Part Six

Conclusion

CHAPTER 2

The question concerning the origin of ideas

 

1032. There is popular knowledge and philosophical knowledge, as St. Thomas himself carefully distinguishes.
I have demonstrated the relationship between popular knowledge and this work, which is only, and only wants to be, the development of a popular opinion (cf. 1 ss.)
Whenever I have had the opportunity, I have also tried to show the relationship of the work to philosophical knowledge. I have indicated the sound cognitions of philosophers who preceded me and have profited from their teachings. But to do them greater justice, I want to add a few more words.

1033. Many wise thinkers, mentioned in the course of this work, have glimpsed the importance of the idea of being in all its universality and its intimate union with our mind. In modern philosophy Malebranche was, I think, one of those who best saw this important truth:
The clear, intimate and necessary presence of ens, understood in a indeterminate way, of ens in general present to the human mind, acts more forcefully in the mind than the presence of all finite things offered to the mind, and can never be banished by the mind.(249)

It is extraordinary to see how this outstanding Cartesian was aware that thinking of ens is more essential to our spirit than thinking of ourselves. This truth, which Descartes himself did not see [App., no. 45], refutes the whole foundation of Cartesian philosophy. Malebranche adds:

 

Persons may indeed not think of themselves for some time, but I do not believe that anyone can for a single instant not think of ens. On the contrary, even when we believe we are not thinking of anything, we are filled with the indeterminate, general idea of ens.(250)

Moreover, Malebranche was not ignorant of the usual objection put by the uneducated and beginners in philosophy. Because they have reflected little on themselves, they easily say, 'If we thought ens continually, we would know it.' Malebranche gives the same answer as I, following the tradition of all antiquity. I showed that the objection arose from defective observation and from making one fact out of two very distinct facts of consciousness: 1. the act of our spirit; and 2 advertence to this act. Malebranche says the same immediately after the passage quoted above:

Things which are very familiar to us and of little importance do not vividly stimulate our mind or motivate its attention. The idea of ens, although great, vast and true, is extremely familiar to us and stimulates us so little that we think we do not perceive it. Hence we do not turn our spirit to it; we hardly believe it exists, we draw its origin solely from the extreme confusion of all special ideas, even though we perceive all particular entia in and through it alone.(251)

He was indeed very close to finding the thread in the extremely intricate labyrinth of ideas: unknowingly, he had it in his hand. However, instead of saying, with St. Thomas, that the idea of ens is a created light, he makes it God himself. This was his mistake. Up to this point he had maintained an acute observation of human nature, applying accurate logic. But now he abandoned his method and, with his imagination, traversed the immense space between creature and Creator. He had said that the idea of ens is vague and indeterminate and ens in general.(252) But the idea of God is not vague; God is infinite, not indeterminate. Finally, God is not being common to all things, much less being in general, but first, certain, complete being outside all genera. This distinction between ideal, universal being and subsistent being is a truth preserved in the deposit of Christian tradition which should have been known and not neglected by such a great man.

1034. Malebranche and his system were preceded in France by Tommassini. At the same time, an Italian, Fr. Giovenale dell'Anaunia (Val di Non) in the Italian Tyrol, was reflecting on these matters. This little-known but learned Capuchin(253) published a book written in Latin in which he proposed the very system which, coming from the elegant pen of Malebranche, had resounding effect in the world. And for the sake of truth, I must say that in comparison with Malebranche's work, Fr. Giovenale's presents a more widely developed and moderate teaching. He is not ignorant of, and does not avoid the difficulties I have mentioned relative to Malebranche's system. He limits and adapts the meaning of his expressions in such a way that they do not oppose the great tradition of Catholic truth. Following the path of the Fathers, he continually seeks to reconcile the teachings of St. Augustine on this matter with the sentiments of St. Thomas.

