New Essay Volume 3

Appendix 12. (1246)

[St. Thomas on the senses]

In volume 2 (cf. 749 ss.), I discussed some criteria concerning the veracity of the senses. Aquinas teaches the same. Here, it will be helpful to discuss one way St. Thomas has of expressing himself, which originates from Aristotle and could be the cause of confusion in the minds of those who have no real understanding of certain expressions now forgotten. He writes: Proprium obiectum intellectus est quod quid est: unde circa hoc non decipitur intellectus nisi per accidens. Circa compositionem autem et divisionem decipitur; sicut et sensus, QUI EST PROPRIORUM, EST SEMPER VERUS* , in aliis autem fallitur [The proper object of the intellect is that which something is. Hence the intellect is not deceived in this except per accidens. It is however deceived about composition and division, just as sense IN SO FAR AS IT IS CONCERNED WITH ITS OWN FEELING IS ALWAYS TRUE, but fails when dealing with the feeling of others] (C.G., 1, q. 58). Here, St. Thomas distinguishes two objects both of the intellect and of sense: the proper object (about which there can be no error) and the accidental object, about which both the understanding and the sense can be led into error. I want to clarify St. Thomas' meaning by explaining the nature of the accidental object of the intellect and sense. I begin with sense.

In his commentary on Aristotle's work on the soul, St. Thomas explains the phrase, 'accidental object': 'Sense does not deceive us when we see something white, but it can deceive us, especially from a distance, about the particular thing which is white - for example, snow or flour or something similar' (bk. 3, less. 6). Note: our sense sees white; the understanding judges whether the white seen by our eye is snow. The judgment is made by the understanding on the basis of what sense presents (whiteness). But because this judgment follows so rapidly the sensation of whiteness, the judgment seems to be intimately united with the sensation. Hence people generally and erroneously believe the judgment to be an object of sense. Thus, if we ask someone: 'Who told you that there is snow on the mountain?', he immediately replies: 'I saw it'. He does not stop to separate two things which, although closely united, are different, that is, 1. the sensation of whiteness, and 2. the judgment made by the understanding, arguing from the whiteness to the existence of the snow on the mountain, that is, from a sign to what is signified.

Even Aristotle did not wish to distance himself from this common but false way of speaking. He had such respect for ordinary language that at times he seemed superstitious about it, ready to accept its errors. He was satisfied to say that the judgment was an accidental object of sense in so far as sense supplied the matter and the judgment immediately followed she sensation. It would be better, however, to avoid this way of speaking and state clearly that the judgment is in no way an object of sense but simply an object of the understanding. This allows us to understand what the object of the intellect must be. Just as the object (properly speaking the term) of sense is the matter of our acts of knowledge, and the form is said to be its accidental object, so the real object of the intellect is the form of the acts of knowledge, and their matter is the accidental object. Hence the understanding, if it judges about sensible things without following sensible experience, falls into error. Finally, I observe that, according to Aristotle, sense sometimes, although rarely, deceives us even about its proper object, that is, in the case of defect in our sense. But I have excluded this exception by separating every foreign element from what is posited by sense.