
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Explanation of sensation in so far as it is a modification of the fundamental feeling of our body |
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Explanation of sensation in so far as it perceives external bodies |
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The difference between our own and external bodies |
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Description of the fundamental feeling |
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Existence of the fundamental feeling |
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The origin of sensations confirms the existence of the fundamental feeling |
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Explanation of St. Thomas' teaching that the body is in the soul |
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Physical relationship between soul and body |
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Origin of the idea of our body by means of modifications of the fundamental feeling |
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The analysis of sensation (contd.) |
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Definition of the fundamental feeling; how it is distinguished from the sense perception of bodies |
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Origin and nature of corporeal pleasure and pain |
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Relationship of corporeal pleasure and pain with extension |
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Confutation of the opinion: 'We feel everything in our brain and then refer the sensation to the relevant parts of our body' |
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Comparison of the two subjective modes in which we feel and perceive the extension of our own body |
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Further proof of the existence of the fundamental feeling |
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All our sensations are simultaneously subjective and extrasubjective |
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Touch as a universal sense |
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The origin of touch |
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The relationship between the two subjective ways of perceiving our body |
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Criterion for the existence of bodies |
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A more perfect definition of bodies |
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The general criterion for judgments about the existence of bodies |
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Application of the general criterion |
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The certainty of our own body is the criterion for the existence of other bodies |
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Application of the criterion to possible errors about the existence of some part of our body |
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Response to the idealists' argument based on dreams |
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Origin of the idea of time |
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The connection between what has already been said and what follows |
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The idea of time derived from consciousness of our own actions |
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The idea of time indicated by the actions of others |
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Pure idea of time |
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Idea of pure, indefinitely long time |
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Continuity in time |
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Everything that happens, happens by instants |
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The difficulty is not solved by the idea of time obtained by observation alone |
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We need to consider the simple possibilities of things, which must not be confused with real things |
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Granted the same intensity of action, observation presents time simply as a relationship of the quantity of different actions |
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The idea of pure time and of its indefinite length and divisibility are mere possibilities or concepts of the mind |
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The phenomenal idea of the continuity of time is illusory |
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The continuity of time is a mere possibility, that is, a concept of the mind |
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Distinction between what is absurd and what is mysterious |
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There is no succession in the duration of complete actions and therefore no idea of time, only of continuum, is present |
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The idea of being constituting our intellect is not subject to time |
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Origin of the idea of movement |
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We perceive movement in three ways |
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Active movement described |
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Passive movement described |
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Of itself, our movement is not sensible |
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Movement in our sense organs is sensible |
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Relationship between movement and sensation |
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Movement relative to touch-perception |
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Movement relative to sight-perception |
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Movement relative to aural-, smell and taste perceptions |
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The continuity of movement |
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Observation cannot perceive minute extensions |
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Observation provides only phenomenal continuity of movement |
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Real continuity of movement is absurd |
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Solution to the objection drawn from leaps in nature |
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Mental continuity of movement |
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Origin of the idea of space |
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Distinction between the ideas of space and of body |
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Extension, or space, is limitless |
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Space or extension is continuous |
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The real continuum |
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The continuum has no parts |
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The continuum can have limits |
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How the continuum can be said to be infinitely divisible |
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Origin of the idea of bodies by means of the extrasubjective perception of touch |
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Analysis of the extrasubjective perception of bodies in general |
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All our senses give us a perception of something different from us |
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All our senses give us a perception of something outside us |
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Touch perceives only corporeal surfaces |
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Touch together with movement gives the idea of three dimensional space |
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A review of the ways we perceive solid space |
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It is easier for us to think about the idea of space acquired by touch and movement than by the fundamental feeling and movement |
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Space perceived by the movement of touchsensation is identical with space perceived by the movement of the fundamental feeling |
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Identity between the extension of our body and of an external body is the basis of the communication between the idea we have of each of them |
