SECTION EIGHT
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE BRANCHES
OF KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER 4
Must our starting point be a particular or a universal?
1473. By placing the idea of being at the beginning of all scientific knowledge, we are inevitably confronted by those who think that the infallible rule of correct method is to go from particulars to universals. I have to note first, however, that such criticism is based on a very serious error with which we are only too familiar nowadays: universals are taken as an aggregate of particulars. I have already refuted this error (cf. vol. 1, 138-155) Moreover, an investigation of the nature of particulars and universals will show that the method directing us to move from particulars to universals cannot be upheld in any way. It is intrinsically impossible and absurd; we cannot think a single particular without using a universal.(332)
1474. Another observation escaping the attention of those who make this criticism is that in affirming the idea of being as the obligatory starting point of philosophy, we are in the happy position of being able to defend two apparently contrary propositions, that is, 'We begin from a universal', and 'We begin from a particular'.
Anyone who understands the nature of the idea of being must realise that mental being is particular and universal at the same time, and that it is much more particular or individual than universal. In fact we have shown that a universal means nothing more than the relationship of likeness that one thing has with many. But before considering a thing in its relationship of likeness with many things, we must have considered or perceived it in itself, and hence in its singularity. The unity of the thing which, as we have said elsewhere, is identified with its existence, precedes the consideration of its universality. We can rightly affirm therefore that in beginning from being we start from a singular because it is singular in itself, although it is also a light diffused universally over all knowable things.
This reflection has special force applied to the idea of being. Ideal being is extremely simple, essentially one, the principle of unity in all things, and consequently not only singular of itself, but the fount of all true unity and singularity (cf. 1450 ss.).
Notes
(332) Cousin, in an excellent passage of his Lessons, shows with utter clarity that it is impossible for a historian of philosophy, and the same may be said for any historian of the human spirit such as a philosopher, to be faithful to the empirical method (cf. Lesson of May 8th 1829, pp. 10-17).