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THE PRINCIPLE
OF THE
DERIVATION OF RIGHTS

318. It seems to me that the time has come for writers not only to affirm what is true, but to present it more clearly by deducing one truth from another logically. Human understanding, which has generally developed in backward nations, is now set on a road from which it was for long excluded by ancient errors and traditional prejudices. Mankind, although crushed by its disastrous experiences, and consequently more mistrustful than ever of human knowledge, will rediscover its confidence if knowledge is clearly expressed through connected, logically justified ideas. Logical order is undoubtedly our best guarantee against error.

Error has in fact become more refined as mental application and sophistication have increased. The result is to arouse greater suspicion in human beings, all of whom are created for truth, and to make them insist on rigorous proofs with clear concepts and deductions. Indeed, once the human mind has savoured the beauty, efficacy and humanity of clear, distinct reasoning, it no longer accepts the burden of confused concepts, ambiguous assertions and incoherent language. Our age, like every other, has its faults, but it cannot be accused, thank God, of tolerating teachers who try to mask their ignorance behind a pretended monopoly of knowledge clothed in complex arguments and captious language.

Yes, it is indeed to be hoped that all things, human and divine, should be expressed sincerely, developed logically and accurately, and argued with precision from their simple principles. Many useless questions would then be omitted; many would change their nature and take other forms, and some would be settled as soon as stated. A little analysis introduced into discussion would put an end to the bitter debates between differing schools and other warring parties and authorities. The light of real certainty would return, agreement be reached, and presumption publicly rebutted.

319. In my own case, my sole intention is to express the little knowledge I have as best I can, and share it with others. I want to do this simply and logically, while aiming at consistent, although not necessarily conventional development; but I will not adopt the language of any particular school, nor attempt to speak ex cathedra. This has always been my practice, and the result is well-known vituperation and calumny. But such things pass, and truth, my great, ineffable consolation, remains. And if I have been blessed enough to have unlocked or indicated truth for others, the way to truth will remain open.

I intend to pursue more rigorously the method that I have constantly proclaimed. Conclusions will I hope be seen in the original light of evident principles, where their truth is best demonstrated. They come to birth, as it were, from the principles, and their legitimacy cannot be doubted.

320. But what we have said needs to be applied to the present book, in which we propose to demonstrate the method to be followed by philosophers in deriving from their supreme principle, in an orderly fashion, the rights of nature and reason which apply to mankind in its mutual relationships. The previous book on the ESSENCE of right will be of assistance to us here. In fact the derivation of particular rights cannot be carried out without knowledge of the essence of every right (this essence, in so far as it is known, was also called by us the notion of right). But granted the conclusions about the notion and definition of right which result from our long discusssion of the matter, we can now apply what we know in order to derive from the principle of right all the particular rights of which human beings are capable.

It is clear that the essence of right, which must be present in each and every particular, genuine right, is the sure rule with which to discern when a right has been posited and when it has not. We can express this rule, if we wish, as follows: `We judge that a right is present wherever we find the notion of right (which consists of the five elements we have indicated); in the absence of this notion, no right is present. This explains why we called the common notion of right `the supreme principle of the science of right. The essence of things contained in their notion is such that when an essence is known it always shows us which particular things participate in it and which do not.

321. But before applying the notion of right to different human activities in order to verify which activities acquire the moral dignity that makes them rights, it will be helpful if we follow the dictates of cautious logic in the long, difficult task of verifying individual human rights, and endeavour to find some reliable rules, some faithful stars, to guide us on our journey. We will be especially helped if there is a supreme rule, the first of all rules, which we could fittingly call the principle of the derivation of rights. In fact, the pyramidal form (composed of different propositions, the lowest being greater in number, the highest less), in which truth is always present for contemplation by human minds, makes the existence of this principle highly probable.

We have now reached the core of this book, which I have entitled `The principle of the derivation of rights because it deals with this principle alone.

Chapter 1