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Continuation |
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The subjective sensation of our body is the means of corporeal, extrasubjective perception |
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The extension of bodies |
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Multiplicity is not essential to corporeal nature |
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The composite unity of our sensitive body |
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We cannot err about the unicity of our body |
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The multiplicity of the feeling of our body |
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Our perception of multiplicity in external bodies |
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The distinction between a body and a corporeal principle |
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Granted that corporeal sensation terminates in a continuous extension, a continuous real extension must also be present in the bodies producing it |
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The sensitive parts of our body do not produce a feeling extending beyond themselves |
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The extension of external bodies is neither greater nor smaller than the sensations they produce in us |
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Phenomenal continuity is present in our touchsensations |
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Elementary sensations are continuous |
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Elementary bodies have a continuous extension |
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Argument against simple points |
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The definition of bodies completed |
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We perceive external bodies by touch and movement |
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Origin of the idea of mathematical body |
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Origin of the idea of physical body |
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The particular criterion for the existence of external bodies |
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The criterion for external bodies is an application of the general criterion for the existence of bodies |
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Applications of the criterion for the existence of external bodies |
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The subjective and the extrasubjective content in external sensations |
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The necessity of this distinction |
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Some truths recalled |
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The understanding analyses sensations |
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The general principle for discerning what is subjective and what is extrasubjective in sensations |
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Application of the general principle to determine the extrasubjective part of sensations |
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The difference between primary and secondary properties of bodies |
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Application of the general principle to determine the subjective part of sensations |
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Resistant extension felt by touch |
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The extrasubjective sensation of the four sense organs |
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Origin of the idea of bodies through the extrasubjective perception of sight |
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The eye perceives a coloured surface |
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The coloured surface is a corporeal surface |
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The coloured surface is identical with the light-affected surface of the retina of the eye |
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The coloured surface we perceive is as big as the retina touched by light; but the colours are distributed in that surface in fixed proportions |
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The coloured surface cannot furnish the idea of solid space, even through the movement of colours taking place in space |
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Colour sensations are signs of the size of things |
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Our sight, associated with touch and movement, perceives the distances and qualities of movement of our body |
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Smell, hearing and taste compared with sight |
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The criterion of bodily size and shape |
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The criterion of the size of bodies is the size perceived by touch |
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Application of our criterion to illusions about the visible size of things |
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Application of the criterion to visual illusion about the distance of things |
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Application of the criterion to illusions about the position of things |
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The criterion of the shape of bodies is their shape as perceived by touch |
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Errors about the shape and size of bodies occasioned by sight |
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The extrasubjective perception of bodies by means of the five senses considered in their mutual relationship |
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The identity of space unites different sensations, so that one body is perceived |
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Our attention is chiefly engaged by the visual perception of bodies |
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Whether sensation gives us the species of corporeal things, or we perceive things themselves |
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Reid mistakenly denies all sensible species in the perception of bodies |
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Reid's distinction between sensation and perception |
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Galluppi improves Scottish philosophy |
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The contribution to Galluppi's theory of the foregoing analysis of sensation |
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The relationship between intellective and sense perceptions of bodies |
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The distinction between intellective perceptions and sense perceptions |
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Locke confuses sense perception of bodies with intellective perception
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Reid recognised better than others the activity of the spirit in the formation of ideas, but fell into the same error |
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Continuation |
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Whether we perceive bodies through the principles of substance and cause |
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Intellective perception was confused with sense perception even in the case of internal feeling and MYSELF |
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The natural disharmonies between the perception of our body as co-subject, and as agent foreign to the subject |
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The difference between the two principal ways of perceiving our body, that is, as co-subject and as an agent foreign to the subject |
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The similarity between the impression of external things and the sensation that follows |
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Materialism rebutted |
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The dividing line between physiology and psychology |
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Systems concerning the union of soul and body |
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The relationship between the external body and the body as co-subject |
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Matter of the fundamental feeling |
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