New Essay Volume 3

Appendix 1. (1049)

[Self-deception about means for an end]

We know very little about ourselves, and are often deceived when passing judgment on things that concern ourselves. Those who think themselves the most free are often the most enslaved. Moments of enthusiasm must first pass before others can look back and examine the state of those who have preceded them. We often say we want to reach an end, but we should not believe that the means we choose must therefore lead to that end. We would frequently deceive ourselves if we believed that a good choice of means depended upon the end in view.

Philosophers are a fair example. If we read Berkeley, we find that he invented idealism for the sole purpose of refuting the many sceptics generated by the philosophy of Locke. But Locke himself had the same intention. The effect of idealism was simply to accelerate the progress towards scepticism. Reid, with the best of intentions, tried to halt this movement, and countered it with a system which generated critical philosophy, the most extreme scepticism that ever existed, the ultimate development and perfection of scepticism. Finally, Kant's intention in his teaching, according to his own words, was that of all his predecessors; to put paid to the sceptics, whom he calls 'a tribe of nomads who abhor all husbandry, and consistently destroy civil society' (Pref.). He then adds that there is no room for opinions in his teaching: 'I have already formed as a rule for myself that in this kind of investigation opinion is not legitimate; hypothesis must be avoided like the plague and denounced as soon as known' (ibid.). Nevertheless, after these promises and assertions, he wants to settle the matter with a massive equivocation: he admits some necessary knowledge but declares that the necessity is apparent and subjective. By this aside he destroys all knowledge and every possibility of knowledge. This last statement is certainly typical of a sophist, although I would not dare to scrutinise his intention. However, in the other philosophers mentioned above, whose upright intention is evident, I think we find a clear example of the truth we have mentioned: when we judge ourselves we often err, and only with difficulty do we know both where we stand and the real, final effect of our way of thinking.