1035. Previous to these authors, the Platonists who flourished in Tuscany under the Medici had come to sense the importance of the idea of being hidden in the remnants of ancient philosophy. Marsilio Ficino, whom we can consider as their head, clearly teaches that the notion of ens is present in all human beings, and his explanation of this truth is worth noting: 'All human beings judge that one being is not at all, that another is in a more imperfect way and that another is in a less imperfect way' [App., no. 46]. The need of the idea of being for making a judgment is precisely the path I have followed to establish the co-created idea antecedent to all other ideas. However, Ficino does not take and develop this fertile thought. Instead he gives it the same importance as many other thoughts of lesser value. Moreover, Platonists generally fall into the confusion already mentioned between the idea of common being or being in potency and the idea of first, most actual being. They transform human reason into divine essence.

1036. The truths in question were not unknown to the Scholastics, and I have shown this by the many places I have quoted from these authors. But I think they failed to investigate the connection binding the truths they knew. Consequently they failed to give to the system concerning the origin of ideas all its necessary simplicity and clarity. For many, our first information comes from a hidden, obscure source or a source which at best they described vaguely and metaphorically, or else declared it a species of instinct. This is how Dante understood the Scholastic opinion, which he presented as follows:

 

Every substantial form distinct from matter,
but with matter united,
has within itself specific virtue
which when inactive is not felt
nor ever shows itself except by its effects,
as verdant leaf reveals life in the plant.
So too we do not know whence comes
our understanding of our first cognitions,
nor whence affection for what we first desire.
These things are to us
as instinct to the bee for honey-making,
- neither praised nor blamed.(254)

1037. This opinion that what we first know comes from an obscure source, from a blind instinct, from a law of human nature is the teaching finally taken up by the whole of modern philosophy, from Reid to Galluppi. Reid introduced a mysterious prompting on the part of nature; Kant, using the Scholastic expression, introduced some forms in nature itself. These two opinions were revived a short time ago in France where two opposing parties seem intent on profitting from the same principle of blind, instinctive faith as the source of all that we first know. Finally, in Italy, Galluppi astutely refuted the error of these philosophers but still called ideas of unity, identity, etc., 'subjective', as if they emerged and drew existence from the subject himself. But if what we first know is not totally independent of the subject, and has no objective existence, the whole of human knowledge is, in my opinion, shaken to its foundations. Certainty is no longer possible, and scepticism, an impossible system, is inevitable. There is surely only one way to lay a firm foundation for human knowledge and certainty: we must accept that our thoughts do have an object which is necessary, universal and independent of human beings and every creature. This is the theory that I have explained of the con-created idea of being .

 

Notes

(249) Bk. 3, c. 8

(250) Ibid. - This observation was made by the author of the Itinerarium, as we have seen.

(251) Ibid.

(252) St. Thomas and St. Bonaventura say very fittingly that God is not 'most common being', but 'supreme, absolute being'. We can easily see that Malebranche had received from his contemporaries a certain lack of esteem for the authors of this earlier period and, I would say, for authors before Descartes, with the exception of St. Augustine, on whom Descartes himself had drawn.

(253) His work was printed in Augsburg under the title 'Solis intelligentiae, cui non succedit nox, lumen indeficiens ac inexstinguibile illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum etc', per P. Juvenalem Anauniensem ord. Capuccinorum. Augustae Vindelicorum, Typis Simonis Uzschneideri reverendiss. ac altiss. Principis et Episcopi Augustani typographi, Anno MDCLXXXVI. It is interesting that Fr. Giovenale died in 1713, just a short time before Malebranche. His book could be the first seed of the teachings developed and illustrated later by the Reformed Minors Fathers Ercolano and Filibert. Further information regarding Fr. Giovenale can be found in Jacopo Tartarotti's Biblioteca Tirolese, enlarged by Todeschini and printed in Venice, 1733, and also in Count Francesco Barbacovi's Memorie storiche della Città e territorio di Trento, vol. 1.

(254) Purg. 18. -the image of the bee is taken from Arist. Metaph., bk. 1, c. 10.


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